Hello! The following was my attempt last week to summarise all of our various keys in server descriptors, how they are formatted, and what they are used for, in the hopes that this is useful in alleviating possible future confusions for others. Let me know (and, more importantly! let Jake know since he's writing a Rust parser for bridge descriptors as part of the Bridge Bandwidth Scanner project) if I got anything wrong. :) ----- Forwarded message from isis agora lovecruft <isis@torproject.org> -----

From: isis agora lovecruft <isis@torproject.org> Subject: Re: Bridge Bandwidth Scanner Internship Date: Thu, 27 Jul 2017 19:52:47 +0000 Message-ID: <20170727195247.GI24882@patternsinthevoid.net> To: jnz@riseup.net Reply-To: isis@torproject.org Delivered-To: <isis+torproject@patternsinthevoid.net>

jnz@riseup.net transcribed 1.4K bytes:

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Hey Isis,

I have started the sanitization spec and the parser. A lot of the stuff I had to learn for the two overlaps, so I am working on them simultaneously. Conceptually, I understand the sanitization process, but I am a little bit confused about what some of the fields are in the descriptors.

Q1. What exactly is the difference between "master-key", "identity-key", and "signing-key"?

After reading through the descriptor spec, cert spec, and other docs, I am pretty confused on what each of the above means.I'm using the Nom crate for the parser, I've never used it before but so far I'm really liking it. Have you ever used it?

This is specified (not all that well, imho) in dir-spec.txt… it's really confusing.

For versions of tor new enough to have prop#220 and prop#228 (>0.2.7.2-alpha):

- "identity-ed25519" is a certificate containing a base64-encoded ed25519 key. The bridge uses this to authenticate to clients.

- "master-key-ed25519" is the ed25519 key which is in the "identity-ed25519" certificate.

- "onion-key" is an RSA-1024 key, encoded as a PKCS#1 RSAPublicKey structure, encoded in base64, and wrapped in "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----" and "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----". This key is used to encrypt CREATE cells to in the older TAP handshake protocol. (TAP is almost entirely unused on the network, last I checked. We'll likely be removing "onion-key"s in the next year or so, after we EOL some old tor versions.)

- "ntor-onion-key" is a public curve25519 key, base64-encoded. This is used in the newer NTor handshake protocol, which replaced TAP. It is still quite common to see routers which have both an "onion-key" and an "ntor-onion-key".

- "signing-key" is the same type and format as "onion-key" above, but it's used as a long-term identity key, for authenticating the bridge to clients. (Similar to "identity-ed25519" just with RSA signatures.)

- "router-sig-ed255519" is a only present iff "identity-ed25519" is present, and it's an ed25519 signature of a SHA-256 digest of the "entire" descriptor (Minus the "@purpose bridge" header since the Bridge Authority is the one who adds that. So from "router " on the first line up to and including the first space after "router-sig-ed25519".) This "entire" descriptor is first prefixed with the string "Tor router descriptor signature v1" before hashing and signing. After the signature is produced, it is encoded in base64 and the trailing "="s are removed.

- "router-signature" contains a signature of the PKCS#1-padded SHA-1 digest of the "entire" server descriptor, taken from the beginning of the "router" line (skipping "@purpose bridge" again), through (and including) the newline after the "router-signature" line. The signature is made with the router's "signing-key" (a.k.a. identity key).

For older tor versions (without prop220 and/or prop228):

- They will have "onion-key", "ntor-onion-key", "signing-key", and "router-signature", as above.

I've attached a tarball of today's descriptors for this bridge from the public/default bridges in Tor Browser:

https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/FEC8FB380DABA9D3C80790B634E4540BF5D09C...

Let me know if you want some more examples! I only grabbed one because they are pretty annoying to pull out of the giant, unordered, undeduplicated files the BridgeAuth produces (at least without writing a full parser).

Also lmk if you have more questions, the entangled ball of crypto junk we shove into descriptors is pretty confusing.

[…snip…] ----- End forwarded message ----- Best regards, -- ♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft _________________________________________________________ OpenPGP: 4096R/0A6A58A14B5946ABDE18E207A3ADB67A2CDB8B35 Current Keys: https://fyb.patternsinthevoid.net/isis.txt