Hi,

I am currently working on a personal project implementing an onion-router, vaguely similar to Tor (let's just call it Oor, other onion router, for the moment), and I have a few questions about attacks, which I think are not really protected by Tor, and whether my solution could possibly work. Of course, if Tor defends against such attacks, then please enlighten me.

- Traffic volume correlation. Tor's FAQ says that it doesn't plan on defending against an adversary monitoring traffic volumes flowing through the Tor network. Oor tries to protect against this attack by: - Obfuscating every single link with a protocol derived by Tor's obfs3 protocol - No public list of all node addresses; this makes determining whether certain traffic is Oor traffic much harder. More at the next bulletpoint - Splitting each circuit (termed "onion stew") into many subcircuits, all terminating at the same exit node. à la multipath TCP. Cells going through the subcircuits have a randomly-determined *uneven *distribution of choice of subcircuit, barring attackers from deducing total traffic from observing one subcircuit. - Blanket blacklist attacks by censors. Censors can poll the directory and block all ordinary Tor nodes. (obfsproxy) bridges are a workaround. - Oor's directory maintains a *graph* of all nodes. Each node knows the public keys of all the other nodes, but each node only knows the addresses of *adjacent* nodes. - Note that this allows (sub)circuit-building along any path in the graph. The "extend circuit" command takes the next node's public key as the parameter, rather than the address. - This reduces the bootstrapping problem to distributing (an alias of) the directory server address. Unlike with Tor bridges, this does not create a bandwidth bottleneck, and no nodes need to be reserved for a special pool of bridges, unable to be used by usual users. Bridges often go offline, but this would work until the alias is blocked. However, as with Tor bridges, things like e-mail can be used to distribute many dynamically-generated aliases of the directory server. - Protocol recognition. In "free" countries like the US of A, Tor users see no pressure to use obfuscated bridges. Tor traffic is rather easily distinguished, and could be used to form suspicion on people. Even with obfsproxy, Tor's constant 512-byte cell length may be an issue. The "Stegotorus" paper presents a filter that finds cell lengths typical of Tor. - Every link is obfuscated in oor with obfs3. - obfs3 happens to create various cell lengths. This would be a problem for Tor-like circuits because it doesn't hide data sizes at all, but I think that breaking circuits into subcircuits solves this problem.

There is a not-really-working but readable PoC implementation of everything except the "onion stewing" part, i.e. circuits can only work with one subcircuit, athttps://github.com/quantum1423/kirisurf-dev/

Current work is underway to rewrite a more robust version with various repos at https://github.com/KirisurfProject/

(yes, it is currently called Kirisurf, oor is just for short previously, and I want to change the kirisurf name anyways. You may find a "kirisurf" on sourceforge. That is a simple one-hop encrypted proxy I made a long time ago just for breaking censorship without privacy protection; Kirisurf gradually grew onion-routing things until I decided to redesign it; namechange probably needed to prevent misleading version numbers)

I would be interested to know what research has been done on these areas in Tor (to avoid reinventing the wheel), and whether any of my ideas are novel.

Thanks!