On 2012-03-18 13:57 , Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) wrote:
On 3/18/12 1:09 PM, Jeroen Massar wrote:
On 18 Mar 2012, at 12:46, "Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)" lists@infosecurity.ch wrote:
- Security issue
Looking at the server seizure threat scenario, who seize the computer running TorHS will be able to know the identity of the TorHS itself by looking at the "hostname" file
Why not simply use Full Disk Encryption or similar to protect all the data files, hat avoids a compromise for any file on the system, heck if hey turn the box off they can't even see there is Tor on it at all. also heavily note that the actual content served is likely much more valuable and you will want to protect that too.
Yes, but any application that store "sensitive data" like keys should provide an integrated way to protect such sensitive data.
Think about the "keychain" of PGP, or keychain of Firefox for digital certificate, etc, etc
All major applications that need to handle "keys" support a built-in feature to provide different degree of protection for such "keys".
And you want to add another one that has to be separately managed? :)
As I mentioned btw, the Tor keys are not that valuable, the content that sits behind it is though. And if you are doing it right you are actually sending TLS/SSL/SSH through the tunnel instead of clear text.
So the idea is to "aggregate" the TorHS related "sensitive information" and apply a protection schema with a "keychain" providing some security feature.
Which is perfectly done by simply crypting the partition/disk the data is stored on, which additionally will resolve quite a few other attacks too. And the attack vectors that are left open with these is much better understood too.
Note that if you just use non-encrypted storage there is a big chance that the 'old' file is still present on the file system which can give away quite a few details already.
Greets, Jeroen