26 Apr
2018
26 Apr
'18
10:16 p.m.
On 25 Apr 2018, at 18:30, Mike Perry mikeperry@torproject.org wrote:
- Hidden service use can't push you over to an unused guard (at all).
- Hidden service use can't influence your choice of guard (at all).
- Exits and websites can't push you over to an unused guard (at all)
- DoS/Guard node downtime signals are rare (absent)
- Nodes are not reused for Guard and Exit positions ("any" positions)
- Information about the guard(s) does not leak to the website/RP (at all).
- Relays in the same family can't be forced to correlate Exit traffic.
I think this list is missing some important user-visible properties, or it's not clear which property above corresponds to these properties:
* Is Tor reliable and responsive when guards go down, or when I move networks, or when I have lost and regained service?
I also think it's missing an implicit property, which we should make explicit:
* Can Tor users be fingerprinted by their set of guards or directory guards?
Perhaps this property is out of scope.
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