11.07.2014 14:31, Ian Goldberg:
On Fri, Jul 11, 2014 at 01:44:36PM +0300, George Kadianakis wrote:
Hey Nick,
this mail is about the schemes we were discussing during the dev meeting on how to protect HSes against guard discovery attacks (#9001). (...)
HS stands for hidden-service, if I'm not mistaking.
And similarly at the exit node: the exit will now know that circuits coming from the same middle are more likely to be the same client. That's a little more worrying to me than the above.
If the proposed change applies to hidden-services alone, "regular" usage of Tor (Client > Guard > Middle > Exit > Destination) is not affected.
My reading was that the middle node for hidden-service connections are kept longer.
Could anyone please clarify the proposed change?
Regards, Sebastian G.