re: grarpamp
I am writing a possible countermeasure which uses transactional requests. You submit entire requests which are processed by the exit node. Several other situations can take place while routing to the exit node. It would also only require exit nodes to have updated to the newer feature.
I'll post as soon as I'm finished..
Thanks, Mike Guidry
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This appears to describe an active network modulation attack (node DoS). Either hammer tree on nodes of the expected path and trace the modulation, or on all but the expected path to find unmodulated. It generally requires GPA, deploying nodes, or being one end of the path... in order to observe the results. And it's old news. As noted before, since Tor (and all other current anonymous overlays) nodes do not perform their own independant buffering, reclocking and contracting for expected hop parameters... this vulnerability will remain.
Anyone wanting to research, code, deploy, and present on such countermeasures would certainly be welcomed.