Re: [tor-dev] proposal 240: Early signing key revocation for directory authorities.

On Sun, Jan 11, 2015 at 4:23 AM, Peter Palfrader weasel@torproject.org wrote:

On Sat, 10 Jan 2015, Nick Mathewson wrote:

...

This proposal describes a simple way for directory authorities to perform signing key revocation.

2. Specification

   We add the following lines to the authority signing certificate format:

   revoked-signing-key SP algname SP FINGERPRINT NL

Why not implictly revoke any previous signing key when we see a new, valid signing key certificate with a later published timestamp?

It would appear to be simpler and require less state.

My main worry there is that it's possible to accidentally publish a certificate in the far future. If we can prevent that from ever happening, then we can probably just do what you suggest. Any thoughts?