On 8 December 2017 at 09:06, George Kadianakis desnacked@riseup.net wrote:
As discussed in this mailing list and in IRC, I'm posting a subsequent version of this proposal. Basic improvements:
- Uses a new custom HTTP header, instead of Alt-Svc or Location.
- Does not do auto-redirect; it instead suggests the onion based on antonella's mockup: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/21952/21952.png
======================================================================== UX improvement proposal: Onion redirects using Onion-Location HTTP header ========================================================================
Motivation:
Lots of high-profile websites have onion addresses these days (e.g. Tor , NYT, blockchain, ProPublica). All those websites seem confused on what's the right way to inform their users about their onion addresses. Here are some confusion examples: a) torproject.org does not even advertise their onion address to Tor users (!!!) b) blockchain.info throws an ugly ASCII page to Tor users mentioning their onion address and completely wrecking the UX (loses URL params, etc.) c) ProPublica has a "Browse via Tor" section which redirects to the onion site.
Ideally there would be a consistent way for websites to inform their users about their onion counterpart. This would provide the following positives:
- Tor users would use onions more often. That's important for user education and user perception, and also to partially dispell the darkweb myth.
- Website operators wouldn't have to come up with ad-hoc ways to advertise their onion services, which sometimes results in complete breakage of the user experience (particularly with blockchain)
This proposal specifies a simple way forward here that's far from perfect, but can still provide benefits and also improve user-education around onions so that in the future we could employ more advanced techniques.
Also see Tor ticket #21952 for more discussion on this: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/21952
Proposal
We introduce a new HTTP header called "Onion-Location" with the exact same restrictions and semantics as the Location HTTP header.
For reference, this is https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7231#section-7.1.2
Websites can use the Onion-Location HTTP header to specify their onion counterpart, in the same way that they would use the Location header.
The Tor Browser intercepts the Onion-Location header (if any) and informs the user of the existense of the onion site, giving them the option to visit it. Tor Browser only does so if the header is served over HTTPS.
Browsers that don't support Tor SHOULD ignore the Onion-Location header.
Improvements
Drawbacks
4.1. No security/performance benefits
While we could come up with onion redirection proposals that provide security and performance benefits, this proposal does not actually provide any of those.
As a matter of fact, the security remains the same as connecting to normal websites (since we trust its HTTP headers), and the performance gets worse since we first need to connect to the website, get its headers, and then also connect to the onion.
I would specifically call out that the user has provided any identifying information (cookies) that may be present, as well as opened themselves to any possible browser-based attack vector served by the target domain.
Still _all_ the website approaches mentioned in the "Motivation" section suffer from the above drawbacks, and sysadmins still come up with ad-hoc ways to inform users abou their onions. So this simple proposal will still help those websites and also pave the way forward for future auto-redirect techniques.
4.2. Defining new HTTP headers is not the best idea
This proposal defines a new non-standard HTTP header. This is not great because it makes Tor into a "special" thing that needs to be supported with special headers. However, the fact that it's a new HTTP header that only works for Tor is a positive thing since it means that non-Tor browsers will just ignore it.
Furthermore, another drawback is that this HTTP header will increase the bandwidth needlessly if it's also served to non-Tor clients. Hence websites with lots of client traffic are encouraged to use tools that detect Tor users and only serve the header to them (e.g. tordnsel).
I would talk about how users could experience false positives and false negatives if this mechanism is used.
I think it is also worth addressing that this does not stop sysadmins from (trying to) detect tor users, and send the onion address in the Location header, thus triggering a non-prompting redirect. But that they should consider the potential user confusion of being redirected to an odd looking domain in such a scenario. And state that this mechanism is designed to provide a browser-supported option to consistently offer an onion service in a hopefully less-confusing way.
-tom
The future
As previously discussed, this is just a simple proposal to introduce the redirection concept to people, and also to help some sysadmins who are currently coming up with weird ways to inform people about their onions. It's not the best way to do this, but it's definitely one of the simplest ways.
In the future we could implement with more advanced auto-redirect proposals like:
a) Have a "domains to onions" map into HTTPS-everywhere and have it do the autoredirects for us (performance benefits, and security benefits under many threat models).
b) Bake onion addresses into SSL certificates and Let's Encrypt as suggested by comment:42 in #21952.
But both of the designs above require non-trivial engineering/policy work and would still confuse people. So I think starting with a simple approach that will educate users and then moving to more advanced designs is a more normative way to go.
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