On 5 Nov. 2016, at 11:26, Patrick Schleizer <patrick-mailinglists@whonix.org> wrote:
Thank you for your answers!
teor:
* Caching of DNS, HS descriptors, preemptive circuits, etc.
Can you please elaborate on 'etc.'?
I am asking because stream isolation for DNS already has a ticket: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/20555
HS cache isolation also has a ticket: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15938
Looks like preemptive circuits isolation does not have a ticket yet.
Preemptive circuits aren't a caching mechanism, and can't really be isolated in the way you think - circuits are isolated by existing mechanisms, but this is likely not enough to defend against hostile clients sharing an instance. Isolation is a defence against the remote end, not the client end.
If you could please elaborate on 'etc.' we might be able to complete the stack of missing tickets.
Circuit cannibalisation (yet another thing that can't be isolated) SSL state Guard state Consensus availability and content Descriptor availability and content Connectivity (or lack thereof) Uptime ControlPort config information ControlPort config changes And many more. The supported way to isolate many of these things is to run a separate Tor instance, preferably on a separate machine on a separate network. We don't even recommend running a SOCKS client and a hidden service on the same instance. T -- Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com PGP C855 6CED 5D90 A0C5 29F6 4D43 450C BA7F 968F 094B ricochet:ekmygaiu4rzgsk6n xmpp: teor at torproject dot org ------------------------------------------------------------------------------