On Fri, 4 Sep 2015 15:31:15 -0600 John Brooks <john.brooks@dereferenced.net> wrote: [snip]
Have you considered all the implications?
Maybe we’ve missed some - what implications are you thinking of, that aren’t addressed in the proposal?
I have two objections to this, one political, one technical: * (The political objection) While this is "cool" and probably(?) "funded", it seems like a poor thing to work on in terms of developmental priority when there are other things Hidden Service related that need a lot of developer attention, primarily in making the existing HSes more resilient against Nation State level adversaries (Eg: Prop. 224). * (The technical objection) It is overly easy for assholes[0] to censor Single Onion Services due to: it’s possible for the previous relay to guess the service you’re connecting to While such a censor would only be able to deny service to clients as a fraction of their relay(s) consensus weight, it's still something that probably should get consideration. Regards, -- Yawning Angel [0]:https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-July/007167.html