30 Sep
2013
30 Sep
'13
11:07 a.m.
On 2013-09-30 13:01 , Ian Goldberg wrote:
On Mon, Sep 30, 2013 at 01:03:14AM -0700, Rohit wrote:
This should satisfy most goals.
- A passive attacker wouldn't be able to distinguish between HTTPS->HTTPS traffic and Tor->Bridge. (Both use TLS)
This seems false to me; it's not too hard to distinguish Tor-over-TLS from HTTP-over-TLS, right?
Mostly indeed as Tor will typically have long-lasting connections.
The primary advantage of such a setup is that a probe can't distinguish anymore between a real webserver on port 443 or Tor.
The moment an adversary looks at flow-lengths/times/byte-counts/packet-timing-variances for a host it could easily catch on that this is not a normal webserver though.
Fortunately long-lasting HTTPS flows are not that uncommon in todays Internet.
Greets, Jeroen