Andrea Shepard:
On Sun, May 05, 2013 at 10:40:52AM +0000, Nima wrote:
Iran is actively dropping connections to *any* unknown port right after *60secs*. Pluggable Transport successfully connects to Tor network, Although it can not make a circuit in many ISPs including "Mobin".
-- Nima 0x1C92A77B
"I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it" --Evelyn Beatrice Hall
Hmmm... what does it behave like during those 60 seconds? Is it throttled, or can we get data through by cycling through a series of fresh TCP connections?
What does it do with UDP packets?
Same thing. they target both TCP and UDP packets.
Could a datagram-based protocol defeat
this? If they're interfering there, what about using TCP-looking packets to fake it? I.e., send SYNs with the data we really want to get through in the body and let them waste resources on their routers tracking connections that don't even really exist.
I'd love to know this, but so far I haven't had a chance to get my hands on that network.
We might be able to do something creative tho! More than 30 ppl have sent queries to Tor Farsi help desk. Most of them are willing to help. Maybe we should write a very tiny small program, which will run few tests and write results in a log file. So we can give it to our volunteers inside Iran to run it and send us the result.
Maybe OONI ppl can help with that?