-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 On 02/13/2014 11:43 AM, Zack Weinberg wrote:
(Four hops is what I2P uses, with two chosen entirely by the client and two entirely by the server; but there appears to be nothing to guarantee that a malicious peer can't connect directly to its counterparty's two-hop chain, sacrificing some of its own anonymity but getting closerfor a while now to the counterparty. I did just argue that that shouldn't matter, though...)
Just FTR, since 0.9.7.1 I2P defaults to 3 hops for "client" tunnels (so default of 6 hops end-to-end, and 12 hops round-trip). And yes, there is nothing stopping a malicious peer building zero-hop tunnels (acting as its own Outbound Endpoint/Inbound Gateway), just as honest clients or servers can choose to use zero-hop tunnels (e.g. a website or IRC network that requires no anonymity of its own, but wants its users to benefit). str4d
zw
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