On 2012-03-17 10:52 , Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) wrote: [..]
That way even in case of seizure of the server running the Tor HS it would not be possible to who seized the Tor HS Server to do actively Impersonation attacks of the Tor HS.
If you want to protect these files, use proper full disk crypto, that will solve all your data issues up to that level, eg somebody taking the disk and trying to attack it from that perspective. Do note that not all FDEs are actually truly secure... and it all depends on what one is protecting against.
If one can get access to a running installation so that they can retrieve/access the file you store your keys in you have lost more than just your identity, they can then also subvert the machine by changing binaries on the system, inserting code into running processes etc etc or just monitoring the thing, likely with the data that goes inside the tunnel.
Another way to solve this is to do SSL/TLS/SSH inside the Tor connection and use that for authentication of client and server, which is probably the best thing you can do to protect your data, as the legs between your client and the Tor instance and the remote HS Tor instance and the app are not 'protected' by the layer that Tor provides oh and those legs are perfectly inspectable with tcpdump.
Greets, Jeroen