Hello Katharina,
Sounds like a great project. I have a couple of suggestions: 1. Consider how to use mixing to anonymize Tor’s name resolution system. Currently, clients connect to onion service by first resolving the onion address (e.g. xyzblah.onion) to a descriptor using a distributed hash table. That hash table can easily be infiltrated by an adversary running relays, and if the adversary also controls a client’s guard they can deanonymize the client during the lookup. This is the attack that the CMU/CERT researchers performed [0] as well as Biryukov et al. [1]. Onion-service descriptors are very small, and so it seems to me that mixing could be applied here to defeat deanonymization. 2. Read the alpha-mixing paper [2], which first described how high-latency and low-latency traffic might be mixed together.
Good luck!
Aaron
[0] <https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/felten/why-were-cert-researchers-attackin... https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/felten/why-were-cert-researchers-attacking-tor/> [1] Alex Biryukov, Ivan Pustogarov, Fabrice Thill, Ralf-Philipp Weinmann; "Content and popularity analysis of Tor hidden services”; IEEE 34th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems Workshops; 2014; <http://arxiv.org/abs/1308.6768 http://arxiv.org/abs/1308.6768>. [2] Roger Dingledine, Andrei Serjantov, and Paul Syverson; "Blending Different Latency Traffic with Alpha-Mixing”; In the Proceedings of the Sixth Workshop on Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PET 2006); 2006; <http://freehaven.net/doc/alpha-mixing/alpha-mixing.pdf http://freehaven.net/doc/alpha-mixing/alpha-mixing.pdf>.
On Feb 22, 2016, at 9:11 AM, Katharina Kohls katharina.kohls@rub.de wrote:
Hi everyone,
we are a team of 4 PHD students in the field of IT security, working at the Ruhr-University Bochum at the chair for systems security and the information security group.
Currently we work on a research project with the goal to leverage the security of Tor against timing attacks by integrating mixes in Tor nodes. The general idea is to differentiate high-latency and low-latency traffic among the network for applying additional delays to the former type of packets. Based on this the success of traffic analysis attacks should be decreased without restricting the low latency assurance of Tor.
We plan to integrate the mix into Tor version 0.2.5.10 and analyze its performance along with the Shadow simulator.
As there are a lot of details to consider, both regarding the technical aspects of the integration as well as practical assumptions, e.g., "how do we get DiffServ-like nodes?", we would be pleased to receive some feedback on the idea and support for the implementation of the mix. Further details on the mix and stuff will sure be provided if needed!
Cheers, Katharina -- M.Sc. Katharina Kohls
Ruhr-University Bochum Research Group Information Security Universitätsstrasse 150 ID 2/123 44780 Bochum / Germany
Phone: +49 234 / 32 - 26991 Web: www.infsec.rub.de _______________________________________________ tor-dev mailing list tor-dev@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev