On 23 Feb 2016, at 01:11, Katharina Kohls katharina.kohls@rub.de wrote:
Hi everyone,
we are a team of 4 PHD students in the field of IT security, working at the Ruhr-University Bochum at the chair for systems security and the information security group.
Currently we work on a research project with the goal to leverage the security of Tor against timing attacks by integrating mixes in Tor nodes. The general idea is to differentiate high-latency and low-latency traffic among the network for applying additional delays to the former type of packets. Based on this the success of traffic analysis attacks should be decreased without restricting the low latency assurance of Tor.
Does differentiating traffic into multiple timing classes make traffic timing analysis easier? (For example, while high-latency traffic is better protected from fingerprinting, low-latency traffic is easier to identify and fingerprint.)
We plan to integrate the mix into Tor version 0.2.5.10 and analyze its performance along with the Shadow simulator.
The latest stable release is Tor 0.2.7.6.
As there are a lot of details to consider, both regarding the technical aspects of the integration as well as practical assumptions, e.g., "how do we get DiffServ-like nodes?", we would be pleased to receive some feedback on the idea and support for the implementation of the mix. Further details on the mix and stuff will sure be provided if needed!
Tim
Tim Wilson-Brown (teor)
teor2345 at gmail dot com PGP 968F094B
teor at blah dot im OTR CAD08081 9755866D 89E2A06F E3558B7F B5A9D14F