Author: mttp Date: 2013-12-12 22:46:22 +0000 (Thu, 12 Dec 2013) New Revision: 26476

Modified: website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml Log: Created a new FAQ entry about VPNs. Fixed an anchor.

Modified: website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml =================================================================== --- website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml 2013-12-12 15:06:35 UTC (rev 26475) +++ website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml 2013-12-12 22:46:22 UTC (rev 26476) @@ -177,6 +177,9 @@ </a></li> <li><a href="#RemotePhysicalDeviceFingerprinting">Does Tor resist "remote physical device fingerprinting"?</a></li> + <li><a href="#VPN">What's safer, Tor or a VPN?</a></li> + <li><a href="#Proxychains">Aren't 10 proxies (proxychains) better than + Tor with only 3 hops?</a></li> <li><a href="#AttacksOnOnionRouting">What attacks remain against onion routing?</a></li> </ul> @@ -3170,6 +3173,47 @@

<hr>

+ <a id="VPN"></a> + <h3><a class="anchor" href="#VPN">What's safer, Tor or a VPN?</a></h3> + + <p> + Some people use Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) as a privacy solution. + VPNs encrypt the traffic between the user and the VPN provider, + and they can act as a proxy between a user and an online destination. + However, VPNs have a single point of failure: the VPN provider. + A technically proficient attacker or a number of employees could + retrieve the full identity information associated with a VPN user. + It is also possible to use coercion or other means to convince a + VPN provider to reveal their users' identities. Identities can be + discovered by following a money trail (using Bitcoin does not solve + this problem because Bitcoin is not anonymous), or by persuading the + VPN provider to hand over logs. Even + if a VPN provider says they don't keep logs, users have to take their + word for it---and trust that the VPN provider won't buckle to outside + pressures that might want them to start keeping logs. + </p> + + <p> + When you use a VPN, websites can still build up a persistent profile of + your usage over time. Even though sites you visit won't automatically + get your originating IP address, they still know how to profile you + based on your browsing history. + </p> + + <p> + When you use Tor the IP address you connect to changes at most every 10 + minutes, and often more frequently than that. This makes it extremely + dificult for websites to create any sort of persistent profile of Tor + users (assuming you did not <a + href="https://torproject.org/download/download.html.en#warning%22%3Eidentify + yourself in other ways</a>). No one Tor relay can know enough + information to compromise any Tor user because of Tor's <a + href="https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en#thesolution%22%3Eencrypted + three-hop circuit</a> design. + </p> + + <hr> + <a id="Proxychains"></a> <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Proxychains">Aren't 10 proxies (proxychains) better than Tor with only 3 hops?</a></h3> @@ -3178,10 +3222,10 @@ Proxychains is a program that sends your traffic through a series of open web proxies that you supply before sending it on to your final destination. <a href="#KeyManagement">Unlike Tor</a>, proxychains - does not encrypt the connections between each proxy. An open proxy - that wanted to monitor your connection can see all the other proxy + does not encrypt the connections between each proxy server. An open proxy + that wanted to monitor your connection could see all the other proxy servers you wanted to use between itself and your final destination, - as well as the IP address that proxy hop receives traffic from. + as well as the IP address that proxy hop received traffic from. </p> <p> Because the <a @@ -3192,7 +3236,7 @@ <p> While Tor relays are run by volunteers and checked periodically for suspicious behavior, many open proxies that can be found with a search - engine are worm-compromised machines, misconfigured private proxies + engine are compromised machines, misconfigured private proxies not intended for public use, or honeypots set up to exploit users. </p>