Author: mttp Date: 2014-03-17 17:12:08 +0000 (Mon, 17 Mar 2014) New Revision: 26654 Modified: website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml Log: Removed IPv6 FAQ entry, which is confusing visitors (#10990) Modified: website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml =================================================================== --- website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml 2014-03-17 09:29:47 UTC (rev 26653) +++ website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml 2014-03-17 17:12:08 UTC (rev 26654) @@ -296,7 +296,6 @@ </a></li> <li><a href="#Steganography">You should use steganography to hide Tor traffic.</a></li> - <li><a href="#IPv6">Tor should support IPv6.</a></li> </ul> <p>Abuse:</p> @@ -4789,39 +4788,6 @@ <hr> - <a id="IPv6"></a> - <h3><a class="anchor" href="#IPv6">Tor should support IPv6.</a></h3> - - <p> - That's a great idea! There are two aspects for IPv6 support that Tor needs. - First, Tor needs to support exit to hosts that only have IPv6 addresses. - Second, Tor needs to support Tor relays that only have IPv6 addresses. - </p> - <p> - The first is far easier: the protocol changes are relatively simple and - isolated. It would be like another kind of exit policy. - </p> - <p> - The second is a little harder: right now, we assume that (mostly) every - Tor relay can connect to every other. This has problems of its own, and - adding IPv6-address-only relays adds problems too: it means that only - relays with IPv6 abilities can connect to IPv6-address-only relays. This - makes it possible for the attacker to make some inferences about client - paths that it would not be able to make otherwise. - </p> - <p> - There is an <a - href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/blob/HEAD:/doc/spec/proposals/117-ipv6-exits.txt"> - IPv6 exit proposal</a> to address the first step for anonymous access to - IPv6 resources on the Internet. - </p> - <p> - Full IPv6 support is definitely on our "someday" list; it will come along - faster if somebody who wants it does some of the work. - </p> - - <hr> - <a id="Abuse"></a> <h2><a class="anchor">Abuse:</a></h2>