commit 5ce6cbbb5f6b2e9f40ccecea0029c82e3fdea61c Author: Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org> Date: Mon Aug 13 16:11:46 2012 -0400 trivial fixes from earlier readings --- .../190-shared-secret-bridge-authorization.txt | 8 ++++---- proposals/191-mitm-bridge-detection-resistance.txt | 14 +++++++------- proposals/203-https-frontend.txt | 4 ++-- proposals/ideas/xxx-port-knocking.txt | 2 +- 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/proposals/190-shared-secret-bridge-authorization.txt b/proposals/190-shared-secret-bridge-authorization.txt index 8683652..e3c2f79 100644 --- a/proposals/190-shared-secret-bridge-authorization.txt +++ b/proposals/190-shared-secret-bridge-authorization.txt @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ Status: Needs-Revision 1. Overview Proposals 187 and 189 introduced AUTHORIZE and AUTHORIZED cells. - Their purpose is to make bridge relays scanning resistant against + Their purpose is to make bridge relays scanning-resistant against censoring adversaries capable of probing hosts to observe whether they speak the Tor protocol. @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ Status: Needs-Revision generating 10 octets of random data using a strong RNG or PRNG. Tor bridge implementations MUST store the shared secret in - 'DataDirectory/keys/bridge_auth_ss_key' in hexademical encoding. + 'DataDirectory/keys/bridge_auth_ss_key' in hexadecimal encoding. Tor bridge implementations MUST support the boolean 'BridgeRequireClientSharedSecretAuthorization' configuration file @@ -73,9 +73,9 @@ Status: Needs-Revision Tor client implementations must extend their Bridge line format to support bridge shared secrets. The new format is: - Bridge <method> <address:port> [["keyid="]<id-fingerprint>] ["shared_secret="<shared_secret>] + Bridge [<method>] <address[:port]> [["keyid="]<id-fingerprint>] ["shared_secret="<shared_secret>] - where <shared_secret> is the bridge shared secret in hexademical + where <shared_secret> is the bridge shared secret in hexadecimal encoding. Tor clients who use bridges with shared-secret-based client diff --git a/proposals/191-mitm-bridge-detection-resistance.txt b/proposals/191-mitm-bridge-detection-resistance.txt index 013d76c..5e9848e 100644 --- a/proposals/191-mitm-bridge-detection-resistance.txt +++ b/proposals/191-mitm-bridge-detection-resistance.txt @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ Status: Open proposals is that of an adversary capable of performing Man In The Middle attacks to Tor clients. At the moment, Tor clients using the v3 link protocol have no way to detect such an MITM attack, and - will gladly send an VERSIONS or an AUTHORIZE cell to the MITMed + will gladly send a VERSIONS or AUTHORIZE cell to the MITMed connection, thereby revealing the Tor protocol and thus the bridge. This proposal introduces a way for clients to detect an MITMed SSL @@ -27,8 +27,8 @@ Status: Open certificate and the client blindly accepting it. This allows the adversary to perform an MITM attack. - A Tor client must detect the MITM attack before he initializes the - Tor protocol by sending a VERSIONS or an AUTHORIZE cell. A good + A Tor client must detect the MITM attack before he initiates the + Tor protocol by sending a VERSIONS or AUTHORIZE cell. A good moment to detect such an MITM attack is during the SSL handshake. To achieve that, bridge operators provide their bridge users with a @@ -46,13 +46,13 @@ Status: Open 3. Security implications Bridge clients who have pinned a bridge to a certificate - fingerprint will be able to detect an MITMing adversary in timely - fashion. If after detection they act as an innocuous Internet + fingerprint will be able to detect an MITMing adversary in time. + If after detection they act as an innocuous Internet client, they can successfully remove suspicion from the SSL connection and subvert bridge detection. Pinning a certificate fingerprint and detecting an MITMing attacker - does not automatically aleviate suspicions from the bridge or the + does not automatically alleviate suspicions from the bridge or the client. Clients must have a behavior to follow after detecting the MITM attack so that they look like innocent Netizens. This proposal does not try to specify such a behavior. @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ Status: Open Tor bridge implementations SHOULD provide a command line option that exports a fully equipped Bridge line containing the bridge - address and port, the link certificate fingerprint and any other + address and port, the link certificate fingerprint, and any other enabled Bridge options, so that bridge operators can easily send it to their users. diff --git a/proposals/203-https-frontend.txt b/proposals/203-https-frontend.txt index 8d3c2e3..26101b3 100644 --- a/proposals/203-https-frontend.txt +++ b/proposals/203-https-frontend.txt @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ Goals and requirements: HTTPS client talking to an HTTPS server. We should make it impossible for an active attacker talking to the - server to tell a Tor bridge server from regular HTTPS server. + server to tell a Tor bridge server from a regular HTTPS server. We should make it impossible for an active attacker who can MITM the server to learn from the client whether it thought it was connecting @@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ Some considerations on distinguishability entirely.) Against an active non-MITM attacker, the best probing attacks will be - ones designed to provoke the system in acting in ways different from + ones designed to provoke the system into acting in ways different from those in which a webserver would act: responding earlier than a web server would respond, or later, or differently. We need to make sure that, whatever the front-end program is, it answers anything that diff --git a/proposals/ideas/xxx-port-knocking.txt b/proposals/ideas/xxx-port-knocking.txt index 85c27ec..bf5afa0 100644 --- a/proposals/ideas/xxx-port-knocking.txt +++ b/proposals/ideas/xxx-port-knocking.txt @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ no longer possible to rebind to those lower ports after they are closed. Tor does not know about any OS level packet filtering. Currently there is no packet filters that understands the Tor network in real time. -1.x Possible partioning of users by bridge operator +1.x Possible partitioning of users by bridge operator Depending on implementation, it may be possible for bridge operators to uniquely identify users. This appears to be a general bridge issue when a