r26104: {website} TBB Design Doc: Mention use of SPDY at exits. This is an ext (website/trunk/projects/torbrowser/design) - tor-commits

11 Mar 2013

Author: mikeperry
Date: 2013-03-12 02:20:25 +0000 (Tue, 12 Mar 2013)
New Revision: 26104
Modified:
   website/trunk/projects/torbrowser/design/index.html.en
Log:
TBB Design Doc: Mention use of SPDY at exits.
This is an extremely important point with the pipelining/SPDY
defense. We don't have to give up if the web doesn't upgrade.
Modified: website/trunk/projects/torbrowser/design/index.html.en
===================================================================

--- website/trunk/projects/torbrowser/design/index.html.en	2013-03-11 21:41:58 UTC (rev 26103)
+++ website/trunk/projects/torbrowser/design/index.html.en	2013-03-12 02:20:25 UTC (rev 26104)
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
 <!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
-<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8" /><title>The Design and Implementation of the Tor Browser [DRAFT]</title><meta name="generator" content="DocBook XSL Stylesheets V1.76.1" /></head><body><div class="article" title="The Design and Implementation of the Tor Browser [DRAFT]"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a id="design"></a>The Design and Implementation of the Tor Browser [DRAFT]</h2></div><div><div class="author"><h3 class="author"><span class="firstname">Mike</span> <span class="surname">Perry</span></h3><div class="affiliation"><div class="address"><p><code class="email">&lt;<a class="email" href="mailto:mikeperry#torproject org">mikeperry#torproject org</a>&gt;</code></p></div></div></div></div><div><div class="author"><h3 class="author"><span class="firstname">Erinn</span> <span class="surname">Clark</span></h3><div class="affiliation"><div class="address"><p><code class=
 "email">&lt;<a class="email" href="mailto:erinn#torproject org">erinn#torproject org</a>&gt;</code></p></div></div></div></div><div><div class="author"><h3 class="author"><span class="firstname">Steven</span> <span class="surname">Murdoch</span></h3><div class="affiliation"><div class="address"><p><code class="email">&lt;<a class="email" href="mailto:sjmurdoch#torproject org">sjmurdoch#torproject org</a>&gt;</code></p></div></div></div></div><div><p class="pubdate">March 8 2013</p></div></div><hr /></div><div class="toc"><p><strong>Table of Contents</strong></p><dl><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#idp2931312">1. Introduction</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#components">1.1. Browser Component Overview</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#DesignRequirements">2. Design Requirements and Philosophy</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#security">2.1. Security Requirements</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a
  href="#privacy">2.2. Privacy Requirements</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#philosophy">2.3. Philosophy</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#adversary">3. Adversary Model</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#adversary-goals">3.1. Adversary Goals</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#adversary-positioning">3.2. Adversary Capabilities - Positioning</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#attacks">3.3. Adversary Capabilities - Attacks</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#Implementation">4. Implementation</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#proxy-obedience">4.1. Proxy Obedience</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#state-separation">4.2. State Separation</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#disk-avoidance">4.3. Disk Avoidance</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#app-data-isolation">4.4. Application Data Isolation</a></span></
 dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#identifier-linkability">4.5. Cross-Origin Identifier Unlinkability</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#fingerprinting-linkability">4.6. Cross-Origin Fingerprinting Unlinkability</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#new-identity">4.7. Long-Term Unlinkability via "New Identity" button</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#other-security">4.8. Other Security Measures</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#firefox-patches">4.9. Description of Firefox Patches</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="appendix"><a href="#Transparency">A. Towards Transparency in Navigation Tracking</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#deprecate">A.1. Deprecation Wishlist</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#idp5839584">A.2. Promising Standards</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></div><div class="sect1" title="1. Introduction"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear:
  both"><a id="idp2931312"></a>1. Introduction</h2></div></div></div><p>
+<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8" /><title>The Design and Implementation of the Tor Browser [DRAFT]</title><meta name="generator" content="DocBook XSL Stylesheets V1.76.1" /></head><body><div class="article" title="The Design and Implementation of the Tor Browser [DRAFT]"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a id="design"></a>The Design and Implementation of the Tor Browser [DRAFT]</h2></div><div><div class="author"><h3 class="author"><span class="firstname">Mike</span> <span class="surname">Perry</span></h3><div class="affiliation"><div class="address"><p><code class="email">&lt;<a class="email" href="mailto:mikeperry#torproject org">mikeperry#torproject org</a>&gt;</code></p></div></div></div></div><div><div class="author"><h3 class="author"><span class="firstname">Erinn</span> <span class="surname">Clark</span></h3><div class="affiliation"><div class="address"><p><code class=
 "email">&lt;<a class="email" href="mailto:erinn#torproject org">erinn#torproject org</a>&gt;</code></p></div></div></div></div><div><div class="author"><h3 class="author"><span class="firstname">Steven</span> <span class="surname">Murdoch</span></h3><div class="affiliation"><div class="address"><p><code class="email">&lt;<a class="email" href="mailto:sjmurdoch#torproject org">sjmurdoch#torproject org</a>&gt;</code></p></div></div></div></div><div><p class="pubdate">March 11, 2013</p></div></div><hr /></div><div class="toc"><p><strong>Table of Contents</strong></p><dl><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#idp3154416">1. Introduction</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#components">1.1. Browser Component Overview</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#DesignRequirements">2. Design Requirements and Philosophy</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#security">2.1. Security Requirements</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2">
 <a href="#privacy">2.2. Privacy Requirements</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#philosophy">2.3. Philosophy</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#adversary">3. Adversary Model</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#adversary-goals">3.1. Adversary Goals</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#adversary-positioning">3.2. Adversary Capabilities - Positioning</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#attacks">3.3. Adversary Capabilities - Attacks</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#Implementation">4. Implementation</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#proxy-obedience">4.1. Proxy Obedience</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#state-separation">4.2. State Separation</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#disk-avoidance">4.3. Disk Avoidance</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#app-data-isolation">4.4. Application Data Isolation</a></span>
 </dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#identifier-linkability">4.5. Cross-Origin Identifier Unlinkability</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#fingerprinting-linkability">4.6. Cross-Origin Fingerprinting Unlinkability</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#new-identity">4.7. Long-Term Unlinkability via "New Identity" button</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#other-security">4.8. Other Security Measures</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#firefox-patches">4.9. Description of Firefox Patches</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="appendix"><a href="#Transparency">A. Towards Transparency in Navigation Tracking</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#deprecate">A.1. Deprecation Wishlist</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#idp5843792">A.2. Promising Standards</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></div><div class="sect1" title="1. Introduction"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clea
 r: both"><a id="idp3154416"></a>1. Introduction</h2></div></div></div><p>
This document describes the <a class="link" href="#adversary" title="3. Adversary Model">adversary model</a>,
 <a class="link" href="#DesignRequirements" title="2. Design Requirements and Philosophy">design requirements</a>, and <a class="link" href="#Implementation" title="4. Implementation">implementation</a>  of the Tor Browser. It is current as of Tor Browser
@@ -473,11 +473,12 @@
</p><p>
-In fact, the ocean of Tor Internet activity (at least, when compared to a lab
-setting) makes it a certainty that an adversary attempting examine large
-amounts of Tor traffic will ultimately be overwhelmed by false positives (even
-after making heavy tradeoffs on the ROC curve to minimize false positives to
-below 0.01%). This problem is known in the IDS literature as the <a class="ulink" href="http://www.raid-symposium.org/raid99/PAPERS/Axelsson.pdf" target="_top">Base Rate
+To make matters worse for a real-world adversary, the ocean of Tor Internet
+activity (at least, when compared to a lab setting) makes it a certainty that
+an adversary attempting examine large amounts of Tor traffic will ultimately
+be overwhelmed by false positives (even after making heavy tradeoffs on the
+ROC curve to minimize false positives to below 0.01%). This problem is known
+in the IDS literature as the <a class="ulink" href="http://www.raid-symposium.org/raid99/PAPERS/Axelsson.pdf" target="_top">Base Rate
 Fallacy</a>, and it is the primary reason that anomaly and activity
 classification-based IDS and antivirus systems have failed to materialize in
 the marketplace (despite early success in academic literature).
@@ -608,13 +609,13 @@
 Tor Browser State is separated from existing browser state through use of a
 custom Firefox profile. Furthermore, plugins are disabled, which prevents
 Flash cookies from leaking from a pre-existing Flash directory.
-   </p></div><div class="sect2" title="4.3. Disk Avoidance"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="disk-avoidance"></a>4.3. Disk Avoidance</h3></div></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Design Goal:"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="idp5584448"></a>Design Goal:</h4></div></div></div><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote">
+   </p></div><div class="sect2" title="4.3. Disk Avoidance"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="disk-avoidance"></a>4.3. Disk Avoidance</h3></div></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Design Goal:"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="idp5587232"></a>Design Goal:</h4></div></div></div><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote">
The User Agent MUST (at user option) prevent all disk records of browser activity.
 The user should be able to optionally enable URL history and other history
 features if they so desire.
-    </blockquote></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Implementation Status:"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="idp5585808"></a>Implementation Status:</h4></div></div></div><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote">
+    </blockquote></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Implementation Status:"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="idp5588592"></a>Implementation Status:</h4></div></div></div><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote">
We achieve this goal through several mechanisms. First, we set the Firefox
 Private Browsing preference
@@ -694,7 +695,7 @@
 context-menu option to drill down into specific types of state or permissions.
 An example of this simplification can be seen in Figure 1.
-   </p><div class="figure"><a id="idp5609888"></a><p class="title"><strong>Figure 1. Improving the Privacy UI</strong></p><div class="figure-contents"><div class="mediaobject" align="center"><img src="NewCookieManager.png" align="middle" alt="Improving the Privacy UI" /></div><div class="caption"><p></p>
+   </p><div class="figure"><a id="idp5612672"></a><p class="title"><strong>Figure 1. Improving the Privacy UI</strong></p><div class="figure-contents"><div class="mediaobject" align="center"><img src="NewCookieManager.png" align="middle" alt="Improving the Privacy UI" /></div><div class="caption"><p></p>
This example UI is a mock-up of how isolating identifiers to the URL bar
 origin can simplify the privacy UI for all data - not just cookies. Once
@@ -1181,11 +1182,11 @@
 menu option in Torbutton. This context menu option is active if Torbutton can
 read the environment variables $TOR_CONTROL_PASSWD and $TOR_CONTROL_PORT.
-   </p><div class="sect3" title="Design Goal:"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="idp5727952"></a>Design Goal:</h4></div></div></div><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote">
+   </p><div class="sect3" title="Design Goal:"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="idp5731056"></a>Design Goal:</h4></div></div></div><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote">
All linkable identifiers and browser state MUST be cleared by this feature.
-    </blockquote></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Implementation Status:"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="idp5729200"></a>Implementation Status:</h4></div></div></div><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
+    </blockquote></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Implementation Status:"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="idp5732304"></a>Implementation Status:</h4></div></div></div><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
First, Torbutton disables Javascript in all open tabs and windows by using
 both the <a class="ulink" href="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/XPCOM_Interface_Reference/nsIDocShell#Attributes" target="_top">browser.docShell.allowJavascript</a>
@@ -1229,7 +1230,7 @@
 Fingerprinting</a> is a statistical attack to attempt to recognize specific
 encrypted website activity.
-     </p><div class="sect3" title="Design Goal:"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="idp5743360"></a>Design Goal:</h4></div></div></div><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
+     </p><div class="sect3" title="Design Goal:"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="idp5746320"></a>Design Goal:</h4></div></div></div><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
We want to deploy a mechanism that reduces the accuracy of <a class="ulink" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Feature_selection" target="_top">useful features</a> available
 for classification. This mechanism would either impact the true and false
@@ -1243,14 +1244,15 @@
 deploy a mechanism that reduces feature extraction resolution without any
 network overhead. In the no-overhead category, we have <a class="ulink" href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/LZCLCP_NDSS11.pdf" target="_top">HTTPOS</a> and
 <a class="ulink" href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/experimental-defense-website-traffic-fingerprinting" target="_top">better
-use of HTTP pipelining and/or SPDY</a>. In the tunable/low-overhead
+use of HTTP pipelining and/or SPDY</a>. 
+In the tunable/low-overhead
 category, we have <a class="ulink" href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/ShWa-Timing06.pdf" target="_top">Adaptive
 Padding</a> and <a class="ulink" href="http://www.cs.sunysb.edu/~xcai/fp.pdf" target="_top">
 Congestion-Sensitive BUFLO</a>. It may be also possible to <a class="ulink" href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7028" target="_top">tune such
 defenses</a> such that they only use existing spare Guard bandwidth capacity in the Tor
 network, making them also effectively no-overhead.
-     </p></blockquote></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Implementation Status:"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="idp5750176"></a>Implementation Status:</h4></div></div></div><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
+     </p></blockquote></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Implementation Status:"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="idp5753216"></a>Implementation Status:</h4></div></div></div><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
 Currently, we patch Firefox to <a class="ulink" href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbrowser.git/blob/maint-2.4:/src/current-patches/firefox/0017-Randomize-HTTP-request-order-and-pipeline-depth.patch" target="_top">randomize
 pipeline order and depth</a>. Unfortunately, pipelining is very fragile.
 Many sites do not support it, and even sites that advertise support for
@@ -1258,7 +1260,11 @@
 forcing the browser into non-pipelined behavior. Firefox also has code to back
 off and reduce or eliminate the pipeline if this happens. These
 shortcomings and fallback behaviors are the primary reason that Google
-developed SPDY as opposed simply extending HTTP to improve pipelining.
+developed SPDY as opposed simply extending HTTP to improve pipelining. It
+turns out that we could actually deploy exit-side proxies that allow us to
+<a class="ulink" href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob/HEAD:/proposals/ideas/xxx-using-spdy.txt" target="_top">use
+SPDY from the client to the exit node</a>. This would make our defense not
+only free, but one that actually <span class="emphasis"><em>improves</em></span> performance.
</p><p>
@@ -1583,7 +1589,7 @@
 ourselves</a>, as they are comparatively rare and can be handled with site
 permissions.
-   </p></li></ol></div></div><div class="sect1" title="A.2. Promising Standards"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a id="idp5839584"></a>A.2. Promising Standards</h2></div></div></div><div class="orderedlist"><ol class="orderedlist" type="1"><li class="listitem"><a class="ulink" href="http://web-send.org" target="_top">Web-Send Introducer</a><p>
+   </p></li></ol></div></div><div class="sect1" title="A.2. Promising Standards"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a id="idp5843792"></a>A.2. Promising Standards</h2></div></div></div><div class="orderedlist"><ol class="orderedlist" type="1"><li class="listitem"><a class="ulink" href="http://web-send.org" target="_top">Web-Send Introducer</a><p>
Web-Send is a browser-based link sharing and federated login widget that is
 designed to operate without relying on third-party tracking or abusing other

    