commit 2180422f4a1fd51ea25fa3822c830581f7a56c43 Author: Roger Dingledine arma@torproject.org Date: Sat Aug 2 00:34:39 2014 -0400

update the spec to say that you must refuse inbound relay_early cells --- tor-spec.txt | 8 +++----- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tor-spec.txt b/tor-spec.txt index ba3393e..1c1257b 100644 --- a/tor-spec.txt +++ b/tor-spec.txt @@ -1199,17 +1199,15 @@ see tor-design.pdf. RELAY_EARLY cell. Otherwise, older Tors will relay it as a RELAY cell.

If a node ever receives more than 8 RELAY_EARLY cells on a given - outbound circuit, it SHOULD close the circuit. (For historical reasons, - we don't limit the number of inbound RELAY_EARLY cells; they should - be harmless anyway because clients won't accept extend requests. See - bug 1038.) + outbound circuit, it SHOULD close the circuit. If it receives any + inbound RELAY_EARLY cells, it MUST close the circuit immediately.

When speaking v2 of the link protocol or later, clients MUST only send EXTEND cells inside RELAY_EARLY cells. Clients SHOULD send the first ~8 RELAY cells that are not targeted at the first hop of any circuit as RELAY_EARLY cells too, in order to partially conceal the circuit length.

- [Starting with Tor 0.2.3.11-alpha, future version of Tor, relays should + [Starting with Tor 0.2.3.11-alpha, relays should reject any EXTEND cell not received in a RELAY_EARLY cell.]

6. Application connections and stream management