Author: rransom Date: 2011-04-26 15:05:12 +0000 (Tue, 26 Apr 2011) New Revision: 24676 Modified: projects/articles/browser-privacy/W3CIdentity.tex Log: Fix more minor issues Modified: projects/articles/browser-privacy/W3CIdentity.tex =================================================================== --- projects/articles/browser-privacy/W3CIdentity.tex 2011-04-26 15:04:37 UTC (rev 24675) +++ projects/articles/browser-privacy/W3CIdentity.tex 2011-04-26 15:05:12 UTC (rev 24676) @@ -343,17 +343,20 @@ what is going on with respect to the user's relationship to the web. However, all current private browsing modes fall short of protecting against a -network adversary and fail to deal with linkability against a network +network-level adversary and fail to deal with linkability against such an adversary\cite{private-browsing}, claiming that it is outside their threat model\footnotemark. If the user is given a new identity that is still linkable to the previous one due to shortcomings of the browser, this approach has failed as a privacy measure. +% XXXX Define network-level adversary. -\footnotetext{The primary reason given to abstain from addressing the network -adversary is IP address linkability. However, we believe this to be a red +\footnotetext{The primary reason given to abstain from addressing a +network-level +adversary is IP-address linkability. However, we believe this to be a red herring. Users are quite capable of using alternate Internet connections, and it is common practice for ISPs in many parts of the world to rotate user IP -addresses daily, to discourage servers and to impede the spread of malware. +addresses daily, to discourage users from operating servers and to impede the +spread of malware. This is especially true of cellular IP networks.} Linkability solutions within the identity framework would be similar to the