commit 4baae27cec328db369acdfb0180a6943ba9dbf95 Author: Karsten Loesing karsten.loesing@gmx.net Date: Sat Nov 29 09:38:06 2014 +0100
Reply to dgoulet's comments. --- 2015/hidden-service-stats/hidden-service-stats.tex | 14 +++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/2015/hidden-service-stats/hidden-service-stats.tex b/2015/hidden-service-stats/hidden-service-stats.tex index ef8f46c..75ce789 100644 --- a/2015/hidden-service-stats/hidden-service-stats.tex +++ b/2015/hidden-service-stats/hidden-service-stats.tex @@ -150,7 +150,11 @@ the introduction point. % it is that there is probably a noticable time difference between using % an already created circuit for which we simply extend one hop versus % establishing a new one of 4 hops. - +% [karsten]: That's right, but we have no data from the client, but only +% from the relay that happens to be the last hop in the circuit. That +% relay only sees that the circuit gets extended to it, but it has no +% information how long the client had the circuit lying around before +% extending it.
% Newly established circuit. % Benefits: Performance reason, this can be useful to know the real cost @@ -497,8 +501,12 @@ There is no obvious risk related to this statistic. % and report a tiny number of actual user cells? but I added an item to % the section start where we can discuss whether this is a good safeguard % in general. -% Right well that's a time statistic and not an amount so if an attacker -% would establish 100 RP I guess he/she indeed poisoning the stat?... +% [dgoulet]: Right well that's a time statistic and not an amount so if an +% attacker would establish 100 RP I guess he/she indeed poisoning the +% stat?... +% [karsten]: Maybe. In theory, the stat is not poisoned for the attacker +% if she knows what values she's contributed to it. But I agree that this +% is not the best example.
\subparagraph{Recommendation}
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