commit ec2a7eb797d818b13b45a1e0a17e948d991047c3 Author: Mike Perry mikeperry-git@fscked.org Date: Tue Feb 19 12:18:19 2013 -0800
Update stale/broken gitweb and trac URLs. --- docs/design/design.xml | 79 +++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------- 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
diff --git a/docs/design/design.xml b/docs/design/design.xml index d723542..07db627 100644 --- a/docs/design/design.xml +++ b/docs/design/design.xml @@ -747,14 +747,19 @@ browser proxy settings. <para> Torbutton disables plugins by using the <command>@mozilla.org/plugin/host;1</command> service to mark the plugin tags -as disabled. Additionally, we set -<command>plugin.disable_full_page_plugin_for_types</command> to the list of -supported mime types for all currently installed plugins. - </para> +as disabled. This block can be undone through both the Torbutton Security UI, +and the Firefox Plugin Preferences. + </para> + <para> +If the user does enable plugins in this way, plugin-handled objects are still +restricted from automatic load through Firefox's click-to-play preference +<command>plugins.click_to_play</command>. + </para> <para> -In addition, to prevent any unproxied activity by plugins at load time, we +In addition, to reduce any unproxied activity by arbitrary plugins at load +time, and to reduce the fingerprintability of the installed plugin list, we also patch the Firefox source code to <ulink -url="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbrowser.git/blob/maint-2.2:/src/current-pat... the load of any plugins except +url="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbrowser.git/blob/maint-2.4:/src/current-pat... the load of any plugins except for Flash and Gnash</ulink>.
</para> @@ -842,16 +847,16 @@ Private Browsing Mode is enabled. We need to
<!-- XXX: Firefox 17 will mess up all these patch links --> <ulink -url="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbrowser.git/blob/maint-2.2:/src/current-pat... +url="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbrowser.git/blob/maint-2.4:/src/current-pat... the permissions manager from recording HTTPS STS state</ulink>, <ulink -url="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbrowser.git/blob/maint-2.2:/src/current-pat... +url="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbrowser.git/blob/maint-2.4:/src/current-pat... intermediate SSL certificates from being recorded</ulink>, <ulink -url="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbrowser.git/blob/maint-2.2:/src/current-pat... +url="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbrowser.git/blob/maint-2.4:/src/current-pat... download history from being recorded</ulink>, and <ulink -url="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbrowser.git/blob/maint-2.2:/src/current-pat... +url="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbrowser.git/blob/maint-2.4:/src/current-pat... the content preferences service from recording site zoom</ulink>.
<!-- XXX: DOM Storage patch, too. --> @@ -862,7 +867,7 @@ Firefox Patches section</link>. </para> <para> For more details on disk leak bugs and enhancements, see the <ulink -url="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=as... tag in our bugtracker</ulink> +url="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?keywords=~tbb-disk-leak&s... tag in our bugtracker</ulink> </para> </sect2> <sect2 id="app-data-isolation"> @@ -975,7 +980,7 @@ security of the isolation</ulink> and to <ulink url="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3754">solve conflicts with OCSP relying the cacheKey property for reuse of POST requests</ulink>, we had to <ulink -url="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbrowser.git/blob/maint-2.2:/src/current-pat... +url="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbrowser.git/blob/maint-2.4:/src/current-pat... Firefox to provide a cacheDomain cache attribute</ulink>. We use the fully qualified url bar domain as input to this field.
@@ -1011,11 +1016,7 @@ HTTP authentication tokens are removed for third party elements using the url="https://developer.mozilla.org/en/Setting_HTTP_request_headers#Observers%22%3... observer</ulink> to remove the Authorization headers to prevent <ulink url="http://jeremiahgrossman.blogspot.com/2007/04/tracking-users-without-cookies.html">silent -linkability between domains</ulink>. We also needed to <ulink -url="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbrowser.git/blob/maint-2.2:/src/current-pat... -Firefox to cause the headers to get added early enough</ulink> to allow the -observer to modify it. - +linkability between domains</ulink>. </para> </listitem> <listitem>DOM Storage @@ -1065,7 +1066,7 @@ We currently clear SSL Session IDs upon <link linkend="new-identity">New Identity</link>, we disable TLS Session Tickets via the Firefox Pref <command>security.enable_tls_session_tickets</command>. We disable SSL Session IDs via a <ulink -url="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbrowser.git/blob/maint-2.2:/src/current-pat... +url="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbrowser.git/blob/maint-2.4:/src/current-pat... to Firefox</ulink>. To compensate for the increased round trip latency from disabling these performance optimizations, we also enable <ulink url="https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-bmoeller-tls-falsestart-00">TLS @@ -1307,7 +1308,7 @@ Firefox provides several options for controlling the browser user agent string which we leverage. We also set similar prefs for controlling the Accept-Language and Accept-Charset headers, which we spoof to English by default. Additionally, we <ulink -url="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbrowser.git/blob/maint-2.2:/src/current-pat... +url="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbrowser.git/blob/maint-2.4:/src/current-pat... content script access</ulink> to Components.interfaces, which <ulink url="http://pseudo-flaw.net/tor/torbutton/fingerprint-firefox.html">can be used</ulink> to fingerprint OS, platform, and Firefox minor version. </para> @@ -1515,7 +1516,7 @@ audio and video objects. <title>Description of Firefox Patches</title> <para> The set of patches we have against Firefox can be found in the <ulink -url="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbrowser.git/tree/maint-2.2:/src/current-pat... directory of the torbrowser git repository</ulink>. They are: +url="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbrowser.git/tree/maint-2.4:/src/current-pat... directory of the torbrowser git repository</ulink>. They are: </para> <orderedlist> <listitem>Block Components.interfaces and Components.lookupMethod @@ -1563,17 +1564,6 @@ allow this.
</para> </listitem> - <listitem>Add HTTP auth headers before on-modify-request fires - <para> - -This patch provides a trivial modification to allow us to properly remove HTTP -auth for third parties. This patch allows us to defend against an adversary -attempting to use <ulink -url="http://jeremiahgrossman.blogspot.com/2007/04/tracking-users-without-cookies.... -auth to silently track users between domains</ulink>. - - </para> - </listitem> <listitem>Add a string-based cacheKey property for domain isolation <para>
@@ -1581,23 +1571,12 @@ To <ulink url="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3666">increase the security of cache isolation</ulink> and to <ulink url="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3754">solve strange and -unknown conflicts with OCSP</ulink>, we had to <ulink -url="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbrowser.git/blob/refs/heads/maint-2.2:/src/... -Firefox to provide a cacheDomain cache attribute</ulink>. We use the url bar +unknown conflicts with OCSP</ulink>, we had to patch +Firefox to provide a cacheDomain cache attribute. We use the url bar FQDN as input to this field.
</para> </listitem> - <listitem>Randomize HTTP pipeline order and depth - <para> -As an -<ulink -url="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/experimental-defense-website-traffic-finger... -defense against Website Traffic Fingerprinting</ulink>, we patch the standard -HTTP pipelining code to randomize the number of requests in a -pipeline, as well as their order. - </para> - </listitem> <listitem>Block all plugins except flash <para> We cannot use the <ulink @@ -1648,6 +1627,18 @@ by the <link linkend="new-identity">New Identity</link> button.
</para> </listitem> + <listitem>Randomize HTTP pipeline order and depth + <para> +As an +<ulink +url="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/experimental-defense-website-traffic-finger... +defense against Website Traffic Fingerprinting</ulink>, we patch the standard +HTTP pipelining code to randomize the number of requests in a +pipeline, as well as their order. + </para> + </listitem> + +<!-- XXX: Several more patches need documentation -->
</orderedlist> </sect2>
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