commit ade4ddaa88ac65741165061e4498f5b3136a880e Author: George Kadianakis desnacked@riseup.net Date: Tue Feb 28 13:22:10 2017 +0200
prop224: Rename some ntor variables for better readability. --- proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt | 18 +++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt b/proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt index 103542a..dc33bb8 100644 --- a/proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt +++ b/proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt @@ -1642,9 +1642,9 @@ Table of contents: generates a single-use keypair: x,X = KEYGEN() and computes: - secret_hs_input = EXP(B,x) | AUTH_KEY | X | B | PROTOID + intro_secret_hs_input = EXP(B,x) | AUTH_KEY | X | B | PROTOID info = m_hsexpand | subcredential - hs_keys = KDF(secret_hs_input | t_hsenc | info, S_KEY_LEN+MAC_LEN) + hs_keys = KDF(intro_secret_hs_input | t_hsenc | info, S_KEY_LEN+MAC_LEN) ENC_KEY = hs_keys[0:S_KEY_LEN] MAC_KEY = hs_keys[S_KEY_LEN:S_KEY_LEN+MAC_KEY_LEN]
@@ -1688,7 +1688,7 @@ Table of contents: To process this format, the hidden service checks PK_VALID(CLIENT_PK) as necessary, and then computes ENC_KEY and MAC_KEY as the client did above, except using EXP(CLIENT_PK,b) in the calculation of - secret_hs_input. The service host then checks whether the MAC is + intro_secret_hs_input. The service host then checks whether the MAC is correct. If it is invalid, it drops the cell. Otherwise, it computes the plaintext by decrypting ENCRYPTED_DATA.
@@ -1698,18 +1698,18 @@ Table of contents: service host generates a keypair of y,Y = KEYGEN(), and uses its introduction point encryption key 'b' to computes:
- secret_hs_input = EXP(X,b) | AUTH_KEY | X | B | PROTOID + intro_secret_hs_input = EXP(X,b) | AUTH_KEY | X | B | PROTOID info = m_hsexpand | subcredential - hs_keys = KDF(secret_hs_input | t_hsenc | info, S_KEY_LEN+MAC_LEN) + hs_keys = KDF(intro_secret_hs_input | t_hsenc | info, S_KEY_LEN+MAC_LEN) HS_DEC_KEY = hs_keys[0:S_KEY_LEN] HS_MAC_KEY = hs_keys[S_KEY_LEN:S_KEY_LEN+MAC_KEY_LEN]
(The above are used to check the MAC and then decrypt the encrypted data.)
- ntor_secret_input = EXP(X,y) | EXP(X,b) | AUTH_KEY | B | X | Y | PROTOID - NTOR_KEY_SEED = MAC(ntor_secret_input, t_hsenc) - verify = MAC(ntor_secret_input, t_hsverify) + rend_secret_hs_input = EXP(X,y) | EXP(X,b) | AUTH_KEY | B | X | Y | PROTOID + NTOR_KEY_SEED = MAC(rend_secret_hs_input, t_hsenc) + verify = MAC(rend_secret_hs_input, t_hsverify) auth_input = verify | AUTH_KEY | B | Y | X | PROTOID | "Server" AUTH_INPUT_MAC = MAC(auth_input, t_hsmac)
@@ -1822,7 +1822,7 @@ Table of contents: HANDSHAKE_INFO and reverses the final operations of section [NTOR-WITH-EXTRA-DATA] as shown here:
- ntor_secret_input = EXP(Y,x) | EXP(B,x) | AUTH_KEY | B | X | Y | PROTOID + rend_secret_hs_input = EXP(Y,x) | EXP(B,x) | AUTH_KEY | B | X | Y | PROTOID NTOR_KEY_SEED = MAC(ntor_secret_input, t_hsenc) verify = MAC(ntor_secret_input, t_hsverify) auth_input = verify | AUTH_KEY | B | Y | X | PROTOID | "Server"
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