[tor/release-0.2.4] don't let recently_chosen_ntors overflow

commit e443beffeb8c20dddeb198cf94667a82f4cb53c7 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org> Date: Thu Sep 5 01:27:46 2013 -0400 don't let recently_chosen_ntors overflow with commit c6f1668d we let it grow arbitrarily large. it can still overflow, but the damage is very small now. --- src/or/onion.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/or/onion.c b/src/or/onion.c index 41fe7b6..8e3e487 100644 --- a/src/or/onion.c +++ b/src/or/onion.c @@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ static uint16_t decide_next_handshake_type(void) { /* The number of times we've chosen ntor lately when both were available. */ - static int recently_chosen_ntors = 0; + static unsigned int recently_chosen_ntors = 0; if (!ol_entries[ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR]) return ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP; /* no ntors? try tap */
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