commit d7662cd672c7af14eee7609a45cc0da36c888e66 Author: Mike Perry mikeperry-git@torproject.org Date: Wed Apr 29 22:18:48 2015 -0700
Speel chek desine dock. --- design-doc/design.xml | 18 +++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/design-doc/design.xml b/design-doc/design.xml index 01559a6..7711d19 100644 --- a/design-doc/design.xml +++ b/design-doc/design.xml @@ -936,7 +936,7 @@ geolocation queries, searchbox queries, XPCOM addon HTTPS/HTTP activity, WebSockets, and live bookmark updates. We have also verified that IPv6 connections are not attempted, through the proxy or otherwise (Tor does not yet support IPv6). We have also verified that external protocol helpers, such -as smb urls and other custom protocol handlers are all blocked. +as SMB URLs and other custom protocol handlers are all blocked.
</para> </listitem> @@ -1321,7 +1321,7 @@ interest to an adversary. </para> <para>
-URIs created with URL.createObjectURI MUST be limited in scope to the first +URIs created with URL.createObjectURL MUST be limited in scope to the first party URL bar domain that created them. We provide this isolation in Tor Browser via a <ulink url="https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser.git/commit/?h=tor-browser-31.6.0esr-4.5-1&id=0d67ab406bdd3cf095802cb25c081641aa1f0bcc">direct @@ -1445,7 +1445,7 @@ fingerprinting makes use of any information that can be extracted from the browser by some specific website action, usually involving Javascript. Some definitions of browser fingerprinting also include supercookies and cookie-like identifier storage, but we deal with those issues separately in -the <link linkend="identifier-linkability">preceeding section on identifier +the <link linkend="identifier-linkability">preceding section on identifier linkability</link>.
</para> @@ -1503,14 +1503,14 @@ concurrent activity, we are less concerned with this mechanism of extracting this information. We also expect that reducing the resolution of Javascript's time sources will significantly increase the duration of execution required to extract accurate results, and thus make statistical approaches both -unattractive and highly noticable due to execessive resource consumption. +unattractive and highly noticeable due to excessive resource consumption.
</para> </listitem> <listitem><command>Operating System Vendor and Version Differences</command> <para>
-Operating system vendor and version differences permiate many different +Operating system vendor and version differences permeate many different aspects of the browser. While it is possible to address these issues with some effort, the relative lack of diversity in operating systems causes us to primarily focus our efforts on passive operating system fingerprinting @@ -1529,7 +1529,7 @@ Due to vast differences in feature set and implementation behavior even between different versions of the same browser, browser vendor and version differences are simply not possible to conceal in any realistic way. It is only possible to minimize the differences among different installations of -the same browser vendor and version. We make no effort to mimick any other +the same browser vendor and version. We make no effort to mimic any other major browser vendor, and in fact most of our fingerprinting defenses serve to differentiate Tor Browser users from normal Firefox users. Because of this, any study that lumps browser vendor and version differences in to its analysis @@ -2121,7 +2121,7 @@ closed (this does not spawn a new Firefox process, only a new window). Upon the close of the final window, an unload handler is fired to invoke the <ulink url="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Tech/XPCOM/Reference/Interface/nsIDOMWindowUtils#garbageCollect%28%29">garbage collector</ulink>, which has the effect of immediately purging any blob:UUID -urls that were created by website content via <ulink +URLs that were created by website content via <ulink url="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/URL/createObjectURL">URL.createObjectURL</ulink>.
</para> @@ -2569,10 +2569,10 @@ consensus, and encoding the package hashes in the Bitcoin blockchain. <para>
The Windows releases are also signed by a hardware token provided by Digicert. -In order to verify package integrity, the signature must be sripped off using +In order to verify package integrity, the signature must be stripped off using the osslsigncode tool, as described on the <ulink url="https://www.torproject.org/docs/verifying-signatures.html.en#BuildVerification">Signature -Vericication</ulink> page. +Verification</ulink> page.
</para> </sect2>
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