Author: phobos Date: 2013-01-21 01:44:17 +0000 (Mon, 21 Jan 2013) New Revision: 26016 Modified: website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml Log: clean up the faq, address ticket 7287, remove polipo. Modified: website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml =================================================================== --- website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml 2013-01-21 01:35:45 UTC (rev 26015) +++ website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml 2013-01-21 01:44:17 UTC (rev 26016) @@ -17,7 +17,8 @@ <p>General questions:</p> <ul> <li><a href="#WhatIsTor">What is Tor?</a></li> - <li><a href="#Torisdifferent">How is Tor different from other proxies?</a></li> + <li><a href="#Torisdifferent">How is Tor different from other +proxies?</a></li> <li><a href="#CompatibleApplications">What programs can I use with Tor?</a></li> <li><a href="#WhyCalledTor">Why is it called Tor?</a></li> @@ -41,10 +42,13 @@ page?</a></li> <li><a href="#GetTor">Your website is blocked in my country. How do I download Tor?</a></li> - <li><a href="#CompileTorWindows">How do I compile Tor under Windows?</a></li> - <li><a href="#VirusFalsePositives">Why does my Tor executable appear to + <li><a href="#CompileTorWindows">How do I compile Tor under +Windows?</a></li> + <li><a href="#VirusFalsePositives">Why does my Tor executable appear +to have a virus or spyware?</a></li> - <li><a href="#LiveCD">Is there a LiveCD or other bundle that includes Tor?</a></li> + <li><a href="#LiveCD">Is there a LiveCD or other bundle that +includes Tor?</a></li> </ul> <p>Tor Browser Bundle:</p> @@ -59,14 +63,18 @@ go?</a></li> <li><a href="#TBBOtherExtensions">Can I install other Firefox extensions?</a></li> - <li><a href="#TBBJavaScriptEnabled">Why is NoScript configured to allow JavaScript by default in the Tor Browser Bundle? Isn't that unsafe?</a></li> - <li><a href="#TBBCanIBlockJS">I'm an expert! (No, really!) Can I configure NoScript to block JavaScript by default?</a></li> + <li><a href="#TBBJavaScriptEnabled">Why is NoScript configured to +allow JavaScript by default in the Tor Browser Bundle? Isn't that +unsafe?</a></li> + <li><a href="#TBBCanIBlockJS">I'm an expert! (No, really!) Can I +configure NoScript to block JavaScript by default?</a></li> <li><a href="#TBBOtherBrowser">I want to use Chrome/IE/Opera/etc with Tor.</a></li> <li><a href="#TBBCloseBrowser">I want to leave Tor Browser Bundle running but close the browser.</a></li> - <li><a href="#GoogleCaptcha">Google makes me solve a Captcha or tells + <li><a href="#GoogleCaptcha">Google makes me solve a Captcha or +tells me I have spyware installed.</a></li> <li><a href="#GmailWarning">Gmail warns me that my account may have been compromised.</a></li> @@ -82,7 +90,8 @@ correctly.</a></li> <li><a href="#VidaliaPassword">Tor/Vidalia prompts for a password at start.</a></li> - <li><a href="#ChooseEntryExit">Can I control which nodes (or country) + <li><a href="#ChooseEntryExit">Can I control which nodes (or +country) are used for entry/exit?</a></li> <li><a href="#FirewallPorts">My firewall only allows a few outgoing ports.</a></li> @@ -90,13 +99,17 @@ <p>Running a Tor relay:</p> <ul> - <li><a href="#RelayFlexible">How stable does my relay need to be?</a></li> - <li><a href="#ExitPolicies">I'd run a relay, but I don't want to deal + <li><a href="#RelayFlexible">How stable does my relay need to +be?</a></li> + <li><a href="#ExitPolicies">I'd run a relay, but I don't want to +deal with abuse issues.</a></li> <li><a href="#RelayOrBridge">Should I be a normal relay or bridge relay?</a></li> - <li><a href="#MultipleRelays">I want to run more than one relay.</a></li> - <li><a href="#RelayMemory">Why is my Tor relay using so much memory?</a></li> + <li><a href="#MultipleRelays">I want to run more than one +relay.</a></li> + <li><a href="#RelayMemory">Why is my Tor relay using so much +memory?</a></li> <li><a href="#WhyNotNamed">Why is my Tor relay not named?</a></li> <li><a href="#RelayDonations">Can I donate for a relay rather than run my own?</a></li> @@ -106,7 +119,8 @@ <p>Anonymity and Security:</p> <ul> - <li><a href="#KeyManagement">Tell me about all the keys Tor uses.</a></li> + <li><a href="#KeyManagement">Tell me about all the keys Tor +uses.</a></li> <li><a href="#EntryGuards">What are Entry Guards?</a></li> </ul> @@ -114,7 +128,8 @@ <ul> <li><a href="#EverybodyARelay">You should make every Tor user be a relay.</a></li> - <li><a href="#TransportIPnotTCP">You should transport all IP packets, + <li><a href="#TransportIPnotTCP">You should transport all IP +packets, not just TCP packets.</a></li> <li><a href="#HideExits">You should hide the list of Tor relays, so people can't block the exits.</a></li> @@ -122,12 +137,14 @@ <p>Abuse:</p> <ul> - <li><a href="#Criminals">Doesn't Tor enable criminals to do bad things?</a></li> + <li><a href="#Criminals">Doesn't Tor enable criminals to do bad +things?</a></li> <li><a href="#RespondISP">How do I respond to my ISP about my exit relay?</a></li> </ul> - <p>For other questions not yet on this version of the FAQ, see the <a + <p>For other questions not yet on this version of the FAQ, see the +<a href="<wikifaq>">wiki FAQ</a> for now.</p> <hr> @@ -142,71 +159,110 @@ </p> <p> - The Tor software is a program you can run on your computer that helps keep - you safe on the Internet. Tor protects you by bouncing your communications + The Tor software is a program you can run on your computer that +helps keep + you safe on the Internet. Tor protects you by bouncing your +communications around a distributed network of relays run by volunteers all around - the world: it prevents somebody watching your Internet connection from + the world: it prevents somebody watching your Internet connection +from learning what sites you visit, and it prevents the sites you visit - from learning your physical location. This set of volunteer relays is - called the Tor network. You can read more about how Tor works on the <a + from learning your physical location. This set of volunteer relays +is + called the Tor network. You can read more about how Tor works on the +<a href="<page about/overview>">overview page</a>. </p> <p> - The Tor Project is a non-profit (charity) organization that maintains + The Tor Project is a non-profit (charity) organization that +maintains and develops the Tor software. </p> <hr> <a id="Torisdifferent"></a> - <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Torisdifferent">How is Tor different from other proxies?</a></h3> + <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Torisdifferent">How is Tor different +from other proxies?</a></h3> <p> - A typical proxy provider sets up a server somewhere on the Internet and -allows you to use it to relay your traffic. This creates a simple, easy to -maintain architecture. The users all enter and leave through the same server. -The provider may charge for use of the proxy, or fund their costs through -advertisements on the server. In the simplest configuration, you don't have to -install anything. You just have to point your browser at their proxy server. -Simple proxy providers are fine solutions if you do not want protections for -your privacy and anonymity online and you trust the provider from doing bad -things. Some simple proxy providers use SSL to secure your connection to them. -This may protect you against local eavesdroppers, such as those at a cafe with + A typical proxy provider sets up a server somewhere on the Internet +and +allows you to use it to relay your traffic. This creates a simple, easy +to +maintain architecture. The users all enter and leave through the same +server. +The provider may charge for use of the proxy, or fund their costs +through +advertisements on the server. In the simplest configuration, you don't +have to +install anything. You just have to point your browser at their proxy +server. +Simple proxy providers are fine solutions if you do not want protections +for +your privacy and anonymity online and you trust the provider from doing +bad +things. Some simple proxy providers use SSL to secure your connection +to them. +This may protect you against local eavesdroppers, such as those at a +cafe with free wifi Internet. </p> <p> - Simple proxy providers also create a single point of failure. The provider -knows who you are and where you browse on the Internet. They can see your -traffic as it passes through their server. In some cases, they can even see + Simple proxy providers also create a single point of failure. The +provider +knows who you are and where you browse on the Internet. They can see +your +traffic as it passes through their server. In some cases, they can even +see inside your -encrypted traffic as they relay it to your banking site or to ecommerce stores. +encrypted traffic as they relay it to your banking site or to ecommerce +stores. You have to trust the provider isn't doing any number of things, such as -watching your traffic, injecting their own advertisements into your traffic +watching your traffic, injecting their own advertisements into your +traffic stream, and recording your personal details. </p> <p> - Tor passes your traffic through at least 3 different servers before sending -it on to the destination. Because there's a separate layer of encryption for -each of the three relays, Tor does not modify, or even know, what you are -sending into it. It merely relays your traffic, completely encrypted through -the Tor network and has it pop out somewhere else in the world, completely -intact. The Tor client is required because we assume you trust your local -computer. The Tor client manages the encryption and the path chosen through -the network. The relays located all over the world merely pass encrypted + Tor passes your traffic through at least 3 different servers before +sending +it on to the destination. Because there's a separate layer of encryption +for +each of the three relays, Tor does not modify, or even know, what you +are +sending into it. It merely relays your traffic, completely encrypted +through +the Tor network and has it pop out somewhere else in the world, +completely +intact. The Tor client is required because we assume you trust your +local +computer. The Tor client manages the encryption and the path chosen +through +the network. The relays located all over the world merely pass +encrypted packets between themselves.</p> <p> <dl> - <dt>Doesn't the first server see who I am?</dt><dd>Possibly. A bad first of -three servers can see encrypted Tor traffic coming from your computer. It -still doesn't know who you are and what you are doing over Tor. It merely sees -"This IP address is using Tor". Tor is not illegal anywhere in the world, so -using Tor by itself is fine. You are still protected from this node figuring + <dt>Doesn't the first server see who I am?</dt><dd>Possibly. A bad +first of +three servers can see encrypted Tor traffic coming from your computer. +It +still doesn't know who you are and what you are doing over Tor. It +merely sees +"This IP address is using Tor". Tor is not illegal anywhere in the +world, so +using Tor by itself is fine. You are still protected from this node +figuring out who you are and where you are going on the Internet.</dd> - <dt>Can't the third server see my traffic?</dt><dd>Possibly. A bad third -of three servers can see the traffic you sent into Tor. It won't know who sent + <dt>Can't the third server see my traffic?</dt><dd>Possibly. A bad +third +of three servers can see the traffic you sent into Tor. It won't know +who sent this traffic. If you're using encryption, such as visiting a bank or -e-commerce website, or encrypted mail connections, etc, it will only know the -destination. It won't be able to see the data inside the traffic stream. You +e-commerce website, or encrypted mail connections, etc, it will only +know the +destination. It won't be able to see the data inside the traffic +stream. You are still protected from this node figuring out who you are and if using encryption, what data you're sending to the destination.</dd> </dl> @@ -215,25 +271,34 @@ <hr> <a id="CompatibleApplications"></a> - <h3><a class="anchor" href="#CompatibleApplications">What programs can I use with Tor?</a></h3> + <h3><a class="anchor" href="#CompatibleApplications">What programs +can I use with Tor?</a></h3> <p> - There are two pieces to "Torifying" a program: connection-level anonymity - and application-level anonymity. Connection-level anonymity focuses on - making sure the application's Internet connections get sent through Tor. + There are two pieces to "Torifying" a program: connection-level +anonymity + and application-level anonymity. Connection-level anonymity focuses +on + making sure the application's Internet connections get sent through +Tor. This step is normally done by configuring the program to use your Tor client as a "socks" proxy, but there are - other ways to do it too. For application-level anonymity, you need to - make sure that the information the application sends out doesn't hurt - your privacy. (Even if the connections are being routed through Tor, you - still don't want to include sensitive information like your name.) This + other ways to do it too. For application-level anonymity, you need +to + make sure that the information the application sends out doesn't +hurt + your privacy. (Even if the connections are being routed through Tor, +you + still don't want to include sensitive information like your name.) +This second step needs to be done on a program-by-program basis, which is why we don't yet recommend very many programs for safe use with Tor. </p> <p> Most of our work so far has focused on the Firefox web browser. The - bundles on the <a href="<page download/download>">download page</a> automatically + bundles on the <a href="<page download/download>">download page</a> +automatically install the <a href="<page torbutton/index>">Torbutton Firefox extension</a> if you have Firefox installed. As of version 1.2.0, Torbutton now takes care of a lot of the connection-level and @@ -255,7 +320,8 @@ <hr> <a id="WhyCalledTor"></a> - <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhyCalledTor">Why is it called Tor?</a></h3> + <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhyCalledTor">Why is it called +Tor?</a></h3> <p> Because Tor is the onion routing network. When we were starting the @@ -272,28 +338,35 @@ </p> <p> - Note: even though it originally came from an acronym, Tor is not spelled + Note: even though it originally came from an acronym, Tor is not +spelled "TOR". Only the first letter is capitalized. In fact, we can usually - spot people who haven't read any of our website (and have instead learned - everything they know about Tor from news articles) by the fact that they + spot people who haven't read any of our website (and have instead +learned + everything they know about Tor from news articles) by the fact that +they spell it wrong. </p> <hr> <a id="Backdoor"></a> - <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Backdoor">Is there a backdoor in Tor?</a></h3> + <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Backdoor">Is there a backdoor in +Tor?</a></h3> <p> - There is absolutely no backdoor in Tor. Nobody has asked us to put one - in, and we know some smart lawyers who say that it's unlikely that anybody + There is absolutely no backdoor in Tor. Nobody has asked us to put +one + in, and we know some smart lawyers who say that it's unlikely that +anybody will try to make us add one in our jurisdiction (U.S.). If they do ask us, we will fight them, and (the lawyers say) probably win. </p> <p> We think that putting a backdoor in Tor would be tremendously - irresponsible to our users, and a bad precedent for security software + irresponsible to our users, and a bad precedent for security +software in general. If we ever put a deliberate backdoor in our security software, it would ruin our professional reputations. Nobody would trust our software ever again — for excellent reason! @@ -302,8 +375,10 @@ <p> But that said, there are still plenty of subtle attacks people might try. Somebody might impersonate us, or break into our - computers, or something like that. Tor is open source, and you should - always check the source (or at least the diffs since the last release) + computers, or something like that. Tor is open source, and you +should + always check the source (or at least the diffs since the last +release) for suspicious things. If we (or the distributors) don't give you source, that's a sure sign something funny might be going on. You should also check the <a href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">PGP @@ -313,35 +388,43 @@ <p> Also, there might be accidental bugs in Tor that could affect your - anonymity. We periodically find and fix anonymity-related bugs, so make + anonymity. We periodically find and fix anonymity-related bugs, so +make sure you keep your Tor versions up-to-date. </p> <hr> <a id="DistributingTor"></a> - <h3><a class="anchor" href="#DistributingTor">Can I distribute Tor?</a></h3> + <h3><a class="anchor" href="#DistributingTor">Can I distribute +Tor?</a></h3> <p> Yes. </p> <p> - The Tor software is <a href="https://www.fsf.org/">free software</a>. This - means we give you the rights to redistribute the Tor software, either - modified or unmodified, either for a fee or gratis. You don't have to + The Tor software is <a href="https://www.fsf.org/">free +software</a>. This + means we give you the rights to redistribute the Tor software, +either + modified or unmodified, either for a fee or gratis. You don't have +to ask us for specific permission. </p> <p> - However, if you want to redistribute the Tor software you must follow our + However, if you want to redistribute the Tor software you must +follow our <a href="<gitblob>LICENSE">LICENSE</a>. - Essentially this means that you need to include our LICENSE file along + Essentially this means that you need to include our LICENSE file +along with whatever part of the Tor software you're distributing. </p> <p> - Most people who ask us this question don't want to distribute just the + Most people who ask us this question don't want to distribute just +the Tor software, though. They want to distribute the <a href="https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser.html.en">Tor Browser</a>. This includes <a @@ -359,39 +442,52 @@ </p> <p> - Also, you should make sure not to confuse your readers about what Tor is, - who makes it, and what properties it provides (and doesn't provide). See - our <a href="<page docs/trademark-faq>">trademark FAQ</a> for details. + Also, you should make sure not to confuse your readers about what +Tor is, + who makes it, and what properties it provides (and doesn't provide). +See + our <a href="<page docs/trademark-faq>">trademark FAQ</a> for +details. </p> <p> Lastly, you should realize that we release new versions of the Tor software frequently, and sometimes we make backward incompatible - changes. So if you distribute a particular version of the Tor software, it - may not be supported — or even work — six months later. This + changes. So if you distribute a particular version of the Tor +software, it + may not be supported — or even work — six months later. +This is a fact of life for all security software under heavy development. </p> <hr> <a id="SupportMail"></a> - <h3><a class="anchor" href="#SupportMail">How can I get support?</a></h3> + <h3><a class="anchor" href="#SupportMail">How can I get +support?</a></h3> <p>Your best bet is to first try the following:</p> <ol> <li>Read through this <a href="<page docs/faq>">FAQ</a>.</li> - <li>Read through the <a href="<page docs/documentation>">documentation</a>.</li> + <li>Read through the <a href="<page +docs/documentation>">documentation</a>.</li> <li>Read through the <a - href="https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk">tor-talk + +href="https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk"> +tor-talk archives</a> and see if your question is already answered.</li> - <li>Join our <a href="ircs://irc.torproject.org#tor">irc channel</a> and + <li>Join our <a href="ircs://irc.torproject.org#tor">irc channel</a> +and state the issue and wait for help.</li> <li>Send an email to <a - href="mailto:help@rt.torproject.org">help@rt.torproject.org</a>.</li> - <li>If all else fails, try <a href="<page about/contact>">contacting us</a> directly.</li> + +href="mailto:help@rt.torproject.org">help@rt.torproject.org</a>.</li> + <li>If all else fails, try <a href="<page about/contact>">contacting +us</a> directly.</li> </ol> - <p>If you find your answer, please stick around on the IRC channel or the + <p>If you find your answer, please stick around on the IRC channel +or the mailing list to help others who were once in your position.</p> <hr> @@ -420,24 +516,31 @@ </p> <p> - Before we answer, though, you should realize that Tor is never going to - be blazing fast. Your traffic is bouncing through volunteers' computers - in various parts of the world, and some bottlenecks and network latency + Before we answer, though, you should realize that Tor is never going +to + be blazing fast. Your traffic is bouncing through volunteers' +computers + in various parts of the world, and some bottlenecks and network +latency will always be present. You shouldn't expect to see university-style bandwidth through Tor. </p> <p> - But that doesn't mean that it can't be improved. The current Tor network - is quite small compared to the number of people trying to use it, and - many of these users don't understand or care that Tor can't currently + But that doesn't mean that it can't be improved. The current Tor +network + is quite small compared to the number of people trying to use it, +and + many of these users don't understand or care that Tor can't +currently handle file-sharing traffic load. </p> <p> For the much more in-depth answer, see <a href="<blog>why-tor-is-slow">Roger's blog - post on the topic</a>, which includes both a detailed PDF and a video + post on the topic</a>, which includes both a detailed PDF and a +video to go with it. </p> @@ -448,60 +551,64 @@ <ul> <li> - <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-relay>">Configure your Tor to relay traffic - for others</a>. Help make the Tor network large enough that we can handle + <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-relay>">Configure your Tor to relay +traffic + for others</a>. Help make the Tor network large enough that we can +handle all the users who want privacy and security on the Internet. </li> <li> - <a href="<page projects/vidalia>">Help us make Tor more usable</a>. We + <a href="<page projects/vidalia>">Help us make Tor more usable</a>. +We especially need people to help make it easier to configure your Tor as a relay. Also, we need help with clear simple documentation to walk people through setting it up. </li> <li> - There are some bottlenecks in the current Tor network. Help us design - experiments to track down and demonstrate where the problems are, and + There are some bottlenecks in the current Tor network. Help us +design + experiments to track down and demonstrate where the problems are, +and then we can focus better on fixing them. </li> <li> - There are some steps that individuals - can take to improve their Tor performance. <a - href="<wiki>doc/FireFoxTorPerf">You - can configure your Firefox to handle Tor better</a>, <a - href="http://www.pps.jussieu.fr/~jch/software/polipo/tor.html">you can use - Polipo with Tor</a>, or you can try <a href="<page download/download>">upgrading - to the latest version of Tor</a>. If this works well, please help by - documenting what you did, and letting us know about it. - </li> - - <li> Tor needs some architectural changes too. One important change is to - start providing <a href="#EverybodyARelay">better service to people who - relay traffic</a>. We're working on this, and we'll finish faster if we + start providing <a href="#EverybodyARelay">better service to people +who + relay traffic</a>. We're working on this, and we'll finish faster if +we get to spend more time on it. </li> <li> - Help do other things so we can do the hard stuff. Please take a moment - to figure out what your skills and interests are, and then <a href="<page + Help do other things so we can do the hard stuff. Please take a +moment + to figure out what your skills and interests are, and then <a +href="<page getinvolved/volunteer>">look at our volunteer page</a>. </li> <li> - Help find sponsors for Tor. Do you work at a company or government agency + Help find sponsors for Tor. Do you work at a company or government +agency that uses Tor or has a use for Internet privacy, e.g. to browse the - competition's websites discreetly, or to connect back to the home servers - when on the road without revealing affiliations? If your organization has - an interest in keeping the Tor network working, please contact them about - supporting Tor. Without sponsors, Tor is going to become even slower. + competition's websites discreetly, or to connect back to the home +servers + when on the road without revealing affiliations? If your +organization has + an interest in keeping the Tor network working, please contact them +about + supporting Tor. Without sponsors, Tor is going to become even +slower. </li> <li> If you can't help out with any of the above, you can still help out - individually by <a href="<page donate/donate>">donating a bit of money to the + individually by <a href="<page donate/donate>">donating a bit of +money to the cause</a>. It adds up! </li> @@ -510,21 +617,25 @@ <hr> <a id="Funding"></a> - <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Funding">What would The Tor Project do with more funding?</a></h3> + <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Funding">What would The Tor Project do +with more funding?</a></h3> <p> The Tor network's <a - href="https://metrics.torproject.org/network.html#networksize">several + +href="https://metrics.torproject.org/network.html#networksize">several thousand</a> relays push <a href="https://metrics.torproject.org/network.html#bandwidth">over 1GB per second on average</a>. We have <a - href="https://metrics.torproject.org/users.html#direct-users">several + +href="https://metrics.torproject.org/users.html#direct-users">several hundred thousand daily users</a>. But the Tor network is not yet self-sustaining. </p> <p> - There are six main development/maintenance pushes that need attention: + There are six main development/maintenance pushes that need +attention: </p> <ul> @@ -532,38 +643,52 @@ <li> Scalability: We need to keep scaling and decentralizing the Tor architecture so it can handle thousands of relays and millions of - users. The upcoming stable release is a major improvement, but there's + users. The upcoming stable release is a major improvement, but +there's lots more to be done next in terms of keeping Tor fast and stable. </li> <li> - User support: With this many users, a lot of people are asking questions - all the time, offering to help out with things, and so on. We need good - clean docs, and we need to spend some effort coordinating volunteers. + User support: With this many users, a lot of people are asking +questions + all the time, offering to help out with things, and so on. We need +good + clean docs, and we need to spend some effort coordinating +volunteers. </li> <li> - Relay support: the Tor network is run by volunteers, but they still need + Relay support: the Tor network is run by volunteers, but they still +need attention with prompt bug fixes, explanations when things go wrong, - reminders to upgrade, and so on. The network itself is a commons, and - somebody needs to spend some energy making sure the relay operators stay - happy. We also need to work on stability on some platforms — e.g., + reminders to upgrade, and so on. The network itself is a commons, +and + somebody needs to spend some energy making sure the relay operators +stay + happy. We also need to work on stability on some platforms — +e.g., Tor relays have problems on Win XP currently. </li> <li> - Usability: Beyond documentation, we also need to work on usability of the - software itself. This includes installers, clean GUIs, easy configuration - to interface with other applications, and generally automating all of - the difficult and confusing steps inside Tor. We've got a start on this - with the <a href="<page projects/vidalia>">Vidalia GUI</a>, but much more work + Usability: Beyond documentation, we also need to work on usability +of the + software itself. This includes installers, clean GUIs, easy +configuration + to interface with other applications, and generally automating all +of + the difficult and confusing steps inside Tor. We've got a start on +this + with the <a href="<page projects/vidalia>">Vidalia GUI</a>, but much +more work remains — usability for privacy software has never been easy. </li> <li> Incentives: We need to work on ways to encourage people to configure their Tors as relays and exit nodes rather than just clients. - <a href="#EverybodyARelay">We need to make it easy to become a relay, + <a href="#EverybodyARelay">We need to make it easy to become a +relay, and we need to give people incentives to do it.</a> </li> @@ -572,9 +697,12 @@ of surprises and gotchas. In our copious free time, we also help run top anonymity and privacy conferences like <a href="http://petsymposium.org/">PETS</a>. We've identified a set of - critical <a href="<page getinvolved/volunteer>#Research">Tor research questions</a> - that will help us figure out how to make Tor secure against the variety of - attacks out there. Of course, there are more research questions waiting + critical <a href="<page getinvolved/volunteer>#Research">Tor +research questions</a> + that will help us figure out how to make Tor secure against the +variety of + attacks out there. Of course, there are more research questions +waiting behind these. </li> @@ -582,9 +710,11 @@ <p> We're continuing to move forward on all of these, but at this rate - <a href="#WhySlow">the Tor network is growing faster than the developers + <a href="#WhySlow">the Tor network is growing faster than the +developers can keep up</a>. - Now would be an excellent time to add a few more developers to the effort + Now would be an excellent time to add a few more developers to the +effort so we can continue to grow the network. </p> @@ -594,23 +724,30 @@ </p> <p> - We are proud to have <a href="<page about/sponsors>">sponsorship and support</a> - from the Omidyar Network, the International Broadcasting Bureau, Bell - Security Solutions, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, several government + We are proud to have <a href="<page about/sponsors>">sponsorship and +support</a> + from the Omidyar Network, the International Broadcasting Bureau, +Bell + Security Solutions, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, several +government agencies and research groups, and hundreds of private contributors. </p> <p> - However, this support is not enough to keep Tor abreast of changes in the - Internet privacy landscape. Please <a href="<page donate/donate>">donate</a> - to the project, or <a href="<page about/contact>">contact</a> our executive + However, this support is not enough to keep Tor abreast of changes +in the + Internet privacy landscape. Please <a href="<page +donate/donate>">donate</a> + to the project, or <a href="<page about/contact>">contact</a> our +executive director for information on making grants or major donations. </p> <hr> <a id="Metrics"></a> - <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Metrics">How many people use Tor? How many relays or exit nodes are there?</a></h3> + <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Metrics">How many people use Tor? How +many relays or exit nodes are there?</a></h3> <p>All this and more about measuring Tor can be found at the <a href="https://metrics.torproject.org/">Tor Metrics Portal</a>.</p> @@ -622,9 +759,11 @@ <p> <pre> *.torproject.org SSL certificate from Digicert: - The serial number is: 02:DA:41:04:89:A5:FD:A2:B5:DB:DB:F8:ED:15:0D:BE + The serial number is: +02:DA:41:04:89:A5:FD:A2:B5:DB:DB:F8:ED:15:0D:BE The SHA-1 fingerprint is: a7e70f8a648fe04a9677f13eedf6f91b5f7f2e25 - The SHA-256 fingerprint is: 23b854af6b96co224fd173382c520b46fa94f2d4e7238893f63ad2d783e27b4b + The SHA-256 fingerprint is: +23b854af6b96co224fd173382c520b46fa94f2d4e7238893f63ad2d783e27b4b blog.torproject.org SSL certificate from RapidSSL: The serial number is: 00:EF:A3 @@ -634,31 +773,47 @@ <hr> <a id="HowUninstallTor"></a> - <h3><a class="anchor" href="#HowUninstallTor">How do I uninstall Tor?</a></h3> + <h3><a class="anchor" href="#HowUninstallTor">How do I uninstall +Tor?</a></h3> <p> - This depends entirely on how you installed it and which operating system you - have. If you installed a package, then hopefully your package has a way to - uninstall itself. The Windows packages include uninstallers. The proper way to - completely remove Tor, Vidalia, Torbutton for Firefox, and Polipo on any - version of Windows is as follows: + Tor Browser does not install itself in the classic sense of +applications. You just simply delete the folder or directory named "Tor +Browser" and it is removed from your system. </p> + <p> + If this is not related to Tor Browser, uninstallation depends +entirely on how you installed it and which operating system you + have. If you installed a package, then hopefully your package has a +way to + uninstall itself. The Windows packages include uninstallers. The +proper way to + completely remove Tor, Vidalia, and Torbutton for Firefox on any +version of Windows is as follows: + </p> + <ol> - <li>In your taskbar, right click on Vidalia (the green onion or the black head) + <li>In your taskbar, right click on Vidalia (the green onion or the +black head) and choose exit.</li> - <li>Right click on the taskbar to bring up TaskManager. Look for tor.exe in the - Process List. If it's running, right click and choose End Process.</li> - <li>Click the Start button, go to Programs, go to Vidalia, choose Uninstall. - This will remove the Vidalia bundle, which includes Tor and Polipo.</li> - <li>Start Firefox. Go to the Tools menu, choose Add-ons. Select Torbutton. + <li>Right click on the taskbar to bring up TaskManager. Look for +tor.exe in the + Process List. If it's running, right click and choose End +Process.</li> + <li>Click the Start button, go to Programs, go to Vidalia, choose +Uninstall. + This will remove the Vidalia bundle, which includes Tor.</li> + <li>Start Firefox. Go to the Tools menu, choose Add-ons. Select +Torbutton. Click the Uninstall button.</li> </ol> <p> If you do not follow these steps (for example by trying to uninstall - Vidalia, Tor, and Polipo while they are still running), you will need to - reboot and manually remove the directory "Program Files\Vidalia Bundle". + Vidalia and Tor while they are still running), you will need to + reboot and manually remove the directory "Program Files\Vidalia +Bundle". </p> <p> @@ -667,24 +822,29 @@ </p> <p> - If you installed by source, I'm afraid there is no easy uninstall method. But - on the bright side, by default it only installs into /usr/local/ and it should + If you installed by source, I'm afraid there is no easy uninstall +method. But + on the bright side, by default it only installs into /usr/local/ and +it should be pretty easy to notice things there. </p> <hr> <a id="PGPSigs"></a> - <h3><a class="anchor" href="#PGPSigs">What are these "sig" files on the download page?</a></h3> + <h3><a class="anchor" href="#PGPSigs">What are these "sig" files on +the download page?</a></h3> <p> - These are PGP signatures, so you can verify that the file you've downloaded is + These are PGP signatures, so you can verify that the file you've +downloaded is exactly the one that we intended you to get. </p> <p> Please read the <a - href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">verifying signatures</a> page for details. + href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">verifying signatures</a> +page for details. </p> <hr> @@ -698,7 +858,8 @@ website. In those cases, you have three options. First, get it from a friend — the <a href="<page projects/torbrowser>">Tor Browser Bundle</a> fits nicely on a USB key. Second, find the <a -href="https://encrypted.google.com/search?q=tor+mirrors">google cache</a> +href="https://encrypted.google.com/search?q=tor+mirrors">google +cache</a> for the <a href="<page getinvolved/mirrors>">Tor mirrors</a> page and see if any of those copies of our website work for you. Third, you can download Tor via email: log in to your Gmail account and mail @@ -709,7 +870,8 @@ </p> <p> -Be sure to <a href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">verify the signature</a> +Be sure to <a href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">verify the +signature</a> of any package you download, especially when you get it from somewhere other than our official HTTPS website. </p> @@ -717,57 +879,72 @@ <hr> <a id="CompileTorWindows"></a> - <h3><a class="anchor" href="#CompileTorWindows">How do I compile Tor under Windows?</a></h3> + <h3><a class="anchor" href="#CompileTorWindows">How do I compile Tor +under Windows?</a></h3> <p> - Try following the steps at <a href="<gitblob>doc/tor-win32-mingw-creation.txt"> + Try following the steps at <a +href="<gitblob>doc/tor-win32-mingw-creation.txt"> tor-win32-mingw-creation.txt</a>. </p> <p> (Note that you don't need to compile Tor yourself in order to use - it. Most people just use the packages available on the <a href="<page + it. Most people just use the packages available on the <a +href="<page download/download>">download page</a>.) </p> <hr> <a id="VirusFalsePositives"></a> - <h3><a class="anchor" href="#VirusFalsePositives">Why does my Tor executable appear to have a virus or spyware?</a></h3> + <h3><a class="anchor" href="#VirusFalsePositives">Why does my Tor +executable appear to have a virus or spyware?</a></h3> <p> - Sometimes, overzealous Windows virus and spyware detectors trigger on some - parts of the Tor Windows binary. Our best guess is that these are false - positives — after all, the anti-virus and anti-spyware business is just a - guessing game anyway. You should contact your vendor and explain that you have - a program that seems to be triggering false positives. Or pick a better vendor. + Sometimes, overzealous Windows virus and spyware detectors trigger +on some + parts of the Tor Windows binary. Our best guess is that these are +false + positives — after all, the anti-virus and anti-spyware +business is just a + guessing game anyway. You should contact your vendor and explain +that you have + a program that seems to be triggering false positives. Or pick a +better vendor. </p> <p> In the meantime, we encourage you to not just take our word for - it. Our job is to provide the source; if you're concerned, please do <a + it. Our job is to provide the source; if you're concerned, please do +<a href="#CompileTorWindows">recompile it yourself</a>. </p> <hr> <a id="LiveCD"></a> - <h3><a class="anchor" href="#LiveCD">Is there a LiveCD or other bundle that includes Tor?</a></h3> + <h3><a class="anchor" href="#LiveCD">Is there a LiveCD or other +bundle that includes Tor?</a></h3> <p> Yes. Use <a href="https://tails.boum.org/">The Amnesic Incognito - Live System</a> or <a href="<page projects/torbrowser>">the Tor Browser + Live System</a> or <a href="<page projects/torbrowser>">the Tor +Browser Bundle</a>. </p> <hr> <a id="TBBFlash"></a> -<h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBFlash">Why can't I view videos on YouTube +<h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBFlash">Why can't I view videos on +YouTube and other Flash-based sites?</a></h3> <p> -<a href="https://www.torproject.org/torbutton/torbutton-faq.html.en#noflash">Answer</a> +<a +href="https://www.torproject.org/torbutton/torbutton-faq.html. +en#noflash">Answer</a> </p> <hr> @@ -821,12 +998,11 @@ <p> If that fails, feel free to install <a -href="http://www.privoxy.org/">privoxy</a> or <a -href="https://archive.torproject.org/tor-package-archive/polipo/">polipo</a>. -You can use <a -href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbrowser.git/blob_plain/1ffcd9dafb9dd76c3a29dd686e05a71a95599fb5:/build-scripts/config/polipo.conf">our -old polipo config file</a> if you like. However, please realize that -this approach is not recommended for novice users. +href="http://www.privoxy.org/">privoxy</a>. +However, please realize that this approach is not recommended for novice +users. Privoxy has an <a +href="http://www.privoxy.org/faq/misc.html#TOR">example +configuration</a> of Tor and Privoxy. </p> <hr> @@ -837,7 +1013,8 @@ <p> Yes. Just install them like normal. But be sure to avoid extensions like -Foxyproxy that screw up your proxy settings. Also, avoid privacy-invasive +Foxyproxy that screw up your proxy settings. Also, avoid +privacy-invasive extensions (for example, pretty much anything with the word Toolbar in its name). </p> @@ -845,7 +1022,9 @@ <hr> <a id="TBBJavaScriptEnabled"></a> -<h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBJavaScriptEnabled">Why is NoScript configured to allow JavaScript by default in the Tor Browser Bundle? Isn't that unsafe?</a></h3> +<h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBJavaScriptEnabled">Why is NoScript +configured to allow JavaScript by default in the Tor Browser Bundle? +Isn't that unsafe?</a></h3> <p> We configure NoScript to allow JavaScript by default in the Tor @@ -859,7 +1038,8 @@ <hr> <a id="TBBCanIBlockJS"></a> -<h3><a class="anchor" href="#CanIBlockJS">I'm an expert! (No, really!) Can I configure NoScript to block JavaScript by default?</a></h3> +<h3><a class="anchor" href="#CanIBlockJS">I'm an expert! (No, really!) +Can I configure NoScript to block JavaScript by default?</a></h3> <p> You can configure your copies of Tor Browser Bundle however you want @@ -887,22 +1067,27 @@ Unfortunately, Torbutton only works with Firefox right now, and without <a href="https://www.torproject.org/torbutton/en/design/">Torbutton's extensive privacy fixes</a> there are many ways for websites or other -attackers to recognize you, track you back to your IP address, and so on. +attackers to recognize you, track you back to your IP address, and so +on. In short, using any browser besides Tor Browser Bundle with Tor is a really bad idea. </p> <p> We're working with the Chrome team to <a -href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/google-chrome-incognito-mode-tor-and-fingerprinting">fix -some bugs and missing APIs in Chrome</a> so it will be possible to write a -Torbutton for Chrome. No support for any other browser is on the horizon. +href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/google-chrome-incognito-mode-tor- +and-fingerprinting">fix +some bugs and missing APIs in Chrome</a> so it will be possible to write +a +Torbutton for Chrome. No support for any other browser is on the +horizon. </p> <hr> <a id="TBBCloseBrowser"></a> -<h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBCloseBrowser">I want to leave Tor Browser +<h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBCloseBrowser">I want to leave Tor +Browser Bundle running but close the browser.</a></h3> <p> @@ -913,7 +1098,8 @@ <hr> <a id="GoogleCaptcha"></a> -<h3><a class="anchor" href="#GoogleCaptcha">Google makes me solve a Captcha or tells me I have spyware installed.</a></h3> +<h3><a class="anchor" href="#GoogleCaptcha">Google makes me solve a +Captcha or tells me I have spyware installed.</a></h3> <p> This is a known and intermittent problem; it does not mean that Google @@ -921,9 +1107,11 @@ </p> <p> -When you use Tor, you are sending queries through exit relays that are also +When you use Tor, you are sending queries through exit relays that are +also shared by thousands of other users. Tor users typically see this message -when many Tor users are querying Google in a short period of time. Google +when many Tor users are querying Google in a short period of time. +Google interprets the high volume of traffic from a single IP address (the exit relay you happened to pick) as somebody trying to "crawl" their website, so it slows down traffic from that IP address for a short time. @@ -938,7 +1126,8 @@ </p> <p> -To our knowledge, Google is not doing anything intentionally specifically +To our knowledge, Google is not doing anything intentionally +specifically to deter or block Tor use. The error message about an infected machine should clear up again after a short time. </p> @@ -952,7 +1141,8 @@ <hr /> <a id="GmailWarning"></a> -<h3><a class="anchor" href="#GmailWarning">Gmail warns me that my account +<h3><a class="anchor" href="#GmailWarning">Gmail warns me that my +account may have been compromised.</a></h3> <p> @@ -964,7 +1154,8 @@ <p> In general this is a false alarm: Google saw a bunch of logins from -different places, as a result of running the service via Tor, and decided +different places, as a result of running the service via Tor, and +decided it was a good idea to confirm the account was being accessed by it's rightful owner. </p> @@ -981,7 +1172,8 @@ or by watching your network traffic. In theory only physical access should compromise your system because Gmail and similar services should only send the cookie over an SSL link. In practice, alas, it's <a -href="http://fscked.org/blog/fully-automated-active-https-cookie-hijacking"> +href="http://fscked.org/blog/fully-automated-active-https-cookie- +hijacking"> way more complex than that</a>. </p> @@ -998,7 +1190,8 @@ <hr> <a id="torrc"></a> -<h3><a class="anchor" href="#torrc">I'm supposed to "edit my torrc". What does that mean?</a></h3> +<h3><a class="anchor" href="#torrc">I'm supposed to "edit my torrc". +What does that mean?</a></h3> <p> Tor installs a text file called torrc that contains configuration @@ -1008,8 +1201,10 @@ users should need to modify their torrc file directly. </p> <p> -Tor Browser Bundle users should edit your torrc through Vidalia. Open the -Vidalia Control Panel. Choose Settings. Choose Advanced. Click the button +Tor Browser Bundle users should edit your torrc through Vidalia. Open +the +Vidalia Control Panel. Choose Settings. Choose Advanced. Click the +button labelled "Edit current torrc". Remember to make sure the checkbox for "Save Settings." is checked. Hit the Ok button and you are done. </p> @@ -1040,19 +1235,22 @@ </li> <li>Finally, if you installed from source, you may not have a torrc installed yet: look in <code>/usr/local/etc/</code> and note that you -may need to manually copy <code>torrc.sample</code> to <code>torrc</code>. +may need to manually copy <code>torrc.sample</code> to +<code>torrc</code>. </li> </ul> <p> If you use Vidalia, be sure to exit both Tor and Vidalia before you edit -your torrc file manually. Otherwise Vidalia might overwrite your changes. +your torrc file manually. Otherwise Vidalia might overwrite your +changes. </p> <p> Once you've changed your torrc, you will need to restart Tor for the changes to take effect. (For advanced users on OS X and Unix, note that -you actually only need to send Tor a HUP signal, not actually restart it.) +you actually only need to send Tor a HUP signal, not actually restart +it.) </p> <p> @@ -1065,7 +1263,8 @@ <hr> <a id="Logs"></a> -<h3><a class="anchor" href="#Logs">How do I set up logging, or see Tor's logs?</a></h3> +<h3><a class="anchor" href="#Logs">How do I set up logging, or see Tor's +logs?</a></h3> <p> If you installed a Tor bundle that includes Vidalia, then Vidalia has a @@ -1094,7 +1293,8 @@ </ul> <p> -To change your logging setup by hand, <a href="#torrc">edit your torrc</a> +To change your logging setup by hand, <a href="#torrc">edit your +torrc</a> and find the section (near the top of the file) which contains the following line: </p> @@ -1122,7 +1322,8 @@ <hr> <a id="DoesntWork"></a> -<h3><a class="anchor" href="#DoesntWork">I installed Tor but it's not working.</a></h3> +<h3><a class="anchor" href="#DoesntWork">I installed Tor but it's not +working.</a></h3> <p> Once you've got the Tor bundle up and running, the first question to @@ -1130,8 +1331,10 @@ </p> <p>If Tor can establish a circuit, the onion icon in -Vidalia will turn green (and if you're running Tor Browser Bundle, it will -automatically launch a browser for you). You can also check in the Vidalia +Vidalia will turn green (and if you're running Tor Browser Bundle, it +will +automatically launch a browser for you). You can also check in the +Vidalia Control Panel to make sure it says "Connected to the Tor network!" under Status. For those not using Vidalia, check your <a href="#Logs">Tor logs</a> for @@ -1153,9 +1356,11 @@ zone is correct.</li> <li>Is your Internet connection <a href="#FirewallPorts">firewalled by port</a>, or do you normally need to use a <a -href="<wikifaq>#MyInternetconnectionrequiresanHTTPorSOCKSproxy.">proxy</a>? +href="<wikifaq>#MyInternetconnectionrequiresanHTTPorSOCKSproxy.">proxy</ +a>? </li> -<li>Are you running programs like Norton Internet Security or SELinux that +<li>Are you running programs like Norton Internet Security or SELinux +that block certain connections, even though you don't realize they do? They could be preventing Tor from making network connections.</li> <li>Are you in China, or behind a restrictive corporate network firewall @@ -1168,7 +1373,8 @@ <hr /> <a id="VidaliaPassword"></a> -<h3><a class="anchor" href="#VidaliaPassword">Tor/Vidalia prompts for a password at start.</a></h3> +<h3><a class="anchor" href="#VidaliaPassword">Tor/Vidalia prompts for a +password at start.</a></h3> <p> Vidalia interacts with the Tor software via Tor's "control port". The @@ -1193,9 +1399,11 @@ </li> <li>Vidalia crashed, but left Tor running with the last known random password. After you restart Vidalia, it generates a new random password, -but Vidalia can't talk to Tor, because the random passwords are different. +but Vidalia can't talk to Tor, because the random passwords are +different. <br /> -If the dialog that prompts you for a control password has a Reset button, +If the dialog that prompts you for a control password has a Reset +button, you can click the button and Vidalia will restart Tor with a new random control password. <br /> @@ -1214,7 +1422,8 @@ but it is different than the saved password in the Tor service. <br /> You need to reconfigure Tor to not be a service. See the FAQ entry on -<a href="<wikifaq>#HowdoIrunmyTorrelayasanNTservice">running Tor as a Windows NT service</a> +<a href="<wikifaq>#HowdoIrunmyTorrelayasanNTservice">running Tor as a +Windows NT service</a> for more information on how to remove the Tor service. </li> </ol> @@ -1222,7 +1431,8 @@ <hr> <a id="ChooseEntryExit"></a> - <h3><a class="anchor" href="#ChooseEntryExit">Can I control which nodes (or country) are used for entry/exit?</a></h3> + <h3><a class="anchor" href="#ChooseEntryExit">Can I control which +nodes (or country) are used for entry/exit?</a></h3> <p> Yes. You can set preferred entry and exit nodes as well as @@ -1232,22 +1442,26 @@ </p> <dl> <dt><tt>EntryNodes $fingerprint,$fingerprint,...</tt></dt> - <dd>A list of preferred nodes to use for the first hop in the circuit, if possible. + <dd>A list of preferred nodes to use for the first hop in the +circuit, if possible. </dd> <dt><tt>ExitNodes $fingerprint,$fingerprint,...</tt></dt> - <dd>A list of preferred nodes to use for the last hop in the circuit, if possible. + <dd>A list of preferred nodes to use for the last hop in the +circuit, if possible. </dd> <dt><tt>ExcludeNodes $fingerprint,$fingerprint,...</tt></dt> <dd>A list of nodes to never use when building a circuit. </dd> <dt><tt>ExcludeExitNodes $fingerprint,$fingerprint,...</tt></dt> <dd>A list of nodes to never use when picking an exit. - Nodes listed in <tt>ExcludeNodes</tt> are automatically in this list. + Nodes listed in <tt>ExcludeNodes</tt> are automatically in +this list. </dd> </dl> <p> <em>We recommend you do not use these</em> - — they are intended for testing and may disappear in future versions. + — they are intended for testing and may disappear in future +versions. You get the best security that Tor can provide when you leave the route selection to Tor; overriding the entry / exit nodes can mess up your anonymity in ways we don't understand. @@ -1259,32 +1473,39 @@ setting <tt>StrictExitNodes 1</tt> or <tt>StrictEntryNodes 1</tt> — but if you do, your Tor connections will stop working if all of the nodes you have specified become unreachable. - See the <a href="<page docs/documentation>#NeatLinks">Tor status pages</a> + See the <a href="<page docs/documentation>#NeatLinks">Tor status +pages</a> for some nodes you might pick. </p> <p> Instead of <tt>$fingerprint</tt> you can also specify a <a - href="https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/ISO_3166-1_alpha-2">2 + +href="https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/ISO_3166-1_alpha-2" +>2 letter ISO3166 country code</a> in curly braces (for example {de}), or an ip address pattern (for example 255.254.0.0/8), or a node nickname. Make sure there are no spaces between the commas and the list items. </p> <p> - If you want to access a service directly through Tor's Socks interface + If you want to access a service directly through Tor's Socks +interface (eg. using ssh via connect.c), another option is to set up an - internal mapping in your configuration file using <tt>MapAddress</tt>. + internal mapping in your configuration file using +<tt>MapAddress</tt>. See the manual page for details. </p> <hr> <a id="FirewallPorts"></a> -<h3><a class="anchor" href="#FirewallPorts">My firewall only allows a few outgoing ports.</a></h3> +<h3><a class="anchor" href="#FirewallPorts">My firewall only allows a +few outgoing ports.</a></h3> <p> If your firewall works by blocking ports, then you can tell Tor to only -use the ports that your firewall permits by adding "FascistFirewall 1" to +use the ports that your firewall permits by adding "FascistFirewall 1" +to your <a href="<page docs/faq>#torrc">torrc configuration file</a>, or by clicking "My firewall only lets me connect to certain ports" in Vidalia's Network Settings window. @@ -1309,7 +1530,8 @@ <hr> <a id="RelayFlexible"></a> - <h3><a class="anchor" href="#RelayFlexible">How stable does my relay need to be?</a></h3> + <h3><a class="anchor" href="#RelayFlexible">How stable does my relay +need to be?</a></h3> <p> We aim to make setting up a Tor relay easy and convenient: @@ -1321,13 +1543,19 @@ rate limiting</a>. Further, if you have a fast link but want to limit the number of bytes per day (or week or month) that you donate, check out the <a - href="<wikifaq>#HowcanIlimitthetotalamountofbandwidthusedbymyTorrelay">hibernation + +href="<wikifaq>#HowcanIlimitthetotalamountofbandwidthusedbymyTorrelay"> +hibernation feature</a>. </li> - <li>Each Tor relay has an <a href="#ExitPolicies">exit policy</a> that - specifies what sort of outbound connections are allowed or refused from - that relay. If you are uncomfortable allowing people to exit from your - relay, you can set it up to only allow connections to other Tor relays. + <li>Each Tor relay has an <a href="#ExitPolicies">exit policy</a> +that + specifies what sort of outbound connections are allowed or refused +from + that relay. If you are uncomfortable allowing people to exit from +your + relay, you can set it up to only allow connections to other Tor +relays. </li> <li>It's fine if the relay goes offline sometimes. The directories notice this quickly and stop advertising the relay. Just try to make @@ -1344,8 +1572,10 @@ offers some examples on how to do this. </li> <li>Your relay will passively estimate and advertise its recent - bandwidth capacity, so high-bandwidth relays will attract more users than - low-bandwidth ones. Therefore having low-bandwidth relays is useful too. + bandwidth capacity, so high-bandwidth relays will attract more users +than + low-bandwidth ones. Therefore having low-bandwidth relays is useful +too. </li> </ul> @@ -1353,7 +1583,8 @@ <a id="RunARelayBut"></a> <a id="ExitPolicies"></a> - <h3><a class="anchor" href="#ExitPolicies">I'd run a relay, but I don't want to deal with abuse issues.</a></h3> + <h3><a class="anchor" href="#ExitPolicies">I'd run a relay, but I +don't want to deal with abuse issues.</a></h3> <p> Great. That's exactly why we implemented exit policies. @@ -1361,13 +1592,16 @@ <p> Each Tor relay has an exit policy that specifies what sort of - outbound connections are allowed or refused from that relay. The exit + outbound connections are allowed or refused from that relay. The +exit policies are propagated to Tor clients via the directory, so clients will automatically avoid picking exit relays that would refuse to exit to their intended destination. This way each relay can decide the services, hosts, and networks he wants to allow connections to, - based on abuse potential and his own situation. Read the FAQ entry on - <a href="<page docs/faq-abuse>#TypicalAbuses">issues you might encounter</a> + based on abuse potential and his own situation. Read the FAQ entry +on + <a href="<page docs/faq-abuse>#TypicalAbuses">issues you might +encounter</a> if you use the default exit policy, and then read Mike Perry's <a href="<blog>tips-running-exit-node-minimal-harassment">tips for running an exit node with minimal harassment</a>. @@ -1375,36 +1609,47 @@ <p> The default exit policy allows access to many popular services - (e.g. web browsing), but <a href="<wikifaq>#Istherealistofdefaultexitports">restricts</a> + (e.g. web browsing), but <a +href="<wikifaq>#Istherealistofdefaultexitports">restricts</a> some due to abuse potential (e.g. mail) and some since the Tor network can't handle the load (e.g. default file-sharing ports). You can change your exit policy using Vidalia's "Sharing" tab, or by manually editing your <a href="<page docs/faq>#torrc">torrc</a> - file. If you want to avoid most if not all abuse potential, set it to - "reject *:*" (or un-check all the boxes in Vidalia). This setting means - that your relay will be used for relaying traffic inside the Tor network, + file. If you want to avoid most if not all abuse potential, set it +to + "reject *:*" (or un-check all the boxes in Vidalia). This setting +means + that your relay will be used for relaying traffic inside the Tor +network, but not for connections to external websites or other services. </p> <p> - If you do allow any exit connections, make sure name resolution works + If you do allow any exit connections, make sure name resolution +works (that is, your computer can resolve Internet addresses correctly). - If there are any resources that your computer can't reach (for example, + If there are any resources that your computer can't reach (for +example, you are behind a restrictive firewall or content filter), please - explicitly reject them in your exit policy — otherwise Tor users + explicitly reject them in your exit policy — otherwise Tor +users will be impacted too. </p> <hr> <a id="RelayOrBridge"></a> - <h3><a class="anchor" href="#RelayOrBridge">Should I be a normal relay or bridge relay?</a></h3> + <h3><a class="anchor" href="#RelayOrBridge">Should I be a normal +relay or bridge relay?</a></h3> - <p><a href="<page docs/bridges>">Bridge relays</a> (or "bridges" for short) - are <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-relay>">Tor relays</a> that aren't listed + <p><a href="<page docs/bridges>">Bridge relays</a> (or "bridges" for +short) + are <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-relay>">Tor relays</a> that aren't +listed in the main Tor directory. That means - that even an ISP or government trying to filter connections to the Tor + that even an ISP or government trying to filter connections to the +Tor network probably won't be able to block all the bridges. </p> @@ -1414,14 +1659,17 @@ </p> <p>Right now, China is the main place in the world that filters - connections to the Tor network. So bridges are useful a) for users in - China, b) as a backup measure in case the Tor network gets blocked in + connections to the Tor network. So bridges are useful a) for users +in + China, b) as a backup measure in case the Tor network gets blocked +in more places, and c) for people who want an extra layer of security because they're worried somebody will recognize that it's a public Tor relay IP address they're contacting. </p> - <p>So should you run a normal relay or bridge relay? If you have lots + <p>So should you run a normal relay or bridge relay? If you have +lots of bandwidth, you should definitely run a normal relay — the average bridge doesn't see much load these days. If you're willing to <a href="#ExitPolicies">be an exit</a>, you should definitely @@ -1433,7 +1681,8 @@ <hr> <a id="MultipleRelays"></a> -<h3><a class="anchor" href="#MultipleRelays">I want to run more than one relay.</a></h3> +<h3><a class="anchor" href="#MultipleRelays">I want to run more than one +relay.</a></h3> <p> Great. If you want to run several relays to donate more to the network, @@ -1454,7 +1703,8 @@ <p> where each fingerprint is the 40 character identity fingerprint (without -spaces). You can also list them by nickname, but fingerprint is safer. Be +spaces). You can also list them by nickname, but fingerprint is safer. +Be sure to prefix the digest strings with a dollar sign ('$') so that the digest is not confused with a nickname in the config file. </p> @@ -1469,27 +1719,38 @@ <hr> <a id="RelayMemory"></a> - <h3><a class="anchor" href="#RelayMemory">Why is my Tor relay using so much memory?</a></h3> + <h3><a class="anchor" href="#RelayMemory">Why is my Tor relay using +so much memory?</a></h3> - <p>If your Tor relay is using more memory than you'd like, here are some + <p>If your Tor relay is using more memory than you'd like, here are +some tips for reducing its footprint: </p> <ol> <li>If you're on Linux, you may be encountering memory fragmentation - bugs in glibc's malloc implementation. That is, when Tor releases memory - back to the system, the pieces of memory are fragmented so they're hard - to reuse. The Tor tarball ships with OpenBSD's malloc implementation, - which doesn't have as many fragmentation bugs (but the tradeoff is higher - CPU load). You can tell Tor to use this malloc implementation instead: + bugs in glibc's malloc implementation. That is, when Tor releases +memory + back to the system, the pieces of memory are fragmented so they're +hard + to reuse. The Tor tarball ships with OpenBSD's malloc +implementation, + which doesn't have as many fragmentation bugs (but the tradeoff is +higher + CPU load). You can tell Tor to use this malloc implementation +instead: <tt>./configure --enable-openbsd-malloc</tt></li> - <li>If you're running a fast relay, meaning you have many TLS connections + <li>If you're running a fast relay, meaning you have many TLS +connections open, you are probably losing a lot of memory to OpenSSL's internal buffers (38KB+ per socket). We've patched OpenSSL to <a - href="https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2008-June/001519.html">release + +href="https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2008-June/001519. +html">release unused buffer memory more aggressively</a>. If you update to OpenSSL - 1.0.0 or newer, Tor's build process will automatically recognize and use + 1.0.0 or newer, Tor's build process will automatically recognize and +use this feature.</li> <li>If you're running on Solaris, OpenBSD, NetBSD, or @@ -1499,7 +1760,8 @@ operating system</a>.</li> <li>If you still can't handle the memory load, consider reducing the - amount of bandwidth your relay advertises. Advertising less bandwidth + amount of bandwidth your relay advertises. Advertising less +bandwidth means you will attract fewer users, so your relay shouldn't grow as large. See the <tt>MaxAdvertisedBandwidth</tt> option in the man page.</li> @@ -1507,23 +1769,28 @@ </ol> <p> - All of this said, fast Tor relays do use a lot of ram. It is not unusual + All of this said, fast Tor relays do use a lot of ram. It is not +unusual for a fast exit relay to use 500-1000 MB of memory. </p> <hr> <a id="WhyNotNamed"></a> - <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhyNotNamed">Why is my Tor relay not named?</a></h3> + <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhyNotNamed">Why is my Tor relay not +named?</a></h3> <p> - We currently use these metrics to determine if your relay should be named:<br> + We currently use these metrics to determine if your relay should be +named:<br> </p> <ul> - <li>The name is not currently mapped to a different key. Existing mappings + <li>The name is not currently mapped to a different key. Existing +mappings are removed after 6 months of inactivity from a relay.</li> <li>The relay must have been around for at least two weeks.</li> - <li>No other router may have wanted the same name in the past month.</li> + <li>No other router may have wanted the same name in the past +month.</li> </ul> <hr> @@ -1541,7 +1808,8 @@ is a German charitable non-profit that runs a wide variety of exit relays. They also like donations of bandwidth from ISPs.</li> <li><a - href="https://www.noisebridge.net/wiki/Noisebridge_Tor">Noisebridge</a> + +href="https://www.noisebridge.net/wiki/Noisebridge_Tor">Noisebridge</a> is a US-based 501(c)(3) non-profit that collects donations and turns them into more exit relay capacity.</li> </ul> @@ -1555,7 +1823,8 @@ <p> Note that there can be a tradeoff here between anonymity and - performance. The Tor network's anonymity comes in part from diversity, + performance. The Tor network's anonymity comes in part from +diversity, so if you are in a position to run your own relay, you will be improving Tor's anonymity more than by donating. At the same time though, economies @@ -1568,24 +1837,29 @@ <hr> <a id="KeyManagement"></a> - <h3><a class="anchor" href="#KeyManagement">Tell me about all the keys Tor uses.</a></h3> + <h3><a class="anchor" href="#KeyManagement">Tell me about all the +keys Tor uses.</a></h3> <p> Tor uses a variety of different keys, with three goals in mind: 1) encryption to ensure privacy of data within the Tor network, 2) authentication so clients know they're - talking to the relays they meant to talk to, and 3) signatures to make + talking to the relays they meant to talk to, and 3) signatures to +make sure all clients know the same set of relays. </p> <p> - <b>Encryption</b>: first, all connections in Tor use TLS link encryption, + <b>Encryption</b>: first, all connections in Tor use TLS link +encryption, so observers can't look inside to see which circuit a given cell is - intended for. Further, the Tor client establishes an ephemeral encryption + intended for. Further, the Tor client establishes an ephemeral +encryption key with each relay in the circuit; these extra layers of encryption mean that only the exit relay can read the cells. Both sides discard the circuit key when the circuit ends, - so logging traffic and then breaking into the relay to discover the key + so logging traffic and then breaking into the relay to discover the +key won't work. </p> @@ -1594,7 +1868,8 @@ Every Tor relay has a public decryption key called the "onion key". Each relay rotates its onion key once a week. When the Tor client establishes circuits, at each step it <a - href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.html#subsec:circuits">demands + +href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.html#subsec:circuits">demands that the Tor relay prove knowledge of its onion key</a>. That way the first node in the path can't just spoof the rest of the path. Because the Tor client chooses the path, it can make sure to get @@ -1604,23 +1879,32 @@ <p> <b>Coordination</b>: - How do clients know what the relays are, and how do they know that they - have the right keys for them? Each relay has a long-term public signing - key called the "identity key". Each directory authority additionally has a + How do clients know what the relays are, and how do they know that +they + have the right keys for them? Each relay has a long-term public +signing + key called the "identity key". Each directory authority additionally +has a "directory signing key". The directory authorities <a href="<specblob>dir-spec.txt">provide a signed list</a> - of all the known relays, and in that list are a set of certificates from - each relay (self-signed by their identity key) specifying their keys, - locations, exit policies, and so on. So unless the adversary can control + of all the known relays, and in that list are a set of certificates +from + each relay (self-signed by their identity key) specifying their +keys, + locations, exit policies, and so on. So unless the adversary can +control a majority of the directory authorities (as of 2012 there are 8 directory authorities), he can't trick the Tor client into using other Tor relays. </p> <p> - How do clients know what the directory authorities are? The Tor software - comes with a built-in list of location and public key for each directory - authority. So the only way to trick users into using a fake Tor network + How do clients know what the directory authorities are? The Tor +software + comes with a built-in list of location and public key for each +directory + authority. So the only way to trick users into using a fake Tor +network is to give them a specially modified version of the software. </p> @@ -1633,23 +1917,30 @@ </p> <p> - In order to be certain that it's really signed by us, you need to have - met us in person and gotten a copy of our GPG key fingerprint, or you - need to know somebody who has. If you're concerned about an attack on - this level, we recommend you get involved with the security community + In order to be certain that it's really signed by us, you need to +have + met us in person and gotten a copy of our GPG key fingerprint, or +you + need to know somebody who has. If you're concerned about an attack +on + this level, we recommend you get involved with the security +community and start meeting people. </p> <hr> <a id="EntryGuards"></a> -<h3><a class="anchor" href="#EntryGuards">What are Entry Guards?</a></h3> +<h3><a class="anchor" href="#EntryGuards">What are Entry +Guards?</a></h3> <p> Tor (like all current practical low-latency anonymity designs) fails when the attacker can see both ends of the communications channel. For -example, suppose the attacker controls or watches the Tor relay you choose -to enter the network, and also controls or watches the website you visit. In +example, suppose the attacker controls or watches the Tor relay you +choose +to enter the network, and also controls or watches the website you +visit. In this case, the research community knows no practical low-latency design that can reliably stop the attacker from correlating volume and timing information on the two sides. @@ -1663,17 +1954,20 @@ <i>(c/n)²</i>. But profiling is, for most users, as bad as being traced all the time: they want to do something often without an attacker noticing, and the attacker noticing once is as bad as the -attacker noticing more often. Thus, choosing many random entries and exits +attacker noticing more often. Thus, choosing many random entries and +exits gives the user no chance of escaping profiling by this kind of attacker. </p> <p> -The solution is "entry guards": each Tor client selects a few relays at random +The solution is "entry guards": each Tor client selects a few relays at +random to use as entry points, and uses only those relays for her first hop. If those relays are not controlled or observed, the attacker can't win, ever, and the user is secure. If those relays <i>are</i> observed or controlled by the attacker, the attacker sees a larger <i>fraction</i> -of the user's traffic — but still the user is no more profiled than +of the user's traffic — but still the user is no more profiled +than before. Thus, the user has some chance (on the order of <i>(n-c)/n</i>) of avoiding profiling, whereas she had none before. </p> @@ -1699,50 +1993,66 @@ <hr> <a id="EverybodyARelay"></a> - <h3><a class="anchor" href="#EverybodyARelay">You should make every Tor user be a relay.</a></h3> + <h3><a class="anchor" href="#EverybodyARelay">You should make every +Tor user be a relay.</a></h3> <p> Requiring every Tor user to be a relay would help with scaling the network to handle all our users, and <a href="<wikifaq>#DoIgetbetteranonymityifIrunarelay">running a Tor - relay may help your anonymity</a>. However, many Tor users cannot be good - relays — for example, some Tor clients operate from behind restrictive - firewalls, connect via modem, or otherwise aren't in a position where they + relay may help your anonymity</a>. However, many Tor users cannot be +good + relays — for example, some Tor clients operate from behind +restrictive + firewalls, connect via modem, or otherwise aren't in a position +where they can relay traffic. Providing service to these clients is a critical - part of providing effective anonymity for everyone, since many Tor users - are subject to these or similar constraints and including these clients + part of providing effective anonymity for everyone, since many Tor +users + are subject to these or similar constraints and including these +clients increases the size of the anonymity set. </p> <p> - That said, we do want to encourage Tor users to run relays, so what we - really want to do is simplify the process of setting up and maintaining - a relay. We've made a lot of progress with easy configuration in the past - few years: Vidalia has an easy relay configuration interface, and supports - uPnP too. Tor is good at automatically detecting whether it's reachable and + That said, we do want to encourage Tor users to run relays, so what +we + really want to do is simplify the process of setting up and +maintaining + a relay. We've made a lot of progress with easy configuration in the +past + few years: Vidalia has an easy relay configuration interface, and +supports + uPnP too. Tor is good at automatically detecting whether it's +reachable and how much bandwidth it can offer. </p> <p> - There are five steps we need to address before we can do this though: + There are five steps we need to address before we can do this +though: </p> <p> First, we need to make Tor stable as a relay on all common operating systems. The main remaining platform is Windows, and we're mostly there. See Section 4.1 of <a - href="https://www.torproject.org/press/2008-12-19-roadmap-press-release">our + +href="https://www.torproject.org/press/2008-12-19-roadmap-press-release" +>our development roadmap</a>. </p> <p> Second, we still need to get better at automatically estimating the right amount of bandwidth to allow. See item #7 on the - <a href="<page getinvolved/volunteer>#Research">research section of the + <a href="<page getinvolved/volunteer>#Research">research section of +the volunteer page</a>: "Tor doesn't work very well when relays have asymmetric bandwidth (e.g. cable or DSL)". It might be that <a href="<page docs/faq>#TransportIPnotTCP">switching - to UDP transport</a> is the simplest answer here — which alas is + to UDP transport</a> is the simplest answer here — which alas +is not a very simple answer at all. </p> @@ -1764,17 +2074,25 @@ href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#clog-the-queue">different</a> <a href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#torta05">research</a> papers describe ways to identify the relays in a circuit by running traffic - through candidate relays and looking for dips in the traffic while the - circuit is active. These clogging attacks are not that scary in the Tor - context so long as relays are never clients too. But if we're trying to - encourage more clients to turn on relay functionality too (whether as - <a href="<page docs/bridges>">bridge relays</a> or as normal relays), then - we need to understand this threat better and learn how to mitigate it. + through candidate relays and looking for dips in the traffic while +the + circuit is active. These clogging attacks are not that scary in the +Tor + context so long as relays are never clients too. But if we're trying +to + encourage more clients to turn on relay functionality too (whether +as + <a href="<page docs/bridges>">bridge relays</a> or as normal +relays), then + we need to understand this threat better and learn how to mitigate +it. </p> <p> - Fifth, we might need some sort of incentive scheme to encourage people - to relay traffic for others, and/or to become exit nodes. Here are our + Fifth, we might need some sort of incentive scheme to encourage +people + to relay traffic for others, and/or to become exit nodes. Here are +our <a href="<blog>two-incentive-designs-tor">current thoughts on Tor incentives</a>. </p> @@ -1786,13 +2104,15 @@ <hr> <a id="TransportIPnotTCP"></a> -<h3><a class="anchor" href="#TransportIPnotTCP">You should transport all IP packets, not just TCP packets.</a></h3> +<h3><a class="anchor" href="#TransportIPnotTCP">You should transport all +IP packets, not just TCP packets.</a></h3> <p> This would be handy, because it would make Tor better able to handle new protocols like VoIP, it could solve the whole need to socksify applications, and it would solve the fact that exit relays need to -allocate a lot of file descriptors to hold open all the exit connections. +allocate a lot of file descriptors to hold open all the exit +connections. </p> <p> @@ -1820,7 +2140,8 @@ the protocols we are transporting. </li> <li><a -href="http://crypto.stanford.edu/~nagendra/projects/dtls/dtls.html">DTLS</a> +href="http://crypto.stanford.edu/~nagendra/projects/dtls/dtls.html">DTLS +</a> (datagram TLS) basically has no users, and IPsec sure is big. Once we've picked a transport mechanism, we need to design a new end-to-end Tor protocol for avoiding tagging attacks and other potential anonymity and @@ -1830,13 +2151,15 @@ IDS. Our node operators tell us that exit policies are one of the main reasons they're willing to run Tor. Adding an Intrusion Detection System to handle exit policies would increase the security complexity of Tor, -and would likely not work anyway, as evidenced by the entire field of IDS +and would likely not work anyway, as evidenced by the entire field of +IDS and counter-IDS papers. Many potential abuse issues are resolved by the fact that Tor only transports valid TCP streams (as opposed to arbitrary IP including malformed packets and IP floods), so exit policies become even <i>more</i> important as we become able to transport IP packets. We also need to compactly describe exit policies in the Tor directory, -so clients can predict which nodes will allow their packets to exit — +so clients can predict which nodes will allow their packets to exit +— and clients need to predict all the packets they will want to send in a session before picking their exit node! </li> @@ -1865,10 +2188,12 @@ through Tor to a test site and build a list of the addresses they see. </li> -<li>If people want to block us, we believe that they should be allowed to +<li>If people want to block us, we believe that they should be allowed +to do so. Obviously, we would prefer for everybody to allow Tor users to connect to them, but people have the right to decide who their services -should allow connections from, and if they want to block anonymous users, +should allow connections from, and if they want to block anonymous +users, they can. </li> @@ -1885,7 +2210,8 @@ <hr> <a id="Criminals"></a> - <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Criminals">Doesn't Tor enable criminals to do bad things?</a></h3> + <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Criminals">Doesn't Tor enable criminals +to do bad things?</a></h3> <p> For the answer to this question and others, please see our <a @@ -1895,7 +2221,8 @@ <hr> <a id="RespondISP"></a> - <h3><a class="anchor" href="#RespondISP">How do I respond to my ISP about my exit relay?</a></h3> + <h3><a class="anchor" href="#RespondISP">How do I respond to my ISP +about my exit relay?</a></h3> <p> A collection of templates for successfully responding to ISPs is <a