commit 1344de9d3c90e3eac02dd13433ef8412a450df5a Author: Georg Koppen <gk@torproject.org> Date: Tue May 24 11:15:49 2016 +0000 fixup! TB4: Tor Browser's Firefox preference overrides. We avoid fingerprinting risks associated with Reader View while keeping the feature enabled for users that really want to have it. This is done by making sure that documents are not parsed on load as this is disabled on some devices due to memory consumption and we pretend that everybody has already been made aware of that feature. (bug 18950) --- browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js b/browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js index f4f4bfe..7b2e773 100644 --- a/browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js +++ b/browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js @@ -145,6 +145,10 @@ pref("privacy.resistFingerprinting", true); pref("dom.event.highrestimestamp.enabled", true); // Bug #17046: "Highres" (but truncated) timestamps prevent uptime leaks pref("privacy.suppressModifierKeyEvents", true); // Bug #17009: Suppress ALT and SHIFT events" pref("ui.use_standins_for_native_colors", true); // https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/232227 +// Make Reader View users uniform if they really want to use that feature. See +// bug 18950 for more details. +pref("browser.reader.detectedFirstArticle", true); +pref("reader.parse-on-load.enabled", false); // Third party stuff pref("network.cookie.cookieBehavior", 1);