[tor/master] Merge branch 'bug31466_029' into bug31466_035_tmp

2 Oct 2019

commit bf4a27c0eae79baff7f0ed4ebe12bda5e2ba06b6
Merge: 02840169d f0e412099
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>
Date:   Wed Sep 18 15:42:40 2019 -0400

    Merge branch 'bug31466_029' into bug31466_035_tmp

 changes/ticket31466           | 5 +++++
 src/core/or/connection_edge.c | 6 ++++--
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --cc src/core/or/connection_edge.c
index 7cc67d7f5,000000000..90991107d
mode 100644,000000..100644

--- a/src/core/or/connection_edge.c
+++ b/src/core/or/connection_edge.c
@@@ -1,4537 -1,0 +1,4539 @@@
 +/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
 + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
 + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
 + * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */
 +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
 +
 +/**
 + * \file connection_edge.c
 + * \brief Handle edge streams.
 + *
 + * An edge_connection_t is a subtype of a connection_t, and represents two
 + * critical concepts in Tor: a stream, and an edge connection.  From the Tor
 + * protocol's point of view, a stream is a bi-directional channel that is
 + * multiplexed on a single circuit.  Each stream on a circuit is identified
 + * with a separate 16-bit stream ID, local to the (circuit,exit) pair.
 + * Streams are created in response to client requests.
 + *
 + * An edge connection is one thing that can implement a stream: it is either a
 + * TCP application socket that has arrived via (e.g.) a SOCKS request, or an
 + * exit connection.
 + *
 + * Not every instance of edge_connection_t truly represents an edge connction,
 + * however. (Sorry!) We also create edge_connection_t objects for streams that
 + * we will not be handling with TCP.  The types of these streams are:
 + *   <ul>
 + *   <li>DNS lookup streams, created on the client side in response to
 + *     a UDP DNS request received on a DNSPort, or a RESOLVE command
 + *     on a controller.
 + *   <li>DNS lookup streams, created on the exit side in response to
 + *     a RELAY_RESOLVE cell from a client.
 + *   <li>Tunneled directory streams, created on the directory cache side
 + *     in response to a RELAY_BEGIN_DIR cell.  These streams attach directly
 + *     to a dir_connection_t object without ever using TCP.
 + *   </ul>
 + *
 + * This module handles general-purpose functionality having to do with
 + * edge_connection_t.  On the client side, it accepts various types of
 + * application requests on SocksPorts, TransPorts, and NATDPorts, and
 + * creates streams appropriately.
 + *
 + * This module is also responsible for implementing stream isolation:
 + * ensuring that streams that should not be linkable to one another are
 + * kept to different circuits.
 + *
 + * On the exit side, this module handles the various stream-creating
 + * type of RELAY cells by launching appropriate outgoing connections,
 + * DNS requests, or directory connection objects.
 + *
 + * And for all edge connections, this module is responsible for handling
 + * incoming and outdoing data as it arrives or leaves in the relay.c
 + * module.  (Outgoing data will be packaged in
 + * connection_edge_process_inbuf() as it calls
 + * connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf(); incoming data from RELAY_DATA
 + * cells is applied in connection_edge_process_relay_cell().)
 + **/
 +#define CONNECTION_EDGE_PRIVATE
 +
 +#include "core/or/or.h"
 +
 +#include "lib/err/backtrace.h"
 +
 +#include "app/config/config.h"
 +#include "core/mainloop/connection.h"
 +#include "core/mainloop/mainloop.h"
 +#include "core/or/channel.h"
 +#include "core/or/circuitbuild.h"
 +#include "core/or/circuitlist.h"
 +#include "core/or/circuituse.h"
 +#include "core/or/connection_edge.h"
 +#include "core/or/connection_or.h"
 +#include "core/or/policies.h"
 +#include "core/or/reasons.h"
 +#include "core/or/relay.h"
 +#include "core/proto/proto_http.h"
 +#include "core/proto/proto_socks.h"
 +#include "feature/client/addressmap.h"
 +#include "feature/client/circpathbias.h"
 +#include "feature/client/dnsserv.h"
 +#include "feature/control/control.h"
 +#include "feature/dircache/dirserv.h"
 +#include "feature/dircommon/directory.h"
 +#include "feature/hibernate/hibernate.h"
 +#include "feature/hs/hs_cache.h"
 +#include "feature/hs/hs_circuit.h"
 +#include "feature/hs/hs_client.h"
 +#include "feature/hs/hs_common.h"
 +#include "feature/nodelist/describe.h"
 +#include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h"
 +#include "feature/nodelist/nodelist.h"
 +#include "feature/nodelist/routerlist.h"
 +#include "feature/nodelist/routerset.h"
 +#include "feature/relay/dns.h"
 +#include "feature/relay/router.h"
 +#include "feature/relay/routermode.h"
 +#include "feature/rend/rendclient.h"
 +#include "feature/rend/rendcommon.h"
 +#include "feature/rend/rendservice.h"
 +#include "feature/stats/predict_ports.h"
 +#include "feature/stats/rephist.h"
 +#include "lib/container/buffers.h"
 +#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h"
 +
 +#include "core/or/cell_st.h"
 +#include "core/or/cpath_build_state_st.h"
 +#include "feature/dircommon/dir_connection_st.h"
 +#include "core/or/entry_connection_st.h"
 +#include "core/or/extend_info_st.h"
 +#include "feature/nodelist/node_st.h"
 +#include "core/or/or_circuit_st.h"
 +#include "core/or/origin_circuit_st.h"
 +#include "core/or/half_edge_st.h"
 +#include "core/or/socks_request_st.h"
 +#include "lib/evloop/compat_libevent.h"
 +
 +#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_TYPES_H
 +#include <linux/types.h>
 +#endif
 +#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_NETFILTER_IPV4_H
 +#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
 +#define TRANS_NETFILTER
 +#define TRANS_NETFILTER_IPV4
 +#endif
 +
 +#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_IF_H
 +#include <linux/if.h>
 +#endif
 +
 +#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_NETFILTER_IPV6_IP6_TABLES_H
 +#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6/ip6_tables.h>
 +#if defined(IP6T_SO_ORIGINAL_DST)
 +#define TRANS_NETFILTER
 +#define TRANS_NETFILTER_IPV6
 +#endif
 +#endif /* defined(HAVE_LINUX_NETFILTER_IPV6_IP6_TABLES_H) */
 +
 +#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
 +#include <fcntl.h>
 +#endif
 +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_IOCTL_H
 +#include <sys/ioctl.h>
 +#endif
 +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PARAM_H
 +#include <sys/param.h>
 +#endif
 +
 +#if defined(HAVE_NET_IF_H) && defined(HAVE_NET_PFVAR_H)
 +#include <net/if.h>
 +#include <net/pfvar.h>
 +#define TRANS_PF
 +#endif
 +
 +#ifdef IP_TRANSPARENT
 +#define TRANS_TPROXY
 +#endif
 +
 +#define SOCKS4_GRANTED          90
 +#define SOCKS4_REJECT           91
 +
 +static int connection_ap_handshake_process_socks(entry_connection_t *conn);
 +static int connection_ap_process_natd(entry_connection_t *conn);
 +static int connection_exit_connect_dir(edge_connection_t *exitconn);
 +static int consider_plaintext_ports(entry_connection_t *conn, uint16_t port);
 +static int connection_ap_supports_optimistic_data(const entry_connection_t *);
 +
 +/** Convert a connection_t* to an edge_connection_t*; assert if the cast is
 + * invalid. */
 +edge_connection_t *
 +TO_EDGE_CONN(connection_t *c)
 +{
 +  tor_assert(c->magic == EDGE_CONNECTION_MAGIC ||
 +             c->magic == ENTRY_CONNECTION_MAGIC);
 +  return DOWNCAST(edge_connection_t, c);
 +}
 +
 +entry_connection_t *
 +TO_ENTRY_CONN(connection_t *c)
 +{
 +  tor_assert(c->magic == ENTRY_CONNECTION_MAGIC);
 +  return (entry_connection_t*) SUBTYPE_P(c, entry_connection_t, edge_.base_);
 +}
 +
 +entry_connection_t *
 +EDGE_TO_ENTRY_CONN(edge_connection_t *c)
 +{
 +  tor_assert(c->base_.magic == ENTRY_CONNECTION_MAGIC);
 +  return (entry_connection_t*) SUBTYPE_P(c, entry_connection_t, edge_);
 +}
 +
 +/** An AP stream has failed/finished. If it hasn't already sent back
 + * a socks reply, send one now (based on endreason). Also set
 + * has_sent_end to 1, and mark the conn.
 + */
 +MOCK_IMPL(void,
 +connection_mark_unattached_ap_,(entry_connection_t *conn, int endreason,
 +                                int line, const char *file))
 +{
 +  connection_t *base_conn = ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn);
 +  edge_connection_t *edge_conn = ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn);
 +  tor_assert(base_conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP);
 +  ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->edge_has_sent_end = 1; /* no circ yet */
 +
 +  /* If this is a rendezvous stream and it is failing without ever
 +   * being attached to a circuit, assume that an attempt to connect to
 +   * the destination hidden service has just ended.
 +   *
 +   * XXXX This condition doesn't limit to only streams failing
 +   * without ever being attached.  That sloppiness should be harmless,
 +   * but we should fix it someday anyway. */
 +  if ((edge_conn->on_circuit != NULL || edge_conn->edge_has_sent_end) &&
 +      connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(edge_conn)) {
 +    if (edge_conn->rend_data) {
 +      rend_client_note_connection_attempt_ended(edge_conn->rend_data);
 +    }
 +  }
 +
 +  if (base_conn->marked_for_close) {
 +    /* This call will warn as appropriate. */
 +    connection_mark_for_close_(base_conn, line, file);
 +    return;
 +  }
 +
 +  if (!conn->socks_request->has_finished) {
 +    if (endreason & END_STREAM_REASON_FLAG_ALREADY_SOCKS_REPLIED)
 +      log_warn(LD_BUG,
 +               "stream (marked at %s:%d) sending two socks replies?",
 +               file, line);
 +
 +    if (SOCKS_COMMAND_IS_CONNECT(conn->socks_request->command))
 +      connection_ap_handshake_socks_reply(conn, NULL, 0, endreason);
 +    else if (SOCKS_COMMAND_IS_RESOLVE(conn->socks_request->command))
 +      connection_ap_handshake_socks_resolved(conn,
 +                                             RESOLVED_TYPE_ERROR_TRANSIENT,
 +                                             0, NULL, -1, -1);
 +    else /* unknown or no handshake at all. send no response. */
 +      conn->socks_request->has_finished = 1;
 +  }
 +
 +  connection_mark_and_flush_(base_conn, line, file);
 +
 +  ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->end_reason = endreason;
 +}
 +
 +/** There was an EOF. Send an end and mark the connection for close.
 + */
 +int
 +connection_edge_reached_eof(edge_connection_t *conn)
 +{
 +  if (connection_get_inbuf_len(TO_CONN(conn)) &&
 +      connection_state_is_open(TO_CONN(conn))) {
 +    /* it still has stuff to process. don't let it die yet. */
 +    return 0;
 +  }
 +  log_info(LD_EDGE,"conn (fd "TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT") reached eof. Closing.",
 +           conn->base_.s);
 +  if (!conn->base_.marked_for_close) {
 +    /* only mark it if not already marked. it's possible to
 +     * get the 'end' right around when the client hangs up on us. */
 +    connection_edge_end(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_DONE);
 +    if (conn->base_.type == CONN_TYPE_AP) {
 +      /* eof, so don't send a socks reply back */
 +      if (EDGE_TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn)->socks_request)
 +        EDGE_TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn)->socks_request->has_finished = 1;
 +    }
 +    connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
 +  }
 +  return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/** Handle new bytes on conn->inbuf based on state:
 + *   - If it's waiting for socks info, try to read another step of the
 + *     socks handshake out of conn->inbuf.
 + *   - If it's waiting for the original destination, fetch it.
 + *   - If it's open, then package more relay cells from the stream.
 + *   - Else, leave the bytes on inbuf alone for now.
 + *
 + * Mark and return -1 if there was an unexpected error with the conn,
 + * else return 0.
 + */
 +int
 +connection_edge_process_inbuf(edge_connection_t *conn, int package_partial)
 +{
 +  tor_assert(conn);
 +
 +  switch (conn->base_.state) {
 +    case AP_CONN_STATE_SOCKS_WAIT:
 +      if (connection_ap_handshake_process_socks(EDGE_TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn)) <0) {
 +        /* already marked */
 +        return -1;
 +      }
 +      return 0;
 +    case AP_CONN_STATE_NATD_WAIT:
 +      if (connection_ap_process_natd(EDGE_TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn)) < 0) {
 +        /* already marked */
 +        return -1;
 +      }
 +      return 0;
 +    case AP_CONN_STATE_HTTP_CONNECT_WAIT:
 +      if (connection_ap_process_http_connect(EDGE_TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn)) < 0) {
 +        return -1;
 +      }
 +      return 0;
 +    case AP_CONN_STATE_OPEN:
 +    case EXIT_CONN_STATE_OPEN:
 +      if (connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf(conn, package_partial, NULL) < 0) {
 +        /* (We already sent an end cell if possible) */
 +        connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
 +        return -1;
 +      }
 +      return 0;
 +    case AP_CONN_STATE_CONNECT_WAIT:
 +      if (connection_ap_supports_optimistic_data(EDGE_TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn))) {
 +        log_info(LD_EDGE,
 +                 "data from edge while in '%s' state. Sending it anyway. "
 +                 "package_partial=%d, buflen=%ld",
 +                 conn_state_to_string(conn->base_.type, conn->base_.state),
 +                 package_partial,
 +                 (long)connection_get_inbuf_len(TO_CONN(conn)));
 +        if (connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf(conn, package_partial, NULL)<0) {
 +          /* (We already sent an end cell if possible) */
 +          connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
 +          return -1;
 +        }
 +        return 0;
 +      }
 +      /* Fall through if the connection is on a circuit without optimistic
 +       * data support. */
 +      /* Falls through. */
 +    case EXIT_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING:
 +    case AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT:
 +    case AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT:
 +    case AP_CONN_STATE_RESOLVE_WAIT:
 +    case AP_CONN_STATE_CONTROLLER_WAIT:
 +      log_info(LD_EDGE,
 +               "data from edge while in '%s' state. Leaving it on buffer.",
 +               conn_state_to_string(conn->base_.type, conn->base_.state));
 +      return 0;
 +  }
 +  log_warn(LD_BUG,"Got unexpected state %d. Closing.",conn->base_.state);
 +  tor_fragile_assert();
 +  connection_edge_end(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_INTERNAL);
 +  connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
 +  return -1;
 +}
 +
 +/** This edge needs to be closed, because its circuit has closed.
 + * Mark it for close and return 0.
 + */
 +int
 +connection_edge_destroy(circid_t circ_id, edge_connection_t *conn)
 +{
 +  if (!conn->base_.marked_for_close) {
 +    log_info(LD_EDGE, "CircID %u: At an edge. Marking connection for close.",
 +             (unsigned) circ_id);
 +    if (conn->base_.type == CONN_TYPE_AP) {
 +      entry_connection_t *entry_conn = EDGE_TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn);
 +      connection_mark_unattached_ap(entry_conn, END_STREAM_REASON_DESTROY);
 +      control_event_stream_bandwidth(conn);
 +      control_event_stream_status(entry_conn, STREAM_EVENT_CLOSED,
 +                                  END_STREAM_REASON_DESTROY);
 +      conn->end_reason |= END_STREAM_REASON_FLAG_ALREADY_SENT_CLOSED;
 +    } else {
 +      /* closing the circuit, nothing to send an END to */
 +      conn->edge_has_sent_end = 1;
 +      conn->end_reason = END_STREAM_REASON_DESTROY;
 +      conn->end_reason |= END_STREAM_REASON_FLAG_ALREADY_SENT_CLOSED;
 +      connection_mark_and_flush(TO_CONN(conn));
 +    }
 +  }
 +  conn->cpath_layer = NULL;
 +  conn->on_circuit = NULL;
 +  return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/** Send a raw end cell to the stream with ID <b>stream_id</b> out over the
 + * <b>circ</b> towards the hop identified with <b>cpath_layer</b>. If this
 + * is not a client connection, set the relay end cell's reason for closing
 + * as <b>reason</b> */
 +static int
 +relay_send_end_cell_from_edge(streamid_t stream_id, circuit_t *circ,
 +                              uint8_t reason, crypt_path_t *cpath_layer)
 +{
 +  char payload[1];
 +
 +  if (CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_IS_CLIENT(circ->purpose)) {
 +    /* Never send the server an informative reason code; it doesn't need to
 +     * know why the client stream is failing. */
 +    reason = END_STREAM_REASON_MISC;
 +  }
 +
 +  payload[0] = (char) reason;
 +
 +  /* Note: we have to use relay_send_command_from_edge here, not
 +   * connection_edge_end or connection_edge_send_command, since those require
 +   * that we have a stream connected to a circuit, and we don't connect to a
 +   * circuit until we have a pending/successful resolve. */
 +  return relay_send_command_from_edge(stream_id, circ, RELAY_COMMAND_END,
 +                                      payload, 1, cpath_layer);
 +}
 +
 +/* If the connection <b>conn</b> is attempting to connect to an external
 + * destination that is an hidden service and the reason is a connection
 + * refused or timeout, log it so the operator can take appropriate actions.
 + * The log statement is a rate limited warning. */
 +static void
 +warn_if_hs_unreachable(const edge_connection_t *conn, uint8_t reason)
 +{
 +  tor_assert(conn);
 +
 +  if (conn->base_.type == CONN_TYPE_EXIT &&
 +      connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(conn) &&
 +      (reason == END_STREAM_REASON_CONNECTREFUSED ||
 +       reason == END_STREAM_REASON_TIMEOUT)) {
 +#define WARN_FAILED_HS_CONNECTION 300
 +    static ratelim_t warn_limit = RATELIM_INIT(WARN_FAILED_HS_CONNECTION);
 +    char *m;
 +    if ((m = rate_limit_log(&warn_limit, approx_time()))) {
 +      log_warn(LD_EDGE, "Onion service connection to %s failed (%s)",
 +               (conn->base_.socket_family == AF_UNIX) ?
 +               safe_str(conn->base_.address) :
 +               safe_str(fmt_addrport(&conn->base_.addr, conn->base_.port)),
 +               stream_end_reason_to_string(reason));
 +      tor_free(m);
 +    }
 +  }
 +}
 +
 +/** Send a relay end cell from stream <b>conn</b> down conn's circuit, and
 + * remember that we've done so.  If this is not a client connection, set the
 + * relay end cell's reason for closing as <b>reason</b>.
 + *
 + * Return -1 if this function has already been called on this conn,
 + * else return 0.
 + */
 +int
 +connection_edge_end(edge_connection_t *conn, uint8_t reason)
 +{
 +  char payload[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE];
 +  size_t payload_len=1;
 +  circuit_t *circ;
 +  uint8_t control_reason = reason;
 +
 +  if (conn->edge_has_sent_end) {
 +    log_warn(LD_BUG,"(Harmless.) Calling connection_edge_end (reason %d) "
 +             "on an already ended stream?", reason);
 +    tor_fragile_assert();
 +    return -1;
 +  }
 +
 +  if (conn->base_.marked_for_close) {
 +    log_warn(LD_BUG,
 +             "called on conn that's already marked for close at %s:%d.",
 +             conn->base_.marked_for_close_file, conn->base_.marked_for_close);
 +    return 0;
 +  }
 +
 +  circ = circuit_get_by_edge_conn(conn);
 +  if (circ && CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_IS_CLIENT(circ->purpose)) {
 +    /* If this is a client circuit, don't send the server an informative
 +     * reason code; it doesn't need to know why the client stream is
 +     * failing. */
 +    reason = END_STREAM_REASON_MISC;
 +  }
 +
 +  payload[0] = (char)reason;
 +  if (reason == END_STREAM_REASON_EXITPOLICY &&
 +      !connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(conn)) {
 +    int addrlen;
 +    if (tor_addr_family(&conn->base_.addr) == AF_INET) {
 +      set_uint32(payload+1, tor_addr_to_ipv4n(&conn->base_.addr));
 +      addrlen = 4;
 +    } else {
 +      memcpy(payload+1, tor_addr_to_in6_addr8(&conn->base_.addr), 16);
 +      addrlen = 16;
 +    }
 +    set_uint32(payload+1+addrlen, htonl(dns_clip_ttl(conn->address_ttl)));
 +    payload_len += 4+addrlen;
 +  }
 +
 +  if (circ && !circ->marked_for_close) {
 +    log_debug(LD_EDGE,"Sending end on conn (fd "TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT").",
 +              conn->base_.s);
 +
 +    if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) {
 +      origin_circuit_t *origin_circ = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
 +      connection_half_edge_add(conn, origin_circ);
 +    }
 +
 +    connection_edge_send_command(conn, RELAY_COMMAND_END,
 +                                 payload, payload_len);
 +    /* We'll log warn if the connection was an hidden service and couldn't be
 +     * made because the service wasn't available. */
 +    warn_if_hs_unreachable(conn, control_reason);
 +  } else {
 +    log_debug(LD_EDGE,"No circ to send end on conn "
 +              "(fd "TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT").",
 +              conn->base_.s);
 +  }
 +
 +  conn->edge_has_sent_end = 1;
 +  conn->end_reason = control_reason;
 +  return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/**
 + * Helper function for bsearch.
 + *
 + * As per smartlist_bsearch, return < 0 if key preceeds member,
 + * > 0 if member preceeds key, and 0 if they are equal.
 + *
 + * This is equivalent to subtraction of the values of key - member
 + * (why does no one ever say that explicitly?).
 + */
 +static int
 +connection_half_edge_compare_bsearch(const void *key, const void **member)
 +{
 +  const half_edge_t *e2;
 +  tor_assert(key);
 +  tor_assert(member && *(half_edge_t**)member);
 +  e2 = *(const half_edge_t **)member;
 +
 +  return *(const streamid_t*)key - e2->stream_id;
 +}
 +
 +/** Total number of half_edge_t objects allocated */
 +static size_t n_half_conns_allocated = 0;
 +
 +/**
 + * Add a half-closed connection to the list, to watch for activity.
 + *
 + * These connections are removed from the list upon receiving an end
 + * cell.
 + */
 +STATIC void
 +connection_half_edge_add(const edge_connection_t *conn,
 +                         origin_circuit_t *circ)
 +{
 +  half_edge_t *half_conn = NULL;
 +  int insert_at = 0;
 +  int ignored;
 +
 +  /* Double-check for re-insertion. This should not happen,
 +   * but this check is cheap compared to the sort anyway */
 +  if (connection_half_edge_find_stream_id(circ->half_streams,
 +                                          conn->stream_id)) {
 +    log_warn(LD_BUG, "Duplicate stream close for stream %d on circuit %d",
 +             conn->stream_id, circ->global_identifier);
 +    return;
 +  }
 +
 +  half_conn = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(half_edge_t));
 +  ++n_half_conns_allocated;
 +
 +  if (!circ->half_streams) {
 +    circ->half_streams = smartlist_new();
 +  }
 +
 +  half_conn->stream_id = conn->stream_id;
 +
 +  // How many sendme's should I expect?
 +  half_conn->sendmes_pending =
 +   (STREAMWINDOW_START-conn->package_window)/STREAMWINDOW_INCREMENT;
 +
 +   // Is there a connected cell pending?
 +  half_conn->connected_pending = conn->base_.state ==
 +      AP_CONN_STATE_CONNECT_WAIT;
 +
 +  /* Data should only arrive if we're not waiting on a resolved cell.
 +   * It can arrive after waiting on connected, because of optimistic
 +   * data. */
 +  if (conn->base_.state != AP_CONN_STATE_RESOLVE_WAIT) {
 +    // How many more data cells can arrive on this id?
 +    half_conn->data_pending = conn->deliver_window;
 +  }
 +
 +  insert_at = smartlist_bsearch_idx(circ->half_streams, &half_conn->stream_id,
 +                                    connection_half_edge_compare_bsearch,
 +                                    &ignored);
 +  smartlist_insert(circ->half_streams, insert_at, half_conn);
 +}
 +
 +/** Release space held by <b>he</b> */
 +void
 +half_edge_free_(half_edge_t *he)
 +{
 +  if (!he)
 +    return;
 +  --n_half_conns_allocated;
 +  tor_free(he);
 +}
 +
 +/** Return the number of bytes devoted to storing info on half-open streams. */
 +size_t
 +half_streams_get_total_allocation(void)
 +{
 +  return n_half_conns_allocated * sizeof(half_edge_t);
 +}
 +
 +/**
 + * Find a stream_id_t in the list in O(lg(n)).
 + *
 + * Returns NULL if the list is empty or element is not found.
 + * Returns a pointer to the element if found.
 + */
 +STATIC half_edge_t *
 +connection_half_edge_find_stream_id(const smartlist_t *half_conns,
 +                                    streamid_t stream_id)
 +{
 +  if (!half_conns)
 +    return NULL;
 +
 +  return smartlist_bsearch(half_conns, &stream_id,
 +                           connection_half_edge_compare_bsearch);
 +}
 +
 +/**
 + * Check if this stream_id is in a half-closed state. If so,
 + * check if it still has data cells pending, and decrement that
 + * window if so.
 + *
 + * Return 1 if the data window was not empty.
 + * Return 0 otherwise.
 + */
 +int
 +connection_half_edge_is_valid_data(const smartlist_t *half_conns,
 +                                   streamid_t stream_id)
 +{
 +  half_edge_t *half = connection_half_edge_find_stream_id(half_conns,
 +                                                          stream_id);
 +
 +  if (!half)
 +    return 0;
 +
 +  if (half->data_pending > 0) {
 +    half->data_pending--;
 +    return 1;
 +  }
 +
 +  return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/**
 + * Check if this stream_id is in a half-closed state. If so,
 + * check if it still has a connected cell pending, and decrement
 + * that window if so.
 + *
 + * Return 1 if the connected window was not empty.
 + * Return 0 otherwise.
 + */
 +int
 +connection_half_edge_is_valid_connected(const smartlist_t *half_conns,
 +                                        streamid_t stream_id)
 +{
 +  half_edge_t *half = connection_half_edge_find_stream_id(half_conns,
 +                                                          stream_id);
 +
 +  if (!half)
 +    return 0;
 +
 +  if (half->connected_pending) {
 +    half->connected_pending = 0;
 +    return 1;
 +  }
 +
 +  return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/**
 + * Check if this stream_id is in a half-closed state. If so,
 + * check if it still has sendme cells pending, and decrement that
 + * window if so.
 + *
 + * Return 1 if the sendme window was not empty.
 + * Return 0 otherwise.
 + */
 +int
 +connection_half_edge_is_valid_sendme(const smartlist_t *half_conns,
 +                                     streamid_t stream_id)
 +{
 +  half_edge_t *half = connection_half_edge_find_stream_id(half_conns,
 +                                                          stream_id);
 +
 +  if (!half)
 +    return 0;
 +
 +  if (half->sendmes_pending > 0) {
 +    half->sendmes_pending--;
 +    return 1;
 +  }
 +
 +  return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/**
 + * Check if this stream_id is in a half-closed state. If so, remove
 + * it from the list. No other data should come after the END cell.
 + *
 + * Return 1 if stream_id was in half-closed state.
 + * Return 0 otherwise.
 + */
 +int
 +connection_half_edge_is_valid_end(smartlist_t *half_conns,
 +                                  streamid_t stream_id)
 +{
 +  half_edge_t *half;
 +  int found, remove_idx;
 +
 +  if (!half_conns)
 +    return 0;
 +
 +  remove_idx = smartlist_bsearch_idx(half_conns, &stream_id,
 +                                    connection_half_edge_compare_bsearch,
 +                                    &found);
 +  if (!found)
 +    return 0;
 +
 +  half = smartlist_get(half_conns, remove_idx);
 +  smartlist_del_keeporder(half_conns, remove_idx);
 +  half_edge_free(half);
 +  return 1;
 +}
 +
 +/**
 + * Streams that were used to send a RESOLVE cell are closed
 + * when they get the RESOLVED, without an end. So treat
 + * a RESOLVED just like an end, and remove from the list.
 + */
 +int
 +connection_half_edge_is_valid_resolved(smartlist_t *half_conns,
 +                                       streamid_t stream_id)
 +{
 +  return connection_half_edge_is_valid_end(half_conns, stream_id);
 +}
 +
 +/** An error has just occurred on an operation on an edge connection
 + * <b>conn</b>.  Extract the errno; convert it to an end reason, and send an
 + * appropriate relay end cell to the other end of the connection's circuit.
 + **/
 +int
 +connection_edge_end_errno(edge_connection_t *conn)
 +{
 +  uint8_t reason;
 +  tor_assert(conn);
 +  reason = errno_to_stream_end_reason(tor_socket_errno(conn->base_.s));
 +  return connection_edge_end(conn, reason);
 +}
 +
 +/** We just wrote some data to <b>conn</b>; act appropriately.
 + *
 + * (That is, if it's open, consider sending a stream-level sendme cell if we
 + * have just flushed enough.)
 + */
 +int
 +connection_edge_flushed_some(edge_connection_t *conn)
 +{
 +  switch (conn->base_.state) {
 +    case AP_CONN_STATE_OPEN:
 +    case EXIT_CONN_STATE_OPEN:
 +      connection_edge_consider_sending_sendme(conn);
 +      break;
 +  }
 +  return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/** Connection <b>conn</b> has finished writing and has no bytes left on
 + * its outbuf.
 + *
 + * If it's in state 'open', stop writing, consider responding with a
 + * sendme, and return.
 + * Otherwise, stop writing and return.
 + *
 + * If <b>conn</b> is broken, mark it for close and return -1, else
 + * return 0.
 + */
 +int
 +connection_edge_finished_flushing(edge_connection_t *conn)
 +{
 +  tor_assert(conn);
 +
 +  switch (conn->base_.state) {
 +    case AP_CONN_STATE_OPEN:
 +    case EXIT_CONN_STATE_OPEN:
 +      connection_edge_consider_sending_sendme(conn);
 +      return 0;
 +    case AP_CONN_STATE_SOCKS_WAIT:
 +    case AP_CONN_STATE_NATD_WAIT:
 +    case AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT:
 +    case AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT:
 +    case AP_CONN_STATE_CONNECT_WAIT:
 +    case AP_CONN_STATE_CONTROLLER_WAIT:
 +    case AP_CONN_STATE_RESOLVE_WAIT:
 +    case AP_CONN_STATE_HTTP_CONNECT_WAIT:
 +      return 0;
 +    default:
 +      log_warn(LD_BUG, "Called in unexpected state %d.",conn->base_.state);
 +      tor_fragile_assert();
 +      return -1;
 +  }
 +  return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/** Longest size for the relay payload of a RELAY_CONNECTED cell that we're
 + * able to generate. */
 +/* 4 zero bytes; 1 type byte; 16 byte IPv6 address; 4 byte TTL. */
 +#define MAX_CONNECTED_CELL_PAYLOAD_LEN 25
 +
 +/** Set the buffer at <b>payload_out</b> -- which must have at least
 + * MAX_CONNECTED_CELL_PAYLOAD_LEN bytes available -- to the body of a
 + * RELAY_CONNECTED cell indicating that we have connected to <b>addr</b>, and
 + * that the name resolution that led us to <b>addr</b> will be valid for
 + * <b>ttl</b> seconds. Return -1 on error, or the number of bytes used on
 + * success. */
 +STATIC int
 +connected_cell_format_payload(uint8_t *payload_out,
 +                              const tor_addr_t *addr,
 +                              uint32_t ttl)
 +{
 +  const sa_family_t family = tor_addr_family(addr);
 +  int connected_payload_len;
 +
 +  /* should be needless */
 +  memset(payload_out, 0, MAX_CONNECTED_CELL_PAYLOAD_LEN);
 +
 +  if (family == AF_INET) {
 +    set_uint32(payload_out, tor_addr_to_ipv4n(addr));
 +    connected_payload_len = 4;
 +  } else if (family == AF_INET6) {
 +    set_uint32(payload_out, 0);
 +    set_uint8(payload_out + 4, 6);
 +    memcpy(payload_out + 5, tor_addr_to_in6_addr8(addr), 16);
 +    connected_payload_len = 21;
 +  } else {
 +    return -1;
 +  }
 +
 +  set_uint32(payload_out + connected_payload_len, htonl(dns_clip_ttl(ttl)));
 +  connected_payload_len += 4;
 +
 +  tor_assert(connected_payload_len <= MAX_CONNECTED_CELL_PAYLOAD_LEN);
 +
 +  return connected_payload_len;
 +}
 +
 +/* This is an onion service client connection: Export the client circuit ID
 + * according to the HAProxy proxy protocol. */
 +STATIC void
 +export_hs_client_circuit_id(edge_connection_t *edge_conn,
 +                            hs_circuit_id_protocol_t protocol)
 +{
 +  /* We only support HAProxy right now. */
 +  if (protocol != HS_CIRCUIT_ID_PROTOCOL_HAPROXY)
 +    return;
 +
 +  char *buf = NULL;
 +  const char dst_ipv6[] = "::1";
 +  /* See RFC4193 regarding fc00::/7 */
 +  const char src_ipv6_prefix[] = "fc00:dead:beef:4dad:";
 +  uint16_t dst_port = 0;
 +  uint16_t src_port = 1; /* default value */
 +  uint32_t gid = 0; /* default value */
 +
 +  /* Generate a GID and source port for this client */
 +  if (edge_conn->on_circuit != NULL) {
 +    gid = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(edge_conn->on_circuit)->global_identifier;
 +    src_port = gid & 0x0000ffff;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Grab the original dest port from the hs ident */
 +  if (edge_conn->hs_ident) {
 +    dst_port = edge_conn->hs_ident->orig_virtual_port;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Build the string */
 +  tor_asprintf(&buf, "PROXY TCP6 %s:%x:%x %s %d %d\r\n",
 +               src_ipv6_prefix,
 +               gid >> 16, gid & 0x0000ffff,
 +               dst_ipv6, src_port, dst_port);
 +
 +  connection_buf_add(buf, strlen(buf), TO_CONN(edge_conn));
 +
 +  tor_free(buf);
 +}
 +
 +/** Connected handler for exit connections: start writing pending
 + * data, deliver 'CONNECTED' relay cells as appropriate, and check
 + * any pending data that may have been received. */
 +int
 +connection_edge_finished_connecting(edge_connection_t *edge_conn)
 +{
 +  connection_t *conn;
 +
 +  tor_assert(edge_conn);
 +  tor_assert(edge_conn->base_.type == CONN_TYPE_EXIT);
 +  conn = TO_CONN(edge_conn);
 +  tor_assert(conn->state == EXIT_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING);
 +
 +  log_info(LD_EXIT,"Exit connection to %s:%u (%s) established.",
 +           escaped_safe_str(conn->address), conn->port,
 +           safe_str(fmt_and_decorate_addr(&conn->addr)));
 +
 +  rep_hist_note_exit_stream_opened(conn->port);
 +
 +  conn->state = EXIT_CONN_STATE_OPEN;
 +
 +  connection_watch_events(conn, READ_EVENT); /* stop writing, keep reading */
 +  if (connection_get_outbuf_len(conn)) /* in case there are any queued relay
 +                                        * cells */
 +    connection_start_writing(conn);
 +  /* deliver a 'connected' relay cell back through the circuit. */
 +  if (connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(edge_conn)) {
 +    if (connection_edge_send_command(edge_conn,
 +                                     RELAY_COMMAND_CONNECTED, NULL, 0) < 0)
 +      return 0; /* circuit is closed, don't continue */
 +  } else {
 +    uint8_t connected_payload[MAX_CONNECTED_CELL_PAYLOAD_LEN];
 +    int connected_payload_len =
 +      connected_cell_format_payload(connected_payload, &conn->addr,
 +                                    edge_conn->address_ttl);
 +    if (connected_payload_len < 0)
 +      return -1;
 +
 +    if (connection_edge_send_command(edge_conn,
 +                        RELAY_COMMAND_CONNECTED,
 +                        (char*)connected_payload, connected_payload_len) < 0)
 +      return 0; /* circuit is closed, don't continue */
 +  }
 +  tor_assert(edge_conn->package_window > 0);
 +  /* in case the server has written anything */
 +  return connection_edge_process_inbuf(edge_conn, 1);
 +}
 +
 +/** A list of all the entry_connection_t * objects that are not marked
 + * for close, and are in AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT.
 + *
 + * (Right now, we check in several places to make sure that this list is
 + * correct.  When it's incorrect, we'll fix it, and log a BUG message.)
 + */
 +static smartlist_t *pending_entry_connections = NULL;
 +
 +static int untried_pending_connections = 0;
 +
 +/**
 + * Mainloop event to tell us to scan for pending connections that can
 + * be attached.
 + */
 +static mainloop_event_t *attach_pending_entry_connections_ev = NULL;
 +
 +/** Common code to connection_(ap|exit)_about_to_close. */
 +static void
 +connection_edge_about_to_close(edge_connection_t *edge_conn)
 +{
 +  if (!edge_conn->edge_has_sent_end) {
 +    connection_t *conn = TO_CONN(edge_conn);
 +    log_warn(LD_BUG, "(Harmless.) Edge connection (marked at %s:%d) "
 +             "hasn't sent end yet?",
 +             conn->marked_for_close_file, conn->marked_for_close);
 +    tor_fragile_assert();
 +  }
 +}
 +
 +/** Called when we're about to finally unlink and free an AP (client)
 + * connection: perform necessary accounting and cleanup */
 +void
 +connection_ap_about_to_close(entry_connection_t *entry_conn)
 +{
 +  circuit_t *circ;
 +  edge_connection_t *edge_conn = ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(entry_conn);
 +  connection_t *conn = ENTRY_TO_CONN(entry_conn);
 +
 +  connection_edge_about_to_close(edge_conn);
 +
 +  if (entry_conn->socks_request->has_finished == 0) {
 +    /* since conn gets removed right after this function finishes,
 +     * there's no point trying to send back a reply at this point. */
 +    log_warn(LD_BUG,"Closing stream (marked at %s:%d) without sending"
 +             " back a socks reply.",
 +             conn->marked_for_close_file, conn->marked_for_close);
 +  }
 +  if (!edge_conn->end_reason) {
 +    log_warn(LD_BUG,"Closing stream (marked at %s:%d) without having"
 +             " set end_reason.",
 +             conn->marked_for_close_file, conn->marked_for_close);
 +  }
 +  if (entry_conn->dns_server_request) {
 +    log_warn(LD_BUG,"Closing stream (marked at %s:%d) without having"
 +             " replied to DNS request.",
 +             conn->marked_for_close_file, conn->marked_for_close);
 +    dnsserv_reject_request(entry_conn);
 +  }
 +
 +  if (TO_CONN(edge_conn)->state == AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT) {
 +    smartlist_remove(pending_entry_connections, entry_conn);
 +  }
 +
 +#if 1
 +  /* Check to make sure that this isn't in pending_entry_connections if it
 +   * didn't actually belong there. */
 +  if (TO_CONN(edge_conn)->type == CONN_TYPE_AP) {
 +    connection_ap_warn_and_unmark_if_pending_circ(entry_conn,
 +                                                  "about_to_close");
 +  }
 +#endif /* 1 */
 +
 +  control_event_stream_bandwidth(edge_conn);
 +  control_event_stream_status(entry_conn, STREAM_EVENT_CLOSED,
 +                              edge_conn->end_reason);
 +  circ = circuit_get_by_edge_conn(edge_conn);
 +  if (circ)
 +    circuit_detach_stream(circ, edge_conn);
 +}
 +
 +/** Called when we're about to finally unlink and free an exit
 + * connection: perform necessary accounting and cleanup */
 +void
 +connection_exit_about_to_close(edge_connection_t *edge_conn)
 +{
 +  circuit_t *circ;
 +  connection_t *conn = TO_CONN(edge_conn);
 +
 +  connection_edge_about_to_close(edge_conn);
 +
 +  circ = circuit_get_by_edge_conn(edge_conn);
 +  if (circ)
 +    circuit_detach_stream(circ, edge_conn);
 +  if (conn->state == EXIT_CONN_STATE_RESOLVING) {
 +    connection_dns_remove(edge_conn);
 +  }
 +}
 +
 +/** Define a schedule for how long to wait between retrying
 + * application connections. Rather than waiting a fixed amount of
 + * time between each retry, we wait 10 seconds each for the first
 + * two tries, and 15 seconds for each retry after
 + * that. Hopefully this will improve the expected user experience. */
 +static int
 +compute_retry_timeout(entry_connection_t *conn)
 +{
 +  int timeout = get_options()->CircuitStreamTimeout;
 +  if (timeout) /* if our config options override the default, use them */
 +    return timeout;
 +  if (conn->num_socks_retries < 2) /* try 0 and try 1 */
 +    return 10;
 +  return 15;
 +}
 +
 +/** Find all general-purpose AP streams waiting for a response that sent their
 + * begin/resolve cell too long ago. Detach from their current circuit, and
 + * mark their current circuit as unsuitable for new streams. Then call
 + * connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit() to attach to a new circuit (if
 + * available) or launch a new one.
 + *
 + * For rendezvous streams, simply give up after SocksTimeout seconds (with no
 + * retry attempt).
 + */
 +void
 +connection_ap_expire_beginning(void)
 +{
 +  edge_connection_t *conn;
 +  entry_connection_t *entry_conn;
 +  circuit_t *circ;
 +  time_t now = time(NULL);
 +  const or_options_t *options = get_options();
 +  int severity;
 +  int cutoff;
 +  int seconds_idle, seconds_since_born;
 +  smartlist_t *conns = get_connection_array();
 +
 +  SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(conns, connection_t *, base_conn) {
 +    if (base_conn->type != CONN_TYPE_AP || base_conn->marked_for_close)
 +      continue;
 +    entry_conn = TO_ENTRY_CONN(base_conn);
 +    conn = ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(entry_conn);
 +    /* if it's an internal linked connection, don't yell its status. */
 +    severity = (tor_addr_is_null(&base_conn->addr) && !base_conn->port)
 +      ? LOG_INFO : LOG_NOTICE;
 +    seconds_idle = (int)( now - base_conn->timestamp_last_read_allowed );
 +    seconds_since_born = (int)( now - base_conn->timestamp_created );
 +
 +    if (base_conn->state == AP_CONN_STATE_OPEN)
 +      continue;
 +
 +    /* We already consider SocksTimeout in
 +     * connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit(), but we need to consider
 +     * it here too because controllers that put streams in controller_wait
 +     * state never ask Tor to attach the circuit. */
 +    if (AP_CONN_STATE_IS_UNATTACHED(base_conn->state)) {
 +      if (seconds_since_born >= options->SocksTimeout) {
 +        log_fn(severity, LD_APP,
 +            "Tried for %d seconds to get a connection to %s:%d. "
 +            "Giving up. (%s)",
 +            seconds_since_born,
 +            safe_str_client(entry_conn->socks_request->address),
 +            entry_conn->socks_request->port,
 +            conn_state_to_string(CONN_TYPE_AP, base_conn->state));
 +        connection_mark_unattached_ap(entry_conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TIMEOUT);
 +      }
 +      continue;
 +    }
 +
 +    /* We're in state connect_wait or resolve_wait now -- waiting for a
 +     * reply to our relay cell. See if we want to retry/give up. */
 +
 +    cutoff = compute_retry_timeout(entry_conn);
 +    if (seconds_idle < cutoff)
 +      continue;
 +    circ = circuit_get_by_edge_conn(conn);
 +    if (!circ) { /* it's vanished? */
 +      log_info(LD_APP,"Conn is waiting (address %s), but lost its circ.",
 +               safe_str_client(entry_conn->socks_request->address));
 +      connection_mark_unattached_ap(entry_conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TIMEOUT);
 +      continue;
 +    }
 +    if (circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED) {
 +      if (seconds_idle >= options->SocksTimeout) {
 +        log_fn(severity, LD_REND,
 +               "Rend stream is %d seconds late. Giving up on address"
 +               " '%s.onion'.",
 +               seconds_idle,
 +               safe_str_client(entry_conn->socks_request->address));
 +        /* Roll back path bias use state so that we probe the circuit
 +         * if nothing else succeeds on it */
 +        pathbias_mark_use_rollback(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ));
 +
 +        connection_edge_end(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TIMEOUT);
 +        connection_mark_unattached_ap(entry_conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TIMEOUT);
 +      }
 +      continue;
 +    }
 +
 +    if (circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL &&
 +        circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_HSDIR_GET &&
 +        circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_HSDIR_POST &&
 +        circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT &&
 +        circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_PATH_BIAS_TESTING) {
 +      log_warn(LD_BUG, "circuit->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL failed. "
 +               "The purpose on the circuit was %s; it was in state %s, "
 +               "path_state %s.",
 +               circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->purpose),
 +               circuit_state_to_string(circ->state),
 +               CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) ?
 +                pathbias_state_to_string(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->path_state) :
 +                "none");
 +    }
 +    log_fn(cutoff < 15 ? LOG_INFO : severity, LD_APP,
 +           "We tried for %d seconds to connect to '%s' using exit %s."
 +           " Retrying on a new circuit.",
 +           seconds_idle,
 +           safe_str_client(entry_conn->socks_request->address),
 +           conn->cpath_layer ?
 +             extend_info_describe(conn->cpath_layer->extend_info):
 +             "*unnamed*");
 +    /* send an end down the circuit */
 +    connection_edge_end(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TIMEOUT);
 +    /* un-mark it as ending, since we're going to reuse it */
 +    conn->edge_has_sent_end = 0;
 +    conn->end_reason = 0;
 +    /* make us not try this circuit again, but allow
 +     * current streams on it to survive if they can */
 +    mark_circuit_unusable_for_new_conns(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ));
 +
 +    /* give our stream another 'cutoff' seconds to try */
 +    conn->base_.timestamp_last_read_allowed += cutoff;
 +    if (entry_conn->num_socks_retries < 250) /* avoid overflow */
 +      entry_conn->num_socks_retries++;
 +    /* move it back into 'pending' state, and try to attach. */
 +    if (connection_ap_detach_retriable(entry_conn, TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ),
 +                                       END_STREAM_REASON_TIMEOUT)<0) {
 +      if (!base_conn->marked_for_close)
 +        connection_mark_unattached_ap(entry_conn,
 +                                      END_STREAM_REASON_CANT_ATTACH);
 +    }
 +  } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(base_conn);
 +}
 +
 +/**
 + * As connection_ap_attach_pending, but first scans the entire connection
 + * array to see if any elements are missing.
 + */
 +void
 +connection_ap_rescan_and_attach_pending(void)
 +{
 +  entry_connection_t *entry_conn;
 +  smartlist_t *conns = get_connection_array();
 +
 +  if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(NULL == pending_entry_connections))
 +    pending_entry_connections = smartlist_new();
 +
 +  SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(conns, connection_t *, conn) {
 +    if (conn->marked_for_close ||
 +        conn->type != CONN_TYPE_AP ||
 +        conn->state != AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT)
 +      continue;
 +
 +    entry_conn = TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn);
 +    tor_assert(entry_conn);
 +    if (! smartlist_contains(pending_entry_connections, entry_conn)) {
 +      log_warn(LD_BUG, "Found a connection %p that was supposed to be "
 +               "in pending_entry_connections, but wasn't. No worries; "
 +               "adding it.",
 +               pending_entry_connections);
 +      untried_pending_connections = 1;
 +      connection_ap_mark_as_pending_circuit(entry_conn);
 +    }
 +
 +  } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(conn);
 +
 +  connection_ap_attach_pending(1);
 +}
 +
 +#ifdef DEBUGGING_17659
 +#define UNMARK() do {                           \
 +    entry_conn->marked_pending_circ_line = 0;   \
 +    entry_conn->marked_pending_circ_file = 0;   \
 +  } while (0)
 +#else /* !(defined(DEBUGGING_17659)) */
 +#define UNMARK() do { } while (0)
 +#endif /* defined(DEBUGGING_17659) */
 +
 +/** Tell any AP streams that are listed as waiting for a new circuit to try
 + * again.  If there is an available circuit for a stream, attach it. Otherwise,
 + * launch a new circuit.
 + *
 + * If <b>retry</b> is false, only check the list if it contains at least one
 + * streams that we have not yet tried to attach to a circuit.
 + */
 +void
 +connection_ap_attach_pending(int retry)
 +{
 +  if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(!pending_entry_connections)) {
 +    return;
 +  }
 +
 +  if (untried_pending_connections == 0 && !retry)
 +    return;
 +
 +  /* Don't allow any modifications to list while we are iterating over
 +   * it.  We'll put streams back on this list if we can't attach them
 +   * immediately. */
 +  smartlist_t *pending = pending_entry_connections;
 +  pending_entry_connections = smartlist_new();
 +
 +  SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(pending,
 +                          entry_connection_t *, entry_conn) {
 +    connection_t *conn = ENTRY_TO_CONN(entry_conn);
 +    tor_assert(conn && entry_conn);
 +    if (conn->marked_for_close) {
 +      UNMARK();
 +      continue;
 +    }
 +    if (conn->magic != ENTRY_CONNECTION_MAGIC) {
 +      log_warn(LD_BUG, "%p has impossible magic value %u.",
 +               entry_conn, (unsigned)conn->magic);
 +      UNMARK();
 +      continue;
 +    }
 +    if (conn->state != AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT) {
 +      log_warn(LD_BUG, "%p is no longer in circuit_wait. Its current state "
 +               "is %s. Why is it on pending_entry_connections?",
 +               entry_conn,
 +               conn_state_to_string(conn->type, conn->state));
 +      UNMARK();
 +      continue;
 +    }
 +
 +    /* Okay, we're through the sanity checks. Try to handle this stream. */
 +    if (connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit(entry_conn) < 0) {
 +      if (!conn->marked_for_close)
 +        connection_mark_unattached_ap(entry_conn,
 +                                      END_STREAM_REASON_CANT_ATTACH);
 +    }
 +
 +    if (! conn->marked_for_close &&
 +        conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP &&
 +        conn->state == AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT) {
 +      /* Is it still waiting for a circuit? If so, we didn't attach it,
 +       * so it's still pending.  Put it back on the list.
 +       */
 +      if (!smartlist_contains(pending_entry_connections, entry_conn)) {
 +        smartlist_add(pending_entry_connections, entry_conn);
 +        continue;
 +      }
 +    }
 +
 +    /* If we got here, then we either closed the connection, or
 +     * we attached it. */
 +    UNMARK();
 +  } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(entry_conn);
 +
 +  smartlist_free(pending);
 +  untried_pending_connections = 0;
 +}
 +
 +static void
 +attach_pending_entry_connections_cb(mainloop_event_t *ev, void *arg)
 +{
 +  (void)ev;
 +  (void)arg;
 +  connection_ap_attach_pending(0);
 +}
 +
 +/** Mark <b>entry_conn</b> as needing to get attached to a circuit.
 + *
 + * And <b>entry_conn</b> must be in AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT,
 + * should not already be pending a circuit.  The circuit will get
 + * launched or the connection will get attached the next time we
 + * call connection_ap_attach_pending().
 + */
 +void
 +connection_ap_mark_as_pending_circuit_(entry_connection_t *entry_conn,
 +                                       const char *fname, int lineno)
 +{
 +  connection_t *conn = ENTRY_TO_CONN(entry_conn);
 +  tor_assert(conn->state == AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT);
 +  tor_assert(conn->magic == ENTRY_CONNECTION_MAGIC);
 +  if (conn->marked_for_close)
 +    return;
 +
 +  if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(NULL == pending_entry_connections)) {
 +    pending_entry_connections = smartlist_new();
 +  }
 +  if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(NULL == attach_pending_entry_connections_ev)) {
 +    attach_pending_entry_connections_ev = mainloop_event_postloop_new(
 +                                  attach_pending_entry_connections_cb, NULL);
 +  }
 +  if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(smartlist_contains(pending_entry_connections,
 +                                          entry_conn))) {
 +    log_warn(LD_BUG, "What?? pending_entry_connections already contains %p! "
 +             "(Called from %s:%d.)",
 +             entry_conn, fname, lineno);
 +#ifdef DEBUGGING_17659
 +    const char *f2 = entry_conn->marked_pending_circ_file;
 +    log_warn(LD_BUG, "(Previously called from %s:%d.)\n",
 +             f2 ? f2 : "<NULL>",
 +             entry_conn->marked_pending_circ_line);
 +#endif /* defined(DEBUGGING_17659) */
 +    log_backtrace(LOG_WARN, LD_BUG, "To debug, this may help");
 +    return;
 +  }
 +
 +#ifdef DEBUGGING_17659
 +  entry_conn->marked_pending_circ_line = (uint16_t) lineno;
 +  entry_conn->marked_pending_circ_file = fname;
 +#endif
 +
 +  untried_pending_connections = 1;
 +  smartlist_add(pending_entry_connections, entry_conn);
 +
 +  mainloop_event_activate(attach_pending_entry_connections_ev);
 +}
 +
 +/** Mark <b>entry_conn</b> as no longer waiting for a circuit. */
 +void
 +connection_ap_mark_as_non_pending_circuit(entry_connection_t *entry_conn)
 +{
 +  if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(NULL == pending_entry_connections))
 +    return;
 +  UNMARK();
 +  smartlist_remove(pending_entry_connections, entry_conn);
 +}
 +
 +/** Mark <b>entry_conn</b> as waiting for a rendezvous descriptor. This
 + * function will remove the entry connection from the waiting for a circuit
 + * list (pending_entry_connections).
 + *
 + * This pattern is used across the code base because a connection in state
 + * AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT must not be in the pending list. */
 +void
 +connection_ap_mark_as_waiting_for_renddesc(entry_connection_t *entry_conn)
 +{
 +  tor_assert(entry_conn);
 +
 +  connection_ap_mark_as_non_pending_circuit(entry_conn);
 +  ENTRY_TO_CONN(entry_conn)->state = AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT;
 +}
 +
 +/* DOCDOC */
 +void
 +connection_ap_warn_and_unmark_if_pending_circ(entry_connection_t *entry_conn,
 +                                              const char *where)
 +{
 +  if (pending_entry_connections &&
 +      smartlist_contains(pending_entry_connections, entry_conn)) {
 +    log_warn(LD_BUG, "What was %p doing in pending_entry_connections in %s?",
 +             entry_conn, where);
 +    connection_ap_mark_as_non_pending_circuit(entry_conn);
 +  }
 +}
 +
 +/** Tell any AP streams that are waiting for a one-hop tunnel to
 + * <b>failed_digest</b> that they are going to fail. */
 +/* XXXX We should get rid of this function, and instead attach
 + * one-hop streams to circ->p_streams so they get marked in
 + * circuit_mark_for_close like normal p_streams. */
 +void
 +connection_ap_fail_onehop(const char *failed_digest,
 +                          cpath_build_state_t *build_state)
 +{
 +  entry_connection_t *entry_conn;
 +  char digest[DIGEST_LEN];
 +  smartlist_t *conns = get_connection_array();
 +  SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(conns, connection_t *, conn) {
 +    if (conn->marked_for_close ||
 +        conn->type != CONN_TYPE_AP ||
 +        conn->state != AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT)
 +      continue;
 +    entry_conn = TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn);
 +    if (!entry_conn->want_onehop)
 +      continue;
 +    if (hexdigest_to_digest(entry_conn->chosen_exit_name, digest) < 0 ||
 +        tor_memneq(digest, failed_digest, DIGEST_LEN))
 +      continue;
 +    if (tor_digest_is_zero(digest)) {
 +      /* we don't know the digest; have to compare addr:port */
 +      tor_addr_t addr;
 +      if (!build_state || !build_state->chosen_exit ||
 +          !entry_conn->socks_request) {
 +        continue;
 +      }
 +      if (tor_addr_parse(&addr, entry_conn->socks_request->address)<0 ||
 +          !tor_addr_eq(&build_state->chosen_exit->addr, &addr) ||
 +          build_state->chosen_exit->port != entry_conn->socks_request->port)
 +        continue;
 +    }
 +    log_info(LD_APP, "Closing one-hop stream to '%s/%s' because the OR conn "
 +                     "just failed.", entry_conn->chosen_exit_name,
 +                     entry_conn->socks_request->address);
 +    connection_mark_unattached_ap(entry_conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TIMEOUT);
 +  } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(conn);
 +}
 +
 +/** A circuit failed to finish on its last hop <b>info</b>. If there
 + * are any streams waiting with this exit node in mind, but they
 + * don't absolutely require it, make them give up on it.
 + */
 +void
 +circuit_discard_optional_exit_enclaves(extend_info_t *info)
 +{
 +  entry_connection_t *entry_conn;
 +  const node_t *r1, *r2;
 +
 +  smartlist_t *conns = get_connection_array();
 +  SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(conns, connection_t *, conn) {
 +    if (conn->marked_for_close ||
 +        conn->type != CONN_TYPE_AP ||
 +        conn->state != AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT)
 +      continue;
 +    entry_conn = TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn);
 +    if (!entry_conn->chosen_exit_optional &&
 +        !entry_conn->chosen_exit_retries)
 +      continue;
 +    r1 = node_get_by_nickname(entry_conn->chosen_exit_name,
 +                              NNF_NO_WARN_UNNAMED);
 +    r2 = node_get_by_id(info->identity_digest);
 +    if (!r1 || !r2 || r1 != r2)
 +      continue;
 +    tor_assert(entry_conn->socks_request);
 +    if (entry_conn->chosen_exit_optional) {
 +      log_info(LD_APP, "Giving up on enclave exit '%s' for destination %s.",
 +               safe_str_client(entry_conn->chosen_exit_name),
 +               escaped_safe_str_client(entry_conn->socks_request->address));
 +      entry_conn->chosen_exit_optional = 0;
 +      tor_free(entry_conn->chosen_exit_name); /* clears it */
 +      /* if this port is dangerous, warn or reject it now that we don't
 +       * think it'll be using an enclave. */
 +      consider_plaintext_ports(entry_conn, entry_conn->socks_request->port);
 +    }
 +    if (entry_conn->chosen_exit_retries) {
 +      if (--entry_conn->chosen_exit_retries == 0) { /* give up! */
 +        clear_trackexithost_mappings(entry_conn->chosen_exit_name);
 +        tor_free(entry_conn->chosen_exit_name); /* clears it */
 +        /* if this port is dangerous, warn or reject it now that we don't
 +         * think it'll be using an enclave. */
 +        consider_plaintext_ports(entry_conn, entry_conn->socks_request->port);
 +      }
 +    }
 +  } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(conn);
 +}
 +
 +/** The AP connection <b>conn</b> has just failed while attaching or
 + * sending a BEGIN or resolving on <b>circ</b>, but another circuit
 + * might work. Detach the circuit, and either reattach it, launch a
 + * new circuit, tell the controller, or give up as appropriate.
 + *
 + * Returns -1 on err, 1 on success, 0 on not-yet-sure.
 + */
 +int
 +connection_ap_detach_retriable(entry_connection_t *conn,
 +                               origin_circuit_t *circ,
 +                               int reason)
 +{
 +  control_event_stream_status(conn, STREAM_EVENT_FAILED_RETRIABLE, reason);
 +  ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->timestamp_last_read_allowed = time(NULL);
 +
 +  /* Roll back path bias use state so that we probe the circuit
 +   * if nothing else succeeds on it */
 +  pathbias_mark_use_rollback(circ);
 +
 +  if (conn->pending_optimistic_data) {
 +    buf_set_to_copy(&conn->sending_optimistic_data,
 +                    conn->pending_optimistic_data);
 +  }
 +
 +  if (!get_options()->LeaveStreamsUnattached || conn->use_begindir) {
 +    /* If we're attaching streams ourself, or if this connection is
 +     * a tunneled directory connection, then just attach it. */
 +    ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->state = AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT;
 +    circuit_detach_stream(TO_CIRCUIT(circ),ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn));
 +    connection_ap_mark_as_pending_circuit(conn);
 +  } else {
 +    CONNECTION_AP_EXPECT_NONPENDING(conn);
 +    ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->state = AP_CONN_STATE_CONTROLLER_WAIT;
 +    circuit_detach_stream(TO_CIRCUIT(circ),ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn));
 +  }
 +  return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/** Check if <b>conn</b> is using a dangerous port. Then warn and/or
 + * reject depending on our config options. */
 +static int
 +consider_plaintext_ports(entry_connection_t *conn, uint16_t port)
 +{
 +  const or_options_t *options = get_options();
 +  int reject = smartlist_contains_int_as_string(
 +                                     options->RejectPlaintextPorts, port);
 +
 +  if (smartlist_contains_int_as_string(options->WarnPlaintextPorts, port)) {
 +    log_warn(LD_APP, "Application request to port %d: this port is "
 +             "commonly used for unencrypted protocols. Please make sure "
 +             "you don't send anything you would mind the rest of the "
 +             "Internet reading!%s", port, reject ? " Closing." : "");
 +    control_event_client_status(LOG_WARN, "DANGEROUS_PORT PORT=%d RESULT=%s",
 +                                port, reject ? "REJECT" : "WARN");
 +  }
 +
 +  if (reject) {
 +    log_info(LD_APP, "Port %d listed in RejectPlaintextPorts. Closing.", port);
 +    connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_ENTRYPOLICY);
 +    return -1;
 +  }
 +
 +  return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/** How many times do we try connecting with an exit configured via
 + * TrackHostExits before concluding that it won't work any more and trying a
 + * different one? */
 +#define TRACKHOSTEXITS_RETRIES 5
 +
 +/** Call connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach() unless a controller
 + *  asked us to leave streams unattached. Return 0 in that case.
 + *
 + *  See connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach()'s
 + *  documentation for arguments and return value.
 + */
 +MOCK_IMPL(int,
 +connection_ap_rewrite_and_attach_if_allowed,(entry_connection_t *conn,
 +                                             origin_circuit_t *circ,
 +                                             crypt_path_t *cpath))
 +{
 +  const or_options_t *options = get_options();
 +
 +  if (options->LeaveStreamsUnattached) {
 +    CONNECTION_AP_EXPECT_NONPENDING(conn);
 +    ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->state = AP_CONN_STATE_CONTROLLER_WAIT;
 +    return 0;
 +  }
 +  return connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(conn, circ, cpath);
 +}
 +
 +/* Try to perform any map-based rewriting of the target address in
 + * <b>conn</b>, filling in the fields of <b>out</b> as we go, and modifying
 + * conn->socks_request.address as appropriate.
 + */
 +STATIC void
 +connection_ap_handshake_rewrite(entry_connection_t *conn,
 +                                rewrite_result_t *out)
 +{
 +  socks_request_t *socks = conn->socks_request;
 +  const or_options_t *options = get_options();
 +  tor_addr_t addr_tmp;
 +
 +  /* Initialize all the fields of 'out' to reasonable defaults */
 +  out->automap = 0;
 +  out->exit_source = ADDRMAPSRC_NONE;
 +  out->map_expires = TIME_MAX;
 +  out->end_reason = 0;
 +  out->should_close = 0;
 +  out->orig_address[0] = 0;
 +
 +  /* We convert all incoming addresses to lowercase. */
 +  tor_strlower(socks->address);
 +  /* Remember the original address. */
 +  strlcpy(out->orig_address, socks->address, sizeof(out->orig_address));
 +  log_debug(LD_APP,"Client asked for %s:%d",
 +            safe_str_client(socks->address),
 +            socks->port);
 +
 +  /* Check for whether this is a .exit address.  By default, those are
 +   * disallowed when they're coming straight from the client, but you're
 +   * allowed to have them in MapAddress commands and so forth. */
 +  if (!strcmpend(socks->address, ".exit")) {
-     log_warn(LD_APP, "The  \".exit\" notation is disabled in Tor due to "
-              "security risks.");
++    static ratelim_t exit_warning_limit = RATELIM_INIT(60*15);
++    log_fn_ratelim(&exit_warning_limit, LOG_WARN, LD_APP,
++                   "The  \".exit\" notation is disabled in Tor due to "
++                   "security risks.");
 +    control_event_client_status(LOG_WARN, "SOCKS_BAD_HOSTNAME HOSTNAME=%s",
 +                                escaped(socks->address));
 +    out->end_reason = END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
 +    out->should_close = 1;
 +    return;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Remember the original address so we can tell the user about what
 +   * they actually said, not just what it turned into. */
 +  /* XXX yes, this is the same as out->orig_address above. One is
 +   * in the output, and one is in the connection. */
 +  if (! conn->original_dest_address) {
 +    /* Is the 'if' necessary here? XXXX */
 +    conn->original_dest_address = tor_strdup(conn->socks_request->address);
 +  }
 +
 +  /* First, apply MapAddress and MAPADDRESS mappings. We need to do
 +   * these only for non-reverse lookups, since they don't exist for those.
 +   * We also need to do this before we consider automapping, since we might
 +   * e.g. resolve irc.oftc.net into irconionaddress.onion, at which point
 +   * we'd need to automap it. */
 +  if (socks->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE_PTR) {
 +    const unsigned rewrite_flags = AMR_FLAG_USE_MAPADDRESS;
 +    if (addressmap_rewrite(socks->address, sizeof(socks->address),
 +                       rewrite_flags, &out->map_expires, &out->exit_source)) {
 +      control_event_stream_status(conn, STREAM_EVENT_REMAP,
 +                                  REMAP_STREAM_SOURCE_CACHE);
 +    }
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Now see if we need to create or return an existing Hostname->IP
 +   * automapping.  Automapping happens when we're asked to resolve a
 +   * hostname, and AutomapHostsOnResolve is set, and the hostname has a
 +   * suffix listed in AutomapHostsSuffixes.  It's a handy feature
 +   * that lets you have Tor assign e.g. IPv6 addresses for .onion
 +   * names, and return them safely from DNSPort.
 +   */
 +  if (socks->command == SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE &&
 +      tor_addr_parse(&addr_tmp, socks->address)<0 &&
 +      options->AutomapHostsOnResolve) {
 +    /* Check the suffix... */
 +    out->automap = addressmap_address_should_automap(socks->address, options);
 +    if (out->automap) {
 +      /* If we get here, then we should apply an automapping for this. */
 +      const char *new_addr;
 +      /* We return an IPv4 address by default, or an IPv6 address if we
 +       * are allowed to do so. */
 +      int addr_type = RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV4;
 +      if (conn->socks_request->socks_version != 4) {
 +        if (!conn->entry_cfg.ipv4_traffic ||
 +            (conn->entry_cfg.ipv6_traffic && conn->entry_cfg.prefer_ipv6) ||
 +            conn->entry_cfg.prefer_ipv6_virtaddr)
 +          addr_type = RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV6;
 +      }
 +      /* Okay, register the target address as automapped, and find the new
 +       * address we're supposed to give as a resolve answer.  (Return a cached
 +       * value if we've looked up this address before.
 +       */
 +      new_addr = addressmap_register_virtual_address(
 +                                    addr_type, tor_strdup(socks->address));
 +      if (! new_addr) {
 +        log_warn(LD_APP, "Unable to automap address %s",
 +                 escaped_safe_str(socks->address));
 +        out->end_reason = END_STREAM_REASON_INTERNAL;
 +        out->should_close = 1;
 +        return;
 +      }
 +      log_info(LD_APP, "Automapping %s to %s",
 +               escaped_safe_str_client(socks->address),
 +               safe_str_client(new_addr));
 +      strlcpy(socks->address, new_addr, sizeof(socks->address));
 +    }
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Now handle reverse lookups, if they're in the cache.  This doesn't
 +   * happen too often, since client-side DNS caching is off by default,
 +   * and very deprecated. */
 +  if (socks->command == SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE_PTR) {
 +    unsigned rewrite_flags = 0;
 +    if (conn->entry_cfg.use_cached_ipv4_answers)
 +      rewrite_flags |= AMR_FLAG_USE_IPV4_DNS;
 +    if (conn->entry_cfg.use_cached_ipv6_answers)
 +      rewrite_flags |= AMR_FLAG_USE_IPV6_DNS;
 +
 +    if (addressmap_rewrite_reverse(socks->address, sizeof(socks->address),
 +                                   rewrite_flags, &out->map_expires)) {
 +      char *result = tor_strdup(socks->address);
 +      /* remember _what_ is supposed to have been resolved. */
 +      tor_snprintf(socks->address, sizeof(socks->address), "REVERSE[%s]",
 +                   out->orig_address);
 +      connection_ap_handshake_socks_resolved(conn, RESOLVED_TYPE_HOSTNAME,
 +                                             strlen(result), (uint8_t*)result,
 +                                             -1,
 +                                             out->map_expires);
 +      tor_free(result);
 +      out->end_reason = END_STREAM_REASON_DONE |
 +                        END_STREAM_REASON_FLAG_ALREADY_SOCKS_REPLIED;
 +      out->should_close = 1;
 +      return;
 +    }
 +
 +    /* Hang on, did we find an answer saying that this is a reverse lookup for
 +     * an internal address?  If so, we should reject it if we're configured to
 +     * do so. */
 +    if (options->ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses) {
 +      /* Don't let clients try to do a reverse lookup on 10.0.0.1. */
 +      tor_addr_t addr;
 +      int ok;
 +      ok = tor_addr_parse_PTR_name(
 +                               &addr, socks->address, AF_UNSPEC, 1);
 +      if (ok == 1 && tor_addr_is_internal(&addr, 0)) {
 +        connection_ap_handshake_socks_resolved(conn, RESOLVED_TYPE_ERROR,
 +                                               0, NULL, -1, TIME_MAX);
 +        out->end_reason = END_STREAM_REASON_SOCKSPROTOCOL |
 +                          END_STREAM_REASON_FLAG_ALREADY_SOCKS_REPLIED;
 +        out->should_close = 1;
 +        return;
 +      }
 +    }
 +  }
 +
 +  /* If we didn't automap it before, then this is still the address that
 +   * came straight from the user, mapped according to any
 +   * MapAddress/MAPADDRESS commands.  Now apply other mappings,
 +   * including previously registered Automap entries (IP back to
 +   * hostname), TrackHostExits entries, and client-side DNS cache
 +   * entries (if they're turned on).
 +   */
 +  if (socks->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE_PTR &&
 +      !out->automap) {
 +    unsigned rewrite_flags = AMR_FLAG_USE_AUTOMAP | AMR_FLAG_USE_TRACKEXIT;
 +    addressmap_entry_source_t exit_source2;
 +    if (conn->entry_cfg.use_cached_ipv4_answers)
 +      rewrite_flags |= AMR_FLAG_USE_IPV4_DNS;
 +    if (conn->entry_cfg.use_cached_ipv6_answers)
 +      rewrite_flags |= AMR_FLAG_USE_IPV6_DNS;
 +    if (addressmap_rewrite(socks->address, sizeof(socks->address),
 +                        rewrite_flags, &out->map_expires, &exit_source2)) {
 +      control_event_stream_status(conn, STREAM_EVENT_REMAP,
 +                                  REMAP_STREAM_SOURCE_CACHE);
 +    }
 +    if (out->exit_source == ADDRMAPSRC_NONE) {
 +      /* If it wasn't a .exit before, maybe it turned into a .exit. Remember
 +       * the original source of a .exit. */
 +      out->exit_source = exit_source2;
 +    }
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Check to see whether we're about to use an address in the virtual
 +   * range without actually having gotten it from an Automap. */
 +  if (!out->automap && address_is_in_virtual_range(socks->address)) {
 +    /* This address was probably handed out by
 +     * client_dns_get_unmapped_address, but the mapping was discarded for some
 +     * reason.  Or the user typed in a virtual address range manually.  We
 +     * *don't* want to send the address through Tor; that's likely to fail,
 +     * and may leak information.
 +     */
 +    log_warn(LD_APP,"Missing mapping for virtual address '%s'. Refusing.",
 +             safe_str_client(socks->address));
 +    out->end_reason = END_STREAM_REASON_INTERNAL;
 +    out->should_close = 1;
 +    return;
 +  }
 +}
 +
 +/** We just received a SOCKS request in <b>conn</b> to an onion address of type
 + *  <b>addresstype</b>. Start connecting to the onion service. */
 +static int
 +connection_ap_handle_onion(entry_connection_t *conn,
 +                           socks_request_t *socks,
 +                           origin_circuit_t *circ,
 +                           hostname_type_t addresstype)
 +{
 +  time_t now = approx_time();
 +  connection_t *base_conn = ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn);
 +
 +  /* If .onion address requests are disabled, refuse the request */
 +  if (!conn->entry_cfg.onion_traffic) {
 +    log_warn(LD_APP, "Onion address %s requested from a port with .onion "
 +             "disabled", safe_str_client(socks->address));
 +    connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_ENTRYPOLICY);
 +    return -1;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Check whether it's RESOLVE or RESOLVE_PTR.  We don't handle those
 +   * for hidden service addresses. */
 +  if (SOCKS_COMMAND_IS_RESOLVE(socks->command)) {
 +    /* if it's a resolve request, fail it right now, rather than
 +     * building all the circuits and then realizing it won't work. */
 +    log_warn(LD_APP,
 +             "Resolve requests to hidden services not allowed. Failing.");
 +    connection_ap_handshake_socks_resolved(conn,RESOLVED_TYPE_ERROR,
 +                                           0,NULL,-1,TIME_MAX);
 +    connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn,
 +                               END_STREAM_REASON_SOCKSPROTOCOL |
 +                               END_STREAM_REASON_FLAG_ALREADY_SOCKS_REPLIED);
 +    return -1;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* If we were passed a circuit, then we need to fail.  .onion addresses
 +   * only work when we launch our own circuits for now. */
 +  if (circ) {
 +    log_warn(LD_CONTROL, "Attachstream to a circuit is not "
 +             "supported for .onion addresses currently. Failing.");
 +    connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
 +    return -1;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Interface: Regardless of HS version after the block below we should have
 +     set onion_address, rend_cache_lookup_result, and descriptor_is_usable. */
 +  const char *onion_address = NULL;
 +  int rend_cache_lookup_result = -ENOENT;
 +  int descriptor_is_usable = 0;
 +
 +  if (addresstype == ONION_V2_HOSTNAME) { /* it's a v2 hidden service */
 +    rend_cache_entry_t *entry = NULL;
 +    /* Look up if we have client authorization configured for this hidden
 +     * service.  If we do, associate it with the rend_data. */
 +    rend_service_authorization_t *client_auth =
 +      rend_client_lookup_service_authorization(socks->address);
 +
 +    const uint8_t *cookie = NULL;
 +    rend_auth_type_t auth_type = REND_NO_AUTH;
 +    if (client_auth) {
 +      log_info(LD_REND, "Using previously configured client authorization "
 +               "for hidden service request.");
 +      auth_type = client_auth->auth_type;
 +      cookie = client_auth->descriptor_cookie;
 +    }
 +
 +    /* Fill in the rend_data field so we can start doing a connection to
 +     * a hidden service. */
 +    rend_data_t *rend_data = ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->rend_data =
 +      rend_data_client_create(socks->address, NULL, (char *) cookie,
 +                              auth_type);
 +    if (rend_data == NULL) {
 +      return -1;
 +    }
 +    onion_address = rend_data_get_address(rend_data);
 +    log_info(LD_REND,"Got a hidden service request for ID '%s'",
 +             safe_str_client(onion_address));
 +
 +    rend_cache_lookup_result = rend_cache_lookup_entry(onion_address,-1,
 +                                                       &entry);
 +    if (!rend_cache_lookup_result && entry) {
 +      descriptor_is_usable = rend_client_any_intro_points_usable(entry);
 +    }
 +  } else { /* it's a v3 hidden service */
 +    tor_assert(addresstype == ONION_V3_HOSTNAME);
 +    const hs_descriptor_t *cached_desc = NULL;
 +    int retval;
 +    /* Create HS conn identifier with HS pubkey */
 +    hs_ident_edge_conn_t *hs_conn_ident =
 +      tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(hs_ident_edge_conn_t));
 +
 +    retval = hs_parse_address(socks->address, &hs_conn_ident->identity_pk,
 +                              NULL, NULL);
 +    if (retval < 0) {
 +      log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "failed to parse hs address");
 +      tor_free(hs_conn_ident);
 +      return -1;
 +    }
 +    ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->hs_ident = hs_conn_ident;
 +
 +    onion_address = socks->address;
 +
 +    /* Check the v3 desc cache */
 +    cached_desc = hs_cache_lookup_as_client(&hs_conn_ident->identity_pk);
 +    if (cached_desc) {
 +      rend_cache_lookup_result = 0;
 +      descriptor_is_usable =
 +        hs_client_any_intro_points_usable(&hs_conn_ident->identity_pk,
 +                                          cached_desc);
 +      log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Found %s descriptor in cache for %s. %s.",
 +               (descriptor_is_usable) ? "usable" : "unusable",
 +               safe_str_client(onion_address),
 +               (descriptor_is_usable) ? "Not fetching." : "Refecting.");
 +    } else {
 +      rend_cache_lookup_result = -ENOENT;
 +    }
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Lookup the given onion address. If invalid, stop right now.
 +   * Otherwise, we might have it in the cache or not. */
 +  unsigned int refetch_desc = 0;
 +  if (rend_cache_lookup_result < 0) {
 +    switch (-rend_cache_lookup_result) {
 +    case EINVAL:
 +      /* We should already have rejected this address! */
 +      log_warn(LD_BUG,"Invalid service name '%s'",
 +               safe_str_client(onion_address));
 +      connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
 +      return -1;
 +    case ENOENT:
 +      /* We didn't have this; we should look it up. */
 +      log_info(LD_REND, "No descriptor found in our cache for %s. Fetching.",
 +               safe_str_client(onion_address));
 +      refetch_desc = 1;
 +      break;
 +    default:
 +      log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unknown cache lookup error %d",
 +               rend_cache_lookup_result);
 +      return -1;
 +    }
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Help predict that we'll want to do hidden service circuits in the
 +   * future. We're not sure if it will need a stable circuit yet, but
 +   * we know we'll need *something*. */
 +  rep_hist_note_used_internal(now, 0, 1);
 +
 +  /* Now we have a descriptor but is it usable or not? If not, refetch.
 +   * Also, a fetch could have been requested if the onion address was not
 +   * found in the cache previously. */
 +  if (refetch_desc || !descriptor_is_usable) {
 +    edge_connection_t *edge_conn = ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn);
 +    connection_ap_mark_as_non_pending_circuit(conn);
 +    base_conn->state = AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT;
 +    if (addresstype == ONION_V2_HOSTNAME) {
 +      tor_assert(edge_conn->rend_data);
 +      rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(edge_conn->rend_data);
 +      /* Whatever the result of the refetch, we don't go further. */
 +      return 0;
 +    } else {
 +      tor_assert(addresstype == ONION_V3_HOSTNAME);
 +      tor_assert(edge_conn->hs_ident);
 +      /* Attempt to fetch the hsv3 descriptor. Check the retval to see how it
 +       * went and act accordingly. */
 +      int ret = hs_client_refetch_hsdesc(&edge_conn->hs_ident->identity_pk);
 +      switch (ret) {
 +      case HS_CLIENT_FETCH_MISSING_INFO:
 +        /* Keeping the connection in descriptor wait state is fine because
 +         * once we get enough dirinfo or a new live consensus, the HS client
 +         * subsystem is notified and every connection in that state will
 +         * trigger a fetch for the service key. */
 +      case HS_CLIENT_FETCH_LAUNCHED:
 +      case HS_CLIENT_FETCH_PENDING:
 +      case HS_CLIENT_FETCH_HAVE_DESC:
 +        return 0;
 +      case HS_CLIENT_FETCH_ERROR:
 +      case HS_CLIENT_FETCH_NO_HSDIRS:
 +      case HS_CLIENT_FETCH_NOT_ALLOWED:
 +        /* Can't proceed further and better close the SOCKS request. */
 +        return -1;
 +      }
 +    }
 +  }
 +
 +  /* We have the descriptor!  So launch a connection to the HS. */
 +  log_info(LD_REND, "Descriptor is here. Great.");
 +
 +  base_conn->state = AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT;
 +  /* We'll try to attach it at the next event loop, or whenever
 +   * we call connection_ap_attach_pending() */
 +  connection_ap_mark_as_pending_circuit(conn);
 +  return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/** Connection <b>conn</b> just finished its socks handshake, or the
 + * controller asked us to take care of it. If <b>circ</b> is defined,
 + * then that's where we'll want to attach it. Otherwise we have to
 + * figure it out ourselves.
 + *
 + * First, parse whether it's a .exit address, remap it, and so on. Then
 + * if it's for a general circuit, try to attach it to a circuit (or launch
 + * one as needed), else if it's for a rendezvous circuit, fetch a
 + * rendezvous descriptor first (or attach/launch a circuit if the
 + * rendezvous descriptor is already here and fresh enough).
 + *
 + * The stream will exit from the hop
 + * indicated by <b>cpath</b>, or from the last hop in circ's cpath if
 + * <b>cpath</b> is NULL.
 + */
 +int
 +connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(entry_connection_t *conn,
 +                                           origin_circuit_t *circ,
 +                                           crypt_path_t *cpath)
 +{
 +  socks_request_t *socks = conn->socks_request;
 +  const or_options_t *options = get_options();
 +  connection_t *base_conn = ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn);
 +  time_t now = time(NULL);
 +  rewrite_result_t rr;
 +
 +  /* First we'll do the rewrite part.  Let's see if we get a reasonable
 +   * answer.
 +   */
 +  memset(&rr, 0, sizeof(rr));
 +  connection_ap_handshake_rewrite(conn,&rr);
 +
 +  if (rr.should_close) {
 +    /* connection_ap_handshake_rewrite told us to close the connection:
 +     * either because it sent back an answer, or because it sent back an
 +     * error */
 +    connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, rr.end_reason);
 +    if (END_STREAM_REASON_DONE == (rr.end_reason & END_STREAM_REASON_MASK))
 +      return 0;
 +    else
 +      return -1;
 +  }
 +
 +  const time_t map_expires = rr.map_expires;
 +  const int automap = rr.automap;
 +  const addressmap_entry_source_t exit_source = rr.exit_source;
 +
 +  /* Now, we parse the address to see if it's an .onion or .exit or
 +   * other special address.
 +   */
 +  const hostname_type_t addresstype = parse_extended_hostname(socks->address);
 +
 +  /* Now see whether the hostname is bogus.  This could happen because of an
 +   * onion hostname whose format we don't recognize. */
 +  if (addresstype == BAD_HOSTNAME) {
 +    control_event_client_status(LOG_WARN, "SOCKS_BAD_HOSTNAME HOSTNAME=%s",
 +                                escaped(socks->address));
 +    connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
 +    return -1;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* If this is a .exit hostname, strip off the .name.exit part, and
 +   * see whether we're willing to connect there, and and otherwise handle the
 +   * .exit address.
 +   *
 +   * We'll set chosen_exit_name and/or close the connection as appropriate.
 +   */
 +  if (addresstype == EXIT_HOSTNAME) {
 +    /* If StrictNodes is not set, then .exit overrides ExcludeNodes but
 +     * not ExcludeExitNodes. */
 +    routerset_t *excludeset = options->StrictNodes ?
 +      options->ExcludeExitNodesUnion_ : options->ExcludeExitNodes;
 +    const node_t *node = NULL;
 +
 +    /* If this .exit was added by an AUTOMAP, then it came straight from
 +     * a user.  That's not safe. */
 +    if (exit_source == ADDRMAPSRC_AUTOMAP) {
 +      /* Whoops; this one is stale.  It must have gotten added earlier?
 +       * (Probably this is not possible, since AllowDotExit no longer
 +       * exists.) */
 +      log_warn(LD_APP,"Stale automapped address for '%s.exit'. Refusing.",
 +               safe_str_client(socks->address));
 +      control_event_client_status(LOG_WARN, "SOCKS_BAD_HOSTNAME HOSTNAME=%s",
 +                                  escaped(socks->address));
 +      connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
 +      tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached();
 +      return -1;
 +    }
 +
 +    /* Double-check to make sure there are no .exits coming from
 +     * impossible/weird sources. */
 +    if (exit_source == ADDRMAPSRC_DNS || exit_source == ADDRMAPSRC_NONE) {
 +      /* It shouldn't be possible to get a .exit address from any of these
 +       * sources. */
 +      log_warn(LD_BUG,"Address '%s.exit', with impossible source for the "
 +               ".exit part. Refusing.",
 +               safe_str_client(socks->address));
 +      control_event_client_status(LOG_WARN, "SOCKS_BAD_HOSTNAME HOSTNAME=%s",
 +                                  escaped(socks->address));
 +      connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
 +      return -1;
 +    }
 +
 +    tor_assert(!automap);
 +
 +    /* Now, find the character before the .(name) part.
 +     * (The ".exit" part got stripped off by "parse_extended_hostname").
 +     *
 +     * We're going to put the exit name into conn->chosen_exit_name, and
 +     * look up a node correspondingly. */
 +    char *s = strrchr(socks->address,'.');
 +    if (s) {
 +      /* The address was of the form "(stuff).(name).exit */
 +      if (s[1] != '\0') {
 +        /* Looks like a real .exit one. */
 +        conn->chosen_exit_name = tor_strdup(s+1);
 +        node = node_get_by_nickname(conn->chosen_exit_name, 0);
 +
 +        if (exit_source == ADDRMAPSRC_TRACKEXIT) {
 +          /* We 5 tries before it expires the addressmap */
 +          conn->chosen_exit_retries = TRACKHOSTEXITS_RETRIES;
 +        }
 +        *s = 0;
 +      } else {
 +        /* Oops, the address was (stuff)..exit.  That's not okay. */
 +        log_warn(LD_APP,"Malformed exit address '%s.exit'. Refusing.",
 +                 safe_str_client(socks->address));
 +        control_event_client_status(LOG_WARN, "SOCKS_BAD_HOSTNAME HOSTNAME=%s",
 +                                    escaped(socks->address));
 +        connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
 +        return -1;
 +      }
 +    } else {
 +      /* It looks like they just asked for "foo.exit".  That's a special
 +       * form that means (foo's address).foo.exit. */
 +
 +      conn->chosen_exit_name = tor_strdup(socks->address);
 +      node = node_get_by_nickname(conn->chosen_exit_name, 0);
 +      if (node) {
 +        *socks->address = 0;
 +        node_get_address_string(node, socks->address, sizeof(socks->address));
 +      }
 +    }
 +
 +    /* Now make sure that the chosen exit exists... */
 +    if (!node) {
 +      log_warn(LD_APP,
 +               "Unrecognized relay in exit address '%s.exit'. Refusing.",
 +               safe_str_client(socks->address));
 +      connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
 +      return -1;
 +    }
 +    /* ...and make sure that it isn't excluded. */
 +    if (routerset_contains_node(excludeset, node)) {
 +      log_warn(LD_APP,
 +               "Excluded relay in exit address '%s.exit'. Refusing.",
 +               safe_str_client(socks->address));
 +      connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
 +      return -1;
 +    }
 +    /* XXXX-1090 Should we also allow foo.bar.exit if ExitNodes is set and
 +       Bar is not listed in it?  I say yes, but our revised manpage branch
 +       implies no. */
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Now, we handle everything that isn't a .onion address. */
 +  if (addresstype != ONION_V2_HOSTNAME && addresstype != ONION_V3_HOSTNAME) {
 +    /* Not a hidden-service request.  It's either a hostname or an IP,
 +     * possibly with a .exit that we stripped off.  We're going to check
 +     * if we're allowed to connect/resolve there, and then launch the
 +     * appropriate request. */
 +
 +    /* Check for funny characters in the address. */
 +    if (address_is_invalid_destination(socks->address, 1)) {
 +      control_event_client_status(LOG_WARN, "SOCKS_BAD_HOSTNAME HOSTNAME=%s",
 +                                  escaped(socks->address));
 +      log_warn(LD_APP,
 +               "Destination '%s' seems to be an invalid hostname. Failing.",
 +               safe_str_client(socks->address));
 +      connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
 +      return -1;
 +    }
 +
 +    /* socks->address is a non-onion hostname or IP address.
 +     * If we can't do any non-onion requests, refuse the connection.
 +     * If we have a hostname but can't do DNS, refuse the connection.
 +     * If we have an IP address, but we can't use that address family,
 +     * refuse the connection.
 +     *
 +     * If we can do DNS requests, and we can use at least one address family,
 +     * then we have to resolve the address first. Then we'll know if it
 +     * resolves to a usable address family. */
 +
 +    /* First, check if all non-onion traffic is disabled */
 +    if (!conn->entry_cfg.dns_request && !conn->entry_cfg.ipv4_traffic
 +        && !conn->entry_cfg.ipv6_traffic) {
 +        log_warn(LD_APP, "Refusing to connect to non-hidden-service hostname "
 +                 "or IP address %s because Port has OnionTrafficOnly set (or "
 +                 "NoDNSRequest, NoIPv4Traffic, and NoIPv6Traffic).",
 +                 safe_str_client(socks->address));
 +        connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_ENTRYPOLICY);
 +        return -1;
 +    }
 +
 +    /* Then check if we have a hostname or IP address, and whether DNS or
 +     * the IP address family are permitted.  Reject if not. */
 +    tor_addr_t dummy_addr;
 +    int socks_family = tor_addr_parse(&dummy_addr, socks->address);
 +    /* family will be -1 for a non-onion hostname that's not an IP */
 +    if (socks_family == -1) {
 +      if (!conn->entry_cfg.dns_request) {
 +        log_warn(LD_APP, "Refusing to connect to hostname %s "
 +                 "because Port has NoDNSRequest set.",
 +                 safe_str_client(socks->address));
 +        connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_ENTRYPOLICY);
 +        return -1;
 +      }
 +    } else if (socks_family == AF_INET) {
 +      if (!conn->entry_cfg.ipv4_traffic) {
 +        log_warn(LD_APP, "Refusing to connect to IPv4 address %s because "
 +                 "Port has NoIPv4Traffic set.",
 +                 safe_str_client(socks->address));
 +        connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_ENTRYPOLICY);
 +        return -1;
 +      }
 +    } else if (socks_family == AF_INET6) {
 +      if (!conn->entry_cfg.ipv6_traffic) {
 +        log_warn(LD_APP, "Refusing to connect to IPv6 address %s because "
 +                 "Port has NoIPv6Traffic set.",
 +                 safe_str_client(socks->address));
 +        connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_ENTRYPOLICY);
 +        return -1;
 +      }
 +    } else {
 +      tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached_once();
 +    }
 +
 +    /* See if this is a hostname lookup that we can answer immediately.
 +     * (For example, an attempt to look up the IP address for an IP address.)
 +     */
 +    if (socks->command == SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE) {
 +      tor_addr_t answer;
 +      /* Reply to resolves immediately if we can. */
 +      if (tor_addr_parse(&answer, socks->address) >= 0) {/* is it an IP? */
 +        /* remember _what_ is supposed to have been resolved. */
 +        strlcpy(socks->address, rr.orig_address, sizeof(socks->address));
 +        connection_ap_handshake_socks_resolved_addr(conn, &answer, -1,
 +                                                    map_expires);
 +        connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn,
 +                                END_STREAM_REASON_DONE |
 +                                END_STREAM_REASON_FLAG_ALREADY_SOCKS_REPLIED);
 +        return 0;
 +      }
 +      tor_assert(!automap);
 +      rep_hist_note_used_resolve(now); /* help predict this next time */
 +    } else if (socks->command == SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT) {
 +      /* Now see if this is a connect request that we can reject immediately */
 +
 +      tor_assert(!automap);
 +      /* Don't allow connections to port 0. */
 +      if (socks->port == 0) {
 +        log_notice(LD_APP,"Application asked to connect to port 0. Refusing.");
 +        connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
 +        return -1;
 +      }
 +      /* You can't make connections to internal addresses, by default.
 +       * Exceptions are begindir requests (where the address is meaningless),
 +       * or cases where you've hand-configured a particular exit, thereby
 +       * making the local address meaningful. */
 +      if (options->ClientRejectInternalAddresses &&
 +          !conn->use_begindir && !conn->chosen_exit_name && !circ) {
 +        /* If we reach this point then we don't want to allow internal
 +         * addresses.  Check if we got one. */
 +        tor_addr_t addr;
 +        if (tor_addr_hostname_is_local(socks->address) ||
 +            (tor_addr_parse(&addr, socks->address) >= 0 &&
 +             tor_addr_is_internal(&addr, 0))) {
 +          /* If this is an explicit private address with no chosen exit node,
 +           * then we really don't want to try to connect to it.  That's
 +           * probably an error. */
 +          if (conn->is_transparent_ap) {
 +#define WARN_INTRVL_LOOP 300
 +            static ratelim_t loop_warn_limit = RATELIM_INIT(WARN_INTRVL_LOOP);
 +            char *m;
 +            if ((m = rate_limit_log(&loop_warn_limit, approx_time()))) {
 +              log_warn(LD_NET,
 +                       "Rejecting request for anonymous connection to private "
 +                       "address %s on a TransPort or NATDPort.  Possible loop "
 +                       "in your NAT rules?%s", safe_str_client(socks->address),
 +                       m);
 +              tor_free(m);
 +            }
 +          } else {
 +#define WARN_INTRVL_PRIV 300
 +            static ratelim_t priv_warn_limit = RATELIM_INIT(WARN_INTRVL_PRIV);
 +            char *m;
 +            if ((m = rate_limit_log(&priv_warn_limit, approx_time()))) {
 +              log_warn(LD_NET,
 +                       "Rejecting SOCKS request for anonymous connection to "
 +                       "private address %s.%s",
 +                       safe_str_client(socks->address),m);
 +              tor_free(m);
 +            }
 +          }
 +          connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_PRIVATE_ADDR);
 +          return -1;
 +        }
 +      } /* end "if we should check for internal addresses" */
 +
 +      /* Okay.  We're still doing a CONNECT, and it wasn't a private
 +       * address.  Here we do special handling for literal IP addresses,
 +       * to see if we should reject this preemptively, and to set up
 +       * fields in conn->entry_cfg to tell the exit what AF we want. */
 +      {
 +        tor_addr_t addr;
 +        /* XXX Duplicate call to tor_addr_parse. */
 +        if (tor_addr_parse(&addr, socks->address) >= 0) {
 +          /* If we reach this point, it's an IPv4 or an IPv6 address. */
 +          sa_family_t family = tor_addr_family(&addr);
 +
 +          if ((family == AF_INET && ! conn->entry_cfg.ipv4_traffic) ||
 +              (family == AF_INET6 && ! conn->entry_cfg.ipv6_traffic)) {
 +            /* You can't do an IPv4 address on a v6-only socks listener,
 +             * or vice versa. */
 +            log_warn(LD_NET, "Rejecting SOCKS request for an IP address "
 +                     "family that this listener does not support.");
 +            connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_ENTRYPOLICY);
 +            return -1;
 +          } else if (family == AF_INET6 && socks->socks_version == 4) {
 +            /* You can't make a socks4 request to an IPv6 address. Socks4
 +             * doesn't support that. */
 +            log_warn(LD_NET, "Rejecting SOCKS4 request for an IPv6 address.");
 +            connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_ENTRYPOLICY);
 +            return -1;
 +          } else if (socks->socks_version == 4 &&
 +                     !conn->entry_cfg.ipv4_traffic) {
 +            /* You can't do any kind of Socks4 request when IPv4 is forbidden.
 +             *
 +             * XXX raise this check outside the enclosing block? */
 +            log_warn(LD_NET, "Rejecting SOCKS4 request on a listener with "
 +                     "no IPv4 traffic supported.");
 +            connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_ENTRYPOLICY);
 +            return -1;
 +          } else if (family == AF_INET6) {
 +            /* Tell the exit: we won't accept any ipv4 connection to an IPv6
 +             * address. */
 +            conn->entry_cfg.ipv4_traffic = 0;
 +          } else if (family == AF_INET) {
 +            /* Tell the exit: we won't accept any ipv6 connection to an IPv4
 +             * address. */
 +            conn->entry_cfg.ipv6_traffic = 0;
 +          }
 +        }
 +      }
 +
 +      /* we never allow IPv6 answers on socks4. (TODO: Is this smart?) */
 +      if (socks->socks_version == 4)
 +        conn->entry_cfg.ipv6_traffic = 0;
 +
 +      /* Still handling CONNECT. Now, check for exit enclaves.  (Which we
 +       * don't do on BEGIN_DIR, or when there is a chosen exit.)
 +       *
 +       * TODO: Should we remove this?  Exit enclaves are nutty and don't
 +       * work very well
 +       */
 +      if (!conn->use_begindir && !conn->chosen_exit_name && !circ) {
 +        /* see if we can find a suitable enclave exit */
 +        const node_t *r =
 +          router_find_exact_exit_enclave(socks->address, socks->port);
 +        if (r) {
 +          log_info(LD_APP,
 +                   "Redirecting address %s to exit at enclave router %s",
 +                   safe_str_client(socks->address), node_describe(r));
 +          /* use the hex digest, not nickname, in case there are two
 +             routers with this nickname */
 +          conn->chosen_exit_name =
 +            tor_strdup(hex_str(r->identity, DIGEST_LEN));
 +          conn->chosen_exit_optional = 1;
 +        }
 +      }
 +
 +      /* Still handling CONNECT: warn or reject if it's using a dangerous
 +       * port. */
 +      if (!conn->use_begindir && !conn->chosen_exit_name && !circ)
 +        if (consider_plaintext_ports(conn, socks->port) < 0)
 +          return -1;
 +
 +      /* Remember the port so that we will predict that more requests
 +         there will happen in the future. */
 +      if (!conn->use_begindir) {
 +        /* help predict this next time */
 +        rep_hist_note_used_port(now, socks->port);
 +      }
 +    } else if (socks->command == SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE_PTR) {
 +      rep_hist_note_used_resolve(now); /* help predict this next time */
 +      /* no extra processing needed */
 +    } else {
 +      /* We should only be doing CONNECT, RESOLVE, or RESOLVE_PTR! */
 +      tor_fragile_assert();
 +    }
 +
 +    /* Okay. At this point we've set chosen_exit_name if needed, rewritten the
 +     * address, and decided not to reject it for any number of reasons. Now
 +     * mark the connection as waiting for a circuit, and try to attach it!
 +     */
 +    base_conn->state = AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT;
 +
 +    /* If we were given a circuit to attach to, try to attach. Otherwise,
 +     * try to find a good one and attach to that. */
 +    int rv;
 +    if (circ) {
 +      rv = connection_ap_handshake_attach_chosen_circuit(conn, circ, cpath);
 +    } else {
 +      /* We'll try to attach it at the next event loop, or whenever
 +       * we call connection_ap_attach_pending() */
 +      connection_ap_mark_as_pending_circuit(conn);
 +      rv = 0;
 +    }
 +
 +    /* If the above function returned 0 then we're waiting for a circuit.
 +     * if it returned 1, we're attached.  Both are okay.  But if it returned
 +     * -1, there was an error, so make sure the connection is marked, and
 +     * return -1. */
 +    if (rv < 0) {
 +      if (!base_conn->marked_for_close)
 +        connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_CANT_ATTACH);
 +      return -1;
 +    }
 +
 +    return 0;
 +  } else {
 +    /* If we get here, it's a request for a .onion address! */
 +    tor_assert(addresstype == ONION_V2_HOSTNAME ||
 +               addresstype == ONION_V3_HOSTNAME);
 +    tor_assert(!automap);
 +    return connection_ap_handle_onion(conn, socks, circ, addresstype);
 +  }
 +
 +  return 0; /* unreached but keeps the compiler happy */
 +}
 +
 +#ifdef TRANS_PF
 +static int pf_socket = -1;
 +int
 +get_pf_socket(void)
 +{
 +  int pf;
 +  /*  This should be opened before dropping privileges. */
 +  if (pf_socket >= 0)
 +    return pf_socket;
 +
 +#if defined(OpenBSD)
 +  /* only works on OpenBSD */
 +  pf = tor_open_cloexec("/dev/pf", O_RDONLY, 0);
 +#else
 +  /* works on NetBSD and FreeBSD */
 +  pf = tor_open_cloexec("/dev/pf", O_RDWR, 0);
 +#endif /* defined(OpenBSD) */
 +
 +  if (pf < 0) {
 +    log_warn(LD_NET, "open(\"/dev/pf\") failed: %s", strerror(errno));
 +    return -1;
 +  }
 +
 +  pf_socket = pf;
 +  return pf_socket;
 +}
 +#endif /* defined(TRANS_PF) */
 +
 +#if defined(TRANS_NETFILTER) || defined(TRANS_PF) || \
 +  defined(TRANS_TPROXY)
 +/** Try fill in the address of <b>req</b> from the socket configured
 + * with <b>conn</b>. */
 +static int
 +destination_from_socket(entry_connection_t *conn, socks_request_t *req)
 +{
 +  struct sockaddr_storage orig_dst;
 +  socklen_t orig_dst_len = sizeof(orig_dst);
 +  tor_addr_t addr;
 +
 +#ifdef TRANS_TPROXY
 +  if (get_options()->TransProxyType_parsed == TPT_TPROXY) {
 +    if (getsockname(ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->s, (struct sockaddr*)&orig_dst,
 +                    &orig_dst_len) < 0) {
 +      int e = tor_socket_errno(ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->s);
 +      log_warn(LD_NET, "getsockname() failed: %s", tor_socket_strerror(e));
 +      return -1;
 +    }
 +    goto done;
 +  }
 +#endif /* defined(TRANS_TPROXY) */
 +
 +#ifdef TRANS_NETFILTER
 +  int rv = -1;
 +  switch (ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->socket_family) {
 +#ifdef TRANS_NETFILTER_IPV4
 +    case AF_INET:
 +      rv = getsockopt(ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->s, SOL_IP, SO_ORIGINAL_DST,
 +                  (struct sockaddr*)&orig_dst, &orig_dst_len);
 +      break;
 +#endif /* defined(TRANS_NETFILTER_IPV4) */
 +#ifdef TRANS_NETFILTER_IPV6
 +    case AF_INET6:
 +      rv = getsockopt(ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->s, SOL_IPV6, IP6T_SO_ORIGINAL_DST,
 +                  (struct sockaddr*)&orig_dst, &orig_dst_len);
 +      break;
 +#endif /* defined(TRANS_NETFILTER_IPV6) */
 +    default:
 +      log_warn(LD_BUG,
 +               "Received transparent data from an unsuported socket family %d",
 +               ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->socket_family);
 +      return -1;
 +  }
 +  if (rv < 0) {
 +    int e = tor_socket_errno(ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->s);
 +    log_warn(LD_NET, "getsockopt() failed: %s", tor_socket_strerror(e));
 +    return -1;
 +  }
 +  goto done;
 +#elif defined(TRANS_PF)
 +  if (getsockname(ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->s, (struct sockaddr*)&orig_dst,
 +                  &orig_dst_len) < 0) {
 +    int e = tor_socket_errno(ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->s);
 +    log_warn(LD_NET, "getsockname() failed: %s", tor_socket_strerror(e));
 +    return -1;
 +  }
 +  goto done;
 +#else
 +  (void)conn;
 +  (void)req;
 +  log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unable to determine destination from socket.");
 +  return -1;
 +#endif /* defined(TRANS_NETFILTER) || ... */
 +
 + done:
 +  tor_addr_from_sockaddr(&addr, (struct sockaddr*)&orig_dst, &req->port);
 +  tor_addr_to_str(req->address, &addr, sizeof(req->address), 1);
 +
 +  return 0;
 +}
 +#endif /* defined(TRANS_NETFILTER) || defined(TRANS_PF) || ... */
 +
 +#ifdef TRANS_PF
 +static int
 +destination_from_pf(entry_connection_t *conn, socks_request_t *req)
 +{
 +  struct sockaddr_storage proxy_addr;
 +  socklen_t proxy_addr_len = sizeof(proxy_addr);
 +  struct sockaddr *proxy_sa = (struct sockaddr*) &proxy_addr;
 +  struct pfioc_natlook pnl;
 +  tor_addr_t addr;
 +  int pf = -1;
 +
 +  if (getsockname(ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->s, (struct sockaddr*)&proxy_addr,
 +                  &proxy_addr_len) < 0) {
 +    int e = tor_socket_errno(ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->s);
 +    log_warn(LD_NET, "getsockname() to determine transocks destination "
 +             "failed: %s", tor_socket_strerror(e));
 +    return -1;
 +  }
 +
 +#ifdef __FreeBSD__
 +  if (get_options()->TransProxyType_parsed == TPT_IPFW) {
 +    /* ipfw(8) is used and in this case getsockname returned the original
 +       destination */
 +    if (tor_addr_from_sockaddr(&addr, proxy_sa, &req->port) < 0) {
 +      tor_fragile_assert();
 +      return -1;
 +    }
 +
 +    tor_addr_to_str(req->address, &addr, sizeof(req->address), 0);
 +
 +    return 0;
 +  }
 +#endif /* defined(__FreeBSD__) */
 +
 +  memset(&pnl, 0, sizeof(pnl));
 +  pnl.proto           = IPPROTO_TCP;
 +  pnl.direction       = PF_OUT;
 +  if (proxy_sa->sa_family == AF_INET) {
 +    struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)proxy_sa;
 +    pnl.af              = AF_INET;
 +    pnl.saddr.v4.s_addr = tor_addr_to_ipv4n(&ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->addr);
 +    pnl.sport           = htons(ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->port);
 +    pnl.daddr.v4.s_addr = sin->sin_addr.s_addr;
 +    pnl.dport           = sin->sin_port;
 +  } else if (proxy_sa->sa_family == AF_INET6) {
 +    struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)proxy_sa;
 +    pnl.af = AF_INET6;
 +    const struct in6_addr *dest_in6 =
 +      tor_addr_to_in6(&ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->addr);
 +    if (BUG(!dest_in6))
 +      return -1;
 +    memcpy(&pnl.saddr.v6, dest_in6, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
 +    pnl.sport = htons(ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->port);
 +    memcpy(&pnl.daddr.v6, &sin6->sin6_addr, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
 +    pnl.dport = sin6->sin6_port;
 +  } else {
 +    log_warn(LD_NET, "getsockname() gave an unexpected address family (%d)",
 +             (int)proxy_sa->sa_family);
 +    return -1;
 +  }
 +
 +  pf = get_pf_socket();
 +  if (pf<0)
 +    return -1;
 +
 +  if (ioctl(pf, DIOCNATLOOK, &pnl) < 0) {
 +    log_warn(LD_NET, "ioctl(DIOCNATLOOK) failed: %s", strerror(errno));
 +    return -1;
 +  }
 +
 +  if (pnl.af == AF_INET) {
 +    tor_addr_from_ipv4n(&addr, pnl.rdaddr.v4.s_addr);
 +  } else if (pnl.af == AF_INET6) {
 +    tor_addr_from_in6(&addr, &pnl.rdaddr.v6);
 +  } else {
 +    tor_fragile_assert();
 +    return -1;
 +  }
 +
 +  tor_addr_to_str(req->address, &addr, sizeof(req->address), 1);
 +  req->port = ntohs(pnl.rdport);
 +
 +  return 0;
 +}
 +#endif /* defined(TRANS_PF) */
 +
 +/** Fetch the original destination address and port from a
 + * system-specific interface and put them into a
 + * socks_request_t as if they came from a socks request.
 + *
 + * Return -1 if an error prevents fetching the destination,
 + * else return 0.
 + */
 +static int
 +connection_ap_get_original_destination(entry_connection_t *conn,
 +                                       socks_request_t *req)
 +{
 +#ifdef TRANS_NETFILTER
 +  return destination_from_socket(conn, req);
 +#elif defined(TRANS_PF)
 +  const or_options_t *options = get_options();
 +
 +  if (options->TransProxyType_parsed == TPT_PF_DIVERT)
 +    return destination_from_socket(conn, req);
 +
 +  if (options->TransProxyType_parsed == TPT_DEFAULT ||
 +      options->TransProxyType_parsed == TPT_IPFW)
 +    return destination_from_pf(conn, req);
 +
 +  (void)conn;
 +  (void)req;
 +  log_warn(LD_BUG, "Proxy destination determination mechanism %s unknown.",
 +           options->TransProxyType);
 +  return -1;
 +#else
 +  (void)conn;
 +  (void)req;
 +  log_warn(LD_BUG, "Called connection_ap_get_original_destination, but no "
 +           "transparent proxy method was configured.");
 +  return -1;
 +#endif /* defined(TRANS_NETFILTER) || ... */
 +}
 +
 +/** connection_edge_process_inbuf() found a conn in state
 + * socks_wait. See if conn->inbuf has the right bytes to proceed with
 + * the socks handshake.
 + *
 + * If the handshake is complete, send it to
 + * connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach().
 + *
 + * Return -1 if an unexpected error with conn occurs (and mark it for close),
 + * else return 0.
 + */
 +static int
 +connection_ap_handshake_process_socks(entry_connection_t *conn)
 +{
 +  socks_request_t *socks;
 +  int sockshere;
 +  const or_options_t *options = get_options();
 +  int had_reply = 0;
 +  connection_t *base_conn = ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn);
 +
 +  tor_assert(conn);
 +  tor_assert(base_conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP);
 +  tor_assert(base_conn->state == AP_CONN_STATE_SOCKS_WAIT);
 +  tor_assert(conn->socks_request);
 +  socks = conn->socks_request;
 +
 +  log_debug(LD_APP,"entered.");
 +
 +  sockshere = fetch_from_buf_socks(base_conn->inbuf, socks,
 +                                   options->TestSocks, options->SafeSocks);
 +
 +  if (socks->replylen) {
 +    had_reply = 1;
 +    connection_buf_add((const char*)socks->reply, socks->replylen,
 +                            base_conn);
 +    socks->replylen = 0;
 +    if (sockshere == -1) {
 +      /* An invalid request just got a reply, no additional
 +       * one is necessary. */
 +      socks->has_finished = 1;
 +    }
 +  }
 +
 +  if (sockshere == 0) {
 +    log_debug(LD_APP,"socks handshake not all here yet.");
 +    return 0;
 +  } else if (sockshere == -1) {
 +    if (!had_reply) {
 +      log_warn(LD_APP,"Fetching socks handshake failed. Closing.");
 +      connection_ap_handshake_socks_reply(conn, NULL, 0,
 +                                          END_STREAM_REASON_SOCKSPROTOCOL);
 +    }
 +    connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn,
 +                              END_STREAM_REASON_SOCKSPROTOCOL |
 +                              END_STREAM_REASON_FLAG_ALREADY_SOCKS_REPLIED);
 +    return -1;
 +  } /* else socks handshake is done, continue processing */
 +
 +  if (SOCKS_COMMAND_IS_CONNECT(socks->command))
 +    control_event_stream_status(conn, STREAM_EVENT_NEW, 0);
 +  else
 +    control_event_stream_status(conn, STREAM_EVENT_NEW_RESOLVE, 0);
 +
 +  return connection_ap_rewrite_and_attach_if_allowed(conn, NULL, NULL);
 +}
 +
 +/** connection_init_accepted_conn() found a new trans AP conn.
 + * Get the original destination and send it to
 + * connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach().
 + *
 + * Return -1 if an unexpected error with conn (and it should be marked
 + * for close), else return 0.
 + */
 +int
 +connection_ap_process_transparent(entry_connection_t *conn)
 +{
 +  socks_request_t *socks;
 +
 +  tor_assert(conn);
 +  tor_assert(conn->socks_request);
 +  socks = conn->socks_request;
 +
 +  /* pretend that a socks handshake completed so we don't try to
 +   * send a socks reply down a transparent conn */
 +  socks->command = SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT;
 +  socks->has_finished = 1;
 +
 +  log_debug(LD_APP,"entered.");
 +
 +  if (connection_ap_get_original_destination(conn, socks) < 0) {
 +    log_warn(LD_APP,"Fetching original destination failed. Closing.");
 +    connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn,
 +                               END_STREAM_REASON_CANT_FETCH_ORIG_DEST);
 +    return -1;
 +  }
 +  /* we have the original destination */
 +
 +  control_event_stream_status(conn, STREAM_EVENT_NEW, 0);
 +
 +  return connection_ap_rewrite_and_attach_if_allowed(conn, NULL, NULL);
 +}
 +
 +/** connection_edge_process_inbuf() found a conn in state natd_wait. See if
 + * conn-\>inbuf has the right bytes to proceed.  See FreeBSD's libalias(3) and
 + * ProxyEncodeTcpStream() in src/lib/libalias/alias_proxy.c for the encoding
 + * form of the original destination.
 + *
 + * If the original destination is complete, send it to
 + * connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach().
 + *
 + * Return -1 if an unexpected error with conn (and it should be marked
 + * for close), else return 0.
 + */
 +static int
 +connection_ap_process_natd(entry_connection_t *conn)
 +{
 +  char tmp_buf[36], *tbuf, *daddr;
 +  size_t tlen = 30;
 +  int err, port_ok;
 +  socks_request_t *socks;
 +
 +  tor_assert(conn);
 +  tor_assert(ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->state == AP_CONN_STATE_NATD_WAIT);
 +  tor_assert(conn->socks_request);
 +  socks = conn->socks_request;
 +
 +  log_debug(LD_APP,"entered.");
 +
 +  /* look for LF-terminated "[DEST ip_addr port]"
 +   * where ip_addr is a dotted-quad and port is in string form */
 +  err = connection_buf_get_line(ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn), tmp_buf, &tlen);
 +  if (err == 0)
 +    return 0;
 +  if (err < 0) {
 +    log_warn(LD_APP,"NATD handshake failed (DEST too long). Closing");
 +    connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_INVALID_NATD_DEST);
 +    return -1;
 +  }
 +
 +  if (strcmpstart(tmp_buf, "[DEST ")) {
 +    log_warn(LD_APP,"NATD handshake was ill-formed; closing. The client "
 +             "said: %s",
 +             escaped(tmp_buf));
 +    connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_INVALID_NATD_DEST);
 +    return -1;
 +  }
 +
 +  daddr = tbuf = &tmp_buf[0] + 6; /* after end of "[DEST " */
 +  if (!(tbuf = strchr(tbuf, ' '))) {
 +    log_warn(LD_APP,"NATD handshake was ill-formed; closing. The client "
 +             "said: %s",
 +             escaped(tmp_buf));
 +    connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_INVALID_NATD_DEST);
 +    return -1;
 +  }
 +  *tbuf++ = '\0';
 +
 +  /* pretend that a socks handshake completed so we don't try to
 +   * send a socks reply down a natd conn */
 +  strlcpy(socks->address, daddr, sizeof(socks->address));
 +  socks->port = (uint16_t)
 +    tor_parse_long(tbuf, 10, 1, 65535, &port_ok, &daddr);
 +  if (!port_ok) {
 +    log_warn(LD_APP,"NATD handshake failed; port %s is ill-formed or out "
 +             "of range.", escaped(tbuf));
 +    connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_INVALID_NATD_DEST);
 +    return -1;
 +  }
 +
 +  socks->command = SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT;
 +  socks->has_finished = 1;
 +
 +  control_event_stream_status(conn, STREAM_EVENT_NEW, 0);
 +
 +  ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->state = AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT;
 +
 +  return connection_ap_rewrite_and_attach_if_allowed(conn, NULL, NULL);
 +}
 +
 +/** Called on an HTTP CONNECT entry connection when some bytes have arrived,
 + * but we have not yet received a full HTTP CONNECT request.  Try to parse an
 + * HTTP CONNECT request from the connection's inbuf.  On success, set up the
 + * connection's socks_request field and try to attach the connection.  On
 + * failure, send an HTTP reply, and mark the connection.
 + */
 +STATIC int
 +connection_ap_process_http_connect(entry_connection_t *conn)
 +{
 +  if (BUG(ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->state != AP_CONN_STATE_HTTP_CONNECT_WAIT))
 +    return -1;
 +
 +  char *headers = NULL, *body = NULL;
 +  char *command = NULL, *addrport = NULL;
 +  char *addr = NULL;
 +  size_t bodylen = 0;
 +
 +  const char *errmsg = NULL;
 +  int rv = 0;
 +
 +  const int http_status =
 +    fetch_from_buf_http(ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->inbuf, &headers, 8192,
 +                        &body, &bodylen, 1024, 0);
 +  if (http_status < 0) {
 +    /* Bad http status */
 +    errmsg = "HTTP/1.0 400 Bad Request\r\n\r\n";
 +    goto err;
 +  } else if (http_status == 0) {
 +    /* no HTTP request yet. */
 +    goto done;
 +  }
 +
 +  const int cmd_status = parse_http_command(headers, &command, &addrport);
 +  if (cmd_status < 0) {
 +    errmsg = "HTTP/1.0 400 Bad Request\r\n\r\n";
 +    goto err;
 +  }
 +  tor_assert(command);
 +  tor_assert(addrport);
 +  if (strcasecmp(command, "connect")) {
 +    errmsg = "HTTP/1.0 405 Method Not Allowed\r\n\r\n";
 +    goto err;
 +  }
 +
 +  tor_assert(conn->socks_request);
 +  socks_request_t *socks = conn->socks_request;
 +  uint16_t port;
 +  if (tor_addr_port_split(LOG_WARN, addrport, &addr, &port) < 0) {
 +    errmsg = "HTTP/1.0 400 Bad Request\r\n\r\n";
 +    goto err;
 +  }
 +  if (strlen(addr) >= MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN) {
 +    errmsg = "HTTP/1.0 414 Request-URI Too Long\r\n\r\n";
 +    goto err;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Abuse the 'username' and 'password' fields here. They are already an
 +  * abuse. */
 +  {
 +    char *authorization = http_get_header(headers, "Proxy-Authorization: ");
 +    if (authorization) {
 +      socks->username = authorization; // steal reference
 +      socks->usernamelen = strlen(authorization);
 +    }
 +    char *isolation = http_get_header(headers, "X-Tor-Stream-Isolation: ");
 +    if (isolation) {
 +      socks->password = isolation; // steal reference
 +      socks->passwordlen = strlen(isolation);
 +    }
 +  }
 +
 +  socks->command = SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT;
 +  socks->listener_type = CONN_TYPE_AP_HTTP_CONNECT_LISTENER;
 +  strlcpy(socks->address, addr, sizeof(socks->address));
 +  socks->port = port;
 +
 +  control_event_stream_status(conn, STREAM_EVENT_NEW, 0);
 +
 +  rv = connection_ap_rewrite_and_attach_if_allowed(conn, NULL, NULL);
 +
 +  // XXXX send a "100 Continue" message?
 +
 +  goto done;
 +
 + err:
 +  if (BUG(errmsg == NULL))
 +    errmsg = "HTTP/1.0 400 Bad Request\r\n\r\n";
 +  log_info(LD_EDGE, "HTTP tunnel error: saying %s", escaped(errmsg));
 +  connection_buf_add(errmsg, strlen(errmsg), ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn));
 +  /* Mark it as "has_finished" so that we don't try to send an extra socks
 +   * reply. */
 +  conn->socks_request->has_finished = 1;
 +  connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn,
 +                                END_STREAM_REASON_HTTPPROTOCOL|
 +                                END_STREAM_REASON_FLAG_ALREADY_SOCKS_REPLIED);
 +
 + done:
 +  tor_free(headers);
 +  tor_free(body);
 +  tor_free(command);
 +  tor_free(addrport);
 +  tor_free(addr);
 +  return rv;
 +}
 +
 +/** Iterate over the two bytes of stream_id until we get one that is not
 + * already in use; return it. Return 0 if can't get a unique stream_id.
 + */
 +streamid_t
 +get_unique_stream_id_by_circ(origin_circuit_t *circ)
 +{
 +  edge_connection_t *tmpconn;
 +  streamid_t test_stream_id;
 +  uint32_t attempts=0;
 +
 + again:
 +  test_stream_id = circ->next_stream_id++;
 +  if (++attempts > 1<<16) {
 +    /* Make sure we don't loop forever if all stream_id's are used. */
 +    log_warn(LD_APP,"No unused stream IDs. Failing.");
 +    return 0;
 +  }
 +  if (test_stream_id == 0)
 +    goto again;
 +  for (tmpconn = circ->p_streams; tmpconn; tmpconn=tmpconn->next_stream)
 +    if (tmpconn->stream_id == test_stream_id)
 +      goto again;
 +
 +  if (connection_half_edge_find_stream_id(circ->half_streams,
 +                                           test_stream_id))
 +    goto again;
 +
 +  return test_stream_id;
 +}
 +
 +/** Return true iff <b>conn</b> is linked to a circuit and configured to use
 + * an exit that supports optimistic data. */
 +static int
 +connection_ap_supports_optimistic_data(const entry_connection_t *conn)
 +{
 +  const edge_connection_t *edge_conn = ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn);
 +  /* We can only send optimistic data if we're connected to an open
 +     general circuit. */
 +  if (edge_conn->on_circuit == NULL ||
 +      edge_conn->on_circuit->state != CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN ||
 +      (edge_conn->on_circuit->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL &&
 +       edge_conn->on_circuit->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_HSDIR_GET &&
 +       edge_conn->on_circuit->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_HSDIR_POST &&
 +       edge_conn->on_circuit->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED))
 +    return 0;
 +
 +  return conn->may_use_optimistic_data;
 +}
 +
 +/** Return a bitmask of BEGIN_FLAG_* flags that we should transmit in the
 + * RELAY_BEGIN cell for <b>ap_conn</b>. */
 +static uint32_t
 +connection_ap_get_begincell_flags(entry_connection_t *ap_conn)
 +{
 +  edge_connection_t *edge_conn = ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(ap_conn);
 +  const node_t *exitnode = NULL;
 +  const crypt_path_t *cpath_layer = edge_conn->cpath_layer;
 +  uint32_t flags = 0;
 +
 +  /* No flags for begindir */
 +  if (ap_conn->use_begindir)
 +    return 0;
 +
 +  /* No flags for hidden services. */
 +  if (edge_conn->on_circuit->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL)
 +    return 0;
 +
 +  /* If only IPv4 is supported, no flags */
 +  if (ap_conn->entry_cfg.ipv4_traffic && !ap_conn->entry_cfg.ipv6_traffic)
 +    return 0;
 +
 +  if (! cpath_layer ||
 +      ! cpath_layer->extend_info)
 +    return 0;
 +
 +  if (!ap_conn->entry_cfg.ipv4_traffic)
 +    flags |= BEGIN_FLAG_IPV4_NOT_OK;
 +
 +  exitnode = node_get_by_id(cpath_layer->extend_info->identity_digest);
 +
 +  if (ap_conn->entry_cfg.ipv6_traffic && exitnode) {
 +    tor_addr_t a;
 +    tor_addr_make_null(&a, AF_INET6);
 +    if (compare_tor_addr_to_node_policy(&a, ap_conn->socks_request->port,
 +                                        exitnode)
 +        != ADDR_POLICY_REJECTED) {
 +      /* Only say "IPv6 OK" if the exit node supports IPv6. Otherwise there's
 +       * no point. */
 +      flags |= BEGIN_FLAG_IPV6_OK;
 +    }
 +  }
 +
 +  if (flags == BEGIN_FLAG_IPV6_OK) {
 +    /* When IPv4 and IPv6 are both allowed, consider whether to say we
 +     * prefer IPv6.  Otherwise there's no point in declaring a preference */
 +    if (ap_conn->entry_cfg.prefer_ipv6)
 +      flags |= BEGIN_FLAG_IPV6_PREFERRED;
 +  }
 +
 +  if (flags == BEGIN_FLAG_IPV4_NOT_OK) {
 +    log_warn(LD_EDGE, "I'm about to ask a node for a connection that I "
 +             "am telling it to fulfil with neither IPv4 nor IPv6. That's "
 +             "not going to work. Did you perhaps ask for an IPv6 address "
 +             "on an IPv4Only port, or vice versa?");
 +  }
 +
 +  return flags;
 +}
 +
 +/** Write a relay begin cell, using destaddr and destport from ap_conn's
 + * socks_request field, and send it down circ.
 + *
 + * If ap_conn is broken, mark it for close and return -1. Else return 0.
 + */
 +MOCK_IMPL(int,
 +connection_ap_handshake_send_begin,(entry_connection_t *ap_conn))
 +{
 +  char payload[CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE];
 +  int payload_len;
 +  int begin_type;
 +  const or_options_t *options = get_options();
 +  origin_circuit_t *circ;
 +  edge_connection_t *edge_conn = ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(ap_conn);
 +  connection_t *base_conn = TO_CONN(edge_conn);
 +  tor_assert(edge_conn->on_circuit);
 +  circ = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(edge_conn->on_circuit);
 +
 +  tor_assert(base_conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP);
 +  tor_assert(base_conn->state == AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT);
 +  tor_assert(ap_conn->socks_request);
 +  tor_assert(SOCKS_COMMAND_IS_CONNECT(ap_conn->socks_request->command));
 +
 +  edge_conn->stream_id = get_unique_stream_id_by_circ(circ);
 +  if (edge_conn->stream_id==0) {
 +    /* XXXX+ Instead of closing this stream, we should make it get
 +     * retried on another circuit. */
 +    connection_mark_unattached_ap(ap_conn, END_STREAM_REASON_INTERNAL);
 +
 +    /* Mark this circuit "unusable for new streams". */
 +    mark_circuit_unusable_for_new_conns(circ);
 +    return -1;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Set up begin cell flags. */
 +  edge_conn->begincell_flags = connection_ap_get_begincell_flags(ap_conn);
 +
 +  tor_snprintf(payload,RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE, "%s:%d",
 +               (circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL) ?
 +                 ap_conn->socks_request->address : "",
 +               ap_conn->socks_request->port);
 +  payload_len = (int)strlen(payload)+1;
 +  if (payload_len <= RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE - 4 && edge_conn->begincell_flags) {
 +    set_uint32(payload + payload_len, htonl(edge_conn->begincell_flags));
 +    payload_len += 4;
 +  }
 +
 +  log_info(LD_APP,
 +           "Sending relay cell %d on circ %u to begin stream %d.",
 +           (int)ap_conn->use_begindir,
 +           (unsigned)circ->base_.n_circ_id,
 +           edge_conn->stream_id);
 +
 +  begin_type = ap_conn->use_begindir ?
 +                 RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN_DIR : RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN;
 +
 +  /* Check that circuits are anonymised, based on their type. */
 +  if (begin_type == RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN) {
 +    /* This connection is a standard OR connection.
 +     * Make sure its path length is anonymous, or that we're in a
 +     * non-anonymous mode. */
 +    assert_circ_anonymity_ok(circ, options);
 +  } else if (begin_type == RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN_DIR) {
 +    /* This connection is a begindir directory connection.
 +     * Look at the linked directory connection to access the directory purpose.
 +     * If a BEGINDIR connection is ever not linked, that's a bug. */
 +    if (BUG(!base_conn->linked)) {
 +      return -1;
 +    }
 +    connection_t *linked_dir_conn_base = base_conn->linked_conn;
 +    /* If the linked connection has been unlinked by other code, we can't send
 +     * a begin cell on it. */
 +    if (!linked_dir_conn_base) {
 +      return -1;
 +    }
 +    /* Sensitive directory connections must have an anonymous path length.
 +     * Otherwise, directory connections are typically one-hop.
 +     * This matches the earlier check for directory connection path anonymity
 +     * in directory_initiate_request(). */
 +    if (purpose_needs_anonymity(linked_dir_conn_base->purpose,
 +                    TO_DIR_CONN(linked_dir_conn_base)->router_purpose,
 +                    TO_DIR_CONN(linked_dir_conn_base)->requested_resource)) {
 +      assert_circ_anonymity_ok(circ, options);
 +    }
 +  } else {
 +    /* This code was written for the two connection types BEGIN and BEGIN_DIR
 +     */
 +    tor_assert_unreached();
 +  }
 +
 +  if (connection_edge_send_command(edge_conn, begin_type,
 +                  begin_type == RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN ? payload : NULL,
 +                  begin_type == RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN ? payload_len : 0) < 0)
 +    return -1; /* circuit is closed, don't continue */
 +
 +  edge_conn->package_window = STREAMWINDOW_START;
 +  edge_conn->deliver_window = STREAMWINDOW_START;
 +  base_conn->state = AP_CONN_STATE_CONNECT_WAIT;
 +  log_info(LD_APP,"Address/port sent, ap socket "TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT
 +           ", n_circ_id %u",
 +           base_conn->s, (unsigned)circ->base_.n_circ_id);
 +  control_event_stream_status(ap_conn, STREAM_EVENT_SENT_CONNECT, 0);
 +
 +  /* If there's queued-up data, send it now */
 +  if ((connection_get_inbuf_len(base_conn) ||
 +       ap_conn->sending_optimistic_data) &&
 +      connection_ap_supports_optimistic_data(ap_conn)) {
 +    log_info(LD_APP, "Sending up to %ld + %ld bytes of queued-up data",
 +             (long)connection_get_inbuf_len(base_conn),
 +             ap_conn->sending_optimistic_data ?
 +             (long)buf_datalen(ap_conn->sending_optimistic_data) : 0);
 +    if (connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf(edge_conn, 1, NULL) < 0) {
 +      connection_mark_for_close(base_conn);
 +    }
 +  }
 +
 +  return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/** Write a relay resolve cell, using destaddr and destport from ap_conn's
 + * socks_request field, and send it down circ.
 + *
 + * If ap_conn is broken, mark it for close and return -1. Else return 0.
 + */
 +int
 +connection_ap_handshake_send_resolve(entry_connection_t *ap_conn)
 +{
 +  int payload_len, command;
 +  const char *string_addr;
 +  char inaddr_buf[REVERSE_LOOKUP_NAME_BUF_LEN];
 +  origin_circuit_t *circ;
 +  edge_connection_t *edge_conn = ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(ap_conn);
 +  connection_t *base_conn = TO_CONN(edge_conn);
 +  tor_assert(edge_conn->on_circuit);
 +  circ = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(edge_conn->on_circuit);
 +
 +  tor_assert(base_conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP);
 +  tor_assert(base_conn->state == AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT);
 +  tor_assert(ap_conn->socks_request);
 +  tor_assert(circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL);
 +
 +  command = ap_conn->socks_request->command;
 +  tor_assert(SOCKS_COMMAND_IS_RESOLVE(command));
 +
 +  edge_conn->stream_id = get_unique_stream_id_by_circ(circ);
 +  if (edge_conn->stream_id==0) {
 +    /* XXXX+ Instead of closing this stream, we should make it get
 +     * retried on another circuit. */
 +    connection_mark_unattached_ap(ap_conn, END_STREAM_REASON_INTERNAL);
 +
 +    /* Mark this circuit "unusable for new streams". */
 +    mark_circuit_unusable_for_new_conns(circ);
 +    return -1;
 +  }
 +
 +  if (command == SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE) {
 +    string_addr = ap_conn->socks_request->address;
 +    payload_len = (int)strlen(string_addr)+1;
 +  } else {
 +    /* command == SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE_PTR */
 +    const char *a = ap_conn->socks_request->address;
 +    tor_addr_t addr;
 +    int r;
 +
 +    /* We're doing a reverse lookup.  The input could be an IP address, or
 +     * could be an .in-addr.arpa or .ip6.arpa address */
 +    r = tor_addr_parse_PTR_name(&addr, a, AF_UNSPEC, 1);
 +    if (r <= 0) {
 +      log_warn(LD_APP, "Rejecting ill-formed reverse lookup of %s",
 +               safe_str_client(a));
 +      connection_mark_unattached_ap(ap_conn, END_STREAM_REASON_INTERNAL);
 +      return -1;
 +    }
 +
 +    r = tor_addr_to_PTR_name(inaddr_buf, sizeof(inaddr_buf), &addr);
 +    if (r < 0) {
 +      log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't generate reverse lookup hostname of %s",
 +               safe_str_client(a));
 +      connection_mark_unattached_ap(ap_conn, END_STREAM_REASON_INTERNAL);
 +      return -1;
 +    }
 +
 +    string_addr = inaddr_buf;
 +    payload_len = (int)strlen(inaddr_buf)+1;
 +    tor_assert(payload_len <= (int)sizeof(inaddr_buf));
 +  }
 +
 +  log_debug(LD_APP,
 +            "Sending relay cell to begin stream %d.", edge_conn->stream_id);
 +
 +  if (connection_edge_send_command(edge_conn,
 +                           RELAY_COMMAND_RESOLVE,
 +                           string_addr, payload_len) < 0)
 +    return -1; /* circuit is closed, don't continue */
 +
 +  if (!base_conn->address) {
 +    /* This might be unnecessary. XXXX */
 +    base_conn->address = tor_addr_to_str_dup(&base_conn->addr);
 +  }
 +  base_conn->state = AP_CONN_STATE_RESOLVE_WAIT;
 +  log_info(LD_APP,"Address sent for resolve, ap socket "TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT
 +           ", n_circ_id %u",
 +           base_conn->s, (unsigned)circ->base_.n_circ_id);
 +  control_event_stream_status(ap_conn, STREAM_EVENT_SENT_RESOLVE, 0);
 +  return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/** Make an AP connection_t linked to the connection_t <b>partner</b>. make a
 + * new linked connection pair, and attach one side to the conn, connection_add
 + * it, initialize it to circuit_wait, and call
 + * connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit(conn) on it.
 + *
 + * Return the newly created end of the linked connection pair, or -1 if error.
 + */
 +entry_connection_t *
 +connection_ap_make_link(connection_t *partner,
 +                        char *address, uint16_t port,
 +                        const char *digest,
 +                        int session_group, int isolation_flags,
 +                        int use_begindir, int want_onehop)
 +{
 +  entry_connection_t *conn;
 +  connection_t *base_conn;
 +
 +  log_info(LD_APP,"Making internal %s tunnel to %s:%d ...",
 +           want_onehop ? "direct" : "anonymized",
 +           safe_str_client(address), port);
 +
 +  conn = entry_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_AP, tor_addr_family(&partner->addr));
 +  base_conn = ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn);
 +  base_conn->linked = 1; /* so that we can add it safely below. */
 +
 +  /* populate conn->socks_request */
 +
 +  /* leave version at zero, so the socks_reply is empty */
 +  conn->socks_request->socks_version = 0;
 +  conn->socks_request->has_finished = 0; /* waiting for 'connected' */
 +  strlcpy(conn->socks_request->address, address,
 +          sizeof(conn->socks_request->address));
 +  conn->socks_request->port = port;
 +  conn->socks_request->command = SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT;
 +  conn->want_onehop = want_onehop;
 +  conn->use_begindir = use_begindir;
 +  if (use_begindir) {
 +    conn->chosen_exit_name = tor_malloc(HEX_DIGEST_LEN+2);
 +    conn->chosen_exit_name[0] = '$';
 +    tor_assert(digest);
 +    base16_encode(conn->chosen_exit_name+1,HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1,
 +                  digest, DIGEST_LEN);
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Populate isolation fields. */
 +  conn->socks_request->listener_type = CONN_TYPE_DIR_LISTENER;
 +  conn->original_dest_address = tor_strdup(address);
 +  conn->entry_cfg.session_group = session_group;
 +  conn->entry_cfg.isolation_flags = isolation_flags;
 +
 +  base_conn->address = tor_strdup("(Tor_internal)");
 +  tor_addr_make_unspec(&base_conn->addr);
 +  base_conn->port = 0;
 +
 +  connection_link_connections(partner, base_conn);
 +
 +  if (connection_add(base_conn) < 0) { /* no space, forget it */
 +    connection_free(base_conn);
 +    return NULL;
 +  }
 +
 +  base_conn->state = AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT;
 +
 +  control_event_stream_status(conn, STREAM_EVENT_NEW, 0);
 +
 +  /* attaching to a dirty circuit is fine */
 +  connection_ap_mark_as_pending_circuit(conn);
 +  log_info(LD_APP,"... application connection created and linked.");
 +  return conn;
 +}
 +
 +/** Notify any interested controller connections about a new hostname resolve
 + * or resolve error.  Takes the same arguments as does
 + * connection_ap_handshake_socks_resolved(). */
 +static void
 +tell_controller_about_resolved_result(entry_connection_t *conn,
 +                                      int answer_type,
 +                                      size_t answer_len,
 +                                      const char *answer,
 +                                      int ttl,
 +                                      time_t expires)
 +{
 +  expires = time(NULL) + ttl;
 +  if (answer_type == RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV4 && answer_len >= 4) {
 +    char *cp = tor_dup_ip(ntohl(get_uint32(answer)));
 +    control_event_address_mapped(conn->socks_request->address,
 +                                 cp, expires, NULL, 0);
 +    tor_free(cp);
 +  } else if (answer_type == RESOLVED_TYPE_HOSTNAME && answer_len < 256) {
 +    char *cp = tor_strndup(answer, answer_len);
 +    control_event_address_mapped(conn->socks_request->address,
 +                                 cp, expires, NULL, 0);
 +    tor_free(cp);
 +  } else {
 +    control_event_address_mapped(conn->socks_request->address,
 +                                 "<error>", time(NULL)+ttl,
 +                                 "error=yes", 0);
 +  }
 +}
 +
 +/**
 + * As connection_ap_handshake_socks_resolved, but take a tor_addr_t to send
 + * as the answer.
 + */
 +void
 +connection_ap_handshake_socks_resolved_addr(entry_connection_t *conn,
 +                                            const tor_addr_t *answer,
 +                                            int ttl,
 +                                            time_t expires)
 +{
 +  if (tor_addr_family(answer) == AF_INET) {
 +    uint32_t a = tor_addr_to_ipv4n(answer); /* network order */
 +    connection_ap_handshake_socks_resolved(conn,RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV4,4,
 +                                           (uint8_t*)&a,
 +                                           ttl, expires);
 +  } else if (tor_addr_family(answer) == AF_INET6) {
 +    const uint8_t *a = tor_addr_to_in6_addr8(answer);
 +    connection_ap_handshake_socks_resolved(conn,RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV6,16,
 +                                           a,
 +                                           ttl, expires);
 +  } else {
 +    log_warn(LD_BUG, "Got called with address of unexpected family %d",
 +             tor_addr_family(answer));
 +    connection_ap_handshake_socks_resolved(conn,
 +                                           RESOLVED_TYPE_ERROR,0,NULL,-1,-1);
 +  }
 +}
 +
 +/** Send an answer to an AP connection that has requested a DNS lookup via
 + * SOCKS.  The type should be one of RESOLVED_TYPE_(IPV4|IPV6|HOSTNAME) or -1
 + * for unreachable; the answer should be in the format specified in the socks
 + * extensions document.  <b>ttl</b> is the ttl for the answer, or -1 on
 + * certain errors or for values that didn't come via DNS.  <b>expires</b> is
 + * a time when the answer expires, or -1 or TIME_MAX if there's a good TTL.
 + **/
 +/* XXXX the use of the ttl and expires fields is nutty.  Let's make this
 + * interface and those that use it less ugly. */
 +MOCK_IMPL(void,
 +connection_ap_handshake_socks_resolved,(entry_connection_t *conn,
 +                                       int answer_type,
 +                                       size_t answer_len,
 +                                       const uint8_t *answer,
 +                                       int ttl,
 +                                       time_t expires))
 +{
 +  char buf[384];
 +  size_t replylen;
 +
 +  if (ttl >= 0) {
 +    if (answer_type == RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV4 && answer_len == 4) {
 +      tor_addr_t a;
 +      tor_addr_from_ipv4n(&a, get_uint32(answer));
 +      if (! tor_addr_is_null(&a)) {
 +        client_dns_set_addressmap(conn,
 +                                  conn->socks_request->address, &a,
 +                                  conn->chosen_exit_name, ttl);
 +      }
 +    } else if (answer_type == RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV6 && answer_len == 16) {
 +      tor_addr_t a;
 +      tor_addr_from_ipv6_bytes(&a, (char*)answer);
 +      if (! tor_addr_is_null(&a)) {
 +        client_dns_set_addressmap(conn,
 +                                  conn->socks_request->address, &a,
 +                                  conn->chosen_exit_name, ttl);
 +      }
 +    } else if (answer_type == RESOLVED_TYPE_HOSTNAME && answer_len < 256) {
 +      char *cp = tor_strndup((char*)answer, answer_len);
 +      client_dns_set_reverse_addressmap(conn,
 +                                        conn->socks_request->address,
 +                                        cp,
 +                                        conn->chosen_exit_name, ttl);
 +      tor_free(cp);
 +    }
 +  }
 +
 +  if (ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->is_dns_request) {
 +    if (conn->dns_server_request) {
 +      /* We had a request on our DNS port: answer it. */
 +      dnsserv_resolved(conn, answer_type, answer_len, (char*)answer, ttl);
 +      conn->socks_request->has_finished = 1;
 +      return;
 +    } else {
 +      /* This must be a request from the controller. Since answers to those
 +       * requests are not cached, they do not generate an ADDRMAP event on
 +       * their own. */
 +      tell_controller_about_resolved_result(conn, answer_type, answer_len,
 +                                            (char*)answer, ttl, expires);
 +      conn->socks_request->has_finished = 1;
 +      return;
 +    }
 +    /* We shouldn't need to free conn here; it gets marked by the caller. */
 +  }
 +
 +  if (conn->socks_request->socks_version == 4) {
 +    buf[0] = 0x00; /* version */
 +    if (answer_type == RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV4 && answer_len == 4) {
 +      buf[1] = SOCKS4_GRANTED;
 +      set_uint16(buf+2, 0);
 +      memcpy(buf+4, answer, 4); /* address */
 +      replylen = SOCKS4_NETWORK_LEN;
 +    } else { /* "error" */
 +      buf[1] = SOCKS4_REJECT;
 +      memset(buf+2, 0, 6);
 +      replylen = SOCKS4_NETWORK_LEN;
 +    }
 +  } else if (conn->socks_request->socks_version == 5) {
 +    /* SOCKS5 */
 +    buf[0] = 0x05; /* version */
 +    if (answer_type == RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV4 && answer_len == 4) {
 +      buf[1] = SOCKS5_SUCCEEDED;
 +      buf[2] = 0; /* reserved */
 +      buf[3] = 0x01; /* IPv4 address type */
 +      memcpy(buf+4, answer, 4); /* address */
 +      set_uint16(buf+8, 0); /* port == 0. */
 +      replylen = 10;
 +    } else if (answer_type == RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV6 && answer_len == 16) {
 +      buf[1] = SOCKS5_SUCCEEDED;
 +      buf[2] = 0; /* reserved */
 +      buf[3] = 0x04; /* IPv6 address type */
 +      memcpy(buf+4, answer, 16); /* address */
 +      set_uint16(buf+20, 0); /* port == 0. */
 +      replylen = 22;
 +    } else if (answer_type == RESOLVED_TYPE_HOSTNAME && answer_len < 256) {
 +      buf[1] = SOCKS5_SUCCEEDED;
 +      buf[2] = 0; /* reserved */
 +      buf[3] = 0x03; /* Domainname address type */
 +      buf[4] = (char)answer_len;
 +      memcpy(buf+5, answer, answer_len); /* address */
 +      set_uint16(buf+5+answer_len, 0); /* port == 0. */
 +      replylen = 5+answer_len+2;
 +    } else {
 +      buf[1] = SOCKS5_HOST_UNREACHABLE;
 +      memset(buf+2, 0, 8);
 +      replylen = 10;
 +    }
 +  } else {
 +    /* no socks version info; don't send anything back */
 +    return;
 +  }
 +  connection_ap_handshake_socks_reply(conn, buf, replylen,
 +          (answer_type == RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV4 ||
 +           answer_type == RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV6 ||
 +           answer_type == RESOLVED_TYPE_HOSTNAME) ?
 +                                      0 : END_STREAM_REASON_RESOLVEFAILED);
 +}
 +
 +/** Send a socks reply to stream <b>conn</b>, using the appropriate
 + * socks version, etc, and mark <b>conn</b> as completed with SOCKS
 + * handshaking.
 + *
 + * If <b>reply</b> is defined, then write <b>replylen</b> bytes of it to conn
 + * and return, else reply based on <b>endreason</b> (one of
 + * END_STREAM_REASON_*). If <b>reply</b> is undefined, <b>endreason</b> can't
 + * be 0 or REASON_DONE.  Send endreason to the controller, if appropriate.
 + */
 +void
 +connection_ap_handshake_socks_reply(entry_connection_t *conn, char *reply,
 +                                    size_t replylen, int endreason)
 +{
 +  char buf[256];
 +  socks5_reply_status_t status =
 +    stream_end_reason_to_socks5_response(endreason);
 +
 +  tor_assert(conn->socks_request); /* make sure it's an AP stream */
 +
 +  if (!SOCKS_COMMAND_IS_RESOLVE(conn->socks_request->command)) {
 +    control_event_stream_status(conn, status==SOCKS5_SUCCEEDED ?
 +                                STREAM_EVENT_SUCCEEDED : STREAM_EVENT_FAILED,
 +                                endreason);
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Flag this stream's circuit as having completed a stream successfully
 +   * (for path bias) */
 +  if (status == SOCKS5_SUCCEEDED ||
 +      endreason == END_STREAM_REASON_RESOLVEFAILED ||
 +      endreason == END_STREAM_REASON_CONNECTREFUSED ||
 +      endreason == END_STREAM_REASON_CONNRESET ||
 +      endreason == END_STREAM_REASON_NOROUTE ||
 +      endreason == END_STREAM_REASON_RESOURCELIMIT) {
 +    if (!conn->edge_.on_circuit ||
 +       !CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(conn->edge_.on_circuit)) {
 +      if (endreason != END_STREAM_REASON_RESOLVEFAILED) {
 +        log_info(LD_BUG,
 +                 "No origin circuit for successful SOCKS stream %"PRIu64
 +                 ". Reason: %d",
 +                 (ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->global_identifier),
 +                 endreason);
 +      }
 +      /*
 +       * Else DNS remaps and failed hidden service lookups can send us
 +       * here with END_STREAM_REASON_RESOLVEFAILED; ignore it
 +       *
 +       * Perhaps we could make the test more precise; we can tell hidden
 +       * services by conn->edge_.renddata != NULL; anything analogous for
 +       * the DNS remap case?
 +       */
 +    } else {
 +      // XXX: Hrmm. It looks like optimistic data can't go through this
 +      // codepath, but someone should probably test it and make sure.
 +      // We don't want to mark optimistically opened streams as successful.
 +      pathbias_mark_use_success(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(conn->edge_.on_circuit));
 +    }
 +  }
 +
 +  if (conn->socks_request->has_finished) {
 +    log_warn(LD_BUG, "(Harmless.) duplicate calls to "
 +             "connection_ap_handshake_socks_reply.");
 +    return;
 +  }
 +  if (replylen) { /* we already have a reply in mind */
 +    connection_buf_add(reply, replylen, ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn));
 +    conn->socks_request->has_finished = 1;
 +    return;
 +  }
 +  if (conn->socks_request->listener_type ==
 +       CONN_TYPE_AP_HTTP_CONNECT_LISTENER) {
 +    const char *response = end_reason_to_http_connect_response_line(endreason);
 +    if (!response) {
 +      response = "HTTP/1.0 400 Bad Request\r\n\r\n";
 +    }
 +    connection_buf_add(response, strlen(response), ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn));
 +  } else if (conn->socks_request->socks_version == 4) {
 +    memset(buf,0,SOCKS4_NETWORK_LEN);
 +    buf[1] = (status==SOCKS5_SUCCEEDED ? SOCKS4_GRANTED : SOCKS4_REJECT);
 +    /* leave version, destport, destip zero */
 +    connection_buf_add(buf, SOCKS4_NETWORK_LEN, ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn));
 +  } else if (conn->socks_request->socks_version == 5) {
 +    size_t buf_len;
 +    memset(buf,0,sizeof(buf));
 +    if (tor_addr_family(&conn->edge_.base_.addr) == AF_INET) {
 +      buf[0] = 5; /* version 5 */
 +      buf[1] = (char)status;
 +      buf[2] = 0;
 +      buf[3] = 1; /* ipv4 addr */
 +      /* 4 bytes for the header, 2 bytes for the port, 4 for the address. */
 +      buf_len = 10;
 +    } else { /* AF_INET6. */
 +      buf[0] = 5; /* version 5 */
 +      buf[1] = (char)status;
 +      buf[2] = 0;
 +      buf[3] = 4; /* ipv6 addr */
 +      /* 4 bytes for the header, 2 bytes for the port, 16 for the address. */
 +      buf_len = 22;
 +    }
 +    connection_buf_add(buf,buf_len,ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn));
 +  }
 +  /* If socks_version isn't 4 or 5, don't send anything.
 +   * This can happen in the case of AP bridges. */
 +  conn->socks_request->has_finished = 1;
 +  return;
 +}
 +
 +/** Read a RELAY_BEGIN or RELAY_BEGIN_DIR cell from <b>cell</b>, decode it, and
 + * place the result in <b>bcell</b>.  On success return 0; on failure return
 + * <0 and set *<b>end_reason_out</b> to the end reason we should send back to
 + * the client.
 + *
 + * Return -1 in the case where we want to send a RELAY_END cell, and < -1 when
 + * we don't.
 + **/
 +STATIC int
 +begin_cell_parse(const cell_t *cell, begin_cell_t *bcell,
 +                 uint8_t *end_reason_out)
 +{
 +  relay_header_t rh;
 +  const uint8_t *body, *nul;
 +
 +  memset(bcell, 0, sizeof(*bcell));
 +  *end_reason_out = END_STREAM_REASON_MISC;
 +
 +  relay_header_unpack(&rh, cell->payload);
 +  if (rh.length > RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE) {
 +    return -2; /*XXXX why not TORPROTOCOL? */
 +  }
 +
 +  bcell->stream_id = rh.stream_id;
 +
 +  if (rh.command == RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN_DIR) {
 +    bcell->is_begindir = 1;
 +    return 0;
 +  } else if (rh.command != RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN) {
 +    log_warn(LD_BUG, "Got an unexpected command %d", (int)rh.command);
 +    *end_reason_out = END_STREAM_REASON_INTERNAL;
 +    return -1;
 +  }
 +
 +  body = cell->payload + RELAY_HEADER_SIZE;
 +  nul = memchr(body, 0, rh.length);
 +  if (! nul) {
 +    log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
 +           "Relay begin cell has no \\0. Closing.");
 +    *end_reason_out = END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
 +    return -1;
 +  }
 +
 +  if (tor_addr_port_split(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN,
 +                          (char*)(body),
 +                          &bcell->address,&bcell->port)<0) {
 +    log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
 +           "Unable to parse addr:port in relay begin cell. Closing.");
 +    *end_reason_out = END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
 +    return -1;
 +  }
 +  if (bcell->port == 0) {
 +    log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
 +           "Missing port in relay begin cell. Closing.");
 +    tor_free(bcell->address);
 +    *end_reason_out = END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
 +    return -1;
 +  }
 +  if (body + rh.length >= nul + 4)
 +    bcell->flags = ntohl(get_uint32(nul+1));
 +
 +  return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/** For the given <b>circ</b> and the edge connection <b>conn</b>, setup the
 + * connection, attach it to the circ and connect it. Return 0 on success
 + * or END_CIRC_AT_ORIGIN if we can't find the requested hidden service port
 + * where the caller should close the circuit. */
 +static int
 +handle_hs_exit_conn(circuit_t *circ, edge_connection_t *conn)
 +{
 +  int ret;
 +  origin_circuit_t *origin_circ;
 +
 +  assert_circuit_ok(circ);
 +  tor_assert(circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED);
 +  tor_assert(conn);
 +
 +  log_debug(LD_REND, "Connecting the hidden service rendezvous circuit "
 +                     "to the service destination.");
 +
 +  origin_circ = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
 +  conn->base_.address = tor_strdup("(rendezvous)");
 +  conn->base_.state = EXIT_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING;
 +
 +  /* The circuit either has an hs identifier for v3+ or a rend_data for legacy
 +   * service. */
 +  if (origin_circ->rend_data) {
 +    conn->rend_data = rend_data_dup(origin_circ->rend_data);
 +    tor_assert(connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(conn));
 +    ret = rend_service_set_connection_addr_port(conn, origin_circ);
 +  } else if (origin_circ->hs_ident) {
 +    /* Setup the identifier to be the one for the circuit service. */
 +    conn->hs_ident =
 +      hs_ident_edge_conn_new(&origin_circ->hs_ident->identity_pk);
 +    tor_assert(connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(conn));
 +    ret = hs_service_set_conn_addr_port(origin_circ, conn);
 +  } else {
 +    /* We should never get here if the circuit's purpose is rendezvous. */
 +    tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached();
 +    return -1;
 +  }
 +  if (ret < 0) {
 +    log_info(LD_REND, "Didn't find rendezvous service (addr%s, port %d)",
 +             fmt_addr(&TO_CONN(conn)->addr), TO_CONN(conn)->port);
 +    /* Send back reason DONE because we want to make hidden service port
 +     * scanning harder thus instead of returning that the exit policy
 +     * didn't match, which makes it obvious that the port is closed,
 +     * return DONE and kill the circuit. That way, a user (malicious or
 +     * not) needs one circuit per bad port unless it matches the policy of
 +     * the hidden service. */
 +    relay_send_end_cell_from_edge(conn->stream_id, circ,
 +                                  END_STREAM_REASON_DONE,
 +                                  origin_circ->cpath->prev);
 +    connection_free_(TO_CONN(conn));
 +
 +    /* Drop the circuit here since it might be someone deliberately
 +     * scanning the hidden service ports. Note that this mitigates port
 +     * scanning by adding more work on the attacker side to successfully
 +     * scan but does not fully solve it. */
 +    if (ret < -1) {
 +      return END_CIRC_AT_ORIGIN;
 +    } else {
 +      return 0;
 +    }
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Link the circuit and the connection crypt path. */
 +  conn->cpath_layer = origin_circ->cpath->prev;
 +
 +  /* Add it into the linked list of p_streams on this circuit */
 +  conn->next_stream = origin_circ->p_streams;
 +  origin_circ->p_streams = conn;
 +  conn->on_circuit = circ;
 +  assert_circuit_ok(circ);
 +
 +  hs_inc_rdv_stream_counter(origin_circ);
 +
 +  /* If it's an onion service connection, we might want to include the proxy
 +   * protocol header: */
 +  if (conn->hs_ident) {
 +    hs_circuit_id_protocol_t circuit_id_protocol =
 +      hs_service_exports_circuit_id(&conn->hs_ident->identity_pk);
 +    export_hs_client_circuit_id(conn, circuit_id_protocol);
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Connect tor to the hidden service destination. */
 +  connection_exit_connect(conn);
 +
 +  /* For path bias: This circuit was used successfully */
 +  pathbias_mark_use_success(origin_circ);
 +  return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/** A relay 'begin' or 'begin_dir' cell has arrived, and either we are
 + * an exit hop for the circuit, or we are the origin and it is a
 + * rendezvous begin.
 + *
 + * Launch a new exit connection and initialize things appropriately.
 + *
 + * If it's a rendezvous stream, call connection_exit_connect() on
 + * it.
 + *
 + * For general streams, call dns_resolve() on it first, and only call
 + * connection_exit_connect() if the dns answer is already known.
 + *
 + * Note that we don't call connection_add() on the new stream! We wait
 + * for connection_exit_connect() to do that.
 + *
 + * Return -(some circuit end reason) if we want to tear down <b>circ</b>.
 + * Else return 0.
 + */
 +int
 +connection_exit_begin_conn(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ)
 +{
 +  edge_connection_t *n_stream;
 +  relay_header_t rh;
 +  char *address = NULL;
 +  uint16_t port = 0;
 +  or_circuit_t *or_circ = NULL;
 +  origin_circuit_t *origin_circ = NULL;
 +  crypt_path_t *layer_hint = NULL;
 +  const or_options_t *options = get_options();
 +  begin_cell_t bcell;
 +  int rv;
 +  uint8_t end_reason=0;
 +
 +  assert_circuit_ok(circ);
 +  if (!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) {
 +    or_circ = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ);
 +  } else {
 +    tor_assert(circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED);
 +    origin_circ = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
 +    layer_hint = origin_circ->cpath->prev;
 +  }
 +
 +  relay_header_unpack(&rh, cell->payload);
 +  if (rh.length > RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE)
 +    return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
 +
 +  if (!server_mode(options) &&
 +      circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED) {
 +    log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
 +           "Relay begin cell at non-server. Closing.");
 +    relay_send_end_cell_from_edge(rh.stream_id, circ,
 +                                  END_STREAM_REASON_EXITPOLICY, NULL);
 +    return 0;
 +  }
 +
 +  rv = begin_cell_parse(cell, &bcell, &end_reason);
 +  if (rv < -1) {
 +    return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
 +  } else if (rv == -1) {
 +    tor_free(bcell.address);
 +    relay_send_end_cell_from_edge(rh.stream_id, circ, end_reason, layer_hint);
 +    return 0;
 +  }
 +
 +  if (! bcell.is_begindir) {
 +    /* Steal reference */
 +    address = bcell.address;
 +    port = bcell.port;
 +
 +    if (or_circ && or_circ->p_chan) {
 +      const int client_chan = channel_is_client(or_circ->p_chan);
 +      if ((client_chan ||
 +           (!connection_or_digest_is_known_relay(
 +                or_circ->p_chan->identity_digest) &&
 +          should_refuse_unknown_exits(options)))) {
 +        /* Don't let clients use us as a single-hop proxy. It attracts
 +         * attackers and users who'd be better off with, well, single-hop
 +         * proxies. */
 +        log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
 +               "Attempt by %s to open a stream %s. Closing.",
 +               safe_str(channel_get_canonical_remote_descr(or_circ->p_chan)),
 +               client_chan ? "on first hop of circuit" :
 +                             "from unknown relay");
 +        relay_send_end_cell_from_edge(rh.stream_id, circ,
 +                                      client_chan ?
 +                                        END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL :
 +                                        END_STREAM_REASON_MISC,
 +                                      NULL);
 +        tor_free(address);
 +        return 0;
 +      }
 +    }
 +  } else if (rh.command == RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN_DIR) {
 +    if (!directory_permits_begindir_requests(options) ||
 +        circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR) {
 +      relay_send_end_cell_from_edge(rh.stream_id, circ,
 +                                  END_STREAM_REASON_NOTDIRECTORY, layer_hint);
 +      return 0;
 +    }
 +    /* Make sure to get the 'real' address of the previous hop: the
 +     * caller might want to know whether the remote IP address has changed,
 +     * and we might already have corrected base_.addr[ess] for the relay's
 +     * canonical IP address. */
 +    if (or_circ && or_circ->p_chan)
 +      address = tor_strdup(channel_get_actual_remote_address(or_circ->p_chan));
 +    else
 +      address = tor_strdup("127.0.0.1");
 +    port = 1; /* XXXX This value is never actually used anywhere, and there
 +               * isn't "really" a connection here.  But we
 +               * need to set it to something nonzero. */
 +  } else {
 +    log_warn(LD_BUG, "Got an unexpected command %d", (int)rh.command);
 +    relay_send_end_cell_from_edge(rh.stream_id, circ,
 +                                  END_STREAM_REASON_INTERNAL, layer_hint);
 +    return 0;
 +  }
 +
 +  if (! options->IPv6Exit) {
 +    /* I don't care if you prefer IPv6; I can't give you any. */
 +    bcell.flags &= ~BEGIN_FLAG_IPV6_PREFERRED;
 +    /* If you don't want IPv4, I can't help. */
 +    if (bcell.flags & BEGIN_FLAG_IPV4_NOT_OK) {
 +      tor_free(address);
 +      relay_send_end_cell_from_edge(rh.stream_id, circ,
 +                                    END_STREAM_REASON_EXITPOLICY, layer_hint);
 +      return 0;
 +    }
 +  }
 +
 +  log_debug(LD_EXIT,"Creating new exit connection.");
 +  /* The 'AF_INET' here is temporary; we might need to change it later in
 +   * connection_exit_connect(). */
 +  n_stream = edge_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_EXIT, AF_INET);
 +
 +  /* Remember the tunneled request ID in the new edge connection, so that
 +   * we can measure download times. */
 +  n_stream->dirreq_id = circ->dirreq_id;
 +
 +  n_stream->base_.purpose = EXIT_PURPOSE_CONNECT;
 +  n_stream->begincell_flags = bcell.flags;
 +  n_stream->stream_id = rh.stream_id;
 +  n_stream->base_.port = port;
 +  /* leave n_stream->s at -1, because it's not yet valid */
 +  n_stream->package_window = STREAMWINDOW_START;
 +  n_stream->deliver_window = STREAMWINDOW_START;
 +
 +  if (circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED) {
 +    int ret;
 +    tor_free(address);
 +    /* We handle this circuit and stream in this function for all supported
 +     * hidden service version. */
 +    ret = handle_hs_exit_conn(circ, n_stream);
 +
 +    if (ret == 0) {
 +      /* This was a valid cell. Count it as delivered + overhead. */
 +      circuit_read_valid_data(origin_circ, rh.length);
 +    }
 +    return ret;
 +  }
 +  tor_strlower(address);
 +  n_stream->base_.address = address;
 +  n_stream->base_.state = EXIT_CONN_STATE_RESOLVEFAILED;
 +  /* default to failed, change in dns_resolve if it turns out not to fail */
 +
 +  /* If we're hibernating or shutting down, we refuse to open new streams. */
 +  if (we_are_hibernating()) {
 +    relay_send_end_cell_from_edge(rh.stream_id, circ,
 +                                  END_STREAM_REASON_HIBERNATING, NULL);
 +    connection_free_(TO_CONN(n_stream));
 +    return 0;
 +  }
 +
 +  n_stream->on_circuit = circ;
 +
 +  if (rh.command == RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN_DIR) {
 +    tor_addr_t tmp_addr;
 +    tor_assert(or_circ);
 +    if (or_circ->p_chan &&
 +        channel_get_addr_if_possible(or_circ->p_chan, &tmp_addr)) {
 +      tor_addr_copy(&n_stream->base_.addr, &tmp_addr);
 +    }
 +    return connection_exit_connect_dir(n_stream);
 +  }
 +
 +  log_debug(LD_EXIT,"about to start the dns_resolve().");
 +
 +  /* send it off to the gethostbyname farm */
 +  switch (dns_resolve(n_stream)) {
 +    case 1: /* resolve worked; now n_stream is attached to circ. */
 +      assert_circuit_ok(circ);
 +      log_debug(LD_EXIT,"about to call connection_exit_connect().");
 +      connection_exit_connect(n_stream);
 +      return 0;
 +    case -1: /* resolve failed */
 +      relay_send_end_cell_from_edge(rh.stream_id, circ,
 +                                    END_STREAM_REASON_RESOLVEFAILED, NULL);
 +      /* n_stream got freed. don't touch it. */
 +      break;
 +    case 0: /* resolve added to pending list */
 +      assert_circuit_ok(circ);
 +      break;
 +  }
 +  return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/**
 + * Called when we receive a RELAY_COMMAND_RESOLVE cell 'cell' along the
 + * circuit <b>circ</b>;
 + * begin resolving the hostname, and (eventually) reply with a RESOLVED cell.
 + */
 +int
 +connection_exit_begin_resolve(cell_t *cell, or_circuit_t *circ)
 +{
 +  edge_connection_t *dummy_conn;
 +  relay_header_t rh;
 +
 +  assert_circuit_ok(TO_CIRCUIT(circ));
 +  relay_header_unpack(&rh, cell->payload);
 +  if (rh.length > RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE)
 +    return -1;
 +
 +  /* This 'dummy_conn' only exists to remember the stream ID
 +   * associated with the resolve request; and to make the
 +   * implementation of dns.c more uniform.  (We really only need to
 +   * remember the circuit, the stream ID, and the hostname to be
 +   * resolved; but if we didn't store them in a connection like this,
 +   * the housekeeping in dns.c would get way more complicated.)
 +   */
 +  dummy_conn = edge_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_EXIT, AF_INET);
 +  dummy_conn->stream_id = rh.stream_id;
 +  dummy_conn->base_.address = tor_strndup(
 +                                       (char*)cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE,
 +                                       rh.length);
 +  dummy_conn->base_.port = 0;
 +  dummy_conn->base_.state = EXIT_CONN_STATE_RESOLVEFAILED;
 +  dummy_conn->base_.purpose = EXIT_PURPOSE_RESOLVE;
 +
 +  dummy_conn->on_circuit = TO_CIRCUIT(circ);
 +
 +  /* send it off to the gethostbyname farm */
 +  switch (dns_resolve(dummy_conn)) {
 +    case -1: /* Impossible to resolve; a resolved cell was sent. */
 +      /* Connection freed; don't touch it. */
 +      return 0;
 +    case 1: /* The result was cached; a resolved cell was sent. */
 +      if (!dummy_conn->base_.marked_for_close)
 +        connection_free_(TO_CONN(dummy_conn));
 +      return 0;
 +    case 0: /* resolve added to pending list */
 +      assert_circuit_ok(TO_CIRCUIT(circ));
 +      break;
 +  }
 +  return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/** Helper: Return true and set *<b>why_rejected</b> to an optional clarifying
 + * message message iff we do not allow connections to <b>addr</b>:<b>port</b>.
 + */
 +static int
 +my_exit_policy_rejects(const tor_addr_t *addr,
 +                       uint16_t port,
 +                       const char **why_rejected)
 +{
 +  if (router_compare_to_my_exit_policy(addr, port)) {
 +    *why_rejected = "";
 +    return 1;
 +  } else if (tor_addr_family(addr) == AF_INET6 && !get_options()->IPv6Exit) {
 +    *why_rejected = " (IPv6 address without IPv6Exit configured)";
 +    return 1;
 +  }
 +  return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/** Connect to conn's specified addr and port. If it worked, conn
 + * has now been added to the connection_array.
 + *
 + * Send back a connected cell. Include the resolved IP of the destination
 + * address, but <em>only</em> if it's a general exit stream. (Rendezvous
 + * streams must not reveal what IP they connected to.)
 + */
 +void
 +connection_exit_connect(edge_connection_t *edge_conn)
 +{
 +  const tor_addr_t *addr;
 +  uint16_t port;
 +  connection_t *conn = TO_CONN(edge_conn);
 +  int socket_error = 0, result;
 +  const char *why_failed_exit_policy = NULL;
 +
 +  /* Apply exit policy to non-rendezvous connections. */
 +  if (! connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(edge_conn) &&
 +      my_exit_policy_rejects(&edge_conn->base_.addr,
 +                             edge_conn->base_.port,
 +                             &why_failed_exit_policy)) {
 +    if (BUG(!why_failed_exit_policy))
 +      why_failed_exit_policy = "";
 +    log_info(LD_EXIT,"%s:%d failed exit policy%s. Closing.",
 +             escaped_safe_str_client(conn->address), conn->port,
 +             why_failed_exit_policy);
 +    connection_edge_end(edge_conn, END_STREAM_REASON_EXITPOLICY);
 +    circuit_detach_stream(circuit_get_by_edge_conn(edge_conn), edge_conn);
 +    connection_free(conn);
 +    return;
 +  }
 +
 +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
 +  if (conn->socket_family != AF_UNIX) {
 +#else
 +  {
 +#endif /* defined(HAVE_SYS_UN_H) */
 +    addr = &conn->addr;
 +    port = conn->port;
 +
 +    if (tor_addr_family(addr) == AF_INET6)
 +      conn->socket_family = AF_INET6;
 +
 +    log_debug(LD_EXIT, "about to try connecting");
 +    result = connection_connect(conn, conn->address,
 +                                addr, port, &socket_error);
 +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
 +  } else {
 +    /*
 +     * In the AF_UNIX case, we expect to have already had conn->port = 1,
 +     * tor_addr_make_unspec(conn->addr) (cf. the way we mark in the incoming
 +     * case in connection_handle_listener_read()), and conn->address should
 +     * have the socket path to connect to.
 +     */
 +    tor_assert(conn->address && strlen(conn->address) > 0);
 +
 +    log_debug(LD_EXIT, "about to try connecting");
 +    result = connection_connect_unix(conn, conn->address, &socket_error);
 +#endif /* defined(HAVE_SYS_UN_H) */
 +  }
 +
 +  switch (result) {
 +    case -1: {
 +      int reason = errno_to_stream_end_reason(socket_error);
 +      connection_edge_end(edge_conn, reason);
 +      circuit_detach_stream(circuit_get_by_edge_conn(edge_conn), edge_conn);
 +      connection_free(conn);
 +      return;
 +    }
 +    case 0:
 +      conn->state = EXIT_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING;
 +
 +      connection_watch_events(conn, READ_EVENT | WRITE_EVENT);
 +      /* writable indicates finish;
 +       * readable/error indicates broken link in windows-land. */
 +      return;
 +    /* case 1: fall through */
 +  }
 +
 +  conn->state = EXIT_CONN_STATE_OPEN;
 +  if (connection_get_outbuf_len(conn)) {
 +    /* in case there are any queued data cells, from e.g. optimistic data */
 +    connection_watch_events(conn, READ_EVENT|WRITE_EVENT);
 +  } else {
 +    connection_watch_events(conn, READ_EVENT);
 +  }
 +
 +  /* also, deliver a 'connected' cell back through the circuit. */
 +  if (connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(edge_conn)) {
 +    /* don't send an address back! */
 +    connection_edge_send_command(edge_conn,
 +                                 RELAY_COMMAND_CONNECTED,
 +                                 NULL, 0);
 +  } else { /* normal stream */
 +    uint8_t connected_payload[MAX_CONNECTED_CELL_PAYLOAD_LEN];
 +    int connected_payload_len =
 +      connected_cell_format_payload(connected_payload, &conn->addr,
 +                                    edge_conn->address_ttl);
 +    if (connected_payload_len < 0) {
 +      connection_edge_end(edge_conn, END_STREAM_REASON_INTERNAL);
 +      circuit_detach_stream(circuit_get_by_edge_conn(edge_conn), edge_conn);
 +      connection_free(conn);
 +      return;
 +    }
 +
 +    connection_edge_send_command(edge_conn,
 +                                 RELAY_COMMAND_CONNECTED,
 +                                 (char*)connected_payload,
 +                                 connected_payload_len);
 +  }
 +}
 +
 +/** Given an exit conn that should attach to us as a directory server, open a
 + * bridge connection with a linked connection pair, create a new directory
 + * conn, and join them together.  Return 0 on success (or if there was an
 + * error we could send back an end cell for).  Return -(some circuit end
 + * reason) if the circuit needs to be torn down.  Either connects
 + * <b>exitconn</b>, frees it, or marks it, as appropriate.
 + */
 +static int
 +connection_exit_connect_dir(edge_connection_t *exitconn)
 +{
 +  dir_connection_t *dirconn = NULL;
 +  or_circuit_t *circ = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(exitconn->on_circuit);
 +
 +  log_info(LD_EXIT, "Opening local connection for anonymized directory exit");
 +
 +  exitconn->base_.state = EXIT_CONN_STATE_OPEN;
 +
 +  dirconn = dir_connection_new(tor_addr_family(&exitconn->base_.addr));
 +
 +  tor_addr_copy(&dirconn->base_.addr, &exitconn->base_.addr);
 +  dirconn->base_.port = 0;
 +  dirconn->base_.address = tor_strdup(exitconn->base_.address);
 +  dirconn->base_.type = CONN_TYPE_DIR;
 +  dirconn->base_.purpose = DIR_PURPOSE_SERVER;
 +  dirconn->base_.state = DIR_CONN_STATE_SERVER_COMMAND_WAIT;
 +
 +  /* Note that the new dir conn belongs to the same tunneled request as
 +   * the edge conn, so that we can measure download times. */
 +  dirconn->dirreq_id = exitconn->dirreq_id;
 +
 +  connection_link_connections(TO_CONN(dirconn), TO_CONN(exitconn));
 +
 +  if (connection_add(TO_CONN(exitconn))<0) {
 +    connection_edge_end(exitconn, END_STREAM_REASON_RESOURCELIMIT);
 +    connection_free_(TO_CONN(exitconn));
 +    connection_free_(TO_CONN(dirconn));
 +    return 0;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* link exitconn to circ, now that we know we can use it. */
 +  exitconn->next_stream = circ->n_streams;
 +  circ->n_streams = exitconn;
 +
 +  if (connection_add(TO_CONN(dirconn))<0) {
 +    connection_edge_end(exitconn, END_STREAM_REASON_RESOURCELIMIT);
 +    connection_close_immediate(TO_CONN(exitconn));
 +    connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(exitconn));
 +    connection_free_(TO_CONN(dirconn));
 +    return 0;
 +  }
 +
 +  connection_start_reading(TO_CONN(dirconn));
 +  connection_start_reading(TO_CONN(exitconn));
 +
 +  if (connection_edge_send_command(exitconn,
 +                                   RELAY_COMMAND_CONNECTED, NULL, 0) < 0) {
 +    connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(exitconn));
 +    connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(dirconn));
 +    return 0;
 +  }
 +
 +  return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/** Return 1 if <b>conn</b> is a rendezvous stream, or 0 if
 + * it is a general stream.
 + */
 +int
 +connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(const edge_connection_t *conn)
 +{
 +  tor_assert(conn);
 +  /* It should not be possible to set both of these structs */
 +  tor_assert_nonfatal(!(conn->rend_data && conn->hs_ident));
 +
 +  if (conn->rend_data || conn->hs_ident) {
 +    return 1;
 +  }
 +  return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/** Return 1 if router <b>exit_node</b> is likely to allow stream <b>conn</b>
 + * to exit from it, or 0 if it probably will not allow it.
 + * (We might be uncertain if conn's destination address has not yet been
 + * resolved.)
 + */
 +int
 +connection_ap_can_use_exit(const entry_connection_t *conn,
 +                           const node_t *exit_node)
 +{
 +  const or_options_t *options = get_options();
 +
 +  tor_assert(conn);
 +  tor_assert(conn->socks_request);
 +  tor_assert(exit_node);
 +
 +  /* If a particular exit node has been requested for the new connection,
 +   * make sure the exit node of the existing circuit matches exactly.
 +   */
 +  if (conn->chosen_exit_name) {
 +    const node_t *chosen_exit =
 +      node_get_by_nickname(conn->chosen_exit_name, 0);
 +    if (!chosen_exit || tor_memneq(chosen_exit->identity,
 +                               exit_node->identity, DIGEST_LEN)) {
 +      /* doesn't match */
 +//      log_debug(LD_APP,"Requested node '%s', considering node '%s'. No.",
 +//                conn->chosen_exit_name, exit->nickname);
 +      return 0;
 +    }
 +  }
 +
 +  if (conn->use_begindir) {
 +    /* Internal directory fetches do not count as exiting. */
 +    return 1;
 +  }
 +
 +  if (conn->socks_request->command == SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT) {
 +    tor_addr_t addr, *addrp = NULL;
 +    addr_policy_result_t r;
 +    if (0 == tor_addr_parse(&addr, conn->socks_request->address)) {
 +      addrp = &addr;
 +    } else if (!conn->entry_cfg.ipv4_traffic && conn->entry_cfg.ipv6_traffic) {
 +      tor_addr_make_null(&addr, AF_INET6);
 +      addrp = &addr;
 +    } else if (conn->entry_cfg.ipv4_traffic && !conn->entry_cfg.ipv6_traffic) {
 +      tor_addr_make_null(&addr, AF_INET);
 +      addrp = &addr;
 +    }
 +    r = compare_tor_addr_to_node_policy(addrp, conn->socks_request->port,
 +                                        exit_node);
 +    if (r == ADDR_POLICY_REJECTED)
 +      return 0; /* We know the address, and the exit policy rejects it. */
 +    if (r == ADDR_POLICY_PROBABLY_REJECTED && !conn->chosen_exit_name)
 +      return 0; /* We don't know the addr, but the exit policy rejects most
 +                 * addresses with this port. Since the user didn't ask for
 +                 * this node, err on the side of caution. */
 +  } else if (SOCKS_COMMAND_IS_RESOLVE(conn->socks_request->command)) {
 +    /* Don't send DNS requests to non-exit servers by default. */
 +    if (!conn->chosen_exit_name && node_exit_policy_rejects_all(exit_node))
 +      return 0;
 +  }
 +  if (routerset_contains_node(options->ExcludeExitNodesUnion_, exit_node)) {
 +    /* Not a suitable exit. Refuse it. */
 +    return 0;
 +  }
 +
 +  return 1;
 +}
 +
 +/** If address is of the form "y.onion" with a well-formed handle y:
 + *     Put a NUL after y, lower-case it, and return ONION_V2_HOSTNAME or
 + *     ONION_V3_HOSTNAME depending on the HS version.
 + *
 + *  If address is of the form "x.y.onion" with a well-formed handle x:
 + *     Drop "x.", put a NUL after y, lower-case it, and return
 + *     ONION_V2_HOSTNAME or ONION_V3_HOSTNAME depending on the HS version.
 + *
 + * If address is of the form "y.onion" with a badly-formed handle y:
 + *     Return BAD_HOSTNAME and log a message.
 + *
 + * If address is of the form "y.exit":
 + *     Put a NUL after y and return EXIT_HOSTNAME.
 + *
 + * Otherwise:
 + *     Return NORMAL_HOSTNAME and change nothing.
 + */
 +hostname_type_t
 +parse_extended_hostname(char *address)
 +{
 +    char *s;
 +    char *q;
 +    char query[HS_SERVICE_ADDR_LEN_BASE32+1];
 +
 +    s = strrchr(address,'.');
 +    if (!s)
 +      return NORMAL_HOSTNAME; /* no dot, thus normal */
 +    if (!strcmp(s+1,"exit")) {
 +      *s = 0; /* NUL-terminate it */
 +      return EXIT_HOSTNAME; /* .exit */
 +    }
 +    if (strcmp(s+1,"onion"))
 +      return NORMAL_HOSTNAME; /* neither .exit nor .onion, thus normal */
 +
 +    /* so it is .onion */
 +    *s = 0; /* NUL-terminate it */
 +    /* locate a 'sub-domain' component, in order to remove it */
 +    q = strrchr(address, '.');
 +    if (q == address) {
 +      goto failed; /* reject sub-domain, as DNS does */
 +    }
 +    q = (NULL == q) ? address : q + 1;
 +    if (strlcpy(query, q, HS_SERVICE_ADDR_LEN_BASE32+1) >=
 +        HS_SERVICE_ADDR_LEN_BASE32+1)
 +      goto failed;
 +    if (q != address) {
 +      memmove(address, q, strlen(q) + 1 /* also get \0 */);
 +    }
 +    if (rend_valid_v2_service_id(query)) {
 +      return ONION_V2_HOSTNAME; /* success */
 +    }
 +    if (hs_address_is_valid(query)) {
 +      return ONION_V3_HOSTNAME;
 +    }
 + failed:
 +    /* otherwise, return to previous state and return 0 */
 +    *s = '.';
 +    log_warn(LD_APP, "Invalid onion hostname %s; rejecting",
 +             safe_str_client(address));
 +    return BAD_HOSTNAME;
 +}
 +
 +/** Return true iff the (possibly NULL) <b>alen</b>-byte chunk of memory at
 + * <b>a</b> is equal to the (possibly NULL) <b>blen</b>-byte chunk of memory
 + * at <b>b</b>. */
 +static int
 +memeq_opt(const char *a, size_t alen, const char *b, size_t blen)
 +{
 +  if (a == NULL) {
 +    return (b == NULL);
 +  } else if (b == NULL) {
 +    return 0;
 +  } else if (alen != blen) {
 +    return 0;
 +  } else {
 +    return tor_memeq(a, b, alen);
 +  }
 +}
 +
 +/**
 + * Return true iff none of the isolation flags and fields in <b>conn</b>
 + * should prevent it from being attached to <b>circ</b>.
 + */
 +int
 +connection_edge_compatible_with_circuit(const entry_connection_t *conn,
 +                                        const origin_circuit_t *circ)
 +{
 +  const uint8_t iso = conn->entry_cfg.isolation_flags;
 +  const socks_request_t *sr = conn->socks_request;
 +
 +  /* If circ has never been used for an isolated connection, we can
 +   * totally use it for this one. */
 +  if (!circ->isolation_values_set)
 +    return 1;
 +
 +  /* If circ has been used for connections having more than one value
 +   * for some field f, it will have the corresponding bit set in
 +   * isolation_flags_mixed.  If isolation_flags_mixed has any bits
 +   * in common with iso, then conn must be isolated from at least
 +   * one stream that has been attached to circ. */
 +  if ((iso & circ->isolation_flags_mixed) != 0) {
 +    /* For at least one field where conn is isolated, the circuit
 +     * already has mixed streams. */
 +    return 0;
 +  }
 +
 +  if (! conn->original_dest_address) {
 +    log_warn(LD_BUG, "Reached connection_edge_compatible_with_circuit without "
 +             "having set conn->original_dest_address");
 +    ((entry_connection_t*)conn)->original_dest_address =
 +      tor_strdup(conn->socks_request->address);
 +  }
 +
 +  if ((iso & ISO_STREAM) &&
 +      (circ->associated_isolated_stream_global_id !=
 +       ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->global_identifier))
 +    return 0;
 +
 +  if ((iso & ISO_DESTPORT) && conn->socks_request->port != circ->dest_port)
 +    return 0;
 +  if ((iso & ISO_DESTADDR) &&
 +      strcasecmp(conn->original_dest_address, circ->dest_address))
 +    return 0;
 +  if ((iso & ISO_SOCKSAUTH) &&
 +      (! memeq_opt(sr->username, sr->usernamelen,
 +                   circ->socks_username, circ->socks_username_len) ||
 +       ! memeq_opt(sr->password, sr->passwordlen,
 +                   circ->socks_password, circ->socks_password_len)))
 +    return 0;
 +  if ((iso & ISO_CLIENTPROTO) &&
 +      (conn->socks_request->listener_type != circ->client_proto_type ||
 +       conn->socks_request->socks_version != circ->client_proto_socksver))
 +    return 0;
 +  if ((iso & ISO_CLIENTADDR) &&
 +      !tor_addr_eq(&ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->addr, &circ->client_addr))
 +    return 0;
 +  if ((iso & ISO_SESSIONGRP) &&
 +      conn->entry_cfg.session_group != circ->session_group)
 +    return 0;
 +  if ((iso & ISO_NYM_EPOCH) && conn->nym_epoch != circ->nym_epoch)
 +    return 0;
 +
 +  return 1;
 +}
 +
 +/**
 + * If <b>dry_run</b> is false, update <b>circ</b>'s isolation flags and fields
 + * to reflect having had <b>conn</b> attached to it, and return 0.  Otherwise,
 + * if <b>dry_run</b> is true, then make no changes to <b>circ</b>, and return
 + * a bitfield of isolation flags that we would have to set in
 + * isolation_flags_mixed to add <b>conn</b> to <b>circ</b>, or -1 if
 + * <b>circ</b> has had no streams attached to it.
 + */
 +int
 +connection_edge_update_circuit_isolation(const entry_connection_t *conn,
 +                                         origin_circuit_t *circ,
 +                                         int dry_run)
 +{
 +  const socks_request_t *sr = conn->socks_request;
 +  if (! conn->original_dest_address) {
 +    log_warn(LD_BUG, "Reached connection_update_circuit_isolation without "
 +             "having set conn->original_dest_address");
 +    ((entry_connection_t*)conn)->original_dest_address =
 +      tor_strdup(conn->socks_request->address);
 +  }
 +
 +  if (!circ->isolation_values_set) {
 +    if (dry_run)
 +      return -1;
 +    circ->associated_isolated_stream_global_id =
 +      ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->global_identifier;
 +    circ->dest_port = conn->socks_request->port;
 +    circ->dest_address = tor_strdup(conn->original_dest_address);
 +    circ->client_proto_type = conn->socks_request->listener_type;
 +    circ->client_proto_socksver = conn->socks_request->socks_version;
 +    tor_addr_copy(&circ->client_addr, &ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->addr);
 +    circ->session_group = conn->entry_cfg.session_group;
 +    circ->nym_epoch = conn->nym_epoch;
 +    circ->socks_username = sr->username ?
 +      tor_memdup(sr->username, sr->usernamelen) : NULL;
 +    circ->socks_password = sr->password ?
 +      tor_memdup(sr->password, sr->passwordlen) : NULL;
 +    circ->socks_username_len = sr->usernamelen;
 +    circ->socks_password_len = sr->passwordlen;
 +
 +    circ->isolation_values_set = 1;
 +    return 0;
 +  } else {
 +    uint8_t mixed = 0;
 +    if (conn->socks_request->port != circ->dest_port)
 +      mixed |= ISO_DESTPORT;
 +    if (strcasecmp(conn->original_dest_address, circ->dest_address))
 +      mixed |= ISO_DESTADDR;
 +    if (!memeq_opt(sr->username, sr->usernamelen,
 +                   circ->socks_username, circ->socks_username_len) ||
 +        !memeq_opt(sr->password, sr->passwordlen,
 +                   circ->socks_password, circ->socks_password_len))
 +      mixed |= ISO_SOCKSAUTH;
 +    if ((conn->socks_request->listener_type != circ->client_proto_type ||
 +         conn->socks_request->socks_version != circ->client_proto_socksver))
 +      mixed |= ISO_CLIENTPROTO;
 +    if (!tor_addr_eq(&ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->addr, &circ->client_addr))
 +      mixed |= ISO_CLIENTADDR;
 +    if (conn->entry_cfg.session_group != circ->session_group)
 +      mixed |= ISO_SESSIONGRP;
 +    if (conn->nym_epoch != circ->nym_epoch)
 +      mixed |= ISO_NYM_EPOCH;
 +
 +    if (dry_run)
 +      return mixed;
 +
 +    if ((mixed & conn->entry_cfg.isolation_flags) != 0) {
 +      log_warn(LD_BUG, "Updating a circuit with seemingly incompatible "
 +               "isolation flags.");
 +    }
 +    circ->isolation_flags_mixed |= mixed;
 +    return 0;
 +  }
 +}
 +
 +/**
 + * Clear the isolation settings on <b>circ</b>.
 + *
 + * This only works on an open circuit that has never had a stream attached to
 + * it, and whose isolation settings are hypothetical.  (We set hypothetical
 + * isolation settings on circuits as we're launching them, so that we
 + * know whether they can handle more streams or whether we need to launch
 + * even more circuits.  Once the circuit is open, if it turns out that
 + * we no longer have any streams to attach to it, we clear the isolation flags
 + * and data so that other streams can have a chance.)
 + */
 +void
 +circuit_clear_isolation(origin_circuit_t *circ)
 +{
 +  if (circ->isolation_any_streams_attached) {
 +    log_warn(LD_BUG, "Tried to clear the isolation status of a dirty circuit");
 +    return;
 +  }
 +  if (TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->state != CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN) {
 +    log_warn(LD_BUG, "Tried to clear the isolation status of a non-open "
 +             "circuit");
 +    return;
 +  }
 +
 +  circ->isolation_values_set = 0;
 +  circ->isolation_flags_mixed = 0;
 +  circ->associated_isolated_stream_global_id = 0;
 +  circ->client_proto_type = 0;
 +  circ->client_proto_socksver = 0;
 +  circ->dest_port = 0;
 +  tor_addr_make_unspec(&circ->client_addr);
 +  tor_free(circ->dest_address);
 +  circ->session_group = -1;
 +  circ->nym_epoch = 0;
 +  if (circ->socks_username) {
 +    memwipe(circ->socks_username, 0x11, circ->socks_username_len);
 +    tor_free(circ->socks_username);
 +  }
 +  if (circ->socks_password) {
 +    memwipe(circ->socks_password, 0x05, circ->socks_password_len);
 +    tor_free(circ->socks_password);
 +  }
 +  circ->socks_username_len = circ->socks_password_len = 0;
 +}
 +
 +/** Free all storage held in module-scoped variables for connection_edge.c */
 +void
 +connection_edge_free_all(void)
 +{
 +  untried_pending_connections = 0;
 +  smartlist_free(pending_entry_connections);
 +  pending_entry_connections = NULL;
 +  mainloop_event_free(attach_pending_entry_connections_ev);
 +}

    

dgoulet＠torproject.org

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