commit a5232e0c4c572cdff85701f698b8b90c9443d7e4 Author: Nick Mathewson nickm@torproject.org Date: Mon May 23 17:04:38 2011 -0400
Fix GCC 4.6's new -Wunused-but-set-variable warnings.
Most instances were dead code; for those, I removed the assignments. Some were pieces of info we don't currently plan to use, but which we might in the future. For those, I added an explicit cast-to-void to indicate that we know that the thing's unused. Finally, one was a case where we were testing the wrong variable in a unit test. That one I fixed.
This resolves bug 3208. --- changes/bug3208 | 2 ++ src/or/circuitbuild.c | 3 --- src/or/command.c | 1 + src/or/control.c | 2 -- src/or/directory.c | 2 -- src/or/dirvote.c | 3 +-- src/or/eventdns.c | 3 +++ src/test/test_crypto.c | 4 +++- 8 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/changes/bug3208 b/changes/bug3208 index 731c96e..fd737ba 100644 --- a/changes/bug3208 +++ b/changes/bug3208 @@ -2,3 +2,5 @@ - Remove undocumented option "-F" from tor-resolve: it hasn't done anything since 0.2.1.16-rc.
+ o Minor bugfixes: + - Fix warnings from GCC 4.6's "-Wunused-but-set-variable" option. diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 08bfb98..108007e 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -3766,7 +3766,6 @@ void entry_guards_compute_status(or_options_t *options, time_t now) { int changed = 0; - int severity = LOG_DEBUG; digestmap_t *reasons;
if (! entry_guards) @@ -3793,8 +3792,6 @@ entry_guards_compute_status(or_options_t *options, time_t now) if (remove_dead_entry_guards(now)) changed = 1;
- severity = changed ? LOG_DEBUG : LOG_INFO; - if (changed) { SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, entry) { const char *reason = digestmap_get(reasons, entry->identity); diff --git a/src/or/command.c b/src/or/command.c index 00d9af3..e377f4f 100644 --- a/src/or/command.c +++ b/src/or/command.c @@ -645,6 +645,7 @@ command_process_netinfo_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
/* XXX maybe act on my_apparent_addr, if the source is sufficiently * trustworthy. */ + (void)my_apparent_addr;
if (connection_or_set_state_open(conn)<0) connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn)); diff --git a/src/or/control.c b/src/or/control.c index 0dad1b9..f75ac67 100644 --- a/src/or/control.c +++ b/src/or/control.c @@ -3142,7 +3142,6 @@ control_event_circuit_status(origin_circuit_t *circ, circuit_status_event_t tp, { const char *status; char extended_buf[96]; - int providing_reason=0; if (!EVENT_IS_INTERESTING(EVENT_CIRCUIT_STATUS)) return 0; tor_assert(circ); @@ -3166,7 +3165,6 @@ control_event_circuit_status(origin_circuit_t *circ, circuit_status_event_t tp, const char *reason_str = circuit_end_reason_to_control_string(reason_code); char *reason = NULL; size_t n=strlen(extended_buf); - providing_reason=1; if (!reason_str) { reason = tor_malloc(16); tor_snprintf(reason, 16, "UNKNOWN_%d", reason_code); diff --git a/src/or/directory.c b/src/or/directory.c index eb99e9d..ff0a5a4 100644 --- a/src/or/directory.c +++ b/src/or/directory.c @@ -1900,7 +1900,6 @@ connection_dir_client_reached_eof(dir_connection_t *conn) router_get_trusteddirserver_by_digest(conn->identity_digest); char *rejected_hdr = http_get_header(headers, "X-Descriptor-Not-New: "); - int rejected = 0; if (rejected_hdr) { if (!strcmp(rejected_hdr, "Yes")) { log_info(LD_GENERAL, @@ -1913,7 +1912,6 @@ connection_dir_client_reached_eof(dir_connection_t *conn) * last descriptor, not on the published time of the last * descriptor. If those are different, that's a bad thing to * do. -NM */ - rejected = 1; } tor_free(rejected_hdr); } diff --git a/src/or/dirvote.c b/src/or/dirvote.c index 96e3df5..c6ce9f6 100644 --- a/src/or/dirvote.c +++ b/src/or/dirvote.c @@ -1592,7 +1592,7 @@ networkstatus_compute_consensus(smartlist_t *votes, * is the same flag as votes[j]->known_flags[b]. */ int *named_flag; /* Index of the flag "Named" for votes[j] */ int *unnamed_flag; /* Index of the flag "Unnamed" for votes[j] */ - int chosen_named_idx, chosen_unnamed_idx; + int chosen_named_idx;
strmap_t *name_to_id_map = strmap_new(); char conflict[DIGEST_LEN]; @@ -1610,7 +1610,6 @@ networkstatus_compute_consensus(smartlist_t *votes, for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(votes); ++i) unnamed_flag[i] = named_flag[i] = -1; chosen_named_idx = smartlist_string_pos(flags, "Named"); - chosen_unnamed_idx = smartlist_string_pos(flags, "Unnamed");
/* Build the flag index. */ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(votes, networkstatus_t *, v, diff --git a/src/or/eventdns.c b/src/or/eventdns.c index fc005df..b7cc292 100644 --- a/src/or/eventdns.c +++ b/src/or/eventdns.c @@ -1028,6 +1028,9 @@ request_parse(u8 *packet, ssize_t length, struct evdns_server_port *port, struct GET16(answers); GET16(authority); GET16(additional); + (void)additional; + (void)authority; + (void)answers;
if (flags & 0x8000) return -1; /* Must not be an answer. */ flags &= 0x0110; /* Only RD and CD get preserved. */ diff --git a/src/test/test_crypto.c b/src/test/test_crypto.c index 781081a..bf2cc48 100644 --- a/src/test/test_crypto.c +++ b/src/test/test_crypto.c @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ test_crypto_rng(void) uint64_t big; char *host; j = crypto_rand_int(100); - if (i < 0 || i >= 100) + if (j < 0 || j >= 100) allok = 0; big = crypto_rand_uint64(U64_LITERAL(1)<<40); if (big >= (U64_LITERAL(1)<<40)) @@ -240,11 +240,13 @@ test_crypto_sha(void) /* Test SHA-1 with a test vector from the specification. */ i = crypto_digest(data, "abc", 3); test_memeq_hex(data, "A9993E364706816ABA3E25717850C26C9CD0D89D"); + tt_int_op(i, ==, 0);
/* Test SHA-256 with a test vector from the specification. */ i = crypto_digest256(data, "abc", 3, DIGEST_SHA256); test_memeq_hex(data, "BA7816BF8F01CFEA414140DE5DAE2223B00361A3" "96177A9CB410FF61F20015AD"); + tt_int_op(i, ==, 0);
/* Test HMAC-SHA-1 with test cases from RFC2202. */
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