commit 2d7a01399b49749a71d760818ef3f0c9c8799cf5 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org> Date: Thu Feb 11 23:29:42 2016 -0500 renumber 260 --- proposals/260-rend-single-onion.txt | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/proposals/260-rend-single-onion.txt b/proposals/260-rend-single-onion.txt index 79990a8..48aa794 100644 --- a/proposals/260-rend-single-onion.txt +++ b/proposals/260-rend-single-onion.txt @@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ Status: Draft And turning off hidden service server preemptive circuits, which is currently unimplemented (#17360) -5.1.3 Recommended Additional Options: Security +5.1.4 Recommended Additional Options: Security We recommend that no other services are run on a rendezvous single onion service tor instance. Since tor runs as a client (and not a relay) by @@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ Status: Draft extend. This is useful for the transition period where not all clients support single onion services. -6.5. Proposal 255 ("Hidden Service Load Balancing") +6.6. Proposal 255 ("Hidden Service Load Balancing") This proposal is compatible with proposal 255. The onion service will perform the rendezvous protocol in the same manner as any other onion @@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ Status: Draft been performed. In addition, a potential drawback is overloading a busy single onion service. -6.4 Predicted circuits +7.4 Predicted circuits We should look whether we can optimize further the predicted circuits that Tor makes as an onion service for this mode. @@ -458,3 +458,4 @@ splitting described in section 8. Here are some initial ideas. This option is disabled in Tor Browser by default. Perhaps some users would be more comfortable enabling submission over an onion service, due to the additional security benefits. +