commit 2ec1866d81fb97628f203777dc0b1f377cec2cf1 Author: Karsten Loesing karsten.loesing@gmx.net Date: Wed Aug 8 20:20:14 2012 +0200
Add ten-ways-discover-tor-bridges blog post. --- 2011/ten-ways-discover-tor-bridges/.gitignore | 3 + .../ten-ways-discover-tor-bridges.bib | 102 ++++++ .../ten-ways-discover-tor-bridges.tex | 351 ++++++++++++++++++++ 2011/ten-ways-discover-tor-bridges/tortechrep.cls | 1 + 4 files changed, 457 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/2011/ten-ways-discover-tor-bridges/.gitignore b/2011/ten-ways-discover-tor-bridges/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 0000000..68511a0 --- /dev/null +++ b/2011/ten-ways-discover-tor-bridges/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +ten-ways-discover-tor-bridges.pdf +ten-ways-discover-tor-bridges-2011-10-31.pdf + diff --git a/2011/ten-ways-discover-tor-bridges/ten-ways-discover-tor-bridges.bib b/2011/ten-ways-discover-tor-bridges/ten-ways-discover-tor-bridges.bib new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ca69d6e --- /dev/null +++ b/2011/ten-ways-discover-tor-bridges/ten-ways-discover-tor-bridges.bib @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +@techreport{dingledine2011strategies, + title = {Strategies for getting more bridge addresses}, + author = {Roger Dingledine}, + institution = {The Tor Project}, + year = {2011}, + month = {May}, + number = {2011-05-001}, + note = {\url{https://research.torproject.org/techreports/strategies-getting-more-bridge-a..., +} + +@inproceedings{babel, + title = {Mixing {E}-mail With {B}abel}, + author = {Ceki G"ulc"u and Gene Tsudik}, + booktitle = {Proceedings of the Network and Distributed Security Symposium - {NDSS} '96}, + year = {1996}, + month = {February}, + pages = {2--16}, + publisher = {IEEE}, + note = {\url{http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#babel%7D%7D, +} + +@inproceedings{VassermanJTHK09, + title = {Membership-concealing overlay networks}, + author = {Eugene Y. Vasserman and Rob Jansen and James Tyra and Nicholas Hopper and + Yongdae Kim}, + booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2009 ACM Conference on Computer and Communications + Security, CCS 2009, Chicago, Illinois, USA, November 9-13, 2009}, + year = {2009}, + pages = {390--399}, + editor = {Ehab Al-Shaer and Somesh Jha and Angelos D. Keromytis}, + publisher = {ACM}, + isbn = {978-1-60558-894-0}, + note = {\url{http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#DBLP:conf:ccs:VassermanJTHK09%7D%7D, +} + +@inproceedings{wpes09-bridge-attack, + title = {{On the risks of serving whenever you surf: Vulnerabilities in Tor's blocking + resistance design}}, + author = {Jon McLachlan and Nicholas Hopper}, + booktitle = {Proceedings of the Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society (WPES + 2009)}, + year = {2009}, + month = {November}, + location = {Chicago, IL, USA}, + publisher = {ACM}, + note = {\url{http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#wpes09-bridge-attack%7D%7D, +} + +@techreport{tor-blocking, + title = {Design of a blocking-resistant anonymity system}, + author = {Roger Dingledine and Nick Mathewson}, + institution = {The Tor Project}, + number = {2006-1}, + year = {2006}, + month = {November}, + note = {\url{http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#tor-blocking%7D%7D, +} + +@inproceedings{wpes11-bridgespa, + title = {BridgeSPA: Improving {Tor} Bridges with Single Packet Authorization}, + author = {Rob Smits and Divam Jain and Sarah Pidcock and Ian Goldberg and Urs + Hengartner}, + booktitle = {Proceedings of the Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society (WPES + 2011)}, + year = {2011}, + month = {October}, + location = {Chicago, IL, USA}, + publisher = {ACM}, + note = {\url{http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#wpes11-bridgespa%7D%7D, +} + +@inproceedings{usenix11-telex, + title = {Telex: Anticensorship in the Network Infrastructure}, + author = {Eric Wustrow and Scott Wolchok and Ian Goldberg and J. Alex Halderman}, + booktitle = {Proceedings of the 20th USENIX Security Symposium}, + year = {2011}, + month = {August}, + note = {\url{http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#usenix11-telex%7D%7D, +} + +@inproceedings{foci11-decoy, + title = {Decoy Routing: Toward Unblockable Internet Communication}, + author = {Josh Karlin and Daniel Ellard and Alden W. Jackson and Christine E. Jones and + Greg Lauer and David P. Mankins and W. Timothy Strayer}, + booktitle = {Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Free and Open Communications on the + Internet (FOCI 2011)}, + year = {2011}, + month = {August}, + note = {\url{http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#foci11-decoy%7D%7D, +} + +@inproceedings{ccs2011-cirripede, + title = {Cirripede: Circumvention Infrastructure using Router Redirection with Plausible + Deniability}, + author = {Amir Houmansadr and Giang T. K. Nguyen and Matthew Caesar and Nikita Borisov}, + booktitle = {Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and Communications + Security (CCS 2011)}, + year = {2011}, + month = {October}, + note = {\url{http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#ccs2011-cirripede%7D%7D, +} + diff --git a/2011/ten-ways-discover-tor-bridges/ten-ways-discover-tor-bridges.tex b/2011/ten-ways-discover-tor-bridges/ten-ways-discover-tor-bridges.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dbdc8db --- /dev/null +++ b/2011/ten-ways-discover-tor-bridges/ten-ways-discover-tor-bridges.tex @@ -0,0 +1,351 @@ +\documentclass{tortechrep} +\begin{document} + +\author{Roger Dingledine} +\contact{arma@torproject.org} +\reportid{2011-10-002} +\date{October 31, 2011} +\title{Ten ways to discover Tor bridges} +\maketitle + +\setcounter{section}{-1} +\section{Introduction} + +While we're exploring smarter ways of getting more bridge addresses +\cite{dingledine2011strategies}, and while the bridge arms race hasn't +heated up yet in most countries (or has surpassed the number of bridges we +have, in the case of China), it's the perfect time to take stock of bridge +address enumeration attacks and how well we can defend against them. + +For background, bridge relays% +\footnote{\url{https://www.torproject.org/docs/bridges%7D%7D +(aka bridges) are Tor relays that aren't listed in the main Tor directory. +So even if an attacker blocks all the public relays, they still need to +block all these ``private'' or ``dark'' relays too. + +Here are ten classes of attacks to discover bridges, examples of them +we've seen or worry about in practice, and some ideas for how to resolve +or mitigate each issue. +If you're looking for a research project, please grab one and start +investigating! + +\section{Overwhelm the public address distribution strategies} + +China broke our https bridge distribution strategy% +\footnote{\url{https://bridges.torproject.org/%7D%7D +in September 2009 by just pretending to be enough legitimate users from +enough different subnets on the Internet. +They broke the Gmail bridge distribution strategy% +\footnote{\url{https://www.torproject.org/docs/bridges%5C#FindingMore%7D%7D +in March 2010. +These were easy to break because we don't have enough addresses relative +to the size of the attacker (at this moment we're giving out 176 bridges +by https and 201 bridges by Gmail, leaving us 165 to give out through +other means like social networks), but it's not just a question of scale: +we need better strategies that require attackers to do more or harder work +than legitimate users. + +\section{Run a non-guard non-exit relay and look for connections from +non-relays} +\label{sec:run-non-guard-non-exit-relay} + +Normal clients use guard nodes% +\footnote{\url{https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq%5C#EntryGuards%7D%7D +for the first hop of their circuits to protect them from long-term +profiling attacks; but we chose to have bridge users use their bridge as a +replacement for the guard hop, so we don't force them onto four-hop paths +which would be less fun to use. +As a result, if you run a relay that doesn't have the Guard flag, the only +Tors who end up building circuits through you are relays (which you can +identify from the public consensus) and bridges. + +This attack has been floating around for a while, and is documented for +example in Zhen Ling et al's Extensive Analysis and Large-Scale Empirical +Evaluation of Tor Bridge Discovery% +\footnote{\url{http://www.cs.uml.edu/~xinwenfu/paper/Bridge.pdf%7D%7D +paper. + +The defense we plan is to make circuits through bridges use guards too. +The naive way to do it would be for the client to choose a set of guards +as her possible next hops after the bridge; but then each new client using +the bridge increasingly exposures the bridge. +The better approach is to make use of Tor's loose source routing feature +to let the bridge itself choose the guards that all of the circuits it +handles will use: that is, transparently layer an extra one-hop circuit +inside the client's circuit. +Those familiar with Babel's design \cite{babel} will recognize this trick +by the name ``inter-mix detours''. + +Using a layer of guards after the bridge has two features: first, it +completely removes the ``bridges directly touch non-guards'' issue, +turning the attack from a deterministic one to a probabilistic one. +Second, it reduces the exposure of the bridge to the rest of the network, +since only a small set of relays will ever see a direct connection from +it. +The tradeoff, alas, is worse performance for bridge users. See proposal +188% +\footnote{\url{https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob/HEAD:/proposals/188-bridge-gu... +for details.% +\footnote{A friendly researcher pointed out to me that another solution +here is to run the bridge as multi-homed, meaning the address that the +relay sees isn't the address that the censor should block. +That solution also helps resolve issues 3-5!} + +\section{Run a guard relay and look for protocol differences} +\label{sec:run-a-guard} + +Bridges are supposed to behave like relays with respect to the users using +them, but like clients with respect to the relays they make connections +to. +Any slip-ups we introduce where the bridge acts like a relay with respect +to the next hop are ways the next hop can distinguish it. +Recent examples include ``bridges fetched directory information like +relays rather than like clients''% +\footnote{\url{https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/4115%7D%7D, +``bridges didn't use a CREATE_FAST cell for the first hop of their own +circuits like clients would have''% +\footnote{\url{https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/4124%7D%7D, +``bridges didn't reject CREATE and CREATE_FAST cells on connections they +had initiated like clients would have''% +\footnote{\url{https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-commits/2011-October/036726.html%..., +and ``bridges distinguish themselves in their NETINFO cell''% +\footnote{\url{https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/4348%7D%7D. + +There's no way that's the end of them. +We could sure use some help auditing the design and code for similar +issues. + +\section{Run a guard relay and do timing analysis} + +Even if we fix issues \ref{sec:run-non-guard-non-exit-relay} and +\ref{sec:run-a-guard}, it may still be possible for a guard relay to look +at the ``clients'' that are connecting to it, and figure out based on +latency that some of the circuits from those clients look like they're two +hops away rather than one hop away. + +I bet there are active tricks to improve the attack accuracy. +For example, the relay could watch round-trip latency from the circuit +originator (seeing packets go towards Alice, and seeing how long until a +packet shows up in response), and comparing that latency to what he sees +when probing the previous hop with some cell that will get an immediate +response rather than going all the way to Alice. +Removing all the ways of probing round-trip latency to an adjacent Tor +relay (either in-protocol or out-of-protocol) is a battle we're not going +to win. + +The research question remains though: how hard is this attack in practice? +It's going to come down to statistics, which means it will be a game of +driving up the false positives. +It's hard to know how best to solve it until somebody does the engineering +work for the attack. + +If the attack turns out to work well (and I expect it will), the ``bridges +use guards'' design will limit the damage from the attack. + +\section{Run a relay and try connecting back to likely ports on each +client that connects to you} +\label{sec:connect-back} + +Many bridges listen for incoming client connections on port 443 or 9001. +The adversary can run a relay and actively portscan each client that +connects, to see which ones are running services that speak the Tor +protocol. +This attack was published by Eugene Vasserman \cite{VassermanJTHK09} and +by Jon McLachlan \cite{wpes09-bridge-attack}, both in 2009. + +The ``bridges use guards'' design partially resolves this attack as well, +since we limit the exposure of the bridge to a small group of relays that +probably could have done some other above attacks as well. + +But it does not wholly resolve the concern: clients (and therefore also +bridges) don't use their entry guards for directory fetches at present. +So while the bridge won't build circuits through the relay it fetches +directory information from, it will still reveal its existence. +That's another reason to move forward with the ``directory guard''% +\footnote{\url{https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2010-April/000112.html%7D%... +design. + +\section{Scan the Internet for services that talk the Tor protocol} +\label{sec:scan-the-internet} + +Even if we successfully hide the bridges behind guards, the adversary can +still blindly scan for them and pretend to be a client. +To make it more practical, he could focus on scanning likely networks, or +near other bridges he's discovered. +We called this topic ``scanning resistance'' in our original bridge design +paper \cite{tor-blocking}. + +There's a particularly insidious combination of \ref{sec:connect-back} and +\ref{sec:scan-the-internet} if you're a government-scale adversary: watch +your government firewall for SSL flows (since Tor tries to blend in with +SSL traffic), and do active followup probing to every destination you see. +Whitelist sites you've already checked if you want to trade efficiency for +precision. +This scale of attack requires some serious engineering work for a large +country, but early indications% +\footnote{\url{https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/4185%7D%7D +are that China might be investigating exactly this approach. + +The answer here is to give the bridge user some secret when she learns the +bridge address, and require her to prove knowledge of that secret before +the bridge will admit to knowing the Tor protocol. +For example, we could imagine running an Apache SSL webserver with a +pass-through module% +\footnote{\url{http://dl.dropbox.com/u/37735/index.html%7D%7D +that tunnels your traffic to the Tor relay once she's presented the right +password. +Or Tor could handle that authentication itself% +\footnote{\url{https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob/HEAD:/proposals/187-allow-cli.... +BridgeSPA: Improving Tor Bridges with Single Packet Authorization +\cite{wpes11-bridgespa} offers an SPA-style approach, with the drawbacks +of requiring root on both sides and being OS-specific. + +Another avenue to explore is putting some of the bridge addresses behind a +service like Telex \cite{usenix11-telex}, Decoy Routing +\cite{foci11-decoy}, or Cirripede \cite{ccs2011-cirripede}. +These designs let users privately tag a flow (e.g.\ an SSL handshake) in +such a way that tagged flows are diverted to a Tor bridge while untagged +flows continue as normal. +So now we could deploy a vanilla Apache in one place and a vanilla Tor +bridge in another, and not have to modify either of them. +The Tor client bundle would need an extra piece of software though, and +there are still some engineering and deployment details to be worked out. + +\section{Break into the Tor Project infrastructure} + +The bridge directory authority% +\footnote{\url{https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/design-paper/blocking.html%5C#tth_sE... +aggregates the list of bridges and periodically sends it to the bridgedb +service% +\footnote{\url{https://gitweb.torproject.org/bridgedb.git/tree%7D%7D +so it can parcel addresses out by its various distribution strategies. +Breaking into either of these services would give you the list of bridges. + +We can imagine some design changes to make the risk less bad. +For one, people can already run bridges that don't publish to the bridge +directory authority (and then distribute their addresses themselves). +Second, I had a nice chat with a Chinese NGO recently who wants to set up +a bridge directory authority of their own, and distribute custom Vidalia +bridge bundles to their members that are configured to publish their +bridge addresses to this alternate bridge directory authority. +A third option is to decentralize the bridge authority and bridgedb +services, such that each component only learns about a fraction of the +total bridge population---that design quickly gets messy though in terms +of engineering and in terms of analyzing its security against various +attacks. + +\section{Just watch the bridge authority's reachability tests} + +You don't actually need to break in to the bridge authority. +Instead, you can just monitor its network connection: it will periodically +test reachability of each bridge it knows, in order to let the bridgedb +service know which addresses to give out. + +We could do these reachability tests through Tor, so watching the bridge +authority doesn't tell you anything about what it's testing. +But that just shifts the risk onto the rest of the relays, such that an +adversary who runs or monitors a sample of relays gets to learn about a +corresponding sample of bridges. + +One option is to decentralize the testing such that monitoring a single +location doesn't give you the whole bridge list. +But how exactly to distribute it, and onto what, is messy from both the +operational and research angles. +Another option would be for the bridges themselves to ramp up the +frequency of their reachability tests (they currently self-test for +reachability before publishing, to give quick feedback to their operator +if they're misconfigured). +Then the bridges can just anonymously publish an authenticated ``still +here'' message once an hour, so (assuming they all tell the truth) the +bridge authority never has to do any testing. +But this self-testing also allows an enumeration attack, since we build a +circuit to a random relay and then try to extend back to our bridge +address! +Maybe bridges should be asking their guards to do the self-testing---once +they have guards, that is? + +These questions are related to the question of learning whether a bridge +has been blocked in a given country% +\footnote{\url{https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/design-paper/blocking.html%5C#subsec.... +More on that in a future report. + +\section{Watch your firewall and DPI for Tor flows} + +While the above attacks have to do with recognizing or inducing +bridge-specific behavior, another class of attacks is just to buy some +fancy Deep Packet Inspection gear and have it look for, say, +characteristics of the SSL certificates or handshakes that make Tor flows +stand out from ``normal'' SSL flows. +Iran has used this strategy% +\footnote{\url{https://blog.torproject.org/blog/iran-blocks-tor-tor-releases-same-day-fix%7... +to block Tor twice, and it lets them block bridges for free. +The attack is most effective if you have a large and diverse population of +Tor users behind your firewall, since you'll only be able to learn about +bridges that your users try to use. + +We can fix the issue by making Tor's handshake more like a normal SSL +handshake% +\footnote{\url{https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob/HEAD:/proposals/179-TLS-cert-..., +but I wonder if that's really a battle we can ever win. +The better answer is to encourage a proliferation of modular Tor +transports% +\footnote{\url{https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob/HEAD:/proposals/180-pluggable..., +like obfsproxy% +\footnote{\url{https://gitweb.torproject.org/obfsproxy.git/blob/HEAD:/doc/tor-obfs-howto.tx..., +and get the rest of the research community interested in designing +tool-neutral transports that blend in better. + +\section{Zig-zag between bridges and users} + +Start with a set of known bridge addresses. +Watch your firewall to see who connects to those bridges. +Then watch those users, and see what other addresses they connect to. +Wash, rinse, repeat. + +As above, this attack only works well when you have a large population of +Tor users behind your firewall. +It also requires some more engineering work to be able to trace source +addresses in addition to destination addresses. +But I'd be surprised if some major government firewalls don't have this +capability already. + +The solution here probably involves partitioning bridge addresses into +cells% +\footnote{\url{http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clandestine_cell_system%7D%7D, +such that zig-zagging from users to bridges only gives you a bounded set +of bridges (and a bounded set of users, for that matter). +That approach will require some changes in our bridgedb design% +\footnote{\url{https://gitweb.torproject.org/bridgedb.git/blob/HEAD:/bridge-db-spec.txt%7D%... +though. +Currently when a user requests some bridge addresses, bridgedb maps the +user's ``address'' (IP address, gmail account name, or whatever) into a +point in the keyspace (using consistent hashing% +\footnote{\url{http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consistent_hashing%7D%7D), +and the answers are the k successors of that point in the ring (using DHT% +\footnote{\url{http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chord_%5C%28DHT%5C%29%7D%7D +terminology). + +Dan Boneh suggested an alternate approach where we do keyed hashes% +\footnote{\url{http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMAC%7D%7D +of the user's address and all the bridge fingerprints, and return all +bridges whose hashed fingerprints match the user's hash in the first b +bits. +The result is that users would tend to get clustered by the bridges they +know. +That feature limits the damage from the zig-zag attack, but does it +increase the risks in some distribution strategies? +I already worry that bridge distribution strategies based on social +networks will result in clusters of socially related users using the same +bridges, meaning the attacker can reconstruct the social network. +If we isolate socially related users in the same partition, do we magnify +that problem? +This approach also needs more research work to make it scale such that we +can always return about k results, even as the address pool grows, and +without reintroducing zig-zag vulnerabilities. + +\section{\dots What did I miss?} + +\bibliography{ten-ways-discover-tor-bridges} + +\end{document} + diff --git a/2011/ten-ways-discover-tor-bridges/tortechrep.cls b/2011/ten-ways-discover-tor-bridges/tortechrep.cls new file mode 120000 index 0000000..4c24db2 --- /dev/null +++ b/2011/ten-ways-discover-tor-bridges/tortechrep.cls @@ -0,0 +1 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