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arma pushed a commit to branch main in repository tor.
The following commit(s) were added to refs/heads/main by this push: new ac306581af fix a few more typos in comments ac306581af is described below
commit ac306581af99df2c803edf6a3e93aa6fb4fe20af Author: Roger Dingledine arma@torproject.org AuthorDate: Sat Aug 6 21:04:28 2022 -0400
fix a few more typos in comments --- src/core/or/circuitbuild.c | 2 +- src/core/or/dos.c | 2 +- src/core/or/or_connection_st.h | 2 +- src/core/or/relay.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c index 511df4112b..257d33f1ab 100644 --- a/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ * constructing/sending create/extend cells, and so on). * * On the client side, this module handles launching circuits. Circuit - * launches are srtarted from circuit_establish_circuit(), called from + * launches are started from circuit_establish_circuit(), called from * circuit_launch_by_extend_info()). To choose the path the circuit will * take, onion_extend_cpath() calls into a maze of node selection functions. * diff --git a/src/core/or/dos.c b/src/core/or/dos.c index 6dd3c50051..efb6433537 100644 --- a/src/core/or/dos.c +++ b/src/core/or/dos.c @@ -607,7 +607,7 @@ dos_cc_new_create_cell(channel_t *chan) /* This is the detection. Assess at every CREATE cell if the client should * get marked as malicious. This should be kept as fast as possible. */ if (cc_has_exhausted_circuits(&entry->dos_stats)) { - /* If this is the first time we mark this entry, log it a info level. + /* If this is the first time we mark this entry, log it. * Under heavy DDoS, logging each time we mark would results in lots and * lots of logs. */ if (entry->dos_stats.cc_stats.marked_until_ts == 0) { diff --git a/src/core/or/or_connection_st.h b/src/core/or/or_connection_st.h index aceed4d2c4..97dfe7a637 100644 --- a/src/core/or/or_connection_st.h +++ b/src/core/or/or_connection_st.h @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ struct or_connection_t {
/** This is the ClientHash value we expect to receive from the * client during the Extended ORPort authentication protocol. We - * compute it upon receiving the ClientNoce from the client, and we + * compute it upon receiving the ClientNonce from the client, and we * compare it with the actual ClientHash value sent by the * client. */ char *ext_or_auth_correct_client_hash; diff --git a/src/core/or/relay.c b/src/core/or/relay.c index 332878a8ea..843d7a8765 100644 --- a/src/core/or/relay.c +++ b/src/core/or/relay.c @@ -3179,7 +3179,7 @@ channel_flush_from_first_active_circuit, (channel_t *chan, int max)) #define RELAY_CIRC_CELL_QUEUE_SIZE_DEFAULT \ (50 * RELAY_CIRC_CELL_QUEUE_SIZE_MIN)
-/* The maximum number of cell a circuit queue can contain. This is updated at +/* The maximum number of cells a circuit queue can contain. This is updated at * every new consensus and controlled by a parameter. */ static int32_t max_circuit_cell_queue_size = RELAY_CIRC_CELL_QUEUE_SIZE_DEFAULT;