commit 1c8ac595cbd13bb0e2cbc01092f451b93b55f2c0 Author: Sebastian Hahn sebastian@torproject.org Date: Tue Nov 11 06:49:17 2014 +0100
rephrase backdoor faq entry --- docs/en/faq.wml | 35 +++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/docs/en/faq.wml b/docs/en/faq.wml index c60e004..0669de6 100644 --- a/docs/en/faq.wml +++ b/docs/en/faq.wml @@ -485,42 +485,37 @@ they Tor?</a></h3>
<p> - There is absolutely no backdoor in Tor. Nobody has asked us to put -one - in, and we know some smart lawyers who say that it's unlikely that -anybody - will try to make us add one in our jurisdiction (U.S.). If they do - ask us, we will fight them, and (the lawyers say) probably win. + There is absolutely no backdoor in Tor. We know some smart lawyers + who say that it's unlikely that anybody will try to make us add one + in our jurisdiction (U.S.). If they do ask us, we will fight them, + and (the lawyers say) probably win. </p>
<p> We think that putting a backdoor in Tor would be tremendously irresponsible to our users, and a bad precedent for security -software - in general. If we ever put a deliberate backdoor in our security - software, it would ruin our professional reputations. Nobody would - trust our software ever again — for excellent reason! + software in general. If we ever put a deliberate backdoor in our + security software, it would ruin our professional reputations. + Nobody would trust our software ever again — for excellent + reason! </p>
<p> But that said, there are still plenty of subtle attacks people might try. Somebody might impersonate us, or break into our computers, or something like that. Tor is open source, and you -should - always check the source (or at least the diffs since the last -release) - for suspicious things. If we (or the distributors) don't give you - source, that's a sure sign something funny might be going on. You - should also check the <a href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">PGP - signatures</a> on the releases, to make sure nobody messed with the - distribution sites. + should always check the source (or at least the diffs since the last + release) for suspicious things. If we (or the distributors) don't + give you source, that's a sure sign something funny might be going + on. You should also check the <a href="<page + docs/verifying-signatures>">PGP signatures</a> on the releases, to + make sure nobody messed with the distribution sites. </p>
<p> Also, there might be accidental bugs in Tor that could affect your anonymity. We periodically find and fix anonymity-related bugs, so -make - sure you keep your Tor versions up-to-date. + make sure you keep your Tor versions up-to-date. </p>
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