commit 4b28ccd3a96f5eacc3a7e7d893960d711fc3ccbd Author: Karsten Loesing karsten.loesing@gmx.net Date: Thu Aug 30 11:38:04 2012 +0200
Make blocking report conform with tortechrep style. --- 2006/blocking/blocking.tex | 39 +++++++++++++++++---------------------- 2006/blocking/tortechrep.cls | 1 + 2006/blocking/usenixsubmit.cls | 7 ------- 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
diff --git a/2006/blocking/blocking.tex b/2006/blocking/blocking.tex index 3d46ef1..acbf90c 100644 --- a/2006/blocking/blocking.tex +++ b/2006/blocking/blocking.tex @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ +\documentclass{tortechrep} %\documentclass{llncs} -\documentclass{usenixsubmit} +%-\documentclass{usenixsubmit} %\documentclass[twocolumn]{article} %usepackage{usenix}
@@ -7,12 +8,6 @@ \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{epsfig}
-\setlength{\textwidth}{6.0in} -\setlength{\textheight}{8.5in} -\setlength{\topmargin}{.5cm} -\setlength{\oddsidemargin}{1cm} -\setlength{\evensidemargin}{1cm} - \newenvironment{tightlist}{\begin{list}{$\bullet$}{ \setlength{\itemsep}{0mm} \setlength{\parsep}{0mm} @@ -24,16 +19,16 @@ \newcommand{\workingnote}[1]{} % The version that hides the note. %\newcommand{\workingnote}[1]{(**#1)} % makes the note visible.
-\date{} -\title{Design of a blocking-resistant anonymity system\Tor Project technical report, Nov 2006} +\date{November 2006} +\title{Design of a blocking-resistant anonymity system}
%\author{Roger Dingledine\inst{1} \and Nick Mathewson\inst{1}} -\author{Roger Dingledine \ The Tor Project \ arma@torproject.org \and -Nick Mathewson \ The Tor Project \ nickm@torproject.org} +\author{Roger Dingledine and Nick Mathewson} +\contact{arma@torproject.org,nickm@torproject.org} +\reportid{2006-11-001}
\begin{document} \maketitle -\pagestyle{plain}
\begin{abstract}
@@ -140,7 +135,7 @@ adversaries will be in different stages of the arms race at each location, so an address blocked in one locale can still be useful in others. We focus on an attacker with somewhat complex goals:
-\begin{tightlist} +\begin{itemize} \item The attacker would like to restrict the flow of certain kinds of information, particularly when this information is seen as embarrassing to those in power (such as information about rights violations or corruption), @@ -185,12 +180,12 @@ We focus on an attacker with somewhat complex goals: (like the bulk of a newspaper's reporting) in order to censor other content distributed through the same channels (like that newspaper's coverage of the censored country). -\end{tightlist} +\end{itemize}
We assume there are three main technical network attacks in use by censors currently~\cite{clayton:pet2006}:
-\begin{tightlist} +\begin{itemize} \item Block a destination or type of traffic by automatically searching for certain strings or patterns in TCP packets. Offending packets can be dropped, or can trigger a response like closing the @@ -199,7 +194,7 @@ currently~\cite{clayton:pet2006}: firewall or other routing control point. \item Intercept DNS requests and give bogus responses for certain destination hostnames. -\end{tightlist} +\end{itemize}
We assume the network firewall has limited CPU and memory per connection~\cite{clayton:pet2006}. Against an adversary who could carefully @@ -265,14 +260,14 @@ with particular emphasis to how we can take advantage of these properties for a blocking-resistance design.
Tor aims to provide three security properties: -\begin{tightlist} -\item 1. A local network attacker can't learn, or influence, your +\begin{enumerate} +\item A local network attacker can't learn, or influence, your destination. -\item 2. No single router in the Tor network can link you to your +\item No single router in the Tor network can link you to your destination. -\item 3. The destination, or somebody watching the destination, +\item The destination, or somebody watching the destination, can't learn your location. -\end{tightlist} +\end{enumerate}
For blocking-resistance, we care most clearly about the first property. But as the arms race progresses, the second property @@ -1411,7 +1406,7 @@ We also need to examine how entry guards fit in. Entry guards step in a circuit) help protect against certain attacks where the attacker runs a few Tor relays and waits for the user to choose these relays as the beginning and end of her -circuit\footnote{\url{http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#EntryGuards%7D%7D. +circuit\footnote{\url{http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ%5C#EntryGuards%7D%7D. If the blocked user doesn't use the bridge's entry guards, then the bridge doesn't gain as much cover benefit. On the other hand, what design changes are needed for the blocked user to use the bridge's entry guards without diff --git a/2006/blocking/tortechrep.cls b/2006/blocking/tortechrep.cls new file mode 120000 index 0000000..4c24db2 --- /dev/null +++ b/2006/blocking/tortechrep.cls @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +../../tortechrep.cls \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/2006/blocking/usenixsubmit.cls b/2006/blocking/usenixsubmit.cls deleted file mode 100644 index 743ffcf..0000000 --- a/2006/blocking/usenixsubmit.cls +++ /dev/null @@ -1,7 +0,0 @@ -% Created by Anil Somayaji - -\ProvidesClass{usenixsubmit} -\LoadClass[11pt,letterpaper]{article} -\usepackage{times} -\usepackage[margin=1in]{geometry} -