[tor-commits] [tor/master] Merge branch 'bug29017-033' into bug29017-master-merge

26 Mar 2019

commit 361738c9649d20f0e759abed478253482836e294
Merge: 94f7e53d0 85c598cbc
Author: teor teor@torproject.org
Date:   Tue Feb 19 18:59:16 2019 +1000
Merge branch 'bug29017-033' into bug29017-master-merge
changes/bug29017           |  4 ++++
 doc/tor.1.txt              |  2 +-
 src/feature/relay/router.c | 11 +++++------
 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --cc src/feature/relay/router.c
index e79681540,000000000..cdd032f78
mode 100644,000000..100644

--- a/src/feature/relay/router.c
+++ b/src/feature/relay/router.c
@@@ -1,3222 -1,0 +1,3221 @@@
 +/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
 + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
 + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
 + * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */
 +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
 +
 +#define ROUTER_PRIVATE
 +
 +#include "core/or/or.h"
 +#include "app/config/config.h"
 +#include "app/config/statefile.h"
 +#include "app/main/main.h"
 +#include "core/mainloop/connection.h"
 +#include "core/mainloop/mainloop.h"
 +#include "core/mainloop/netstatus.h"
 +#include "core/or/policies.h"
 +#include "core/or/protover.h"
 +#include "feature/client/transports.h"
 +#include "feature/control/control.h"
 +#include "feature/dirauth/process_descs.h"
 +#include "feature/dircache/dirserv.h"
 +#include "feature/dirclient/dirclient.h"
 +#include "feature/dircommon/directory.h"
 +#include "feature/dirparse/authcert_parse.h"
 +#include "feature/dirparse/routerparse.h"
 +#include "feature/dirparse/signing.h"
 +#include "feature/hibernate/hibernate.h"
 +#include "feature/keymgt/loadkey.h"
 +#include "feature/nodelist/authcert.h"
 +#include "feature/nodelist/dirlist.h"
 +#include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h"
 +#include "feature/nodelist/nickname.h"
 +#include "feature/nodelist/nodefamily.h"
 +#include "feature/nodelist/nodelist.h"
 +#include "feature/nodelist/routerlist.h"
 +#include "feature/nodelist/torcert.h"
 +#include "feature/relay/dns.h"
 +#include "feature/relay/router.h"
 +#include "feature/relay/routerkeys.h"
 +#include "feature/relay/routermode.h"
 +#include "feature/relay/selftest.h"
 +#include "lib/geoip/geoip.h"
 +#include "feature/stats/geoip_stats.h"
 +#include "feature/stats/rephist.h"
 +#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_ed25519.h"
 +#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_format.h"
 +#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_init.h"
 +#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h"
 +#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h"
 +#include "lib/encoding/confline.h"
 +#include "lib/osinfo/uname.h"
 +#include "lib/tls/tortls.h"
 +#include "lib/version/torversion.h"
 +
 +#include "feature/dirauth/authmode.h"
 +
 +#include "app/config/or_state_st.h"
 +#include "core/or/port_cfg_st.h"
 +#include "feature/dirclient/dir_server_st.h"
 +#include "feature/dircommon/dir_connection_st.h"
 +#include "feature/nodelist/authority_cert_st.h"
 +#include "feature/nodelist/extrainfo_st.h"
 +#include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus_st.h"
 +#include "feature/nodelist/node_st.h"
 +#include "feature/nodelist/routerinfo_st.h"
 +#include "feature/nodelist/routerstatus_st.h"
 +
 +/**
 + * \file router.c
 + * \brief Miscellaneous relay functionality, including RSA key maintenance,
 + * generating and uploading server descriptors, picking an address to
 + * advertise, and so on.
 + *
 + * This module handles the job of deciding whether we are a Tor relay, and if
 + * so what kind. (Mostly through functions like server_mode() that inspect an
 + * or_options_t, but in some cases based on our own capabilities, such as when
 + * we are deciding whether to be a directory cache in
 + * router_has_bandwidth_to_be_dirserver().)
 + *
 + * Also in this module are the functions to generate our own routerinfo_t and
 + * extrainfo_t, and to encode those to signed strings for upload to the
 + * directory authorities.
 + *
 + * This module also handles key maintenance for RSA and Curve25519-ntor keys,
 + * and for our TLS context. (These functions should eventually move to
 + * routerkeys.c along with the code that handles Ed25519 keys now.)
 + **/
 +
 +/************************************************************/
 +
 +/*****
 + * Key management: ORs only.
 + *****/
 +
 +/** Private keys for this OR.  There is also an SSL key managed by tortls.c.
 + */
 +static tor_mutex_t *key_lock=NULL;
 +static time_t onionkey_set_at=0; /**< When was onionkey last changed? */
 +/** Current private onionskin decryption key: used to decode CREATE cells. */
 +static crypto_pk_t *onionkey=NULL;
 +/** Previous private onionskin decryption key: used to decode CREATE cells
 + * generated by clients that have an older version of our descriptor. */
 +static crypto_pk_t *lastonionkey=NULL;
 +/** Current private ntor secret key: used to perform the ntor handshake. */
 +static curve25519_keypair_t curve25519_onion_key;
 +/** Previous private ntor secret key: used to perform the ntor handshake
 + * with clients that have an older version of our descriptor. */
 +static curve25519_keypair_t last_curve25519_onion_key;
 +/** Private server "identity key": used to sign directory info and TLS
 + * certificates. Never changes. */
 +static crypto_pk_t *server_identitykey=NULL;
 +/** Digest of server_identitykey. */
 +static char server_identitykey_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
 +/** Private client "identity key": used to sign bridges' and clients'
 + * outbound TLS certificates. Regenerated on startup and on IP address
 + * change. */
 +static crypto_pk_t *client_identitykey=NULL;
 +/** Signing key used for v3 directory material; only set for authorities. */
 +static crypto_pk_t *authority_signing_key = NULL;
 +/** Key certificate to authenticate v3 directory material; only set for
 + * authorities. */
 +static authority_cert_t *authority_key_certificate = NULL;
 +
 +/** For emergency V3 authority key migration: An extra signing key that we use
 + * with our old (obsolete) identity key for a while. */
 +static crypto_pk_t *legacy_signing_key = NULL;
 +/** For emergency V3 authority key migration: An extra certificate to
 + * authenticate legacy_signing_key with our obsolete identity key.*/
 +static authority_cert_t *legacy_key_certificate = NULL;
 +
 +/* (Note that v3 authorities also have a separate "authority identity key",
 + * but this key is never actually loaded by the Tor process.  Instead, it's
 + * used by tor-gencert to sign new signing keys and make new key
 + * certificates. */
 +
 +/** Return a readonly string with human readable description
 + * of <b>err</b>.
 + */
 +const char *
 +routerinfo_err_to_string(int err)
 +{
 +  switch (err) {
 +    case TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_NO_EXT_ADDR:
 +      return "No known exit address yet";
 +    case TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_CANNOT_PARSE:
 +      return "Cannot parse descriptor";
 +    case TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_NOT_A_SERVER:
 +      return "Not running in server mode";
 +    case TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILED:
 +      return "Key digest failed";
 +    case TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_CANNOT_GENERATE:
 +      return "Cannot generate descriptor";
 +    case TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_DESC_REBUILDING:
 +      return "Descriptor still rebuilding - not ready yet";
 +  }
 +
 +  log_warn(LD_BUG, "unknown routerinfo error %d - shouldn't happen", err);
 +  tor_assert_unreached();
 +
 +  return "Unknown error";
 +}
 +
 +/** Return true if we expect given error to be transient.
 + * Return false otherwise.
 + */
 +int
 +routerinfo_err_is_transient(int err)
 +{
 +  /**
 +   * For simplicity, we consider all errors other than
 +   * "not a server" transient - see discussion on
 +   * https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/27034
 +   */
 +  return err != TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_NOT_A_SERVER;
 +}
 +
 +/** Replace the current onion key with <b>k</b>.  Does not affect
 + * lastonionkey; to update lastonionkey correctly, call rotate_onion_key().
 + */
 +static void
 +set_onion_key(crypto_pk_t *k)
 +{
 +  if (onionkey && crypto_pk_eq_keys(onionkey, k)) {
 +    /* k is already our onion key; free it and return */
 +    crypto_pk_free(k);
 +    return;
 +  }
 +  tor_mutex_acquire(key_lock);
 +  crypto_pk_free(onionkey);
 +  onionkey = k;
 +  tor_mutex_release(key_lock);
 +  mark_my_descriptor_dirty("set onion key");
 +}
 +
 +/** Return the current onion key.  Requires that the onion key has been
 + * loaded or generated. */
 +crypto_pk_t *
 +get_onion_key(void)
 +{
 +  tor_assert(onionkey);
 +  return onionkey;
 +}
 +
 +/** Store a full copy of the current onion key into *<b>key</b>, and a full
 + * copy of the most recent onion key into *<b>last</b>.  Store NULL into
 + * a pointer if the corresponding key does not exist.
 + */
 +void
 +dup_onion_keys(crypto_pk_t **key, crypto_pk_t **last)
 +{
 +  tor_assert(key);
 +  tor_assert(last);
 +  tor_mutex_acquire(key_lock);
 +  if (onionkey)
 +    *key = crypto_pk_copy_full(onionkey);
 +  else
 +    *key = NULL;
 +  if (lastonionkey)
 +    *last = crypto_pk_copy_full(lastonionkey);
 +  else
 +    *last = NULL;
 +  tor_mutex_release(key_lock);
 +}
 +
 +/** Expire our old set of onion keys. This is done by setting
 + * last_curve25519_onion_key and lastonionkey to all zero's and NULL
 + * respectively.
 + *
 + * This function does not perform any grace period checks for the old onion
 + * keys.
 + */
 +void
 +expire_old_onion_keys(void)
 +{
 +  char *fname = NULL;
 +
 +  tor_mutex_acquire(key_lock);
 +
 +  /* Free lastonionkey and set it to NULL. */
 +  if (lastonionkey) {
 +    crypto_pk_free(lastonionkey);
 +    lastonionkey = NULL;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* We zero out the keypair. See the tor_mem_is_zero() check made in
 +   * construct_ntor_key_map() below. */
 +  memset(&last_curve25519_onion_key, 0, sizeof(last_curve25519_onion_key));
 +
 +  tor_mutex_release(key_lock);
 +
 +  fname = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key.old");
 +  if (file_status(fname) == FN_FILE) {
 +    if (tor_unlink(fname) != 0) {
 +      log_warn(LD_FS, "Couldn't unlink old onion key file %s: %s",
 +               fname, strerror(errno));
 +    }
 +  }
 +  tor_free(fname);
 +
 +  fname = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key_ntor.old");
 +  if (file_status(fname) == FN_FILE) {
 +    if (tor_unlink(fname) != 0) {
 +      log_warn(LD_FS, "Couldn't unlink old ntor onion key file %s: %s",
 +               fname, strerror(errno));
 +    }
 +  }
 +  tor_free(fname);
 +}
 +
 +/** Return the current secret onion key for the ntor handshake. Must only
 + * be called from the main thread. */
 +static const curve25519_keypair_t *
 +get_current_curve25519_keypair(void)
 +{
 +  return &curve25519_onion_key;
 +}
 +/** Return a map from KEYID (the key itself) to keypairs for use in the ntor
 + * handshake. Must only be called from the main thread. */
 +di_digest256_map_t *
 +construct_ntor_key_map(void)
 +{
 +  di_digest256_map_t *m = NULL;
 +
 +  if (!tor_mem_is_zero((const char*)
 +                       curve25519_onion_key.pubkey.public_key,
 +                       CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) {
 +    dimap_add_entry(&m,
 +                    curve25519_onion_key.pubkey.public_key,
 +                    tor_memdup(&curve25519_onion_key,
 +                               sizeof(curve25519_keypair_t)));
 +  }
 +  if (!tor_mem_is_zero((const char*)
 +                          last_curve25519_onion_key.pubkey.public_key,
 +                       CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) {
 +    dimap_add_entry(&m,
 +                    last_curve25519_onion_key.pubkey.public_key,
 +                    tor_memdup(&last_curve25519_onion_key,
 +                               sizeof(curve25519_keypair_t)));
 +  }
 +
 +  return m;
 +}
 +/** Helper used to deallocate a di_digest256_map_t returned by
 + * construct_ntor_key_map. */
 +static void
 +ntor_key_map_free_helper(void *arg)
 +{
 +  curve25519_keypair_t *k = arg;
 +  memwipe(k, 0, sizeof(*k));
 +  tor_free(k);
 +}
 +/** Release all storage from a keymap returned by construct_ntor_key_map. */
 +void
 +ntor_key_map_free_(di_digest256_map_t *map)
 +{
 +  if (!map)
 +    return;
 +  dimap_free(map, ntor_key_map_free_helper);
 +}
 +
 +/** Return the time when the onion key was last set.  This is either the time
 + * when the process launched, or the time of the most recent key rotation since
 + * the process launched.
 + */
 +time_t
 +get_onion_key_set_at(void)
 +{
 +  return onionkey_set_at;
 +}
 +
 +/** Set the current server identity key to <b>k</b>.
 + */
 +void
 +set_server_identity_key(crypto_pk_t *k)
 +{
 +  crypto_pk_free(server_identitykey);
 +  server_identitykey = k;
 +  if (crypto_pk_get_digest(server_identitykey,
 +                           server_identitykey_digest) < 0) {
 +    log_err(LD_BUG, "Couldn't compute our own identity key digest.");
 +    tor_assert(0);
 +  }
 +}
 +
 +#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS
 +/** Testing only -- set the server's RSA identity digest to
 + * be <b>digest</b> */
 +void
 +set_server_identity_key_digest_testing(const uint8_t *digest)
 +{
 +  memcpy(server_identitykey_digest, digest, DIGEST_LEN);
 +}
 +#endif
 +
 +/** Make sure that we have set up our identity keys to match or not match as
 + * appropriate, and die with an assertion if we have not. */
 +static void
 +assert_identity_keys_ok(void)
 +{
 +  if (1)
 +    return;
 +  tor_assert(client_identitykey);
 +  if (public_server_mode(get_options())) {
 +    /* assert that we have set the client and server keys to be equal */
 +    tor_assert(server_identitykey);
 +    tor_assert(crypto_pk_eq_keys(client_identitykey, server_identitykey));
 +  } else {
 +    /* assert that we have set the client and server keys to be unequal */
 +    if (server_identitykey)
 +      tor_assert(!crypto_pk_eq_keys(client_identitykey, server_identitykey));
 +  }
 +}
 +
 +/** Returns the current server identity key; requires that the key has
 + * been set, and that we are running as a Tor server.
 + */
 +crypto_pk_t *
 +get_server_identity_key(void)
 +{
 +  tor_assert(server_identitykey);
 +  tor_assert(server_mode(get_options()));
 +  assert_identity_keys_ok();
 +  return server_identitykey;
 +}
 +
 +/** Return true iff we are a server and the server identity key
 + * has been set. */
 +int
 +server_identity_key_is_set(void)
 +{
 +  return server_mode(get_options()) && server_identitykey != NULL;
 +}
 +
 +/** Set the current client identity key to <b>k</b>.
 + */
 +void
 +set_client_identity_key(crypto_pk_t *k)
 +{
 +  crypto_pk_free(client_identitykey);
 +  client_identitykey = k;
 +}
 +
 +/** Returns the current client identity key for use on outgoing TLS
 + * connections; requires that the key has been set.
 + */
 +crypto_pk_t *
 +get_tlsclient_identity_key(void)
 +{
 +  tor_assert(client_identitykey);
 +  assert_identity_keys_ok();
 +  return client_identitykey;
 +}
 +
 +/** Return true iff the client identity key has been set. */
 +int
 +client_identity_key_is_set(void)
 +{
 +  return client_identitykey != NULL;
 +}
 +
 +/** Return the key certificate for this v3 (voting) authority, or NULL
 + * if we have no such certificate. */
 +MOCK_IMPL(authority_cert_t *,
 +get_my_v3_authority_cert, (void))
 +{
 +  return authority_key_certificate;
 +}
 +
 +/** Return the v3 signing key for this v3 (voting) authority, or NULL
 + * if we have no such key. */
 +crypto_pk_t *
 +get_my_v3_authority_signing_key(void)
 +{
 +  return authority_signing_key;
 +}
 +
 +/** If we're an authority, and we're using a legacy authority identity key for
 + * emergency migration purposes, return the certificate associated with that
 + * key. */
 +authority_cert_t *
 +get_my_v3_legacy_cert(void)
 +{
 +  return legacy_key_certificate;
 +}
 +
 +/** If we're an authority, and we're using a legacy authority identity key for
 + * emergency migration purposes, return that key. */
 +crypto_pk_t *
 +get_my_v3_legacy_signing_key(void)
 +{
 +  return legacy_signing_key;
 +}
 +
 +/** Replace the previous onion key with the current onion key, and generate
 + * a new previous onion key.  Immediately after calling this function,
 + * the OR should:
 + *   - schedule all previous cpuworkers to shut down _after_ processing
 + *     pending work.  (This will cause fresh cpuworkers to be generated.)
 + *   - generate and upload a fresh routerinfo.
 + */
 +void
 +rotate_onion_key(void)
 +{
 +  char *fname, *fname_prev;
 +  crypto_pk_t *prkey = NULL;
 +  or_state_t *state = get_or_state();
 +  curve25519_keypair_t new_curve25519_keypair;
 +  time_t now;
 +  fname = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key");
 +  fname_prev = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key.old");
 +  /* There isn't much point replacing an old key with an empty file */
 +  if (file_status(fname) == FN_FILE) {
 +    if (replace_file(fname, fname_prev))
 +      goto error;
 +  }
 +  if (!(prkey = crypto_pk_new())) {
 +    log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error constructing rotated onion key");
 +    goto error;
 +  }
 +  if (crypto_pk_generate_key(prkey)) {
 +    log_err(LD_BUG,"Error generating onion key");
 +    goto error;
 +  }
 +  if (crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_filename(prkey, fname)) {
 +    log_err(LD_FS,"Couldn't write generated onion key to "%s".", fname);
 +    goto error;
 +  }
 +  tor_free(fname);
 +  tor_free(fname_prev);
 +  fname = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key_ntor");
 +  fname_prev = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key_ntor.old");
 +  if (curve25519_keypair_generate(&new_curve25519_keypair, 1) < 0)
 +    goto error;
 +  /* There isn't much point replacing an old key with an empty file */
 +  if (file_status(fname) == FN_FILE) {
 +    if (replace_file(fname, fname_prev))
 +      goto error;
 +  }
 +  if (curve25519_keypair_write_to_file(&new_curve25519_keypair, fname,
 +                                       "onion") < 0) {
 +    log_err(LD_FS,"Couldn't write curve25519 onion key to "%s".",fname);
 +    goto error;
 +  }
 +  log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Rotating onion key");
 +  tor_mutex_acquire(key_lock);
 +  crypto_pk_free(lastonionkey);
 +  lastonionkey = onionkey;
 +  onionkey = prkey;
 +  memcpy(&last_curve25519_onion_key, &curve25519_onion_key,
 +         sizeof(curve25519_keypair_t));
 +  memcpy(&curve25519_onion_key, &new_curve25519_keypair,
 +         sizeof(curve25519_keypair_t));
 +  now = time(NULL);
 +  state->LastRotatedOnionKey = onionkey_set_at = now;
 +  tor_mutex_release(key_lock);
 +  mark_my_descriptor_dirty("rotated onion key");
 +  or_state_mark_dirty(state, get_options()->AvoidDiskWrites ? now+3600 : 0);
 +  goto done;
 + error:
 +  log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Couldn't rotate onion key.");
 +  if (prkey)
 +    crypto_pk_free(prkey);
 + done:
 +  memwipe(&new_curve25519_keypair, 0, sizeof(new_curve25519_keypair));
 +  tor_free(fname);
 +  tor_free(fname_prev);
 +}
 +
 +/** Log greeting message that points to new relay lifecycle document the
 + * first time this function has been called.
 + */
 +static void
 +log_new_relay_greeting(void)
 +{
 +  static int already_logged = 0;
 +
 +  if (already_logged)
 +    return;
 +
 +  tor_log(LOG_NOTICE, LD_GENERAL, "You are running a new relay. "
 +         "Thanks for helping the Tor network! If you wish to know "
 +         "what will happen in the upcoming weeks regarding its usage, "
 +         "have a look at https://blog.torproject.org/blog/lifecycle-of"
 +         "-a-new-relay");
 +
 +  already_logged = 1;
 +}
 +
 +/** Load a curve25519 keypair from the file <b>fname</b>, writing it into
 + * <b>keys_out</b>.  If the file isn't found, or is empty, and <b>generate</b>
 + * is true, create a new keypair and write it into the file.  If there are
 + * errors, log them at level <b>severity</b>. Generate files using <b>tag</b>
 + * in their ASCII wrapper. */
 +static int
 +init_curve25519_keypair_from_file(curve25519_keypair_t *keys_out,
 +                                  const char *fname,
 +                                  int generate,
 +                                  int severity,
 +                                  const char *tag)
 +{
 +  switch (file_status(fname)) {
 +    case FN_DIR:
 +    case FN_ERROR:
 +      tor_log(severity, LD_FS,"Can't read key from "%s"", fname);
 +      goto error;
 +    /* treat empty key files as if the file doesn't exist, and, if generate
 +     * is set, replace the empty file in curve25519_keypair_write_to_file() */
 +    case FN_NOENT:
 +    case FN_EMPTY:
 +      if (generate) {
 +        if (!have_lockfile()) {
 +          if (try_locking(get_options(), 0)<0) {
 +            /* Make sure that --list-fingerprint only creates new keys
 +             * if there is no possibility for a deadlock. */
 +            tor_log(severity, LD_FS, "Another Tor process has locked "%s". "
 +                    "Not writing any new keys.", fname);
 +            /*XXXX The 'other process' might make a key in a second or two;
 +             * maybe we should wait for it. */
 +            goto error;
 +          }
 +        }
 +        log_info(LD_GENERAL, "No key found in "%s"; generating fresh key.",
 +                 fname);
 +        if (curve25519_keypair_generate(keys_out, 1) < 0)
 +          goto error;
 +        if (curve25519_keypair_write_to_file(keys_out, fname, tag)<0) {
 +          tor_log(severity, LD_FS,
 +              "Couldn't write generated key to "%s".", fname);
 +          memwipe(keys_out, 0, sizeof(*keys_out));
 +          goto error;
 +        }
 +      } else {
 +        log_info(LD_GENERAL, "No key found in "%s"", fname);
 +      }
 +      return 0;
 +    case FN_FILE:
 +      {
 +        char *tag_in=NULL;
 +        if (curve25519_keypair_read_from_file(keys_out, &tag_in, fname) < 0) {
 +          tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,"Error loading private key.");
 +          tor_free(tag_in);
 +          goto error;
 +        }
 +        if (!tag_in || strcmp(tag_in, tag)) {
 +          tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,"Unexpected tag %s on private key.",
 +              escaped(tag_in));
 +          tor_free(tag_in);
 +          goto error;
 +        }
 +        tor_free(tag_in);
 +        return 0;
 +      }
 +    default:
 +      tor_assert(0);
 +  }
 +
 + error:
 +  return -1;
 +}
 +
 +/** Try to load the vote-signing private key and certificate for being a v3
 + * directory authority, and make sure they match.  If <b>legacy</b>, load a
 + * legacy key/cert set for emergency key migration; otherwise load the regular
 + * key/cert set.  On success, store them into *<b>key_out</b> and
 + * *<b>cert_out</b> respectively, and return 0.  On failure, return -1. */
 +static int
 +load_authority_keyset(int legacy, crypto_pk_t **key_out,
 +                      authority_cert_t **cert_out)
 +{
 +  int r = -1;
 +  char *fname = NULL, *cert = NULL;
 +  const char *eos = NULL;
 +  crypto_pk_t *signing_key = NULL;
 +  authority_cert_t *parsed = NULL;
 +
 +  fname = get_keydir_fname(
 +                 legacy ? "legacy_signing_key" : "authority_signing_key");
 +  signing_key = init_key_from_file(fname, 0, LOG_ERR, NULL);
 +  if (!signing_key) {
 +    log_warn(LD_DIR, "No version 3 directory key found in %s", fname);
 +    goto done;
 +  }
 +  tor_free(fname);
 +  fname = get_keydir_fname(
 +               legacy ? "legacy_certificate" : "authority_certificate");
 +  cert = read_file_to_str(fname, 0, NULL);
 +  if (!cert) {
 +    log_warn(LD_DIR, "Signing key found, but no certificate found in %s",
 +               fname);
 +    goto done;
 +  }
 +  parsed = authority_cert_parse_from_string(cert, strlen(cert), &eos);
 +  if (!parsed) {
 +    log_warn(LD_DIR, "Unable to parse certificate in %s", fname);
 +    goto done;
 +  }
 +  if (!crypto_pk_eq_keys(signing_key, parsed->signing_key)) {
 +    log_warn(LD_DIR, "Stored signing key does not match signing key in "
 +             "certificate");
 +    goto done;
 +  }
 +
 +  crypto_pk_free(*key_out);
 +  authority_cert_free(*cert_out);
 +
 +  *key_out = signing_key;
 +  *cert_out = parsed;
 +  r = 0;
 +  signing_key = NULL;
 +  parsed = NULL;
 +
 + done:
 +  tor_free(fname);
 +  tor_free(cert);
 +  crypto_pk_free(signing_key);
 +  authority_cert_free(parsed);
 +  return r;
 +}
 +
 +/** Load the v3 (voting) authority signing key and certificate, if they are
 + * present.  Return -1 if anything is missing, mismatched, or unloadable;
 + * return 0 on success. */
 +static int
 +init_v3_authority_keys(void)
 +{
 +  if (load_authority_keyset(0, &authority_signing_key,
 +                            &authority_key_certificate)<0)
 +    return -1;
 +
 +  if (get_options()->V3AuthUseLegacyKey &&
 +      load_authority_keyset(1, &legacy_signing_key,
 +                            &legacy_key_certificate)<0)
 +    return -1;
 +
 +  return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/** If we're a v3 authority, check whether we have a certificate that's
 + * likely to expire soon.  Warn if we do, but not too often. */
 +void
 +v3_authority_check_key_expiry(void)
 +{
 +  time_t now, expires;
 +  static time_t last_warned = 0;
 +  int badness, time_left, warn_interval;
 +  if (!authdir_mode_v3(get_options()) || !authority_key_certificate)
 +    return;
 +
 +  now = time(NULL);
 +  expires = authority_key_certificate->expires;
 +  time_left = (int)( expires - now );
 +  if (time_left <= 0) {
 +    badness = LOG_ERR;
 +    warn_interval = 60*60;
 +  } else if (time_left <= 24*60*60) {
 +    badness = LOG_WARN;
 +    warn_interval = 60*60;
 +  } else if (time_left <= 24*60*60*7) {
 +    badness = LOG_WARN;
 +    warn_interval = 24*60*60;
 +  } else if (time_left <= 24*60*60*30) {
 +    badness = LOG_WARN;
 +    warn_interval = 24*60*60*5;
 +  } else {
 +    return;
 +  }
 +
 +  if (last_warned + warn_interval > now)
 +    return;
 +
 +  if (time_left <= 0) {
 +    tor_log(badness, LD_DIR, "Your v3 authority certificate has expired."
 +            " Generate a new one NOW.");
 +  } else if (time_left <= 24*60*60) {
 +    tor_log(badness, LD_DIR, "Your v3 authority certificate expires in %d "
 +            "hours; Generate a new one NOW.", time_left/(60*60));
 +  } else {
 +    tor_log(badness, LD_DIR, "Your v3 authority certificate expires in %d "
 +            "days; Generate a new one soon.", time_left/(24*60*60));
 +  }
 +  last_warned = now;
 +}
 +
 +/** Get the lifetime of an onion key in days. This value is defined by the
 + * network consesus parameter "onion-key-rotation-days". Always returns a value
 + * between <b>MIN_ONION_KEY_LIFETIME_DAYS</b> and
 + * <b>MAX_ONION_KEY_LIFETIME_DAYS</b>.
 + */
 +static int
 +get_onion_key_rotation_days_(void)
 +{
 +  return networkstatus_get_param(NULL,
 +                                 "onion-key-rotation-days",
 +                                 DEFAULT_ONION_KEY_LIFETIME_DAYS,
 +                                 MIN_ONION_KEY_LIFETIME_DAYS,
 +                                 MAX_ONION_KEY_LIFETIME_DAYS);
 +}
 +
 +/** Get the current lifetime of an onion key in seconds. This value is defined
 + * by the network consesus parameter "onion-key-rotation-days", but the value
 + * is converted to seconds.
 + */
 +int
 +get_onion_key_lifetime(void)
 +{
 +  return get_onion_key_rotation_days_()*24*60*60;
 +}
 +
 +/** Get the grace period of an onion key in seconds. This value is defined by
 + * the network consesus parameter "onion-key-grace-period-days", but the value
 + * is converted to seconds.
 + */
 +int
 +get_onion_key_grace_period(void)
 +{
 +  int grace_period;
 +  grace_period = networkstatus_get_param(NULL,
 +                                         "onion-key-grace-period-days",
 +                                         DEFAULT_ONION_KEY_GRACE_PERIOD_DAYS,
 +                                         MIN_ONION_KEY_GRACE_PERIOD_DAYS,
 +                                         get_onion_key_rotation_days_());
 +  return grace_period*24*60*60;
 +}
 +
 +/** Set up Tor's TLS contexts, based on our configuration and keys. Return 0
 + * on success, and -1 on failure. */
 +int
 +router_initialize_tls_context(void)
 +{
 +  unsigned int flags = 0;
 +  const or_options_t *options = get_options();
 +  int lifetime = options->SSLKeyLifetime;
 +  if (public_server_mode(options))
 +    flags |= TOR_TLS_CTX_IS_PUBLIC_SERVER;
 +  if (!lifetime) { /* we should guess a good ssl cert lifetime */
 +
 +    /* choose between 5 and 365 days, and round to the day */
 +    unsigned int five_days = 5*24*3600;
 +    unsigned int one_year = 365*24*3600;
 +    lifetime = crypto_rand_int_range(five_days, one_year);
 +    lifetime -= lifetime % (24*3600);
 +
 +    if (crypto_rand_int(2)) {
 +      /* Half the time we expire at midnight, and half the time we expire
 +       * one second before midnight. (Some CAs wobble their expiry times a
 +       * bit in practice, perhaps to reduce collision attacks; see ticket
 +       * 8443 for details about observed certs in the wild.) */
 +      lifetime--;
 +    }
 +  }
 +
 +  /* It's ok to pass lifetime in as an unsigned int, since
 +   * config_parse_interval() checked it. */
 +  return tor_tls_context_init(flags,
 +                              get_tlsclient_identity_key(),
 +                              server_mode(options) ?
 +                              get_server_identity_key() : NULL,
 +                              (unsigned int)lifetime);
 +}
 +
 +/** Compute fingerprint (or hashed fingerprint if hashed is 1) and write
 + * it to 'fingerprint' (or 'hashed-fingerprint'). Return 0 on success, or
 + * -1 if Tor should die,
 + */
 +STATIC int
 +router_write_fingerprint(int hashed)
 +{
 +  char *keydir = NULL, *cp = NULL;
 +  const char *fname = hashed ? "hashed-fingerprint" :
 +                               "fingerprint";
 +  char fingerprint[FINGERPRINT_LEN+1];
 +  const or_options_t *options = get_options();
 +  char *fingerprint_line = NULL;
 +  int result = -1;
 +
 +  keydir = get_datadir_fname(fname);
 +  log_info(LD_GENERAL,"Dumping %sfingerprint to "%s"...",
 +           hashed ? "hashed " : "", keydir);
 +  if (!hashed) {
 +    if (crypto_pk_get_fingerprint(get_server_identity_key(),
 +                                  fingerprint, 0) < 0) {
 +      log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error computing fingerprint");
 +      goto done;
 +    }
 +  } else {
 +    if (crypto_pk_get_hashed_fingerprint(get_server_identity_key(),
 +                                         fingerprint) < 0) {
 +      log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error computing hashed fingerprint");
 +      goto done;
 +    }
 +  }
 +
 +  tor_asprintf(&fingerprint_line, "%s %s\n", options->Nickname, fingerprint);
 +
 +  /* Check whether we need to write the (hashed-)fingerprint file. */
 +
 +  cp = read_file_to_str(keydir, RFTS_IGNORE_MISSING, NULL);
 +  if (!cp || strcmp(cp, fingerprint_line)) {
 +    if (write_str_to_file(keydir, fingerprint_line, 0)) {
 +      log_err(LD_FS, "Error writing %sfingerprint line to file",
 +              hashed ? "hashed " : "");
 +      goto done;
 +    }
 +  }
 +
 +  log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "Your Tor %s identity key fingerprint is '%s %s'",
 +             hashed ? "bridge's hashed" : "server's", options->Nickname,
 +             fingerprint);
 +
 +  result = 0;
 + done:
 +  tor_free(cp);
 +  tor_free(keydir);
 +  tor_free(fingerprint_line);
 +  return result;
 +}
 +
 +static int
 +init_keys_common(void)
 +{
 +  if (!key_lock)
 +    key_lock = tor_mutex_new();
 +
 +  /* There are a couple of paths that put us here before we've asked
 +   * openssl to initialize itself. */
 +  if (crypto_global_init(get_options()->HardwareAccel,
 +                         get_options()->AccelName,
 +                         get_options()->AccelDir)) {
 +    log_err(LD_BUG, "Unable to initialize OpenSSL. Exiting.");
 +    return -1;
 +  }
 +
 +  return 0;
 +}
 +
 +int
 +init_keys_client(void)
 +{
 +  crypto_pk_t *prkey;
 +  if (init_keys_common() < 0)
 +    return -1;
 +
 +  if (!(prkey = crypto_pk_new()))
 +    return -1;
 +  if (crypto_pk_generate_key(prkey)) {
 +    crypto_pk_free(prkey);
 +    return -1;
 +  }
 +  set_client_identity_key(prkey);
 +  /* Create a TLS context. */
 +  if (router_initialize_tls_context() < 0) {
 +    log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error creating TLS context for Tor client.");
 +    return -1;
 +  }
 +  return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/** Initialize all OR private keys, and the TLS context, as necessary.
 + * On OPs, this only initializes the tls context. Return 0 on success,
 + * or -1 if Tor should die.
 + */
 +int
 +init_keys(void)
 +{
 +  char *keydir;
 +  const char *mydesc;
 +  crypto_pk_t *prkey;
 +  char digest[DIGEST_LEN];
 +  char v3_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
 +  const or_options_t *options = get_options();
 +  dirinfo_type_t type;
 +  time_t now = time(NULL);
 +  dir_server_t *ds;
 +  int v3_digest_set = 0;
 +  authority_cert_t *cert = NULL;
 +
 +  /* OP's don't need persistent keys; just make up an identity and
 +   * initialize the TLS context. */
 +  if (!server_mode(options)) {
 +    return init_keys_client();
 +  }
 +  if (init_keys_common() < 0)
 +    return -1;
 +
 +  if (create_keys_directory(options) < 0)
 +    return -1;
 +
 +  /* 1a. Read v3 directory authority key/cert information. */
 +  memset(v3_digest, 0, sizeof(v3_digest));
 +  if (authdir_mode_v3(options)) {
 +    if (init_v3_authority_keys()<0) {
 +      log_err(LD_GENERAL, "We're configured as a V3 authority, but we "
 +              "were unable to load our v3 authority keys and certificate! "
 +              "Use tor-gencert to generate them. Dying.");
 +      return -1;
 +    }
 +    cert = get_my_v3_authority_cert();
 +    if (cert) {
 +      if (crypto_pk_get_digest(get_my_v3_authority_cert()->identity_key,
 +                               v3_digest) < 0) {
 +        log_err(LD_BUG, "Couldn't compute my v3 authority identity key "
 +                "digest.");
 +        return -1;
 +      }
 +      v3_digest_set = 1;
 +    }
 +  }
 +
 +  /* 1b. Read identity key. Make it if none is found. */
 +  keydir = get_keydir_fname("secret_id_key");
 +  log_info(LD_GENERAL,"Reading/making identity key "%s"...",keydir);
 +  bool created = false;
 +  prkey = init_key_from_file(keydir, 1, LOG_ERR, &created);
 +  tor_free(keydir);
 +  if (!prkey) return -1;
 +  if (created)
 +    log_new_relay_greeting();
 +  set_server_identity_key(prkey);
 +
 +  /* 1c. If we are configured as a bridge, generate a client key;
 +   * otherwise, set the server identity key as our client identity
 +   * key. */
 +  if (public_server_mode(options)) {
 +    set_client_identity_key(crypto_pk_dup_key(prkey)); /* set above */
 +  } else {
 +    if (!(prkey = crypto_pk_new()))
 +      return -1;
 +    if (crypto_pk_generate_key(prkey)) {
 +      crypto_pk_free(prkey);
 +      return -1;
 +    }
 +    set_client_identity_key(prkey);
 +  }
 +
 +  /* 1d. Load all ed25519 keys */
 +  const int new_signing_key = load_ed_keys(options,now);
 +  if (new_signing_key < 0)
 +    return -1;
 +
 +  /* 2. Read onion key.  Make it if none is found. */
 +  keydir = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key");
 +  log_info(LD_GENERAL,"Reading/making onion key "%s"...",keydir);
 +  prkey = init_key_from_file(keydir, 1, LOG_ERR, &created);
 +  if (created)
 +    log_new_relay_greeting();
 +  tor_free(keydir);
 +  if (!prkey) return -1;
 +  set_onion_key(prkey);
 +  if (options->command == CMD_RUN_TOR) {
 +    /* only mess with the state file if we're actually running Tor */
 +    or_state_t *state = get_or_state();
 +    if (state->LastRotatedOnionKey > 100 && state->LastRotatedOnionKey < now) {
 +      /* We allow for some parsing slop, but we don't want to risk accepting
 +       * values in the distant future.  If we did, we might never rotate the
 +       * onion key. */
 +      onionkey_set_at = state->LastRotatedOnionKey;
 +    } else {
 +      /* We have no LastRotatedOnionKey set; either we just created the key
 +       * or it's a holdover from 0.1.2.4-alpha-dev or earlier.  In either case,
 +       * start the clock ticking now so that we will eventually rotate it even
 +       * if we don't stay up for the full lifetime of an onion key. */
 +      state->LastRotatedOnionKey = onionkey_set_at = now;
 +      or_state_mark_dirty(state, options->AvoidDiskWrites ?
 +                                   time(NULL)+3600 : 0);
 +    }
 +  }
 +
 +  keydir = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key.old");
 +  if (!lastonionkey && file_status(keydir) == FN_FILE) {
 +    /* Load keys from non-empty files only.
 +     * Missing old keys won't be replaced with freshly generated keys. */
 +    prkey = init_key_from_file(keydir, 0, LOG_ERR, 0);
 +    if (prkey)
 +      lastonionkey = prkey;
 +  }
 +  tor_free(keydir);
 +
 +  {
 +    /* 2b. Load curve25519 onion keys. */
 +    int r;
 +    keydir = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key_ntor");
 +    r = init_curve25519_keypair_from_file(&curve25519_onion_key,
 +                                          keydir, 1, LOG_ERR, "onion");
 +    tor_free(keydir);
 +    if (r<0)
 +      return -1;
 +
 +    keydir = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key_ntor.old");
 +    if (tor_mem_is_zero((const char *)
 +                           last_curve25519_onion_key.pubkey.public_key,
 +                        CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN) &&
 +        file_status(keydir) == FN_FILE) {
 +      /* Load keys from non-empty files only.
 +       * Missing old keys won't be replaced with freshly generated keys. */
 +      init_curve25519_keypair_from_file(&last_curve25519_onion_key,
 +                                        keydir, 0, LOG_ERR, "onion");
 +    }
 +    tor_free(keydir);
 +  }
 +
 +  /* 3. Initialize link key and TLS context. */
 +  if (router_initialize_tls_context() < 0) {
 +    log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error initializing TLS context");
 +    return -1;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* 3b. Get an ed25519 link certificate.  Note that we need to do this
 +   * after we set up the TLS context */
 +  if (generate_ed_link_cert(options, now, new_signing_key > 0) < 0) {
 +    log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Couldn't make link cert");
 +    return -1;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* 4. Build our router descriptor. */
 +  /* Must be called after keys are initialized. */
 +  mydesc = router_get_my_descriptor();
 +  if (authdir_mode_v3(options)) {
 +    const char *m = NULL;
 +    routerinfo_t *ri;
 +    /* We need to add our own fingerprint so it gets recognized. */
 +    if (dirserv_add_own_fingerprint(get_server_identity_key())) {
 +      log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error adding own fingerprint to set of relays");
 +      return -1;
 +    }
 +    if (mydesc) {
 +      was_router_added_t added;
 +      ri = router_parse_entry_from_string(mydesc, NULL, 1, 0, NULL, NULL);
 +      if (!ri) {
 +        log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Generated a routerinfo we couldn't parse.");
 +        return -1;
 +      }
 +      added = dirserv_add_descriptor(ri, &m, "self");
 +      if (!WRA_WAS_ADDED(added)) {
 +        if (!WRA_WAS_OUTDATED(added)) {
 +          log_err(LD_GENERAL, "Unable to add own descriptor to directory: %s",
 +                  m?m:"<unknown error>");
 +          return -1;
 +        } else {
 +          /* If the descriptor was outdated, that's ok. This can happen
 +           * when some config options are toggled that affect workers, but
 +           * we don't really need new keys yet so the descriptor doesn't
 +           * change and the old one is still fresh. */
 +          log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Couldn't add own descriptor to directory "
 +                   "after key init: %s This is usually not a problem.",
 +                   m?m:"<unknown error>");
 +        }
 +      }
 +    }
 +  }
 +
 +  /* 5. Dump fingerprint and possibly hashed fingerprint to files. */
 +  if (router_write_fingerprint(0)) {
 +    log_err(LD_FS, "Error writing fingerprint to file");
 +    return -1;
 +  }
 +  if (!public_server_mode(options) && router_write_fingerprint(1)) {
 +    log_err(LD_FS, "Error writing hashed fingerprint to file");
 +    return -1;
 +  }
 +
 +  if (!authdir_mode(options))
 +    return 0;
 +  /* 6. [authdirserver only] load approved-routers file */
 +  if (dirserv_load_fingerprint_file() < 0) {
 +    log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error loading fingerprints");
 +    return -1;
 +  }
 +  /* 6b. [authdirserver only] add own key to approved directories. */
 +  crypto_pk_get_digest(get_server_identity_key(), digest);
 +  type = ((options->V3AuthoritativeDir ?
 +               (V3_DIRINFO|MICRODESC_DIRINFO|EXTRAINFO_DIRINFO) : NO_DIRINFO) |
 +          (options->BridgeAuthoritativeDir ? BRIDGE_DIRINFO : NO_DIRINFO));
 +
 +  ds = router_get_trusteddirserver_by_digest(digest);
 +  if (!ds) {
 +    ds = trusted_dir_server_new(options->Nickname, NULL,
 +                                router_get_advertised_dir_port(options, 0),
 +                                router_get_advertised_or_port(options),
 +                                NULL,
 +                                digest,
 +                                v3_digest,
 +                                type, 0.0);
 +    if (!ds) {
 +      log_err(LD_GENERAL,"We want to be a directory authority, but we "
 +              "couldn't add ourselves to the authority list. Failing.");
 +      return -1;
 +    }
 +    dir_server_add(ds);
 +  }
 +  if (ds->type != type) {
 +    log_warn(LD_DIR,  "Configured authority type does not match authority "
 +             "type in DirAuthority list.  Adjusting. (%d v %d)",
 +             type, ds->type);
 +    ds->type = type;
 +  }
 +  if (v3_digest_set && (ds->type & V3_DIRINFO) &&
 +      tor_memneq(v3_digest, ds->v3_identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN)) {
 +    log_warn(LD_DIR, "V3 identity key does not match identity declared in "
 +             "DirAuthority line.  Adjusting.");
 +    memcpy(ds->v3_identity_digest, v3_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
 +  }
 +
 +  if (cert) { /* add my own cert to the list of known certs */
 +    log_info(LD_DIR, "adding my own v3 cert");
 +    if (trusted_dirs_load_certs_from_string(
 +                      cert->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body,
 +                      TRUSTED_DIRS_CERTS_SRC_SELF, 0,
 +                      NULL)<0) {
 +      log_warn(LD_DIR, "Unable to parse my own v3 cert! Failing.");
 +      return -1;
 +    }
 +  }
 +
 +  return 0; /* success */
 +}
 +
 +/** The lower threshold of remaining bandwidth required to advertise (or
 + * automatically provide) directory services */
 +/* XXX Should this be increased? */
 +#define MIN_BW_TO_ADVERTISE_DIRSERVER 51200
 +
 +/** Return true iff we have enough configured bandwidth to advertise or
 + * automatically provide directory services from cache directory
 + * information. */
 +int
 +router_has_bandwidth_to_be_dirserver(const or_options_t *options)
 +{
 +  if (options->BandwidthRate < MIN_BW_TO_ADVERTISE_DIRSERVER) {
 +    return 0;
 +  }
 +  if (options->RelayBandwidthRate > 0 &&
 +      options->RelayBandwidthRate < MIN_BW_TO_ADVERTISE_DIRSERVER) {
 +    return 0;
 +  }
 +  return 1;
 +}
 +
 +/** Helper: Return 1 if we have sufficient resources for serving directory
 + * requests, return 0 otherwise.
 + * dir_port is either 0 or the configured DirPort number.
 + * If AccountingMax is set less than our advertised bandwidth, then don't
 + * serve requests. Likewise, if our advertised bandwidth is less than
 + * MIN_BW_TO_ADVERTISE_DIRSERVER, don't bother trying to serve requests.
 + */
 +static int
 +router_should_be_dirserver(const or_options_t *options, int dir_port)
 +{
 +  static int advertising=1; /* start out assuming we will advertise */
 +  int new_choice=1;
 +  const char *reason = NULL;
 +
 +  if (accounting_is_enabled(options) &&
 +    get_options()->AccountingRule != ACCT_IN) {
 +    /* Don't spend bytes for directory traffic if we could end up hibernating,
 +     * but allow DirPort otherwise. Some relay operators set AccountingMax
 +     * because they're confused or to get statistics. Directory traffic has a
 +     * much larger effect on output than input so there is no reason to turn it
 +     * off if using AccountingRule in. */
 +    int interval_length = accounting_get_interval_length();
 +    uint32_t effective_bw = get_effective_bwrate(options);
 +    uint64_t acc_bytes;
 +    if (!interval_length) {
 +      log_warn(LD_BUG, "An accounting interval is not allowed to be zero "
 +                       "seconds long. Raising to 1.");
 +      interval_length = 1;
 +    }
 +    log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Calculating whether to advertise %s: effective "
 +                         "bwrate: %u, AccountingMax: %"PRIu64", "
 +                         "accounting interval length %d",
 +                         dir_port ? "dirport" : "begindir",
 +                         effective_bw, (options->AccountingMax),
 +                         interval_length);
 +
 +    acc_bytes = options->AccountingMax;
 +    if (get_options()->AccountingRule == ACCT_SUM)
 +      acc_bytes /= 2;
 +    if (effective_bw >=
 +        acc_bytes / interval_length) {
 +      new_choice = 0;
 +      reason = "AccountingMax enabled";
 +    }
 +  } else if (! router_has_bandwidth_to_be_dirserver(options)) {
 +    /* if we're advertising a small amount */
 +    new_choice = 0;
 +    reason = "BandwidthRate under 50KB";
 +  }
 +
 +  if (advertising != new_choice) {
 +    if (new_choice == 1) {
 +      if (dir_port > 0)
 +        log_notice(LD_DIR, "Advertising DirPort as %d", dir_port);
 +      else
 +        log_notice(LD_DIR, "Advertising directory service support");
 +    } else {
 +      tor_assert(reason);
 +      log_notice(LD_DIR, "Not advertising Dir%s (Reason: %s)",
 +                 dir_port ? "Port" : "ectory Service support", reason);
 +    }
 +    advertising = new_choice;
 +  }
 +
 +  return advertising;
 +}
 +
 +/** Look at a variety of factors, and return 0 if we don't want to
 + * advertise the fact that we have a DirPort open or begindir support, else
 + * return 1.
 + *
 + * Where dir_port or supports_tunnelled_dir_requests are not relevant, they
 + * must be 0.
 + *
 + * Log a helpful message if we change our mind about whether to publish.
 + */
 +static int
 +decide_to_advertise_dir_impl(const or_options_t *options,
 +                             uint16_t dir_port,
 +                             int supports_tunnelled_dir_requests)
 +{
 +  /* Part one: reasons to publish or not publish that aren't
 +   * worth mentioning to the user, either because they're obvious
 +   * or because they're normal behavior. */
 +
 +  /* short circuit the rest of the function */
 +  if (!dir_port && !supports_tunnelled_dir_requests)
 +    return 0;
 +  if (authdir_mode(options)) /* always publish */
 +    return 1;
 +  if (net_is_disabled())
 +    return 0;
 +  if (dir_port && !router_get_advertised_dir_port(options, dir_port))
 +    return 0;
 +  if (supports_tunnelled_dir_requests &&
 +      !router_get_advertised_or_port(options))
 +    return 0;
 +
 +  /* Part two: consider config options that could make us choose to
 +   * publish or not publish that the user might find surprising. */
 +  return router_should_be_dirserver(options, dir_port);
 +}
 +
 +/** Front-end to decide_to_advertise_dir_impl(): return 0 if we don't want to
 + * advertise the fact that we have a DirPort open, else return the
 + * DirPort we want to advertise.
 + */
 +int
 +router_should_advertise_dirport(const or_options_t *options, uint16_t dir_port)
 +{
 +  /* supports_tunnelled_dir_requests is not relevant, pass 0 */
 +  return decide_to_advertise_dir_impl(options, dir_port, 0) ? dir_port : 0;
 +}
 +
 +/** Front-end to decide_to_advertise_dir_impl(): return 0 if we don't want to
 + * advertise the fact that we support begindir requests, else return 1.
 + */
 +static int
 +router_should_advertise_begindir(const or_options_t *options,
 +                             int supports_tunnelled_dir_requests)
 +{
 +  /* dir_port is not relevant, pass 0 */
 +  return decide_to_advertise_dir_impl(options, 0,
 +                                      supports_tunnelled_dir_requests);
 +}
 +
 +/** Return true iff the combination of options in <b>options</b> and parameters
 + * in the consensus mean that we don't want to allow exits from circuits
 + * we got from addresses not known to be servers. */
 +int
 +should_refuse_unknown_exits(const or_options_t *options)
 +{
 +  if (options->RefuseUnknownExits != -1) {
 +    return options->RefuseUnknownExits;
 +  } else {
 +    return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "refuseunknownexits", 1, 0, 1);
 +  }
 +}
 +
 +/** Decide if we're a publishable server. We are a publishable server if:
 + * - We don't have the ClientOnly option set
 + * and
 + * - We have the PublishServerDescriptor option set to non-empty
 + * and
 + * - We have ORPort set
 + * and
 + * - We believe our ORPort and DirPort (if present) are reachable from
 + *   the outside; or
 + * - We believe our ORPort is reachable from the outside, and we can't
 + *   check our DirPort because the consensus has no exits; or
 + * - We are an authoritative directory server.
 + */
 +static int
 +decide_if_publishable_server(void)
 +{
 +  const or_options_t *options = get_options();
 +
 +  if (options->ClientOnly)
 +    return 0;
 +  if (options->PublishServerDescriptor_ == NO_DIRINFO)
 +    return 0;
 +  if (!server_mode(options))
 +    return 0;
 +  if (authdir_mode(options))
 +    return 1;
 +  if (!router_get_advertised_or_port(options))
 +    return 0;
 +  if (!check_whether_orport_reachable(options))
 +    return 0;
 +  if (router_have_consensus_path() == CONSENSUS_PATH_INTERNAL) {
 +    /* All set: there are no exits in the consensus (maybe this is a tiny
 +     * test network), so we can't check our DirPort reachability. */
 +    return 1;
 +  } else {
 +    return check_whether_dirport_reachable(options);
 +  }
 +}
 +
 +/** Initiate server descriptor upload as reasonable (if server is publishable,
 + * etc).  <b>force</b> is as for router_upload_dir_desc_to_dirservers.
 + *
 + * We need to rebuild the descriptor if it's dirty even if we're not
 + * uploading, because our reachability testing *uses* our descriptor to
 + * determine what IP address and ports to test.
 + */
 +void
 +consider_publishable_server(int force)
 +{
 +  int rebuilt;
 +
 +  if (!server_mode(get_options()))
 +    return;
 +
 +  rebuilt = router_rebuild_descriptor(0);
 +  if (decide_if_publishable_server()) {
 +    set_server_advertised(1);
 +    if (rebuilt == 0)
 +      router_upload_dir_desc_to_dirservers(force);
 +  } else {
 +    set_server_advertised(0);
 +  }
 +}
 +
 +/** Return the port of the first active listener of type
 + *  <b>listener_type</b>. */
 +/** XXX not a very good interface. it's not reliable when there are
 +    multiple listeners. */
 +uint16_t
 +router_get_active_listener_port_by_type_af(int listener_type,
 +                                           sa_family_t family)
 +{
 +  /* Iterate all connections, find one of the right kind and return
 +     the port. Not very sophisticated or fast, but effective. */
 +  smartlist_t *conns = get_connection_array();
 +  SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(conns, connection_t *, conn) {
 +    if (conn->type == listener_type && !conn->marked_for_close &&
 +        conn->socket_family == family) {
 +      return conn->port;
 +    }
 +  } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(conn);
 +
 +  return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/** Return the port that we should advertise as our ORPort; this is either
 + * the one configured in the ORPort option, or the one we actually bound to
 + * if ORPort is "auto".
 + */
 +uint16_t
 +router_get_advertised_or_port(const or_options_t *options)
 +{
 +  return router_get_advertised_or_port_by_af(options, AF_INET);
 +}
 +
 +/** As router_get_advertised_or_port(), but allows an address family argument.
 + */
 +uint16_t
 +router_get_advertised_or_port_by_af(const or_options_t *options,
 +                                    sa_family_t family)
 +{
 +  int port = get_first_advertised_port_by_type_af(CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER,
 +                                                  family);
 +  (void)options;
 +
 +  /* If the port is in 'auto' mode, we have to use
 +     router_get_listener_port_by_type(). */
 +  if (port == CFG_AUTO_PORT)
 +    return router_get_active_listener_port_by_type_af(CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER,
 +                                                      family);
 +
 +  return port;
 +}
 +
 +/** Return the port that we should advertise as our DirPort;
 + * this is one of three possibilities:
 + * The one that is passed as <b>dirport</b> if the DirPort option is 0, or
 + * the one configured in the DirPort option,
 + * or the one we actually bound to if DirPort is "auto". */
 +uint16_t
 +router_get_advertised_dir_port(const or_options_t *options, uint16_t dirport)
 +{
 +  int dirport_configured = get_primary_dir_port();
 +  (void)options;
 +
 +  if (!dirport_configured)
 +    return dirport;
 +
 +  if (dirport_configured == CFG_AUTO_PORT)
 +    return router_get_active_listener_port_by_type_af(CONN_TYPE_DIR_LISTENER,
 +                                                      AF_INET);
 +
 +  return dirport_configured;
 +}
 +
 +/*
 + * OR descriptor generation.
 + */
 +
 +/** My routerinfo. */
 +static routerinfo_t *desc_routerinfo = NULL;
 +/** My extrainfo */
 +static extrainfo_t *desc_extrainfo = NULL;
 +/** Why did we most recently decide to regenerate our descriptor?  Used to
 + * tell the authorities why we're sending it to them. */
 +static const char *desc_gen_reason = "uninitialized reason";
 +/** Since when has our descriptor been "clean"?  0 if we need to regenerate it
 + * now. */
 +STATIC time_t desc_clean_since = 0;
 +/** Why did we mark the descriptor dirty? */
 +STATIC const char *desc_dirty_reason = "Tor just started";
 +/** Boolean: do we need to regenerate the above? */
 +static int desc_needs_upload = 0;
 +
 +/** OR only: If <b>force</b> is true, or we haven't uploaded this
 + * descriptor successfully yet, try to upload our signed descriptor to
 + * all the directory servers we know about.
 + */
 +void
 +router_upload_dir_desc_to_dirservers(int force)
 +{
 +  const routerinfo_t *ri;
 +  extrainfo_t *ei;
 +  char *msg;
 +  size_t desc_len, extra_len = 0, total_len;
 +  dirinfo_type_t auth = get_options()->PublishServerDescriptor_;
 +
 +  ri = router_get_my_routerinfo();
 +  if (!ri) {
 +    log_info(LD_GENERAL, "No descriptor; skipping upload");
 +    return;
 +  }
 +  ei = router_get_my_extrainfo();
 +  if (auth == NO_DIRINFO)
 +    return;
 +  if (!force && !desc_needs_upload)
 +    return;
 +
 +  log_info(LD_OR, "Uploading relay descriptor to directory authorities%s",
 +           force ? " (forced)" : "");
 +
 +  desc_needs_upload = 0;
 +
 +  desc_len = ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len;
 +  extra_len = ei ? ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len : 0;
 +  total_len = desc_len + extra_len + 1;
 +  msg = tor_malloc(total_len);
 +  memcpy(msg, ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body, desc_len);
 +  if (ei) {
 +    memcpy(msg+desc_len, ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body, extra_len);
 +  }
 +  msg[desc_len+extra_len] = 0;
 +
 +  directory_post_to_dirservers(DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_DIR,
 +                               (auth & BRIDGE_DIRINFO) ?
 +                                 ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE :
 +                                 ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL,
 +                               auth, msg, desc_len, extra_len);
 +  tor_free(msg);
 +}
 +
 +/** OR only: Check whether my exit policy says to allow connection to
 + * conn.  Return 0 if we accept; non-0 if we reject.
 + */
 +int
 +router_compare_to_my_exit_policy(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port)
 +{
 +  const routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo();
 +  if (!me) /* make sure routerinfo exists */
 +    return -1;
 +
 +  /* make sure it's resolved to something. this way we can't get a
 +     'maybe' below. */
 +  if (tor_addr_is_null(addr))
 +    return -1;
 +
 +  /* look at router_get_my_routerinfo()->exit_policy for both the v4 and the
 +   * v6 policies.  The exit_policy field in router_get_my_routerinfo() is a
 +   * bit unusual, in that it contains IPv6 and IPv6 entries.  We don't want to
 +   * look at router_get_my_routerinfo()->ipv6_exit_policy, since that's a port
 +   * summary. */
 +  if ((tor_addr_family(addr) == AF_INET ||
 +       tor_addr_family(addr) == AF_INET6)) {
 +    return compare_tor_addr_to_addr_policy(addr, port,
 +                               me->exit_policy) != ADDR_POLICY_ACCEPTED;
 +#if 0
 +  } else if (tor_addr_family(addr) == AF_INET6) {
 +    return get_options()->IPv6Exit &&
 +      desc_routerinfo->ipv6_exit_policy &&
 +      compare_tor_addr_to_short_policy(addr, port,
 +                               me->ipv6_exit_policy) != ADDR_POLICY_ACCEPTED;
 +#endif /* 0 */
 +  } else {
 +    return -1;
 +  }
 +}
 +
 +/** Return true iff my exit policy is reject *:*.  Return -1 if we don't
 + * have a descriptor */
 +MOCK_IMPL(int,
 +router_my_exit_policy_is_reject_star,(void))
 +{
 +  const routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo();
 +  if (!me) /* make sure routerinfo exists */
 +    return -1;
 +
 +  return me->policy_is_reject_star;
 +}
 +
 +/** Return true iff I'm a server and <b>digest</b> is equal to
 + * my server identity key digest. */
 +int
 +router_digest_is_me(const char *digest)
 +{
 +  return (server_identitykey &&
 +          tor_memeq(server_identitykey_digest, digest, DIGEST_LEN));
 +}
 +
 +/** Return my identity digest. */
 +const uint8_t *
 +router_get_my_id_digest(void)
 +{
 +  return (const uint8_t *)server_identitykey_digest;
 +}
 +
 +/** Return true iff I'm a server and <b>digest</b> is equal to
 + * my identity digest. */
 +int
 +router_extrainfo_digest_is_me(const char *digest)
 +{
 +  extrainfo_t *ei = router_get_my_extrainfo();
 +  if (!ei)
 +    return 0;
 +
 +  return tor_memeq(digest,
 +                 ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest,
 +                 DIGEST_LEN);
 +}
 +
 +/** A wrapper around router_digest_is_me(). */
 +int
 +router_is_me(const routerinfo_t *router)
 +{
 +  return router_digest_is_me(router->cache_info.identity_digest);
 +}
 +
 +/** Return a routerinfo for this OR, rebuilding a fresh one if
 + * necessary.  Return NULL on error, or if called on an OP. */
 +MOCK_IMPL(const routerinfo_t *,
 +router_get_my_routerinfo,(void))
 +{
 +  return router_get_my_routerinfo_with_err(NULL);
 +}
 +
 +/** Return routerinfo of this OR. Rebuild it from
 + * scratch if needed. Set <b>*err</b> to 0 on success or to
 + * appropriate TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_* value on failure.
 + */
 +MOCK_IMPL(const routerinfo_t *,
 +router_get_my_routerinfo_with_err,(int *err))
 +{
 +  if (!server_mode(get_options())) {
 +    if (err)
 +      *err = TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_NOT_A_SERVER;
 +
 +    return NULL;
 +  }
 +
 +  if (!desc_clean_since) {
 +    int rebuild_err = router_rebuild_descriptor(0);
 +    if (rebuild_err < 0) {
 +      if (err)
 +        *err = rebuild_err;
 +
 +      return NULL;
 +    }
 +  }
 +
 +  if (!desc_routerinfo) {
 +    if (err)
 +      *err = TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_DESC_REBUILDING;
 +
 +    return NULL;
 +  }
 +
 +  if (err)
 +    *err = 0;
 +
 +  return desc_routerinfo;
 +}
 +
 +/** OR only: Return a signed server descriptor for this OR, rebuilding a fresh
 + * one if necessary.  Return NULL on error.
 + */
 +const char *
 +router_get_my_descriptor(void)
 +{
 +  const char *body;
 +  const routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo();
 +  if (! me)
 +    return NULL;
 +  tor_assert(me->cache_info.saved_location == SAVED_NOWHERE);
 +  body = signed_descriptor_get_body(&me->cache_info);
 +  /* Make sure this is nul-terminated. */
 +  tor_assert(!body[me->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len]);
 +  log_debug(LD_GENERAL,"my desc is '%s'", body);
 +  return body;
 +}
 +
 +/** Return the extrainfo document for this OR, or NULL if we have none.
 + * Rebuilt it (and the server descriptor) if necessary. */
 +extrainfo_t *
 +router_get_my_extrainfo(void)
 +{
 +  if (!server_mode(get_options()))
 +    return NULL;
 +  if (router_rebuild_descriptor(0))
 +    return NULL;
 +  return desc_extrainfo;
 +}
 +
 +/** Return a human-readable string describing what triggered us to generate
 + * our current descriptor, or NULL if we don't know. */
 +const char *
 +router_get_descriptor_gen_reason(void)
 +{
 +  return desc_gen_reason;
 +}
 +
 +static int router_guess_address_from_dir_headers(uint32_t *guess);
 +
 +/** Make a current best guess at our address, either because
 + * it's configured in torrc, or because we've learned it from
 + * dirserver headers. Place the answer in *<b>addr</b> and return
 + * 0 on success, else return -1 if we have no guess.
 + *
 + * If <b>cache_only</b> is true, just return any cached answers, and
 + * don't try to get any new answers.
 + */
 +MOCK_IMPL(int,
 +router_pick_published_address,(const or_options_t *options, uint32_t *addr,
 +                               int cache_only))
 +{
 +  /* First, check the cached output from resolve_my_address(). */
 +  *addr = get_last_resolved_addr();
 +  if (*addr)
 +    return 0;
 +
 +  /* Second, consider doing a resolve attempt right here. */
 +  if (!cache_only) {
 +    if (resolve_my_address(LOG_INFO, options, addr, NULL, NULL) >= 0) {
 +      log_info(LD_CONFIG,"Success: chose address '%s'.", fmt_addr32(*addr));
 +      return 0;
 +    }
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Third, check the cached output from router_new_address_suggestion(). */
 +  if (router_guess_address_from_dir_headers(addr) >= 0)
 +    return 0;
 +
 +  /* We have no useful cached answers. Return failure. */
 +  return -1;
 +}
 +
 +/* Like router_check_descriptor_address_consistency, but specifically for the
 + * ORPort or DirPort.
 + * listener_type is either CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER or CONN_TYPE_DIR_LISTENER. */
 +static void
 +router_check_descriptor_address_port_consistency(uint32_t ipv4h_desc_addr,
 +                                                 int listener_type)
 +{
 +  tor_assert(listener_type == CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER ||
 +             listener_type == CONN_TYPE_DIR_LISTENER);
 +
 +  /* The first advertised Port may be the magic constant CFG_AUTO_PORT.
 +   */
 +  int port_v4_cfg = get_first_advertised_port_by_type_af(listener_type,
 +                                                         AF_INET);
 +  if (port_v4_cfg != 0 &&
 +      !port_exists_by_type_addr32h_port(listener_type,
 +                                        ipv4h_desc_addr, port_v4_cfg, 1)) {
 +        const tor_addr_t *port_addr = get_first_advertised_addr_by_type_af(
 +                                                                listener_type,
 +                                                                AF_INET);
 +        /* If we're building a descriptor with no advertised address,
 +         * something is terribly wrong. */
 +        tor_assert(port_addr);
 +
 +        tor_addr_t desc_addr;
 +        char port_addr_str[TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN];
 +        char desc_addr_str[TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN];
 +
 +        tor_addr_to_str(port_addr_str, port_addr, TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN, 0);
 +
 +        tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&desc_addr, ipv4h_desc_addr);
 +        tor_addr_to_str(desc_addr_str, &desc_addr, TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN, 0);
 +
 +        const char *listener_str = (listener_type == CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER ?
 +                                    "OR" : "Dir");
 +        log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "The IPv4 %sPort address %s does not match the "
 +                 "descriptor address %s. If you have a static public IPv4 "
 +                 "address, use 'Address <IPv4>' and 'OutboundBindAddress "
 +                 "<IPv4>'. If you are behind a NAT, use two %sPort lines: "
 +                 "'%sPort <PublicPort> NoListen' and '%sPort <InternalPort> "
 +                 "NoAdvertise'.",
 +                 listener_str, port_addr_str, desc_addr_str, listener_str,
 +                 listener_str, listener_str);
 +      }
 +}
 +
 +/* Tor relays only have one IPv4 address in the descriptor, which is derived
 + * from the Address torrc option, or guessed using various methods in
 + * router_pick_published_address().
 + * Warn the operator if there is no ORPort on the descriptor address
 + * ipv4h_desc_addr.
 + * Warn the operator if there is no DirPort on the descriptor address.
 + * This catches a few common config errors:
 + *  - operators who expect ORPorts and DirPorts to be advertised on the
 + *    ports' listen addresses, rather than the torrc Address (or guessed
 + *    addresses in the absence of an Address config). This includes
 + *    operators who attempt to put their ORPort and DirPort on different
 + *    addresses;
 + *  - discrepancies between guessed addresses and configured listen
 + *    addresses (when the Address option isn't set).
 + * If a listener is listening on all IPv4 addresses, it is assumed that it
 + * is listening on the configured Address, and no messages are logged.
 + * If an operators has specified NoAdvertise ORPorts in a NAT setting,
 + * no messages are logged, unless they have specified other advertised
 + * addresses.
 + * The message tells operators to configure an ORPort and DirPort that match
 + * the Address (using NoListen if needed).
 + */
 +static void
 +router_check_descriptor_address_consistency(uint32_t ipv4h_desc_addr)
 +{
 +  router_check_descriptor_address_port_consistency(ipv4h_desc_addr,
 +                                                   CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER);
 +  router_check_descriptor_address_port_consistency(ipv4h_desc_addr,
 +                                                   CONN_TYPE_DIR_LISTENER);
 +}
 +
 +/** A list of nicknames that we've warned about including in our family,
 + * for one reason or another. */
 +static smartlist_t *warned_family = NULL;
 +
 +/**
 + * Return a new smartlist containing the family members configured in
 + * <b>options</b>.  Warn about invalid or missing entries.  Return NULL
 + * if this relay should not declare a family.
 + **/
 +STATIC smartlist_t *
 +get_my_declared_family(const or_options_t *options)
 +{
 +  if (!options->MyFamily)
 +    return NULL;
 +
 +  if (options->BridgeRelay)
 +    return NULL;
 +
 +  if (!warned_family)
 +    warned_family = smartlist_new();
 +
 +  smartlist_t *declared_family = smartlist_new();
 +  config_line_t *family;
 +
 +  /* First we try to get the whole family in the form of hexdigests. */
 +  for (family = options->MyFamily; family; family = family->next) {
 +    char *name = family->value;
 +    const node_t *member;
 +    if (options->Nickname && !strcasecmp(name, options->Nickname))
 +      continue; /* Don't list ourself by nickname, that's redundant */
 +    else
 +      member = node_get_by_nickname(name, 0);
 +
 +    if (!member) {
 +      /* This node doesn't seem to exist, so warn about it if it is not
 +       * a hexdigest. */
 +      int is_legal = is_legal_nickname_or_hexdigest(name);
 +      if (!smartlist_contains_string(warned_family, name) &&
 +          !is_legal_hexdigest(name)) {
 +        if (is_legal)
 +          log_warn(LD_CONFIG,
 +                   "There is a router named %s in my declared family, but "
 +                   "I have no descriptor for it. I'll use the nickname "
 +                   "as is, but this may confuse clients. Please list it "
 +                   "by identity digest instead.", escaped(name));
 +        else
 +          log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "There is a router named %s in my declared "
 +                   "family, but that isn't a legal digest or nickname. "
 +                   "Skipping it.", escaped(name));
 +        smartlist_add_strdup(warned_family, name);
 +      }
 +      if (is_legal) {
 +        smartlist_add_strdup(declared_family, name);
 +      }
 +    } else {
 +      /* List the node by digest. */
 +      char *fp = tor_malloc(HEX_DIGEST_LEN+2);
 +      fp[0] = '$';
 +      base16_encode(fp+1,HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1,
 +                    member->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
 +      smartlist_add(declared_family, fp);
 +
 +      if (! is_legal_hexdigest(name) &&
 +          !smartlist_contains_string(warned_family, name)) {
 +        /* Warn if this node was not specified by hexdigest. */
 +        log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "There is a router named %s in my declared "
 +                 "family, but it wasn't listed by digest. Please consider "
 +                 "saying %s instead, if that's what you meant.",
 +                 escaped(name), fp);
 +        smartlist_add_strdup(warned_family, name);
 +      }
 +    }
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Now declared_family should have the closest we can come to the
 +   * identities that the user wanted.
 +   *
 +   * Unlike older versions of Tor, we _do_ include our own identity: this
 +   * helps microdescriptor compression, and helps in-memory compression
 +   * on clients. */
 +  nodefamily_t *nf = nodefamily_from_members(declared_family,
 +                                     router_get_my_id_digest(),
 +                                     NF_WARN_MALFORMED,
 +                                     NULL);
 +  SMARTLIST_FOREACH(declared_family, char *, s, tor_free(s));
 +  smartlist_free(declared_family);
 +  if (!nf) {
 +    return NULL;
 +  }
 +
 +  char *s = nodefamily_format(nf);
 +  nodefamily_free(nf);
 +
 +  smartlist_t *result = smartlist_new();
 +  smartlist_split_string(result, s, NULL,
 +                         SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE|SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, 0);
 +  tor_free(s);
 +
 +  if (smartlist_len(result) == 1) {
 +    /* This is a one-element list containing only ourself; instead return
 +     * nothing */
 +    const char *singleton = smartlist_get(result, 0);
 +    bool is_me = false;
 +    if (singleton[0] == '$') {
 +      char d[DIGEST_LEN];
 +      int n = base16_decode(d, sizeof(d), singleton+1, strlen(singleton+1));
 +      if (n == DIGEST_LEN &&
 +          fast_memeq(d, router_get_my_id_digest(), DIGEST_LEN)) {
 +        is_me = true;
 +      }
 +    }
 +    if (!is_me) {
 +      // LCOV_EXCL_START
 +      log_warn(LD_BUG, "Found a singleton family list with an element "
 +               "that wasn't us! Element was %s", escaped(singleton));
 +      // LCOV_EXCL_STOP
 +    } else {
 +      SMARTLIST_FOREACH(result, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
 +      smartlist_free(result);
 +      return NULL;
 +    }
 +  }
 +
 +  return result;
 +}
 +
 +/** Build a fresh routerinfo, signed server descriptor, and extra-info document
 + * for this OR. Set r to the generated routerinfo, e to the generated
 + * extra-info document. Return 0 on success, -1 on temporary error. Failure to
 + * generate an extra-info document is not an error and is indicated by setting
 + * e to NULL. Caller is responsible for freeing generated documents if 0 is
 + * returned.
 + */
 +int
 +router_build_fresh_descriptor(routerinfo_t **r, extrainfo_t **e)
 +{
 +  routerinfo_t *ri;
 +  extrainfo_t *ei;
 +  uint32_t addr;
 +  char platform[256];
 +  int hibernating = we_are_hibernating();
 +  const or_options_t *options = get_options();
 +
 +  if (router_pick_published_address(options, &addr, 0) < 0) {
 +    log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Don't know my address while generating descriptor");
 +    return TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_NO_EXT_ADDR;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Log a message if the address in the descriptor doesn't match the ORPort
 +   * and DirPort addresses configured by the operator. */
 +  router_check_descriptor_address_consistency(addr);
 +
 +  ri = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(routerinfo_t));
 +  ri->cache_info.routerlist_index = -1;
 +  ri->nickname = tor_strdup(options->Nickname);
 +  ri->addr = addr;
 +  ri->or_port = router_get_advertised_or_port(options);
 +  ri->dir_port = router_get_advertised_dir_port(options, 0);
 +  ri->supports_tunnelled_dir_requests =
 +    directory_permits_begindir_requests(options);
 +  ri->cache_info.published_on = time(NULL);
 +  /* get_onion_key() must invoke from main thread */
 +  router_set_rsa_onion_pkey(get_onion_key(), &ri->onion_pkey,
 +                            &ri->onion_pkey_len);
 +
 +  ri->onion_curve25519_pkey =
 +    tor_memdup(&get_current_curve25519_keypair()->pubkey,
 +               sizeof(curve25519_public_key_t));
 +
 +  /* For now, at most one IPv6 or-address is being advertised. */
 +  {
 +    const port_cfg_t *ipv6_orport = NULL;
 +    SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(get_configured_ports(), const port_cfg_t *, p) {
 +      if (p->type == CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER &&
 +          ! p->server_cfg.no_advertise &&
 +          ! p->server_cfg.bind_ipv4_only &&
 +          tor_addr_family(&p->addr) == AF_INET6) {
 +        /* Like IPv4, if the relay is configured using the default
 +         * authorities, disallow internal IPs. Otherwise, allow them. */
 +        const int default_auth = using_default_dir_authorities(options);
 +        if (! tor_addr_is_internal(&p->addr, 0) || ! default_auth) {
 +          ipv6_orport = p;
 +          break;
 +        } else {
 +          char addrbuf[TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN];
 +          log_warn(LD_CONFIG,
 +                   "Unable to use configured IPv6 address "%s" in a "
 +                   "descriptor. Skipping it. "
 +                   "Try specifying a globally reachable address explicitly.",
 +                   tor_addr_to_str(addrbuf, &p->addr, sizeof(addrbuf), 1));
 +        }
 +      }
 +    } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(p);
 +    if (ipv6_orport) {
 +      tor_addr_copy(&ri->ipv6_addr, &ipv6_orport->addr);
 +      ri->ipv6_orport = ipv6_orport->port;
 +    }
 +  }
 +
 +  ri->identity_pkey = crypto_pk_dup_key(get_server_identity_key());
 +  if (BUG(crypto_pk_get_digest(ri->identity_pkey,
 +                           ri->cache_info.identity_digest) < 0)) {
 +    routerinfo_free(ri);
 +    return TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILED;
 +  }
 +  ri->cache_info.signing_key_cert =
 +    tor_cert_dup(get_master_signing_key_cert());
 +
 +  get_platform_str(platform, sizeof(platform));
 +  ri->platform = tor_strdup(platform);
 +
 +  ri->protocol_list = tor_strdup(protover_get_supported_protocols());
 +
 +  /* compute ri->bandwidthrate as the min of various options */
 +  ri->bandwidthrate = get_effective_bwrate(options);
 +
 +  /* and compute ri->bandwidthburst similarly */
 +  ri->bandwidthburst = get_effective_bwburst(options);
 +
 +  /* Report bandwidth, unless we're hibernating or shutting down */
 +  ri->bandwidthcapacity = hibernating ? 0 : rep_hist_bandwidth_assess();
 +
 +  if (dns_seems_to_be_broken() || has_dns_init_failed()) {
 +    /* DNS is screwed up; don't claim to be an exit. */
 +    policies_exit_policy_append_reject_star(&ri->exit_policy);
 +  } else {
 +    policies_parse_exit_policy_from_options(options,ri->addr,&ri->ipv6_addr,
 +                                            &ri->exit_policy);
 +  }
 +  ri->policy_is_reject_star =
 +    policy_is_reject_star(ri->exit_policy, AF_INET, 1) &&
 +    policy_is_reject_star(ri->exit_policy, AF_INET6, 1);
 +
 +  if (options->IPv6Exit) {
 +    char *p_tmp = policy_summarize(ri->exit_policy, AF_INET6);
 +    if (p_tmp)
 +      ri->ipv6_exit_policy = parse_short_policy(p_tmp);
 +    tor_free(p_tmp);
 +  }
 +
 +  ri->declared_family = get_my_declared_family(options);
 +
 +  /* Now generate the extrainfo. */
 +  ei = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(extrainfo_t));
 +  ei->cache_info.is_extrainfo = 1;
 +  strlcpy(ei->nickname, get_options()->Nickname, sizeof(ei->nickname));
 +  ei->cache_info.published_on = ri->cache_info.published_on;
 +  ei->cache_info.signing_key_cert =
 +    tor_cert_dup(get_master_signing_key_cert());
 +
 +  memcpy(ei->cache_info.identity_digest, ri->cache_info.identity_digest,
 +         DIGEST_LEN);
 +  if (extrainfo_dump_to_string(&ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body,
 +                               ei, get_server_identity_key(),
 +                               get_master_signing_keypair()) < 0) {
 +    log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't generate extra-info descriptor.");
 +    extrainfo_free(ei);
 +    ei = NULL;
 +  } else {
 +    ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len =
 +      strlen(ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body);
 +    router_get_extrainfo_hash(ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body,
 +                              ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len,
 +                              ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest);
 +    crypto_digest256((char*) ei->digest256,
 +                     ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body,
 +                     ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len,
 +                     DIGEST_SHA256);
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Now finish the router descriptor. */
 +  if (ei) {
 +    memcpy(ri->cache_info.extra_info_digest,
 +           ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest,
 +           DIGEST_LEN);
 +    memcpy(ri->cache_info.extra_info_digest256,
 +           ei->digest256,
 +           DIGEST256_LEN);
 +  } else {
 +    /* ri was allocated with tor_malloc_zero, so there is no need to
 +     * zero ri->cache_info.extra_info_digest here. */
 +  }
 +  if (! (ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body =
 +          router_dump_router_to_string(ri, get_server_identity_key(),
 +                                       get_onion_key(),
 +                                       get_current_curve25519_keypair(),
 +                                       get_master_signing_keypair())) ) {
 +    log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't generate router descriptor.");
 +    routerinfo_free(ri);
 +    extrainfo_free(ei);
 +    return TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_CANNOT_GENERATE;
 +  }
 +  ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len =
 +    strlen(ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body);
 +
 +  ri->purpose =
 +    options->BridgeRelay ? ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE : ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL;
 +  if (options->BridgeRelay) {
 +    /* Bridges shouldn't be able to send their descriptors unencrypted,
 +       anyway, since they don't have a DirPort, and always connect to the
 +       bridge authority anonymously.  But just in case they somehow think of
 +       sending them on an unencrypted connection, don't allow them to try. */
 +    ri->cache_info.send_unencrypted = 0;
 +    if (ei)
 +      ei->cache_info.send_unencrypted = 0;
 +  } else {
 +    ri->cache_info.send_unencrypted = 1;
 +    if (ei)
 +      ei->cache_info.send_unencrypted = 1;
 +  }
 +
 +  router_get_router_hash(ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body,
 +                         strlen(ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body),
 +                         ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest);
 +
 +  if (ei) {
 +    tor_assert(!
 +          routerinfo_incompatible_with_extrainfo(ri->identity_pkey, ei,
 +                                                 &ri->cache_info, NULL));
 +  }
 +
 +  *r = ri;
 +  *e = ei;
 +  return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/** If <b>force</b> is true, or our descriptor is out-of-date, rebuild a fresh
 + * routerinfo, signed server descriptor, and extra-info document for this OR.
 + * Return 0 on success, -1 on temporary error.
 + */
 +int
 +router_rebuild_descriptor(int force)
 +{
 +  int err = 0;
 +  routerinfo_t *ri;
 +  extrainfo_t *ei;
 +  uint32_t addr;
 +  const or_options_t *options = get_options();
 +
 +  if (desc_clean_since && !force)
 +    return 0;
 +
 +  if (router_pick_published_address(options, &addr, 0) < 0 ||
 +      router_get_advertised_or_port(options) == 0) {
 +    /* Stop trying to rebuild our descriptor every second. We'll
 +     * learn that it's time to try again when ip_address_changed()
 +     * marks it dirty. */
 +    desc_clean_since = time(NULL);
 +    return TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_DESC_REBUILDING;
 +  }
 +
 +  log_info(LD_OR, "Rebuilding relay descriptor%s", force ? " (forced)" : "");
 +
 +  err = router_build_fresh_descriptor(&ri, &ei);
 +  if (err < 0) {
 +    return err;
 +  }
 +
 +  routerinfo_free(desc_routerinfo);
 +  desc_routerinfo = ri;
 +  extrainfo_free(desc_extrainfo);
 +  desc_extrainfo = ei;
 +
 +  desc_clean_since = time(NULL);
 +  desc_needs_upload = 1;
 +  desc_gen_reason = desc_dirty_reason;
 +  if (BUG(desc_gen_reason == NULL)) {
 +    desc_gen_reason = "descriptor was marked dirty earlier, for no reason.";
 +  }
 +  desc_dirty_reason = NULL;
 +  control_event_my_descriptor_changed();
 +  return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/** If our router descriptor ever goes this long without being regenerated
 + * because something changed, we force an immediate regenerate-and-upload. */
 +#define FORCE_REGENERATE_DESCRIPTOR_INTERVAL (18*60*60)
 +
 +/** If our router descriptor seems to be missing or unacceptable according
 + * to the authorities, regenerate and reupload it _this_ often. */
 +#define FAST_RETRY_DESCRIPTOR_INTERVAL (90*60)
 +
 +/** Mark descriptor out of date if it's been "too long" since we last tried
 + * to upload one. */
 +void
 +mark_my_descriptor_dirty_if_too_old(time_t now)
 +{
 +  networkstatus_t *ns;
 +  const routerstatus_t *rs;
 +  const char *retry_fast_reason = NULL; /* Set if we should retry frequently */
 +  const time_t slow_cutoff = now - FORCE_REGENERATE_DESCRIPTOR_INTERVAL;
 +  const time_t fast_cutoff = now - FAST_RETRY_DESCRIPTOR_INTERVAL;
 +
 +  /* If it's already dirty, don't mark it. */
 +  if (! desc_clean_since)
 +    return;
 +
 +  /* If it's older than FORCE_REGENERATE_DESCRIPTOR_INTERVAL, it's always
 +   * time to rebuild it. */
 +  if (desc_clean_since < slow_cutoff) {
 +    mark_my_descriptor_dirty("time for new descriptor");
 +    return;
 +  }
 +  /* Now we see whether we want to be retrying frequently or no.  The
 +   * rule here is that we'll retry frequently if we aren't listed in the
 +   * live consensus we have, or if the publication time of the
 +   * descriptor listed for us in the consensus is very old, or if the
 +   * consensus lists us as "stale" and we haven't regenerated since the
 +   * consensus was published. */
 +  ns = networkstatus_get_live_consensus(now);
 +  if (ns) {
 +    rs = networkstatus_vote_find_entry(ns, server_identitykey_digest);
 +    if (rs == NULL)
 +      retry_fast_reason = "not listed in consensus";
 +    else if (rs->published_on < slow_cutoff)
 +      retry_fast_reason = "version listed in consensus is quite old";
 +    else if (rs->is_staledesc && ns->valid_after > desc_clean_since)
 +      retry_fast_reason = "listed as stale in consensus";
 +  }
 +
 +  if (retry_fast_reason && desc_clean_since < fast_cutoff)
 +    mark_my_descriptor_dirty(retry_fast_reason);
 +}
 +
 +/** Call when the current descriptor is out of date. */
 +void
 +mark_my_descriptor_dirty(const char *reason)
 +{
 +  const or_options_t *options = get_options();
 +  if (BUG(reason == NULL)) {
 +    reason = "marked descriptor dirty for unspecified reason";
 +  }
 +  if (server_mode(options) && options->PublishServerDescriptor_)
 +    log_info(LD_OR, "Decided to publish new relay descriptor: %s", reason);
 +  desc_clean_since = 0;
 +  if (!desc_dirty_reason)
 +    desc_dirty_reason = reason;
 +}
 +
 +/** How frequently will we republish our descriptor because of large (factor
 + * of 2) shifts in estimated bandwidth? Note: We don't use this constant
 + * if our previous bandwidth estimate was exactly 0. */
 +#define MAX_BANDWIDTH_CHANGE_FREQ (3*60*60)
 +
 +/** Maximum uptime to republish our descriptor because of large shifts in
 + * estimated bandwidth. */
 +#define MAX_UPTIME_BANDWIDTH_CHANGE (24*60*60)
 +
 +/** By which factor bandwidth shifts have to change to be considered large. */
 +#define BANDWIDTH_CHANGE_FACTOR 2
 +
 +/** Check whether bandwidth has changed a lot since the last time we announced
 + * bandwidth while the uptime is smaller than MAX_UPTIME_BANDWIDTH_CHANGE.
 + * If so, mark our descriptor dirty. */
 +void
 +check_descriptor_bandwidth_changed(time_t now)
 +{
 +  static time_t last_changed = 0;
 +  uint64_t prev, cur;
 +  const int hibernating = we_are_hibernating();
 +
 +  /* If the relay uptime is bigger than MAX_UPTIME_BANDWIDTH_CHANGE,
 +   * the next regularly scheduled descriptor update (18h) will be enough */
 +  if (get_uptime() > MAX_UPTIME_BANDWIDTH_CHANGE && !hibernating)
 +    return;
 +
 +  const routerinfo_t *my_ri = router_get_my_routerinfo();
 +
 +  if (!my_ri)
 +    return;
 +
 +  prev = my_ri->bandwidthcapacity;
 +
 +  /* Consider ourselves to have zero bandwidth if we're hibernating or
 +   * shutting down. */
 +  cur = hibernating ? 0 : rep_hist_bandwidth_assess();
 +
 +  if ((prev != cur && (!prev || !cur)) ||
 +      cur > (prev * BANDWIDTH_CHANGE_FACTOR) ||
 +      cur < (prev / BANDWIDTH_CHANGE_FACTOR) ) {
 +    if (last_changed+MAX_BANDWIDTH_CHANGE_FREQ < now || !prev) {
 +      log_info(LD_GENERAL,
 +               "Measured bandwidth has changed; rebuilding descriptor.");
 +      mark_my_descriptor_dirty("bandwidth has changed");
 +      last_changed = now;
 +    }
 +  }
 +}
 +
 +/** Note at log level severity that our best guess of address has changed from
 + * <b>prev</b> to <b>cur</b>. */
 +static void
 +log_addr_has_changed(int severity,
 +                     const tor_addr_t *prev,
 +                     const tor_addr_t *cur,
 +                     const char *source)
 +{
 +  char addrbuf_prev[TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN];
 +  char addrbuf_cur[TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN];
 +
 +  if (BUG(!server_mode(get_options())))
 +    return;
 +
 +  if (tor_addr_to_str(addrbuf_prev, prev, sizeof(addrbuf_prev), 1) == NULL)
 +    strlcpy(addrbuf_prev, "???", TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN);
 +  if (tor_addr_to_str(addrbuf_cur, cur, sizeof(addrbuf_cur), 1) == NULL)
 +    strlcpy(addrbuf_cur, "???", TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN);
 +
 +  if (!tor_addr_is_null(prev))
 +    log_fn(severity, LD_GENERAL,
 +           "Our IP Address has changed from %s to %s; "
 +           "rebuilding descriptor (source: %s).",
 +           addrbuf_prev, addrbuf_cur, source);
 +  else
 +    log_notice(LD_GENERAL,
 +             "Guessed our IP address as %s (source: %s).",
 +             addrbuf_cur, source);
 +}
 +
 +/** Check whether our own address as defined by the Address configuration
 + * has changed. This is for routers that get their address from a service
 + * like dyndns. If our address has changed, mark our descriptor dirty. */
 +void
 +check_descriptor_ipaddress_changed(time_t now)
 +{
 +  uint32_t prev, cur;
 +  const or_options_t *options = get_options();
 +  const char *method = NULL;
 +  char *hostname = NULL;
 +  const routerinfo_t *my_ri = router_get_my_routerinfo();
 +
 +  (void) now;
 +
 +  if (my_ri == NULL) /* make sure routerinfo exists */
 +    return;
 +
 +  /* XXXX ipv6 */
 +  prev = my_ri->addr;
 +  if (resolve_my_address(LOG_INFO, options, &cur, &method, &hostname) < 0) {
 +    log_info(LD_CONFIG,"options->Address didn't resolve into an IP.");
 +    return;
 +  }
 +
 +  if (prev != cur) {
 +    char *source;
 +    tor_addr_t tmp_prev, tmp_cur;
 +
 +    tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&tmp_prev, prev);
 +    tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&tmp_cur, cur);
 +
 +    tor_asprintf(&source, "METHOD=%s%s%s", method,
 +                 hostname ? " HOSTNAME=" : "",
 +                 hostname ? hostname : "");
 +
 +    log_addr_has_changed(LOG_NOTICE, &tmp_prev, &tmp_cur, source);
 +    tor_free(source);
 +
 +    ip_address_changed(0);
 +  }
 +
 +  tor_free(hostname);
 +}
 +
 +/** The most recently guessed value of our IP address, based on directory
 + * headers. */
 +static tor_addr_t last_guessed_ip = TOR_ADDR_NULL;
 +
 +/** A directory server <b>d_conn</b> told us our IP address is
 + * <b>suggestion</b>.
 + * If this address is different from the one we think we are now, and
 + * if our computer doesn't actually know its IP address, then switch. */
 +void
 +router_new_address_suggestion(const char *suggestion,
 +                              const dir_connection_t *d_conn)
 +{
 +  tor_addr_t addr;
 +  uint32_t cur = 0;             /* Current IPv4 address.  */
 +  const or_options_t *options = get_options();
 +
 +  /* first, learn what the IP address actually is */
 +  if (tor_addr_parse(&addr, suggestion) == -1) {
 +    log_debug(LD_DIR, "Malformed X-Your-Address-Is header %s. Ignoring.",
 +              escaped(suggestion));
 +    return;
 +  }
 +
 +  log_debug(LD_DIR, "Got X-Your-Address-Is: %s.", suggestion);
 +
 +  if (!server_mode(options)) {
 +    tor_addr_copy(&last_guessed_ip, &addr);
 +    return;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* XXXX ipv6 */
 +  cur = get_last_resolved_addr();
 +  if (cur ||
 +      resolve_my_address(LOG_INFO, options, &cur, NULL, NULL) >= 0) {
 +    /* We're all set -- we already know our address. Great. */
 +    tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&last_guessed_ip, cur); /* store it in case we
 +                                                   need it later */
 +    return;
 +  }
 +  if (tor_addr_is_internal(&addr, 0)) {
 +    /* Don't believe anybody who says our IP is, say, 127.0.0.1. */
 +    return;
 +  }
 +  if (tor_addr_eq(&d_conn->base_.addr, &addr)) {
 +    /* Don't believe anybody who says our IP is their IP. */
 +    log_debug(LD_DIR, "A directory server told us our IP address is %s, "
 +              "but they are just reporting their own IP address. Ignoring.",
 +              suggestion);
 +    return;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Okay.  We can't resolve our own address, and X-Your-Address-Is is giving
 +   * us an answer different from what we had the last time we managed to
 +   * resolve it. */
 +  if (!tor_addr_eq(&last_guessed_ip, &addr)) {
 +    control_event_server_status(LOG_NOTICE,
 +                                "EXTERNAL_ADDRESS ADDRESS=%s METHOD=DIRSERV",
 +                                suggestion);
 +    log_addr_has_changed(LOG_NOTICE, &last_guessed_ip, &addr,
 +                         d_conn->base_.address);
 +    ip_address_changed(0);
 +    tor_addr_copy(&last_guessed_ip, &addr); /* router_rebuild_descriptor()
 +                                               will fetch it */
 +  }
 +}
 +
 +/** We failed to resolve our address locally, but we'd like to build
 + * a descriptor and publish / test reachability. If we have a guess
 + * about our address based on directory headers, answer it and return
 + * 0; else return -1. */
 +static int
 +router_guess_address_from_dir_headers(uint32_t *guess)
 +{
 +  if (!tor_addr_is_null(&last_guessed_ip)) {
 +    *guess = tor_addr_to_ipv4h(&last_guessed_ip);
 +    return 0;
 +  }
 +  return -1;
 +}
 +
 +/** Set <b>platform</b> (max length <b>len</b>) to a NUL-terminated short
 + * string describing the version of Tor and the operating system we're
 + * currently running on.
 + */
 +STATIC void
 +get_platform_str(char *platform, size_t len)
 +{
 +  tor_snprintf(platform, len, "Tor %s on %s",
 +               get_short_version(), get_uname());
 +}
 +
 +/* XXX need to audit this thing and count fenceposts. maybe
 + *     refactor so we don't have to keep asking if we're
 + *     near the end of maxlen?
 + */
 +#define DEBUG_ROUTER_DUMP_ROUTER_TO_STRING
 +
 +/** OR only: Given a routerinfo for this router, and an identity key to sign
 + * with, encode the routerinfo as a signed server descriptor and return a new
 + * string encoding the result, or NULL on failure.
 + */
 +char *
 +router_dump_router_to_string(routerinfo_t *router,
 +                             const crypto_pk_t *ident_key,
 +                             const crypto_pk_t *tap_key,
 +                             const curve25519_keypair_t *ntor_keypair,
 +                             const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_keypair)
 +{
 +  char *address = NULL;
 +  char *onion_pkey = NULL; /* Onion key, PEM-encoded. */
 +  crypto_pk_t *rsa_pubkey = NULL;
 +  char *identity_pkey = NULL; /* Identity key, PEM-encoded. */
 +  char digest[DIGEST256_LEN];
 +  char published[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
 +  char fingerprint[FINGERPRINT_LEN+1];
 +  char *extra_info_line = NULL;
 +  size_t onion_pkeylen, identity_pkeylen;
 +  char *family_line = NULL;
 +  char *extra_or_address = NULL;
 +  const or_options_t *options = get_options();
 +  smartlist_t *chunks = NULL;
 +  char *output = NULL;
 +  const int emit_ed_sigs = signing_keypair &&
 +    router->cache_info.signing_key_cert;
 +  char *ed_cert_line = NULL;
 +  char *rsa_tap_cc_line = NULL;
 +  char *ntor_cc_line = NULL;
 +  char *proto_line = NULL;
 +
 +  /* Make sure the identity key matches the one in the routerinfo. */
 +  if (!crypto_pk_eq_keys(ident_key, router->identity_pkey)) {
 +    log_warn(LD_BUG,"Tried to sign a router with a private key that didn't "
 +             "match router's public key!");
 +    goto err;
 +  }
 +  if (emit_ed_sigs) {
 +    if (!router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key_included ||
 +        !ed25519_pubkey_eq(&router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signed_key,
 +                           &signing_keypair->pubkey)) {
 +      log_warn(LD_BUG, "Tried to sign a router descriptor with a mismatched "
 +               "ed25519 key chain %d",
 +               router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key_included);
 +      goto err;
 +    }
 +  }
 +
 +  /* record our fingerprint, so we can include it in the descriptor */
 +  if (crypto_pk_get_fingerprint(router->identity_pkey, fingerprint, 1)<0) {
 +    log_err(LD_BUG,"Error computing fingerprint");
 +    goto err;
 +  }
 +
 +  if (emit_ed_sigs) {
 +    /* Encode ed25519 signing cert */
 +    char ed_cert_base64[256];
 +    char ed_fp_base64[ED25519_BASE64_LEN+1];
 +    if (base64_encode(ed_cert_base64, sizeof(ed_cert_base64),
 +                    (const char*)router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->encoded,
 +                    router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->encoded_len,
 +                    BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE) < 0) {
 +      log_err(LD_BUG,"Couldn't base64-encode signing key certificate!");
 +      goto err;
 +    }
 +    if (ed25519_public_to_base64(ed_fp_base64,
 +                       &router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key)<0) {
 +      log_err(LD_BUG,"Couldn't base64-encode identity key\n");
 +      goto err;
 +    }
 +    tor_asprintf(&ed_cert_line, "identity-ed25519\n"
 +                 "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
 +                 "%s"
 +                 "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
 +                 "master-key-ed25519 %s\n",
 +                 ed_cert_base64, ed_fp_base64);
 +  }
 +
 +  /* PEM-encode the onion key */
 +  rsa_pubkey = router_get_rsa_onion_pkey(router->onion_pkey,
 +                                         router->onion_pkey_len);
 +  if (crypto_pk_write_public_key_to_string(rsa_pubkey,
 +                                           &onion_pkey,&onion_pkeylen)<0) {
 +    log_warn(LD_BUG,"write onion_pkey to string failed!");
 +    goto err;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* PEM-encode the identity key */
 +  if (crypto_pk_write_public_key_to_string(router->identity_pkey,
 +                                        &identity_pkey,&identity_pkeylen)<0) {
 +    log_warn(LD_BUG,"write identity_pkey to string failed!");
 +    goto err;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Cross-certify with RSA key */
 +  if (tap_key && router->cache_info.signing_key_cert &&
 +      router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key_included) {
 +    char buf[256];
 +    int tap_cc_len = 0;
 +    uint8_t *tap_cc =
 +      make_tap_onion_key_crosscert(tap_key,
 +                            &router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key,
 +                            router->identity_pkey,
 +                            &tap_cc_len);
 +    if (!tap_cc) {
 +      log_warn(LD_BUG,"make_tap_onion_key_crosscert failed!");
 +      goto err;
 +    }
 +
 +    if (base64_encode(buf, sizeof(buf), (const char*)tap_cc, tap_cc_len,
 +                      BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE) < 0) {
 +      log_warn(LD_BUG,"base64_encode(rsa_crosscert) failed!");
 +      tor_free(tap_cc);
 +      goto err;
 +    }
 +    tor_free(tap_cc);
 +
 +    tor_asprintf(&rsa_tap_cc_line,
 +                 "onion-key-crosscert\n"
 +                 "-----BEGIN CROSSCERT-----\n"
 +                 "%s"
 +                 "-----END CROSSCERT-----\n", buf);
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Cross-certify with onion keys */
 +  if (ntor_keypair && router->cache_info.signing_key_cert &&
 +      router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key_included) {
 +    int sign = 0;
 +    char buf[256];
 +    /* XXXX Base the expiration date on the actual onion key expiration time?*/
 +    tor_cert_t *cert =
 +      make_ntor_onion_key_crosscert(ntor_keypair,
 +                         &router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key,
 +                         router->cache_info.published_on,
 +                         get_onion_key_lifetime(), &sign);
 +    if (!cert) {
 +      log_warn(LD_BUG,"make_ntor_onion_key_crosscert failed!");
 +      goto err;
 +    }
 +    tor_assert(sign == 0 || sign == 1);
 +
 +    if (base64_encode(buf, sizeof(buf),
 +                      (const char*)cert->encoded, cert->encoded_len,
 +                      BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE)<0) {
 +      log_warn(LD_BUG,"base64_encode(ntor_crosscert) failed!");
 +      tor_cert_free(cert);
 +      goto err;
 +    }
 +    tor_cert_free(cert);
 +
 +    tor_asprintf(&ntor_cc_line,
 +                 "ntor-onion-key-crosscert %d\n"
 +                 "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
 +                 "%s"
 +                 "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n", sign, buf);
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Encode the publication time. */
 +  format_iso_time(published, router->cache_info.published_on);
 +
 +  if (router->declared_family && smartlist_len(router->declared_family)) {
 +    char *family = smartlist_join_strings(router->declared_family,
 +                                          " ", 0, NULL);
 +    tor_asprintf(&family_line, "family %s\n", family);
 +    tor_free(family);
 +  } else {
 +    family_line = tor_strdup("");
 +  }
 +
 +  if (!tor_digest_is_zero(router->cache_info.extra_info_digest)) {
 +    char extra_info_digest[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
 +    base16_encode(extra_info_digest, sizeof(extra_info_digest),
 +                  router->cache_info.extra_info_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
 +    if (!tor_digest256_is_zero(router->cache_info.extra_info_digest256)) {
 +      char d256_64[BASE64_DIGEST256_LEN+1];
 +      digest256_to_base64(d256_64, router->cache_info.extra_info_digest256);
 +      tor_asprintf(&extra_info_line, "extra-info-digest %s %s\n",
 +                   extra_info_digest, d256_64);
 +    } else {
 +      tor_asprintf(&extra_info_line, "extra-info-digest %s\n",
 +                   extra_info_digest);
 +    }
 +  }
 +
 +  if (router->ipv6_orport &&
 +      tor_addr_family(&router->ipv6_addr) == AF_INET6) {
 +    char addr[TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN];
 +    const char *a;
 +    a = tor_addr_to_str(addr, &router->ipv6_addr, sizeof(addr), 1);
 +    if (a) {
 +      tor_asprintf(&extra_or_address,
 +                   "or-address %s:%d\n", a, router->ipv6_orport);
 +      log_debug(LD_OR, "My or-address line is <%s>", extra_or_address);
 +    }
 +  }
 +
 +  if (router->protocol_list) {
 +    tor_asprintf(&proto_line, "proto %s\n", router->protocol_list);
 +  } else {
 +    proto_line = tor_strdup("");
 +  }
 +
 +  address = tor_dup_ip(router->addr);
 +  chunks = smartlist_new();
 +
 +  /* Generate the easy portion of the router descriptor. */
 +  smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks,
 +                    "router %s %s %d 0 %d\n"
 +                    "%s"
 +                    "%s"
 +                    "platform %s\n"
 +                    "%s"
 +                    "published %s\n"
 +                    "fingerprint %s\n"
 +                    "uptime %ld\n"
 +                    "bandwidth %d %d %d\n"
 +                    "%s%s"
 +                    "onion-key\n%s"
 +                    "signing-key\n%s"
 +                    "%s%s"
 +                    "%s%s%s",
 +    router->nickname,
 +    address,
 +    router->or_port,
 +    router_should_advertise_dirport(options, router->dir_port),
 +    ed_cert_line ? ed_cert_line : "",
 +    extra_or_address ? extra_or_address : "",
 +    router->platform,
 +    proto_line,
 +    published,
 +    fingerprint,
 +    get_uptime(),
 +    (int) router->bandwidthrate,
 +    (int) router->bandwidthburst,
 +    (int) router->bandwidthcapacity,
 +    extra_info_line ? extra_info_line : "",
 +    (options->DownloadExtraInfo || options->V3AuthoritativeDir) ?
 +                         "caches-extra-info\n" : "",
 +    onion_pkey, identity_pkey,
 +    rsa_tap_cc_line ? rsa_tap_cc_line : "",
 +    ntor_cc_line ? ntor_cc_line : "",
 +    family_line,
 +    we_are_hibernating() ? "hibernating 1\n" : "",
 +    "hidden-service-dir\n");
 +
 +  if (options->ContactInfo && strlen(options->ContactInfo)) {
 +    const char *ci = options->ContactInfo;
 +    if (strchr(ci, '\n') || strchr(ci, '\r'))
 +      ci = escaped(ci);
 +    smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "contact %s\n", ci);
 +  }
 +
 +  if (options->BridgeRelay) {
 +    const char *bd;
 +    if (options->BridgeDistribution && strlen(options->BridgeDistribution)) {
 +      bd = options->BridgeDistribution;
 +    } else {
 +      bd = "any";
 +    }
 +    if (strchr(bd, '\n') || strchr(bd, '\r'))
 +      bd = escaped(bd);
 +    smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "bridge-distribution-request %s\n", bd);
 +  }
 +
 +  if (router->onion_curve25519_pkey) {
 +    char kbuf[128];
 +    base64_encode(kbuf, sizeof(kbuf),
 +                  (const char *)router->onion_curve25519_pkey->public_key,
 +                  CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN, BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE);
 +    smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "ntor-onion-key %s", kbuf);
 +  } else {
 +    /* Authorities will start rejecting relays without ntor keys in 0.2.9 */
 +    log_err(LD_BUG, "A relay must have an ntor onion key");
 +    goto err;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Write the exit policy to the end of 's'. */
 +  if (!router->exit_policy || !smartlist_len(router->exit_policy)) {
 +    smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, "reject *:*\n");
 +  } else if (router->exit_policy) {
 +    char *exit_policy = router_dump_exit_policy_to_string(router,1,0);
 +
 +    if (!exit_policy)
 +      goto err;
 +
 +    smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "%s\n", exit_policy);
 +    tor_free(exit_policy);
 +  }
 +
 +  if (router->ipv6_exit_policy) {
 +    char *p6 = write_short_policy(router->ipv6_exit_policy);
 +    if (p6 && strcmp(p6, "reject 1-65535")) {
 +      smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks,
 +                            "ipv6-policy %s\n", p6);
 +    }
 +    tor_free(p6);
 +  }
 +
 +  if (router_should_advertise_begindir(options,
 +                                   router->supports_tunnelled_dir_requests)) {
 +    smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, "tunnelled-dir-server\n");
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Sign the descriptor with Ed25519 */
 +  if (emit_ed_sigs)  {
 +    smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, "router-sig-ed25519 ");
 +    crypto_digest_smartlist_prefix(digest, DIGEST256_LEN,
 +                                   ED_DESC_SIGNATURE_PREFIX,
 +                                   chunks, "", DIGEST_SHA256);
 +    ed25519_signature_t sig;
 +    char buf[ED25519_SIG_BASE64_LEN+1];
 +    if (ed25519_sign(&sig, (const uint8_t*)digest, DIGEST256_LEN,
 +                     signing_keypair) < 0)
 +      goto err;
 +    if (ed25519_signature_to_base64(buf, &sig) < 0)
 +      goto err;
 +
 +    smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "%s\n", buf);
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Sign the descriptor with RSA */
 +  smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, "router-signature\n");
 +
 +  crypto_digest_smartlist(digest, DIGEST_LEN, chunks, "", DIGEST_SHA1);
 +
 +  {
 +    char *sig;
 +    if (!(sig = router_get_dirobj_signature(digest, DIGEST_LEN, ident_key))) {
 +      log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't sign router descriptor");
 +      goto err;
 +    }
 +    smartlist_add(chunks, sig);
 +  }
 +
 +  /* include a last '\n' */
 +  smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, "\n");
 +
 +  output = smartlist_join_strings(chunks, "", 0, NULL);
 +
 +#ifdef DEBUG_ROUTER_DUMP_ROUTER_TO_STRING
 +  {
 +    char *s_dup;
 +    const char *cp;
 +    routerinfo_t *ri_tmp;
 +    cp = s_dup = tor_strdup(output);
 +    ri_tmp = router_parse_entry_from_string(cp, NULL, 1, 0, NULL, NULL);
 +    if (!ri_tmp) {
 +      log_err(LD_BUG,
 +              "We just generated a router descriptor we can't parse.");
 +      log_err(LD_BUG, "Descriptor was: <<%s>>", output);
 +      goto err;
 +    }
 +    tor_free(s_dup);
 +    routerinfo_free(ri_tmp);
 +  }
 +#endif /* defined(DEBUG_ROUTER_DUMP_ROUTER_TO_STRING) */
 +
 +  goto done;
 +
 + err:
 +  tor_free(output); /* sets output to NULL */
 + done:
 +  if (chunks) {
 +    SMARTLIST_FOREACH(chunks, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
 +    smartlist_free(chunks);
 +  }
 +  crypto_pk_free(rsa_pubkey);
 +  tor_free(address);
 +  tor_free(family_line);
 +  tor_free(onion_pkey);
 +  tor_free(identity_pkey);
 +  tor_free(extra_or_address);
 +  tor_free(ed_cert_line);
 +  tor_free(rsa_tap_cc_line);
 +  tor_free(ntor_cc_line);
 +  tor_free(extra_info_line);
 +  tor_free(proto_line);
 +
 +  return output;
 +}
 +
 +/**
 + * OR only: Given <b>router</b>, produce a string with its exit policy.
 + * If <b>include_ipv4</b> is true, include IPv4 entries.
 + * If <b>include_ipv6</b> is true, include IPv6 entries.
 + */
 +char *
 +router_dump_exit_policy_to_string(const routerinfo_t *router,
 +                                  int include_ipv4,
 +                                  int include_ipv6)
 +{
 +  if ((!router->exit_policy) || (router->policy_is_reject_star)) {
 +    return tor_strdup("reject *:*");
 +  }
 +
 +  return policy_dump_to_string(router->exit_policy,
 +                               include_ipv4,
 +                               include_ipv6);
 +}
 +
 +/** Load the contents of <b>filename</b>, find the last line starting with
 + * <b>end_line</b>, ensure that its timestamp is not more than 25 hours in
 + * the past or more than 1 hour in the future with respect to <b>now</b>,
 + * and write the file contents starting with that line to *<b>out</b>.
 + * Return 1 for success, 0 if the file does not exist or is empty, or -1
 + * if the file does not contain a line matching these criteria or other
 + * failure. */
 +static int
 +load_stats_file(const char *filename, const char *end_line, time_t now,
 +                char **out)
 +{
 +  int r = -1;
 +  char *fname = get_datadir_fname(filename);
 +  char *contents, *start = NULL, *tmp, timestr[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
 +  time_t written;
 +  switch (file_status(fname)) {
 +    case FN_FILE:
 +      /* X022 Find an alternative to reading the whole file to memory. */
 +      if ((contents = read_file_to_str(fname, 0, NULL))) {
 +        tmp = strstr(contents, end_line);
 +        /* Find last block starting with end_line */
 +        while (tmp) {
 +          start = tmp;
 +          tmp = strstr(tmp + 1, end_line);
 +        }
 +        if (!start)
 +          goto notfound;
 +        if (strlen(start) < strlen(end_line) + 1 + sizeof(timestr))
 +          goto notfound;
 +        strlcpy(timestr, start + 1 + strlen(end_line), sizeof(timestr));
 +        if (parse_iso_time(timestr, &written) < 0)
 +          goto notfound;
 +        if (written < now - (25*60*60) || written > now + (1*60*60))
 +          goto notfound;
 +        *out = tor_strdup(start);
 +        r = 1;
 +      }
 +     notfound:
 +      tor_free(contents);
 +      break;
 +    /* treat empty stats files as if the file doesn't exist */
 +    case FN_NOENT:
 +    case FN_EMPTY:
 +      r = 0;
 +      break;
 +    case FN_ERROR:
 +    case FN_DIR:
 +    default:
 +      break;
 +  }
 +  tor_free(fname);
 +  return r;
 +}
 +
 +/** Write the contents of <b>extrainfo</b> and aggregated statistics to
 + * *<b>s_out</b>, signing them with <b>ident_key</b>. Return 0 on
 + * success, negative on failure. */
 +int
 +extrainfo_dump_to_string(char **s_out, extrainfo_t *extrainfo,
 +                         crypto_pk_t *ident_key,
 +                         const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_keypair)
 +{
 +  const or_options_t *options = get_options();
 +  char identity[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
 +  char published[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
 +  char digest[DIGEST_LEN];
 +  char *bandwidth_usage;
 +  int result;
 +  static int write_stats_to_extrainfo = 1;
 +  char sig[DIROBJ_MAX_SIG_LEN+1];
 +  char *s = NULL, *pre, *contents, *cp, *s_dup = NULL;
 +  time_t now = time(NULL);
 +  smartlist_t *chunks = smartlist_new();
 +  extrainfo_t *ei_tmp = NULL;
 +  const int emit_ed_sigs = signing_keypair &&
 +    extrainfo->cache_info.signing_key_cert;
 +  char *ed_cert_line = NULL;
 +
 +  base16_encode(identity, sizeof(identity),
 +                extrainfo->cache_info.identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
 +  format_iso_time(published, extrainfo->cache_info.published_on);
 +  bandwidth_usage = rep_hist_get_bandwidth_lines();
 +  if (emit_ed_sigs) {
 +    if (!extrainfo->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key_included ||
 +        !ed25519_pubkey_eq(&extrainfo->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signed_key,
 +                           &signing_keypair->pubkey)) {
 +      log_warn(LD_BUG, "Tried to sign a extrainfo descriptor with a "
 +               "mismatched ed25519 key chain %d",
 +               extrainfo->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key_included);
 +      goto err;
 +    }
 +    char ed_cert_base64[256];
 +    if (base64_encode(ed_cert_base64, sizeof(ed_cert_base64),
 +                 (const char*)extrainfo->cache_info.signing_key_cert->encoded,
 +                 extrainfo->cache_info.signing_key_cert->encoded_len,
 +                 BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE) < 0) {
 +      log_err(LD_BUG,"Couldn't base64-encode signing key certificate!");
 +      goto err;
 +    }
 +    tor_asprintf(&ed_cert_line, "identity-ed25519\n"
 +                 "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
 +                 "%s"
 +                 "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n", ed_cert_base64);
 +  } else {
 +    ed_cert_line = tor_strdup("");
 +  }
 +
 +  tor_asprintf(&pre, "extra-info %s %s\n%spublished %s\n%s",
 +               extrainfo->nickname, identity,
 +               ed_cert_line,
 +               published, bandwidth_usage);
 +  smartlist_add(chunks, pre);
 +
 +  if (geoip_is_loaded(AF_INET))
 +    smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "geoip-db-digest %s\n",
 +                           geoip_db_digest(AF_INET));
 +  if (geoip_is_loaded(AF_INET6))
 +    smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "geoip6-db-digest %s\n",
 +                           geoip_db_digest(AF_INET6));
 +
 +  if (options->ExtraInfoStatistics && write_stats_to_extrainfo) {
 +    log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Adding stats to extra-info descriptor.");
 +    if (options->DirReqStatistics &&
 +        load_stats_file("stats"PATH_SEPARATOR"dirreq-stats",
 +                        "dirreq-stats-end", now, &contents) > 0) {
 +      smartlist_add(chunks, contents);
 +    }
 +    if (options->HiddenServiceStatistics &&
 +        load_stats_file("stats"PATH_SEPARATOR"hidserv-stats",
 +                        "hidserv-stats-end", now, &contents) > 0) {
 +      smartlist_add(chunks, contents);
 +    }
 +    if (options->EntryStatistics &&
 +        load_stats_file("stats"PATH_SEPARATOR"entry-stats",
 +                        "entry-stats-end", now, &contents) > 0) {
 +      smartlist_add(chunks, contents);
 +    }
 +    if (options->CellStatistics &&
 +        load_stats_file("stats"PATH_SEPARATOR"buffer-stats",
 +                        "cell-stats-end", now, &contents) > 0) {
 +      smartlist_add(chunks, contents);
 +    }
 +    if (options->ExitPortStatistics &&
 +        load_stats_file("stats"PATH_SEPARATOR"exit-stats",
 +                        "exit-stats-end", now, &contents) > 0) {
 +      smartlist_add(chunks, contents);
 +    }
 +    if (options->ConnDirectionStatistics &&
 +        load_stats_file("stats"PATH_SEPARATOR"conn-stats",
 +                        "conn-bi-direct", now, &contents) > 0) {
 +      smartlist_add(chunks, contents);
 +    }
-   }
- 
-   if (options->PaddingStatistics) {
-     contents = rep_hist_get_padding_count_lines();
-     if (contents)
-       smartlist_add(chunks, contents);
++    if (options->PaddingStatistics) {
++      contents = rep_hist_get_padding_count_lines();
++      if (contents)
++        smartlist_add(chunks, contents);
++    }
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Add information about the pluggable transports we support. */
 +  if (options->ServerTransportPlugin) {
 +    char *pluggable_transports = pt_get_extra_info_descriptor_string();
 +    if (pluggable_transports)
 +      smartlist_add(chunks, pluggable_transports);
 +  }
 +
 +  if (should_record_bridge_info(options) && write_stats_to_extrainfo) {
 +    const char *bridge_stats = geoip_get_bridge_stats_extrainfo(now);
 +    if (bridge_stats) {
 +      smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, bridge_stats);
 +    }
 +  }
 +
 +  if (emit_ed_sigs) {
 +    char sha256_digest[DIGEST256_LEN];
 +    smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, "router-sig-ed25519 ");
 +    crypto_digest_smartlist_prefix(sha256_digest, DIGEST256_LEN,
 +                                   ED_DESC_SIGNATURE_PREFIX,
 +                                   chunks, "", DIGEST_SHA256);
 +    ed25519_signature_t ed_sig;
 +    char buf[ED25519_SIG_BASE64_LEN+1];
 +    if (ed25519_sign(&ed_sig, (const uint8_t*)sha256_digest, DIGEST256_LEN,
 +                     signing_keypair) < 0)
 +      goto err;
 +    if (ed25519_signature_to_base64(buf, &ed_sig) < 0)
 +      goto err;
 +
 +    smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "%s\n", buf);
 +  }
 +
 +  smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, "router-signature\n");
 +  s = smartlist_join_strings(chunks, "", 0, NULL);
 +
 +  while (strlen(s) > MAX_EXTRAINFO_UPLOAD_SIZE - DIROBJ_MAX_SIG_LEN) {
 +    /* So long as there are at least two chunks (one for the initial
 +     * extra-info line and one for the router-signature), we can keep removing
 +     * things. */
 +    if (smartlist_len(chunks) > 2) {
 +      /* We remove the next-to-last element (remember, len-1 is the last
 +         element), since we need to keep the router-signature element. */
 +      int idx = smartlist_len(chunks) - 2;
 +      char *e = smartlist_get(chunks, idx);
 +      smartlist_del_keeporder(chunks, idx);
 +      log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "We just generated an extra-info descriptor "
 +                           "with statistics that exceeds the 50 KB "
 +                           "upload limit. Removing last added "
 +                           "statistics.");
 +      tor_free(e);
 +      tor_free(s);
 +      s = smartlist_join_strings(chunks, "", 0, NULL);
 +    } else {
 +      log_warn(LD_BUG, "We just generated an extra-info descriptors that "
 +                       "exceeds the 50 KB upload limit.");
 +      goto err;
 +    }
 +  }
 +
 +  memset(sig, 0, sizeof(sig));
 +  if (router_get_extrainfo_hash(s, strlen(s), digest) < 0 ||
 +      router_append_dirobj_signature(sig, sizeof(sig), digest, DIGEST_LEN,
 +                                     ident_key) < 0) {
 +    log_warn(LD_BUG, "Could not append signature to extra-info "
 +                     "descriptor.");
 +    goto err;
 +  }
 +  smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, sig);
 +  tor_free(s);
 +  s = smartlist_join_strings(chunks, "", 0, NULL);
 +
 +  cp = s_dup = tor_strdup(s);
 +  ei_tmp = extrainfo_parse_entry_from_string(cp, NULL, 1, NULL, NULL);
 +  if (!ei_tmp) {
 +    if (write_stats_to_extrainfo) {
 +      log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "We just generated an extra-info descriptor "
 +                           "with statistics that we can't parse. Not "
 +                           "adding statistics to this or any future "
 +                           "extra-info descriptors.");
 +      write_stats_to_extrainfo = 0;
 +      result = extrainfo_dump_to_string(s_out, extrainfo, ident_key,
 +                                        signing_keypair);
 +      goto done;
 +    } else {
 +      log_warn(LD_BUG, "We just generated an extrainfo descriptor we "
 +                       "can't parse.");
 +      goto err;
 +    }
 +  }
 +
 +  *s_out = s;
 +  s = NULL; /* prevent free */
 +  result = 0;
 +  goto done;
 +
 + err:
 +  result = -1;
 +
 + done:
 +  tor_free(s);
 +  SMARTLIST_FOREACH(chunks, char *, chunk, tor_free(chunk));
 +  smartlist_free(chunks);
 +  tor_free(s_dup);
 +  tor_free(ed_cert_line);
 +  extrainfo_free(ei_tmp);
 +  tor_free(bandwidth_usage);
 +
 +  return result;
 +}
 +
 +/** Forget that we have issued any router-related warnings, so that we'll
 + * warn again if we see the same errors. */
 +void
 +router_reset_warnings(void)
 +{
 +  if (warned_family) {
 +    SMARTLIST_FOREACH(warned_family, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
 +    smartlist_clear(warned_family);
 +  }
 +}
 +
 +/** Release all static resources held in router.c */
 +void
 +router_free_all(void)
 +{
 +  crypto_pk_free(onionkey);
 +  crypto_pk_free(lastonionkey);
 +  crypto_pk_free(server_identitykey);
 +  crypto_pk_free(client_identitykey);
 +
 +  tor_mutex_free(key_lock);
 +  routerinfo_free(desc_routerinfo);
 +  extrainfo_free(desc_extrainfo);
 +  crypto_pk_free(authority_signing_key);
 +  authority_cert_free(authority_key_certificate);
 +  crypto_pk_free(legacy_signing_key);
 +  authority_cert_free(legacy_key_certificate);
 +
 +  memwipe(&curve25519_onion_key, 0, sizeof(curve25519_onion_key));
 +  memwipe(&last_curve25519_onion_key, 0, sizeof(last_curve25519_onion_key));
 +
 +  if (warned_family) {
 +    SMARTLIST_FOREACH(warned_family, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
 +    smartlist_free(warned_family);
 +  }
 +}
 +
 +/* From the given RSA key object, convert it to ASN-1 encoded format and set
 + * the newly allocated object in onion_pkey_out. The length of the key is set
 + * in onion_pkey_len_out. */
 +void
 +router_set_rsa_onion_pkey(const crypto_pk_t *pk, char **onion_pkey_out,
 +                          size_t *onion_pkey_len_out)
 +{
 +  int len;
 +  char buf[1024];
 +
 +  tor_assert(pk);
 +  tor_assert(onion_pkey_out);
 +  tor_assert(onion_pkey_len_out);
 +
 +  len = crypto_pk_asn1_encode(pk, buf, sizeof(buf));
 +  if (BUG(len < 0)) {
 +    goto done;
 +  }
 +
 +  *onion_pkey_out = tor_memdup(buf, len);
 +  *onion_pkey_len_out = len;
 +
 + done:
 +  return;
 +}
 +
 +/* From an ASN-1 encoded onion pkey, return a newly allocated RSA key object.
 + * It is the caller responsability to free the returned object.
 + *
 + * Return NULL if the pkey is NULL, malformed or if the length is 0. */
 +crypto_pk_t *
 +router_get_rsa_onion_pkey(const char *pkey, size_t pkey_len)
 +{
 +  if (!pkey || pkey_len == 0) {
 +    return NULL;
 +  }
 +  return crypto_pk_asn1_decode(pkey, pkey_len);
 +}

    

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[tor-commits] [tor/master] Merge branch 'bug29017-033' into bug29017-master-merge