commit 40ca9a48bfdaaa920dd95784ac8f19614d374bc5 Author: Roger Dingledine arma@torproject.org Date: Sun Apr 26 14:25:57 2015 -0400
be more accurate about guard probability --- docs/en/faq.wml | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/docs/en/faq.wml b/docs/en/faq.wml index bc1fa0e..381e050 100644 --- a/docs/en/faq.wml +++ b/docs/en/faq.wml @@ -3622,7 +3622,7 @@ information on the two sides. So, what should we do? Suppose the attacker controls, or can observe, <i>C</i> relays. Suppose there are <i>N</i> relays total. If you select new entry and exit relays each time you use the network, the attacker -will be able to correlate all traffic you send with probability +will be able to correlate all traffic you send with probability around <i>(c/n)<sup>2</sup></i>. But profiling is, for most users, as bad as being traced all the time: they want to do something often without an attacker noticing, and the attacker noticing once is as bad as the