commit ec691dded4cff4c4c8bc5996821bfdab94b16976 Author: Damian Johnson atagar@torproject.org Date: Sat Feb 27 23:27:16 2016 -0800
Add 'Panopticlick' project idea
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/18328 --- getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 60 insertions(+)
diff --git a/getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml b/getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml index 02b9746..6c73977 100644 --- a/getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml +++ b/getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml @@ -437,6 +437,11 @@ meetings around the world.</li> privacy and security issues in mainline version. </p>
+ <p> + <b>Project Ideas:</b><br /> + <i><a href="#panopticlick">Panopticlick</a></i><br /> + </p> + <a id="project-httpseverywhere"></a> <h3><a href="https://www.eff.org/https-everywhere">HTTPS Everywhere</a> (<a href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/https-everywhere.git">code</a>, <a @@ -1467,6 +1472,61 @@ href="https://github.com/arlolra/ctypes-otr/issues%22%3Eone of the open key verification issues</a> as part of the application process. </p> </li> + + <a id="panopticlick"></a> + <li> + <b>Panopticlick</b> + <br> + Likely Mentors: <i>Georg (GeKo)</i> + <p> + +The <a href="https://panopticlick.eff.org">Panopticlick project by the EFF</a> +revolutionized how people think about <a +href="https://panopticlick.eff.org/browser-uniqueness.pdf%22%3Ebrowser +fingerprinting</a>, both by developing tests and metrics to measure browser +fingerprintability, and by crowdsourcing the evaluation and contribution of +individual browser features to overall fingerprintability. + + </p> + <p> + +Unfortunately, the way Panopticlick is designed <a +href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/effs-panopticlick-and-torbutton%22%3Emakes +it difficult</a> to evaluate defenses to browser fingerprinting, especially +for browsers with a relatively small userbase such as Tor Browser. This is +because any approach we take to reduce fingerprinting automatically makes our +users more distinct from the previous users who submitted their fingerprint +data to the EFF. Indeed, it is also impossible to ever expect that users of +one browser will ever be able to blend in with users of another browser +(Chrome users will always be distinguishable from Firefox users for example, +based on feature set alone). + + </p> + <p> + +To address this, we would like to have <a +href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6119%22%3Eour own +fingerprint test suite</a> to evaluate the fingerprintability of each browser +feature for users running a specific Tor Browser version. There are also <a +href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?keywords=~tbb-fingerprinting%... +fingerprinting tests</a> we can add beyond those deployed by Panopticlick. + </p> + <p> + +For this project, the student would develop a website that users can +voluntarily visit to test and record their Tor Browser fingerprint. The user +should get feedback on how she performed and the test results should be +available in a machine readable format (e.g. JSON), broken down by Tor Browser +version. In a second step one could think about adding more sophisticated +tests or supporting other browser vendors that might want to test the +uniformity amongst their userbase as well. Of course, results from each +browser would also need to be broken down by both browser implementation and +version, so that results would only reflect the population of that specific +implementation. + + </p> + </li> + <!-- <a id=""></a> <li>