commit 197a29460ab2d5768e02289ecf7fd813ee135916 Author: Mike Perry mikeperry-git@torproject.org Date: Wed May 6 13:59:32 2015 -0700
Clarify that we believe our list of general defenses to be complete.
At least so far, everything we've done is one form of these or other. --- design-doc/design.xml | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/design-doc/design.xml b/design-doc/design.xml index 96e6ecd..c43e4e5 100644 --- a/design-doc/design.xml +++ b/design-doc/design.xml @@ -1589,8 +1589,8 @@ To date, the Tor Browser team has concerned itself only with developing defenses for APIs that have already been standardized and deployed. Once an API or feature has been standardized and widely deployed, defenses to the associated fingerprinting issues tend to have only a few options available to -compensate for the lack of up-front privacy design. In our experience, these -options are usually limited to value spoofing, subsystem reimplementation, +compensate for the lack of up-front privacy design. In our experience, so far +these options have been limited to value spoofing, subsystem reimplementation, virtualization, site permissions, and feature removal. We will now describe these options and the fingerprinting sources they tend to work best with.