commit 3c9b71b979c48961cc6701ef36cd7afae0edf88a Author: Mike Perry mikeperry-git@fscked.org Date: Mon Apr 4 17:16:48 2011 -0700
Alter order of Security requirements.
In the TBB use case, state separation is slightly more important than network isolation. --- website/design/design.xml | 9 +++++---- 1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/website/design/design.xml b/website/design/design.xml index 4997cfa..d997dba 100644 --- a/website/design/design.xml +++ b/website/design/design.xml @@ -332,13 +332,13 @@ acceptable style.. Don't really want to make my own stylesheet --> <listitem id="proxy"><command>Proxy Obedience</command> <para>The browser MUST NOT bypass Tor proxy settings for any content.</para></listitem> - <listitem id="isolation"><command>Network Isolation</command> - <para>Pages MUST NOT perform any network activity in a Tor state different - from the state they were originally loaded in.</para></listitem> <listitem id="state"><command>State Separation</command> <para>Browser state (cookies, cache, history, 'DOM storage'), accumulated in one Tor state MUST NOT be accessible via the network in another Tor state.</para></listitem> + <listitem id="isolation"><command>Network Isolation</command> + <para>Pages MUST NOT perform any network activity in a Tor state different + from the state they were originally loaded in.</para></listitem> <listitem id="undiscoverability"><command>Tor Undiscoverability</command><para>With the advent of bridge support in Tor 0.2.0.x, there are now a class of Tor users whose network fingerprint does not obviously betray the fact that they @@ -349,7 +349,8 @@ reveal its presence while Tor is disabled.</para></listitem> <listitem id="location"><command>Location Neutrality</command><para>The browser SHOULD NOT leak location-specific information, such as timezone or locale via Tor.</para></listitem> <listitem id="setpreservation"><command>Anonymity Set -Preservation</command><para>The browser SHOULD NOT leak any other anonymity set reducing information +Preservation</command><para>The browser SHOULD NOT leak any other anonymity +set reducing or fingerprinting information (such as user agent, extension presence, and resolution information) automatically via Tor. The assessment of the attacks above should make it clear that anonymity set reduction is a very powerful method of tracking and