[tor-commits] [tor/maint-0.3.5] Merge remote-tracking branch 'nickm/ticket30454_034_01_squashed' into ticket30454_035_01

12 Aug 2019

commit 245dccb77d79dc432bb7aab21ce2c893da4b602a
Merge: e5deb2bbc 56908c6f1
Author: David Goulet dgoulet@torproject.org
Date:   Wed May 22 11:43:55 2019 -0400
Merge remote-tracking branch 'nickm/ticket30454_034_01_squashed' into ticket30454_035_01
changes/ticket30454                    | 10 ++++++++
 src/feature/hs/hs_cell.c               | 16 +++++++------
 src/feature/hs/hs_cell.h               | 13 ----------
 src/feature/hs/hs_client.c             | 18 +++++++-------
 src/feature/hs/hs_intropoint.c         | 27 +++++++++++----------
 src/feature/hs/hs_intropoint.h         | 15 ------------
 src/test/test_hs_cell.c                |  2 +-
 src/test/test_hs_intropoint.c          |  4 ++--
 src/trunnel/hs/cell_introduce1.c       | 44 +++++++++++++---------------------
 src/trunnel/hs/cell_introduce1.h       |  7 ++++++
 src/trunnel/hs/cell_introduce1.trunnel | 21 +++++++++++++---
 11 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 90 deletions(-)
diff --cc src/feature/hs/hs_cell.c
index 597982b34,000000000..613ffe726
mode 100644,000000..100644

--- a/src/feature/hs/hs_cell.c
+++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_cell.c
@@@ -1,950 -1,0 +1,952 @@@
 +/* Copyright (c) 2017-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */
 +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
 +
 +/**
 + * \file hs_cell.c
 + * \brief Hidden service API for cell creation and handling.
 + **/
 +
 +#include "core/or/or.h"
 +#include "app/config/config.h"
 +#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h"
 +#include "feature/rend/rendservice.h"
 +#include "feature/hs_common/replaycache.h"
 +
 +#include "feature/hs/hs_cell.h"
 +#include "core/crypto/hs_ntor.h"
 +
 +#include "core/or/origin_circuit_st.h"
 +
 +/* Trunnel. */
 +#include "trunnel/ed25519_cert.h"
 +#include "trunnel/hs/cell_common.h"
 +#include "trunnel/hs/cell_establish_intro.h"
 +#include "trunnel/hs/cell_introduce1.h"
 +#include "trunnel/hs/cell_rendezvous.h"
 +
 +/* Compute the MAC of an INTRODUCE cell in mac_out. The encoded_cell param is
 + * the cell content up to the ENCRYPTED section of length encoded_cell_len.
 + * The encrypted param is the start of the ENCRYPTED section of length
 + * encrypted_len. The mac_key is the key needed for the computation of the MAC
 + * derived from the ntor handshake of length mac_key_len.
 + *
 + * The length mac_out_len must be at least DIGEST256_LEN. */
 +static void
 +compute_introduce_mac(const uint8_t *encoded_cell, size_t encoded_cell_len,
 +                      const uint8_t *encrypted, size_t encrypted_len,
 +                      const uint8_t *mac_key, size_t mac_key_len,
 +                      uint8_t *mac_out, size_t mac_out_len)
 +{
 +  size_t offset = 0;
 +  size_t mac_msg_len;
 +  uint8_t mac_msg[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE] = {0};
 +
 +  tor_assert(encoded_cell);
 +  tor_assert(encrypted);
 +  tor_assert(mac_key);
 +  tor_assert(mac_out);
 +  tor_assert(mac_out_len >= DIGEST256_LEN);
 +
 +  /* Compute the size of the message which is basically the entire cell until
 +   * the MAC field of course. */
 +  mac_msg_len = encoded_cell_len + (encrypted_len - DIGEST256_LEN);
 +  tor_assert(mac_msg_len <= sizeof(mac_msg));
 +
 +  /* First, put the encoded cell in the msg. */
 +  memcpy(mac_msg, encoded_cell, encoded_cell_len);
 +  offset += encoded_cell_len;
 +  /* Second, put the CLIENT_PK + ENCRYPTED_DATA but ommit the MAC field (which
 +   * is junk at this point). */
 +  memcpy(mac_msg + offset, encrypted, (encrypted_len - DIGEST256_LEN));
 +  offset += (encrypted_len - DIGEST256_LEN);
 +  tor_assert(offset == mac_msg_len);
 +
 +  crypto_mac_sha3_256(mac_out, mac_out_len,
 +                      mac_key, mac_key_len,
 +                      mac_msg, mac_msg_len);
 +  memwipe(mac_msg, 0, sizeof(mac_msg));
 +}
 +
 +/* From a set of keys, subcredential and the ENCRYPTED section of an
 + * INTRODUCE2 cell, return a newly allocated intro cell keys structure.
 + * Finally, the client public key is copied in client_pk. On error, return
 + * NULL. */
 +static hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_t *
 +get_introduce2_key_material(const ed25519_public_key_t *auth_key,
 +                            const curve25519_keypair_t *enc_key,
 +                            const uint8_t *subcredential,
 +                            const uint8_t *encrypted_section,
 +                            curve25519_public_key_t *client_pk)
 +{
 +  hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_t *keys;
 +
 +  tor_assert(auth_key);
 +  tor_assert(enc_key);
 +  tor_assert(subcredential);
 +  tor_assert(encrypted_section);
 +  tor_assert(client_pk);
 +
 +  keys = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*keys));
 +
 +  /* First bytes of the ENCRYPTED section are the client public key. */
 +  memcpy(client_pk->public_key, encrypted_section, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
 +
 +  if (hs_ntor_service_get_introduce1_keys(auth_key, enc_key, client_pk,
 +                                          subcredential, keys) < 0) {
 +    /* Don't rely on the caller to wipe this on error. */
 +    memwipe(client_pk, 0, sizeof(curve25519_public_key_t));
 +    tor_free(keys);
 +    keys = NULL;
 +  }
 +  return keys;
 +}
 +
 +/* Using the given encryption key, decrypt the encrypted_section of length
 + * encrypted_section_len of an INTRODUCE2 cell and return a newly allocated
 + * buffer containing the decrypted data. On decryption failure, NULL is
 + * returned. */
 +static uint8_t *
 +decrypt_introduce2(const uint8_t *enc_key, const uint8_t *encrypted_section,
 +                   size_t encrypted_section_len)
 +{
 +  uint8_t *decrypted = NULL;
 +  crypto_cipher_t *cipher = NULL;
 +
 +  tor_assert(enc_key);
 +  tor_assert(encrypted_section);
 +
 +  /* Decrypt ENCRYPTED section. */
 +  cipher = crypto_cipher_new_with_bits((char *) enc_key,
 +                                       CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN * 8);
 +  tor_assert(cipher);
 +
 +  /* This is symmetric encryption so can't be bigger than the encrypted
 +   * section length. */
 +  decrypted = tor_malloc_zero(encrypted_section_len);
 +  if (crypto_cipher_decrypt(cipher, (char *) decrypted,
 +                            (const char *) encrypted_section,
 +                            encrypted_section_len) < 0) {
 +    tor_free(decrypted);
 +    decrypted = NULL;
 +    goto done;
 +  }
 +
 + done:
 +  crypto_cipher_free(cipher);
 +  return decrypted;
 +}
 +
 +/* Given a pointer to the decrypted data of the ENCRYPTED section of an
 + * INTRODUCE2 cell of length decrypted_len, parse and validate the cell
 + * content. Return a newly allocated cell structure or NULL on error. The
 + * circuit and service object are only used for logging purposes. */
 +static trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_t *
 +parse_introduce2_encrypted(const uint8_t *decrypted_data,
 +                           size_t decrypted_len, const origin_circuit_t *circ,
 +                           const hs_service_t *service)
 +{
 +  trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_t *enc_cell = NULL;
 +
 +  tor_assert(decrypted_data);
 +  tor_assert(circ);
 +  tor_assert(service);
 +
 +  if (trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_parse(&enc_cell, decrypted_data,
 +                                         decrypted_len) < 0) {
 +    log_info(LD_REND, "Unable to parse the decrypted ENCRYPTED section of "
 +                      "the INTRODUCE2 cell on circuit %u for service %s",
 +             TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id,
 +             safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
 +    goto err;
 +  }
 +
 +  if (trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_get_onion_key_type(enc_cell) !=
-       HS_CELL_ONION_KEY_TYPE_NTOR) {
++      TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ONION_KEY_TYPE_NTOR) {
 +    log_info(LD_REND, "INTRODUCE2 onion key type is invalid. Got %u but "
 +                      "expected %u on circuit %u for service %s",
 +             trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_get_onion_key_type(enc_cell),
-              HS_CELL_ONION_KEY_TYPE_NTOR, TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id,
++             TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ONION_KEY_TYPE_NTOR,
++             TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id,
 +             safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
 +    goto err;
 +  }
 +
 +  if (trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_getlen_onion_key(enc_cell) !=
 +      CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN) {
 +    log_info(LD_REND, "INTRODUCE2 onion key length is invalid. Got %u but "
 +                      "expected %d on circuit %u for service %s",
 +             (unsigned)trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_getlen_onion_key(enc_cell),
 +             CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN, TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id,
 +             safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
 +    goto err;
 +  }
 +  /* XXX: Validate NSPEC field as well. */
 +
 +  return enc_cell;
 + err:
 +  trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_free(enc_cell);
 +  return NULL;
 +}
 +
 +/* Build a legacy ESTABLISH_INTRO cell with the given circuit nonce and RSA
 + * encryption key. The encoded cell is put in cell_out that MUST at least be
 + * of the size of RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE. Return the encoded cell length on
 + * success else a negative value and cell_out is untouched. */
 +static ssize_t
 +build_legacy_establish_intro(const char *circ_nonce, crypto_pk_t *enc_key,
 +                             uint8_t *cell_out)
 +{
 +  ssize_t cell_len;
 +
 +  tor_assert(circ_nonce);
 +  tor_assert(enc_key);
 +  tor_assert(cell_out);
 +
 +  memwipe(cell_out, 0, RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE);
 +
 +  cell_len = rend_service_encode_establish_intro_cell((char*)cell_out,
 +                                                      RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE,
 +                                                      enc_key, circ_nonce);
 +  return cell_len;
 +}
 +
 +/* Parse an INTRODUCE2 cell from payload of size payload_len for the given
 + * service and circuit which are used only for logging purposes. The resulting
 + * parsed cell is put in cell_ptr_out.
 + *
 + * This function only parses prop224 INTRODUCE2 cells even when the intro point
 + * is a legacy intro point. That's because intro points don't actually care
 + * about the contents of the introduce cell. Legacy INTRODUCE cells are only
 + * used by the legacy system now.
 + *
 + * Return 0 on success else a negative value and cell_ptr_out is untouched. */
 +static int
 +parse_introduce2_cell(const hs_service_t *service,
 +                      const origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *payload,
 +                      size_t payload_len,
 +                      trn_cell_introduce1_t **cell_ptr_out)
 +{
 +  trn_cell_introduce1_t *cell = NULL;
 +
 +  tor_assert(service);
 +  tor_assert(circ);
 +  tor_assert(payload);
 +  tor_assert(cell_ptr_out);
 +
 +  /* Parse the cell so we can start cell validation. */
 +  if (trn_cell_introduce1_parse(&cell, payload, payload_len) < 0) {
 +    log_info(LD_PROTOCOL, "Unable to parse INTRODUCE2 cell on circuit %u "
 +                          "for service %s",
 +             TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id,
 +             safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
 +    goto err;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Success. */
 +  *cell_ptr_out = cell;
 +  return 0;
 + err:
 +  return -1;
 +}
 +
 +/* Set the onion public key onion_pk in cell, the encrypted section of an
 + * INTRODUCE1 cell. */
 +static void
 +introduce1_set_encrypted_onion_key(trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_t *cell,
 +                                   const uint8_t *onion_pk)
 +{
 +  tor_assert(cell);
 +  tor_assert(onion_pk);
 +  /* There is only one possible key type for a non legacy cell. */
 +  trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_set_onion_key_type(cell,
-                                                   HS_CELL_ONION_KEY_TYPE_NTOR);
++                                   TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ONION_KEY_TYPE_NTOR);
 +  trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_set_onion_key_len(cell, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
 +  trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_setlen_onion_key(cell, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
 +  memcpy(trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_getarray_onion_key(cell), onion_pk,
 +         trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_getlen_onion_key(cell));
 +}
 +
 +/* Set the link specifiers in lspecs in cell, the encrypted section of an
 + * INTRODUCE1 cell. */
 +static void
 +introduce1_set_encrypted_link_spec(trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_t *cell,
 +                                   const smartlist_t *lspecs)
 +{
 +  tor_assert(cell);
 +  tor_assert(lspecs);
 +  tor_assert(smartlist_len(lspecs) > 0);
 +  tor_assert(smartlist_len(lspecs) <= UINT8_MAX);
 +
 +  uint8_t lspecs_num = (uint8_t) smartlist_len(lspecs);
 +  trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_set_nspec(cell, lspecs_num);
 +  /* We aren't duplicating the link specifiers object here which means that
 +   * the ownership goes to the trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_t cell and those
 +   * object will be freed when the cell is. */
 +  SMARTLIST_FOREACH(lspecs, link_specifier_t *, ls,
 +                    trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_add_nspecs(cell, ls));
 +}
 +
 +/* Set padding in the enc_cell only if needed that is the total length of both
 + * sections are below the mininum required for an INTRODUCE1 cell. */
 +static void
 +introduce1_set_encrypted_padding(const trn_cell_introduce1_t *cell,
 +                                 trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_t *enc_cell)
 +{
 +  tor_assert(cell);
 +  tor_assert(enc_cell);
 +  /* This is the length we expect to have once encoded of the whole cell. */
 +  ssize_t full_len = trn_cell_introduce1_encoded_len(cell) +
 +                     trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_encoded_len(enc_cell);
 +  tor_assert(full_len > 0);
 +  if (full_len < HS_CELL_INTRODUCE1_MIN_SIZE) {
 +    size_t padding = HS_CELL_INTRODUCE1_MIN_SIZE - full_len;
 +    trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_setlen_pad(enc_cell, padding);
 +    memset(trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_getarray_pad(enc_cell), 0,
 +           trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_getlen_pad(enc_cell));
 +  }
 +}
 +
 +/* Encrypt the ENCRYPTED payload and encode it in the cell using the enc_cell
 + * and the INTRODUCE1 data.
 + *
 + * This can't fail but it is very important that the caller sets every field
 + * in data so the computation of the INTRODUCE1 keys doesn't fail. */
 +static void
 +introduce1_encrypt_and_encode(trn_cell_introduce1_t *cell,
 +                              const trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_t *enc_cell,
 +                              const hs_cell_introduce1_data_t *data)
 +{
 +  size_t offset = 0;
 +  ssize_t encrypted_len;
 +  ssize_t encoded_cell_len, encoded_enc_cell_len;
 +  uint8_t encoded_cell[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE] = {0};
 +  uint8_t encoded_enc_cell[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE] = {0};
 +  uint8_t *encrypted = NULL;
 +  uint8_t mac[DIGEST256_LEN];
 +  crypto_cipher_t *cipher = NULL;
 +  hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_t keys;
 +
 +  tor_assert(cell);
 +  tor_assert(enc_cell);
 +  tor_assert(data);
 +
 +  /* Encode the cells up to now of what we have to we can perform the MAC
 +   * computation on it. */
 +  encoded_cell_len = trn_cell_introduce1_encode(encoded_cell,
 +                                                sizeof(encoded_cell), cell);
 +  /* We have a much more serious issue if this isn't true. */
 +  tor_assert(encoded_cell_len > 0);
 +
 +  encoded_enc_cell_len =
 +    trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_encode(encoded_enc_cell,
 +                                        sizeof(encoded_enc_cell), enc_cell);
 +  /* We have a much more serious issue if this isn't true. */
 +  tor_assert(encoded_enc_cell_len > 0);
 +
 +  /* Get the key material for the encryption. */
 +  if (hs_ntor_client_get_introduce1_keys(data->auth_pk, data->enc_pk,
 +                                         data->client_kp,
 +                                         data->subcredential, &keys) < 0) {
 +    tor_assert_unreached();
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Prepare cipher with the encryption key just computed. */
 +  cipher = crypto_cipher_new_with_bits((const char *) keys.enc_key,
 +                                       sizeof(keys.enc_key) * 8);
 +  tor_assert(cipher);
 +
 +  /* Compute the length of the ENCRYPTED section which is the CLIENT_PK,
 +   * ENCRYPTED_DATA and MAC length. */
 +  encrypted_len = sizeof(data->client_kp->pubkey) + encoded_enc_cell_len +
 +                  sizeof(mac);
 +  tor_assert(encrypted_len < RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE);
 +  encrypted = tor_malloc_zero(encrypted_len);
 +
 +  /* Put the CLIENT_PK first. */
 +  memcpy(encrypted, data->client_kp->pubkey.public_key,
 +         sizeof(data->client_kp->pubkey.public_key));
 +  offset += sizeof(data->client_kp->pubkey.public_key);
 +  /* Then encrypt and set the ENCRYPTED_DATA. This can't fail. */
 +  crypto_cipher_encrypt(cipher, (char *) encrypted + offset,
 +                        (const char *) encoded_enc_cell, encoded_enc_cell_len);
 +  crypto_cipher_free(cipher);
 +  offset += encoded_enc_cell_len;
 +  /* Compute MAC from the above and put it in the buffer. This function will
 +   * make the adjustment to the encrypted_len to omit the MAC length. */
 +  compute_introduce_mac(encoded_cell, encoded_cell_len,
 +                        encrypted, encrypted_len,
 +                        keys.mac_key, sizeof(keys.mac_key),
 +                        mac, sizeof(mac));
 +  memcpy(encrypted + offset, mac, sizeof(mac));
 +  offset += sizeof(mac);
 +  tor_assert(offset == (size_t) encrypted_len);
 +
 +  /* Set the ENCRYPTED section in the cell. */
 +  trn_cell_introduce1_setlen_encrypted(cell, encrypted_len);
 +  memcpy(trn_cell_introduce1_getarray_encrypted(cell),
 +         encrypted, encrypted_len);
 +
 +  /* Cleanup. */
 +  memwipe(&keys, 0, sizeof(keys));
 +  memwipe(mac, 0, sizeof(mac));
 +  memwipe(encrypted, 0, sizeof(encrypted_len));
 +  memwipe(encoded_enc_cell, 0, sizeof(encoded_enc_cell));
 +  tor_free(encrypted);
 +}
 +
 +/* Using the INTRODUCE1 data, setup the ENCRYPTED section in cell. This means
 + * set it, encrypt it and encode it. */
 +static void
 +introduce1_set_encrypted(trn_cell_introduce1_t *cell,
 +                         const hs_cell_introduce1_data_t *data)
 +{
 +  trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_t *enc_cell;
 +  trn_cell_extension_t *ext;
 +
 +  tor_assert(cell);
 +  tor_assert(data);
 +
 +  enc_cell = trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_new();
 +  tor_assert(enc_cell);
 +
 +  /* Set extension data. None are used. */
 +  ext = trn_cell_extension_new();
 +  tor_assert(ext);
 +  trn_cell_extension_set_num(ext, 0);
 +  trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_set_extensions(enc_cell, ext);
 +
 +  /* Set the rendezvous cookie. */
 +  memcpy(trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_getarray_rend_cookie(enc_cell),
 +         data->rendezvous_cookie, REND_COOKIE_LEN);
 +
 +  /* Set the onion public key. */
 +  introduce1_set_encrypted_onion_key(enc_cell, data->onion_pk->public_key);
 +
 +  /* Set the link specifiers. */
 +  introduce1_set_encrypted_link_spec(enc_cell, data->link_specifiers);
 +
 +  /* Set padding. */
 +  introduce1_set_encrypted_padding(cell, enc_cell);
 +
 +  /* Encrypt and encode it in the cell. */
 +  introduce1_encrypt_and_encode(cell, enc_cell, data);
 +
 +  /* Cleanup. */
 +  trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_free(enc_cell);
 +}
 +
 +/* Set the authentication key in the INTRODUCE1 cell from the given data. */
 +static void
 +introduce1_set_auth_key(trn_cell_introduce1_t *cell,
 +                        const hs_cell_introduce1_data_t *data)
 +{
 +  tor_assert(cell);
 +  tor_assert(data);
 +  /* There is only one possible type for a non legacy cell. */
-   trn_cell_introduce1_set_auth_key_type(cell, HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_ED25519);
++  trn_cell_introduce1_set_auth_key_type(cell,
++                                   TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_ED25519);
 +  trn_cell_introduce1_set_auth_key_len(cell, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
 +  trn_cell_introduce1_setlen_auth_key(cell, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
 +  memcpy(trn_cell_introduce1_getarray_auth_key(cell),
 +         data->auth_pk->pubkey, trn_cell_introduce1_getlen_auth_key(cell));
 +}
 +
 +/* Set the legacy ID field in the INTRODUCE1 cell from the given data. */
 +static void
 +introduce1_set_legacy_id(trn_cell_introduce1_t *cell,
 +                         const hs_cell_introduce1_data_t *data)
 +{
 +  tor_assert(cell);
 +  tor_assert(data);
 +
 +  if (data->is_legacy) {
 +    uint8_t digest[DIGEST_LEN];
 +    if (BUG(crypto_pk_get_digest(data->legacy_key, (char *) digest) < 0)) {
 +      return;
 +    }
 +    memcpy(trn_cell_introduce1_getarray_legacy_key_id(cell),
 +           digest, trn_cell_introduce1_getlen_legacy_key_id(cell));
 +  } else {
 +    /* We have to zeroed the LEGACY_KEY_ID field. */
 +    memset(trn_cell_introduce1_getarray_legacy_key_id(cell), 0,
 +           trn_cell_introduce1_getlen_legacy_key_id(cell));
 +  }
 +}
 +
 +/* ========== */
 +/* Public API */
 +/* ========== */
 +
 +/* Build an ESTABLISH_INTRO cell with the given circuit nonce and intro point
 + * object. The encoded cell is put in cell_out that MUST at least be of the
 + * size of RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE. Return the encoded cell length on success else
 + * a negative value and cell_out is untouched. This function also supports
 + * legacy cell creation. */
 +ssize_t
 +hs_cell_build_establish_intro(const char *circ_nonce,
 +                              const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip,
 +                              uint8_t *cell_out)
 +{
 +  ssize_t cell_len = -1;
 +  uint16_t sig_len = ED25519_SIG_LEN;
 +  trn_cell_extension_t *ext;
 +  trn_cell_establish_intro_t *cell = NULL;
 +
 +  tor_assert(circ_nonce);
 +  tor_assert(ip);
 +
 +  /* Quickly handle the legacy IP. */
 +  if (ip->base.is_only_legacy) {
 +    tor_assert(ip->legacy_key);
 +    cell_len = build_legacy_establish_intro(circ_nonce, ip->legacy_key,
 +                                            cell_out);
 +    tor_assert(cell_len <= RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE);
 +    /* Success or not we are done here. */
 +    goto done;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Set extension data. None used here. */
 +  ext = trn_cell_extension_new();
 +  trn_cell_extension_set_num(ext, 0);
 +  cell = trn_cell_establish_intro_new();
 +  trn_cell_establish_intro_set_extensions(cell, ext);
 +  /* Set signature size. Array is then allocated in the cell. We need to do
 +   * this early so we can use trunnel API to get the signature length. */
 +  trn_cell_establish_intro_set_sig_len(cell, sig_len);
 +  trn_cell_establish_intro_setlen_sig(cell, sig_len);
 +
 +  /* Set AUTH_KEY_TYPE: 2 means ed25519 */
 +  trn_cell_establish_intro_set_auth_key_type(cell,
-                                              HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_ED25519);
++                                    TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_ED25519);
 +
 +  /* Set AUTH_KEY and AUTH_KEY_LEN field. Must also set byte-length of
 +   * AUTH_KEY to match */
 +  {
 +    uint16_t auth_key_len = ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN;
 +    trn_cell_establish_intro_set_auth_key_len(cell, auth_key_len);
 +    trn_cell_establish_intro_setlen_auth_key(cell, auth_key_len);
 +    /* We do this call _after_ setting the length because it's reallocated at
 +     * that point only. */
 +    uint8_t *auth_key_ptr = trn_cell_establish_intro_getarray_auth_key(cell);
 +    memcpy(auth_key_ptr, ip->auth_key_kp.pubkey.pubkey, auth_key_len);
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Calculate HANDSHAKE_AUTH field (MAC). */
 +  {
 +    ssize_t tmp_cell_enc_len = 0;
 +    ssize_t tmp_cell_mac_offset =
 +      sig_len + sizeof(cell->sig_len) +
 +      trn_cell_establish_intro_getlen_handshake_mac(cell);
 +    uint8_t tmp_cell_enc[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE] = {0};
 +    uint8_t mac[TRUNNEL_SHA3_256_LEN], *handshake_ptr;
 +
 +    /* We first encode the current fields we have in the cell so we can
 +     * compute the MAC using the raw bytes. */
 +    tmp_cell_enc_len = trn_cell_establish_intro_encode(tmp_cell_enc,
 +                                                       sizeof(tmp_cell_enc),
 +                                                       cell);
 +    if (BUG(tmp_cell_enc_len < 0)) {
 +      goto done;
 +    }
 +    /* Sanity check. */
 +    tor_assert(tmp_cell_enc_len > tmp_cell_mac_offset);
 +
 +    /* Circuit nonce is always DIGEST_LEN according to tor-spec.txt. */
 +    crypto_mac_sha3_256(mac, sizeof(mac),
 +                        (uint8_t *) circ_nonce, DIGEST_LEN,
 +                        tmp_cell_enc, tmp_cell_enc_len - tmp_cell_mac_offset);
 +    handshake_ptr = trn_cell_establish_intro_getarray_handshake_mac(cell);
 +    memcpy(handshake_ptr, mac, sizeof(mac));
 +
 +    memwipe(mac, 0, sizeof(mac));
 +    memwipe(tmp_cell_enc, 0, sizeof(tmp_cell_enc));
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Calculate the cell signature SIG. */
 +  {
 +    ssize_t tmp_cell_enc_len = 0;
 +    ssize_t tmp_cell_sig_offset = (sig_len + sizeof(cell->sig_len));
 +    uint8_t tmp_cell_enc[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE] = {0}, *sig_ptr;
 +    ed25519_signature_t sig;
 +
 +    /* We first encode the current fields we have in the cell so we can
 +     * compute the signature from the raw bytes of the cell. */
 +    tmp_cell_enc_len = trn_cell_establish_intro_encode(tmp_cell_enc,
 +                                                       sizeof(tmp_cell_enc),
 +                                                       cell);
 +    if (BUG(tmp_cell_enc_len < 0)) {
 +      goto done;
 +    }
 +
 +    if (ed25519_sign_prefixed(&sig, tmp_cell_enc,
 +                              tmp_cell_enc_len - tmp_cell_sig_offset,
 +                              ESTABLISH_INTRO_SIG_PREFIX, &ip->auth_key_kp)) {
 +      log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unable to make signature for ESTABLISH_INTRO cell.");
 +      goto done;
 +    }
 +    /* Copy the signature into the cell. */
 +    sig_ptr = trn_cell_establish_intro_getarray_sig(cell);
 +    memcpy(sig_ptr, sig.sig, sig_len);
 +
 +    memwipe(tmp_cell_enc, 0, sizeof(tmp_cell_enc));
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Encode the cell. Can't be bigger than a standard cell. */
 +  cell_len = trn_cell_establish_intro_encode(cell_out, RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE,
 +                                             cell);
 +
 + done:
 +  trn_cell_establish_intro_free(cell);
 +  return cell_len;
 +}
 +
 +/* Parse the INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell in the payload of size payload_len. If we
 + * are successful at parsing it, return the length of the parsed cell else a
 + * negative value on error. */
 +ssize_t
 +hs_cell_parse_intro_established(const uint8_t *payload, size_t payload_len)
 +{
 +  ssize_t ret;
 +  trn_cell_intro_established_t *cell = NULL;
 +
 +  tor_assert(payload);
 +
 +  /* Try to parse the payload into a cell making sure we do actually have a
 +   * valid cell. */
 +  ret = trn_cell_intro_established_parse(&cell, payload, payload_len);
 +  if (ret >= 0) {
 +    /* On success, we do not keep the cell, we just notify the caller that it
 +     * was successfully parsed. */
 +    trn_cell_intro_established_free(cell);
 +  }
 +  return ret;
 +}
 +
 +/* Parse the INTRODUCE2 cell using data which contains everything we need to
 + * do so and contains the destination buffers of information we extract and
 + * compute from the cell. Return 0 on success else a negative value. The
 + * service and circ are only used for logging purposes. */
 +ssize_t
 +hs_cell_parse_introduce2(hs_cell_introduce2_data_t *data,
 +                         const origin_circuit_t *circ,
 +                         const hs_service_t *service)
 +{
 +  int ret = -1;
 +  time_t elapsed;
 +  uint8_t *decrypted = NULL;
 +  size_t encrypted_section_len;
 +  const uint8_t *encrypted_section;
 +  trn_cell_introduce1_t *cell = NULL;
 +  trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_t *enc_cell = NULL;
 +  hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_t *intro_keys = NULL;
 +
 +  tor_assert(data);
 +  tor_assert(circ);
 +  tor_assert(service);
 +
 +  /* Parse the cell into a decoded data structure pointed by cell_ptr. */
 +  if (parse_introduce2_cell(service, circ, data->payload, data->payload_len,
 +                            &cell) < 0) {
 +    goto done;
 +  }
 +
 +  log_info(LD_REND, "Received a decodable INTRODUCE2 cell on circuit %u "
 +                    "for service %s. Decoding encrypted section...",
 +           TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id,
 +           safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
 +
 +  encrypted_section = trn_cell_introduce1_getconstarray_encrypted(cell);
 +  encrypted_section_len = trn_cell_introduce1_getlen_encrypted(cell);
 +
 +  /* Encrypted section must at least contain the CLIENT_PK and MAC which is
 +   * defined in section 3.3.2 of the specification. */
 +  if (encrypted_section_len < (CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN + DIGEST256_LEN)) {
 +    log_info(LD_REND, "Invalid INTRODUCE2 encrypted section length "
 +                      "for service %s. Dropping cell.",
 +             safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
 +    goto done;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Check our replay cache for this introduction point. */
 +  if (replaycache_add_test_and_elapsed(data->replay_cache, encrypted_section,
 +                                       encrypted_section_len, &elapsed)) {
 +    log_warn(LD_REND, "Possible replay detected! An INTRODUCE2 cell with the"
 +                      "same ENCRYPTED section was seen %ld seconds ago. "
 +                      "Dropping cell.", (long int) elapsed);
 +    goto done;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Build the key material out of the key material found in the cell. */
 +  intro_keys = get_introduce2_key_material(data->auth_pk, data->enc_kp,
 +                                           data->subcredential,
 +                                           encrypted_section,
 +                                           &data->client_pk);
 +  if (intro_keys == NULL) {
 +    log_info(LD_REND, "Invalid INTRODUCE2 encrypted data. Unable to "
 +                      "compute key material on circuit %u for service %s",
 +             TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id,
 +             safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
 +    goto done;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Validate MAC from the cell and our computed key material. The MAC field
 +   * in the cell is at the end of the encrypted section. */
 +  {
 +    uint8_t mac[DIGEST256_LEN];
 +    /* The MAC field is at the very end of the ENCRYPTED section. */
 +    size_t mac_offset = encrypted_section_len - sizeof(mac);
 +    /* Compute the MAC. Use the entire encoded payload with a length up to the
 +     * ENCRYPTED section. */
 +    compute_introduce_mac(data->payload,
 +                          data->payload_len - encrypted_section_len,
 +                          encrypted_section, encrypted_section_len,
 +                          intro_keys->mac_key, sizeof(intro_keys->mac_key),
 +                          mac, sizeof(mac));
 +    if (tor_memcmp(mac, encrypted_section + mac_offset, sizeof(mac))) {
 +      log_info(LD_REND, "Invalid MAC validation for INTRODUCE2 cell on "
 +                        "circuit %u for service %s",
 +               TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id,
 +               safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
 +      goto done;
 +    }
 +  }
 +
 +  {
 +    /* The ENCRYPTED_DATA section starts just after the CLIENT_PK. */
 +    const uint8_t *encrypted_data =
 +      encrypted_section + sizeof(data->client_pk);
 +    /* It's symmetric encryption so it's correct to use the ENCRYPTED length
 +     * for decryption. Computes the length of ENCRYPTED_DATA meaning removing
 +     * the CLIENT_PK and MAC length. */
 +    size_t encrypted_data_len =
 +      encrypted_section_len - (sizeof(data->client_pk) + DIGEST256_LEN);
 +
 +    /* This decrypts the ENCRYPTED_DATA section of the cell. */
 +    decrypted = decrypt_introduce2(intro_keys->enc_key,
 +                                   encrypted_data, encrypted_data_len);
 +    if (decrypted == NULL) {
 +      log_info(LD_REND, "Unable to decrypt the ENCRYPTED section of an "
 +                        "INTRODUCE2 cell on circuit %u for service %s",
 +               TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id,
 +               safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
 +      goto done;
 +    }
 +
 +    /* Parse this blob into an encrypted cell structure so we can then extract
 +     * the data we need out of it. */
 +    enc_cell = parse_introduce2_encrypted(decrypted, encrypted_data_len,
 +                                          circ, service);
 +    memwipe(decrypted, 0, encrypted_data_len);
 +    if (enc_cell == NULL) {
 +      goto done;
 +    }
 +  }
 +
 +  /* XXX: Implement client authorization checks. */
 +
 +  /* Extract onion key and rendezvous cookie from the cell used for the
 +   * rendezvous point circuit e2e encryption. */
 +  memcpy(data->onion_pk.public_key,
 +         trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_getconstarray_onion_key(enc_cell),
 +         CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
 +  memcpy(data->rendezvous_cookie,
 +         trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_getconstarray_rend_cookie(enc_cell),
 +         sizeof(data->rendezvous_cookie));
 +
 +  /* Extract rendezvous link specifiers. */
 +  for (size_t idx = 0;
 +       idx < trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_get_nspec(enc_cell); idx++) {
 +    link_specifier_t *lspec =
 +      trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_get_nspecs(enc_cell, idx);
 +    smartlist_add(data->link_specifiers, hs_link_specifier_dup(lspec));
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Success. */
 +  ret = 0;
 +  log_info(LD_REND, "Valid INTRODUCE2 cell. Launching rendezvous circuit.");
 +
 + done:
 +  if (intro_keys) {
 +    memwipe(intro_keys, 0, sizeof(hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_t));
 +    tor_free(intro_keys);
 +  }
 +  tor_free(decrypted);
 +  trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_free(enc_cell);
 +  trn_cell_introduce1_free(cell);
 +  return ret;
 +}
 +
 +/* Build a RENDEZVOUS1 cell with the given rendezvous cookie and handshake
 + * info. The encoded cell is put in cell_out and the length of the data is
 + * returned. This can't fail. */
 +ssize_t
 +hs_cell_build_rendezvous1(const uint8_t *rendezvous_cookie,
 +                          size_t rendezvous_cookie_len,
 +                          const uint8_t *rendezvous_handshake_info,
 +                          size_t rendezvous_handshake_info_len,
 +                          uint8_t *cell_out)
 +{
 +  ssize_t cell_len;
 +  trn_cell_rendezvous1_t *cell;
 +
 +  tor_assert(rendezvous_cookie);
 +  tor_assert(rendezvous_handshake_info);
 +  tor_assert(cell_out);
 +
 +  cell = trn_cell_rendezvous1_new();
 +  /* Set the RENDEZVOUS_COOKIE. */
 +  memcpy(trn_cell_rendezvous1_getarray_rendezvous_cookie(cell),
 +         rendezvous_cookie, rendezvous_cookie_len);
 +  /* Set the HANDSHAKE_INFO. */
 +  trn_cell_rendezvous1_setlen_handshake_info(cell,
 +                                            rendezvous_handshake_info_len);
 +  memcpy(trn_cell_rendezvous1_getarray_handshake_info(cell),
 +         rendezvous_handshake_info, rendezvous_handshake_info_len);
 +  /* Encoding. */
 +  cell_len = trn_cell_rendezvous1_encode(cell_out, RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE, cell);
 +  tor_assert(cell_len > 0);
 +
 +  trn_cell_rendezvous1_free(cell);
 +  return cell_len;
 +}
 +
 +/* Build an INTRODUCE1 cell from the given data. The encoded cell is put in
 + * cell_out which must be of at least size RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE. On success, the
 + * encoded length is returned else a negative value and the content of
 + * cell_out should be ignored. */
 +ssize_t
 +hs_cell_build_introduce1(const hs_cell_introduce1_data_t *data,
 +                         uint8_t *cell_out)
 +{
 +  ssize_t cell_len;
 +  trn_cell_introduce1_t *cell;
 +  trn_cell_extension_t *ext;
 +
 +  tor_assert(data);
 +  tor_assert(cell_out);
 +
 +  cell = trn_cell_introduce1_new();
 +  tor_assert(cell);
 +
 +  /* Set extension data. None are used. */
 +  ext = trn_cell_extension_new();
 +  tor_assert(ext);
 +  trn_cell_extension_set_num(ext, 0);
 +  trn_cell_introduce1_set_extensions(cell, ext);
 +
 +  /* Set the legacy ID field. */
 +  introduce1_set_legacy_id(cell, data);
 +
 +  /* Set the authentication key. */
 +  introduce1_set_auth_key(cell, data);
 +
 +  /* Set the encrypted section. This will set, encrypt and encode the
 +   * ENCRYPTED section in the cell. After this, we'll be ready to encode. */
 +  introduce1_set_encrypted(cell, data);
 +
 +  /* Final encoding. */
 +  cell_len = trn_cell_introduce1_encode(cell_out, RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE, cell);
 +
 +  trn_cell_introduce1_free(cell);
 +  return cell_len;
 +}
 +
 +/* Build an ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS cell from the given rendezvous_cookie. The
 + * encoded cell is put in cell_out which must be of at least
 + * RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE. On success, the encoded length is returned and the
 + * caller should clear up the content of the cell.
 + *
 + * This function can't fail. */
 +ssize_t
 +hs_cell_build_establish_rendezvous(const uint8_t *rendezvous_cookie,
 +                                   uint8_t *cell_out)
 +{
 +  tor_assert(rendezvous_cookie);
 +  tor_assert(cell_out);
 +
 +  memcpy(cell_out, rendezvous_cookie, HS_REND_COOKIE_LEN);
 +  return HS_REND_COOKIE_LEN;
 +}
 +
 +/* Handle an INTRODUCE_ACK cell encoded in payload of length payload_len.
 + * Return the status code on success else a negative value if the cell as not
 + * decodable. */
 +int
 +hs_cell_parse_introduce_ack(const uint8_t *payload, size_t payload_len)
 +{
 +  int ret = -1;
 +  trn_cell_introduce_ack_t *cell = NULL;
 +
 +  tor_assert(payload);
 +
 +  /* If it is a legacy IP, rend-spec.txt specifies that a ACK is 0 byte and a
 +   * NACK is 1 byte. We can't use the legacy function for this so we have to
 +   * do a special case. */
 +  if (payload_len <= 1) {
 +    if (payload_len == 0) {
-       ret = HS_CELL_INTRO_ACK_SUCCESS;
++      ret = TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_SUCCESS;
 +    } else {
-       ret = HS_CELL_INTRO_ACK_FAILURE;
++      ret = TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_UNKNOWN_ID;
 +    }
 +    goto end;
 +  }
 +
 +  if (trn_cell_introduce_ack_parse(&cell, payload, payload_len) < 0) {
 +    log_info(LD_REND, "Invalid INTRODUCE_ACK cell. Unable to parse it.");
 +    goto end;
 +  }
 +
 +  ret = trn_cell_introduce_ack_get_status(cell);
 +
 + end:
 +  trn_cell_introduce_ack_free(cell);
 +  return ret;
 +}
 +
 +/* Handle a RENDEZVOUS2 cell encoded in payload of length payload_len. On
 + * success, handshake_info contains the data in the HANDSHAKE_INFO field, and
 + * 0 is returned. On error, a negative value is returned. */
 +int
 +hs_cell_parse_rendezvous2(const uint8_t *payload, size_t payload_len,
 +                          uint8_t *handshake_info, size_t handshake_info_len)
 +{
 +  int ret = -1;
 +  trn_cell_rendezvous2_t *cell = NULL;
 +
 +  tor_assert(payload);
 +  tor_assert(handshake_info);
 +
 +  if (trn_cell_rendezvous2_parse(&cell, payload, payload_len) < 0) {
 +    log_info(LD_REND, "Invalid RENDEZVOUS2 cell. Unable to parse it.");
 +    goto end;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Static size, we should never have an issue with this else we messed up
 +   * our code flow. */
 +  tor_assert(trn_cell_rendezvous2_getlen_handshake_info(cell) ==
 +             handshake_info_len);
 +  memcpy(handshake_info,
 +         trn_cell_rendezvous2_getconstarray_handshake_info(cell),
 +         handshake_info_len);
 +  ret = 0;
 +
 + end:
 +  trn_cell_rendezvous2_free(cell);
 +  return ret;
 +}
 +
 +/* Clear the given INTRODUCE1 data structure data. */
 +void
 +hs_cell_introduce1_data_clear(hs_cell_introduce1_data_t *data)
 +{
 +  if (data == NULL) {
 +    return;
 +  }
 +  /* Object in this list have been moved to the cell object when building it
 +   * so they've been freed earlier. We do that in order to avoid duplicating
 +   * them leading to more memory and CPU time being used for nothing. */
 +  smartlist_free(data->link_specifiers);
 +  /* The data object has no ownership of any members. */
 +  memwipe(data, 0, sizeof(hs_cell_introduce1_data_t));
 +}
 +
diff --cc src/feature/hs/hs_cell.h
index abdaba4fb,000000000..9569de535
mode 100644,000000..100644
--- a/src/feature/hs/hs_cell.h
+++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_cell.h
@@@ -1,122 -1,0 +1,109 @@@
 +/* Copyright (c) 2017-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */
 +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
 +
 +/**
 + * \file hs_cell.h
 + * \brief Header file containing cell data for the whole HS subsytem.
 + **/
 +
 +#ifndef TOR_HS_CELL_H
 +#define TOR_HS_CELL_H
 +
 +#include "core/or/or.h"
 +#include "feature/hs/hs_service.h"
 +
 +/* An INTRODUCE1 cell requires at least this amount of bytes (see section
 + * 3.2.2 of the specification). Below this value, the cell must be padded. */
 +#define HS_CELL_INTRODUCE1_MIN_SIZE 246
 +
- /* Status code of an INTRODUCE_ACK cell. */
- typedef enum {
-   HS_CELL_INTRO_ACK_SUCCESS = 0x0000, /* Cell relayed to service. */
-   HS_CELL_INTRO_ACK_FAILURE = 0x0001, /* Service ID not recognized */
-   HS_CELL_INTRO_ACK_BADFMT  = 0x0002, /* Bad message format */
-   HS_CELL_INTRO_ACK_NORELAY = 0x0003, /* Can't relay cell to service */
- } hs_cell_introd_ack_status_t;
- 
- /* Onion key type found in the INTRODUCE1 cell. */
- typedef enum {
-   HS_CELL_ONION_KEY_TYPE_NTOR = 1,
- } hs_cell_onion_key_type_t;
- 
 +/* This data structure contains data that we need to build an INTRODUCE1 cell
 + * used by the INTRODUCE1 build function. */
 +typedef struct hs_cell_introduce1_data_t {
 +  /* Is this a legacy introduction point? */
 +  unsigned int is_legacy : 1;
 +  /* (Legacy only) The encryption key for a legacy intro point. Only set if
 +   * is_legacy is true. */
 +  const crypto_pk_t *legacy_key;
 +  /* Introduction point authentication public key. */
 +  const ed25519_public_key_t *auth_pk;
 +  /* Introduction point encryption public key. */
 +  const curve25519_public_key_t *enc_pk;
 +  /* Subcredentials of the service. */
 +  const uint8_t *subcredential;
 +  /* Onion public key for the ntor handshake. */
 +  const curve25519_public_key_t *onion_pk;
 +  /* Rendezvous cookie. */
 +  const uint8_t *rendezvous_cookie;
 +  /* Public key put before the encrypted data (CLIENT_PK). */
 +  const curve25519_keypair_t *client_kp;
 +  /* Rendezvous point link specifiers. */
 +  smartlist_t *link_specifiers;
 +} hs_cell_introduce1_data_t;
 +
 +/* This data structure contains data that we need to parse an INTRODUCE2 cell
 + * which is used by the INTRODUCE2 cell parsing function. On a successful
 + * parsing, the onion_pk and rendezvous_cookie will be populated with the
 + * computed key material from the cell data. This structure is only used during
 + * INTRO2 parsing and discarded after that. */
 +typedef struct hs_cell_introduce2_data_t {
 +  /*** Immutable Section: Set on structure init. ***/
 +
 +  /* Introduction point authentication public key. Pointer owned by the
 +     introduction point object through which we received the INTRO2 cell. */
 +  const ed25519_public_key_t *auth_pk;
 +  /* Introduction point encryption keypair for the ntor handshake. Pointer
 +     owned by the introduction point object through which we received the
 +     INTRO2 cell*/
 +  const curve25519_keypair_t *enc_kp;
 +  /* Subcredentials of the service. Pointer owned by the descriptor that owns
 +     the introduction point through which we received the INTRO2 cell. */
 +  const uint8_t *subcredential;
 +  /* Payload of the received encoded cell. */
 +  const uint8_t *payload;
 +  /* Size of the payload of the received encoded cell. */
 +  size_t payload_len;
 +
 +  /*** Mutable Section: Set upon parsing INTRODUCE2 cell. ***/
 +
 +  /* Onion public key computed using the INTRODUCE2 encrypted section. */
 +  curve25519_public_key_t onion_pk;
 +  /* Rendezvous cookie taken from the INTRODUCE2 encrypted section. */
 +  uint8_t rendezvous_cookie[REND_COOKIE_LEN];
 +  /* Client public key from the INTRODUCE2 encrypted section. */
 +  curve25519_public_key_t client_pk;
 +  /* Link specifiers of the rendezvous point. Contains link_specifier_t. */
 +  smartlist_t *link_specifiers;
 +  /* Replay cache of the introduction point. */
 +  replaycache_t *replay_cache;
 +} hs_cell_introduce2_data_t;
 +
 +/* Build cell API. */
 +ssize_t hs_cell_build_establish_intro(const char *circ_nonce,
 +                                      const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip,
 +                                      uint8_t *cell_out);
 +ssize_t hs_cell_build_rendezvous1(const uint8_t *rendezvous_cookie,
 +                                  size_t rendezvous_cookie_len,
 +                                  const uint8_t *rendezvous_handshake_info,
 +                                  size_t rendezvous_handshake_info_len,
 +                                  uint8_t *cell_out);
 +ssize_t hs_cell_build_introduce1(const hs_cell_introduce1_data_t *data,
 +                                 uint8_t *cell_out);
 +ssize_t hs_cell_build_establish_rendezvous(const uint8_t *rendezvous_cookie,
 +                                           uint8_t *cell_out);
 +
 +/* Parse cell API. */
 +ssize_t hs_cell_parse_intro_established(const uint8_t *payload,
 +                                        size_t payload_len);
 +ssize_t hs_cell_parse_introduce2(hs_cell_introduce2_data_t *data,
 +                                 const origin_circuit_t *circ,
 +                                 const hs_service_t *service);
 +int hs_cell_parse_introduce_ack(const uint8_t *payload, size_t payload_len);
 +int hs_cell_parse_rendezvous2(const uint8_t *payload, size_t payload_len,
 +                              uint8_t *handshake_info,
 +                              size_t handshake_info_len);
 +
 +/* Util API. */
 +void hs_cell_introduce1_data_clear(hs_cell_introduce1_data_t *data);
 +
 +#endif /* !defined(TOR_HS_CELL_H) */
 +
diff --cc src/feature/hs/hs_client.c
index bd43ef613,000000000..2a5765aec
mode 100644,000000..100644
--- a/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c
+++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c
@@@ -1,1945 -1,0 +1,1945 @@@
 +/* Copyright (c) 2016-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */
 +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
 +
 +/**
 + * \file hs_client.c
 + * \brief Implement next generation hidden service client functionality
 + **/
 +
 +#define HS_CLIENT_PRIVATE
 +
 +#include "core/or/or.h"
 +#include "app/config/config.h"
 +#include "core/crypto/hs_ntor.h"
 +#include "core/mainloop/connection.h"
 +#include "core/or/circuitbuild.h"
 +#include "core/or/circuitlist.h"
 +#include "core/or/circuituse.h"
 +#include "core/or/connection_edge.h"
 +#include "core/or/reasons.h"
 +#include "feature/client/circpathbias.h"
 +#include "feature/dirclient/dirclient.h"
 +#include "feature/dircommon/directory.h"
 +#include "feature/hs/hs_cache.h"
 +#include "feature/hs/hs_cell.h"
 +#include "feature/hs/hs_circuit.h"
 +#include "feature/hs/hs_circuitmap.h"
 +#include "feature/hs/hs_client.h"
 +#include "feature/hs/hs_control.h"
 +#include "feature/hs/hs_descriptor.h"
 +#include "feature/hs/hs_ident.h"
 +#include "feature/nodelist/describe.h"
 +#include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h"
 +#include "feature/nodelist/nodelist.h"
 +#include "feature/nodelist/routerset.h"
 +#include "feature/rend/rendclient.h"
 +#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_format.h"
 +#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h"
 +#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h"
 +
 +#include "core/or/cpath_build_state_st.h"
 +#include "feature/dircommon/dir_connection_st.h"
 +#include "core/or/entry_connection_st.h"
 +#include "core/or/extend_info_st.h"
 +#include "core/or/origin_circuit_st.h"
 +
 +/* Client-side authorizations for hidden services; map of service identity
 + * public key to hs_client_service_authorization_t *. */
 +static digest256map_t *client_auths = NULL;
 +
++#include "trunnel/hs/cell_introduce1.h"
++
 +/* Return a human-readable string for the client fetch status code. */
 +static const char *
 +fetch_status_to_string(hs_client_fetch_status_t status)
 +{
 +  switch (status) {
 +  case HS_CLIENT_FETCH_ERROR:
 +    return "Internal error";
 +  case HS_CLIENT_FETCH_LAUNCHED:
 +    return "Descriptor fetch launched";
 +  case HS_CLIENT_FETCH_HAVE_DESC:
 +    return "Already have descriptor";
 +  case HS_CLIENT_FETCH_NO_HSDIRS:
 +    return "No more HSDir available to query";
 +  case HS_CLIENT_FETCH_NOT_ALLOWED:
 +    return "Fetching descriptors is not allowed";
 +  case HS_CLIENT_FETCH_MISSING_INFO:
 +    return "Missing directory information";
 +  case HS_CLIENT_FETCH_PENDING:
 +    return "Pending descriptor fetch";
 +  default:
 +    return "(Unknown client fetch status code)";
 +  }
 +}
 +
 +/* Return true iff tor should close the SOCKS request(s) for the descriptor
 + * fetch that ended up with this given status code. */
 +static int
 +fetch_status_should_close_socks(hs_client_fetch_status_t status)
 +{
 +  switch (status) {
 +  case HS_CLIENT_FETCH_NO_HSDIRS:
 +    /* No more HSDir to query, we can't complete the SOCKS request(s). */
 +  case HS_CLIENT_FETCH_ERROR:
 +    /* The fetch triggered an internal error. */
 +  case HS_CLIENT_FETCH_NOT_ALLOWED:
 +    /* Client is not allowed to fetch (FetchHidServDescriptors 0). */
 +    goto close;
 +  case HS_CLIENT_FETCH_MISSING_INFO:
 +  case HS_CLIENT_FETCH_HAVE_DESC:
 +  case HS_CLIENT_FETCH_PENDING:
 +  case HS_CLIENT_FETCH_LAUNCHED:
 +    /* The rest doesn't require tor to close the SOCKS request(s). */
 +    goto no_close;
 +  }
 +
 + no_close:
 +  return 0;
 + close:
 +  return 1;
 +}
 +
 +/* Cancel all descriptor fetches currently in progress. */
 +static void
 +cancel_descriptor_fetches(void)
 +{
 +  smartlist_t *conns =
 +    connection_list_by_type_state(CONN_TYPE_DIR, DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_HSDESC);
 +  SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(conns, connection_t *, conn) {
 +    const hs_ident_dir_conn_t *ident = TO_DIR_CONN(conn)->hs_ident;
 +    if (BUG(ident == NULL)) {
 +      /* A directory connection fetching a service descriptor can't have an
 +       * empty hidden service identifier. */
 +      continue;
 +    }
 +    log_debug(LD_REND, "Marking for close a directory connection fetching "
 +                       "a hidden service descriptor for service %s.",
 +              safe_str_client(ed25519_fmt(&ident->identity_pk)));
 +    connection_mark_for_close(conn);
 +  } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(conn);
 +
 +  /* No ownership of the objects in this list. */
 +  smartlist_free(conns);
 +  log_info(LD_REND, "Hidden service client descriptor fetches cancelled.");
 +}
 +
 +/* Get all connections that are waiting on a circuit and flag them back to
 + * waiting for a hidden service descriptor for the given service key
 + * service_identity_pk. */
 +static void
 +flag_all_conn_wait_desc(const ed25519_public_key_t *service_identity_pk)
 +{
 +  tor_assert(service_identity_pk);
 +
 +  smartlist_t *conns =
 +    connection_list_by_type_state(CONN_TYPE_AP, AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT);
 +
 +  SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(conns, connection_t *, conn) {
 +    edge_connection_t *edge_conn;
 +    if (BUG(!CONN_IS_EDGE(conn))) {
 +      continue;
 +    }
 +    edge_conn = TO_EDGE_CONN(conn);
 +    if (edge_conn->hs_ident &&
 +        ed25519_pubkey_eq(&edge_conn->hs_ident->identity_pk,
 +                          service_identity_pk)) {
 +      connection_ap_mark_as_waiting_for_renddesc(TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn));
 +    }
 +  } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(conn);
 +
 +  smartlist_free(conns);
 +}
 +
 +/* Remove tracked HSDir requests from our history for this hidden service
 + * identity public key. */
 +static void
 +purge_hid_serv_request(const ed25519_public_key_t *identity_pk)
 +{
 +  char base64_blinded_pk[ED25519_BASE64_LEN + 1];
 +  ed25519_public_key_t blinded_pk;
 +
 +  tor_assert(identity_pk);
 +
 +  /* Get blinded pubkey of hidden service. It is possible that we just moved
 +   * to a new time period meaning that we won't be able to purge the request
 +   * from the previous time period. That is fine because they will expire at
 +   * some point and we don't care about those anymore. */
 +  hs_build_blinded_pubkey(identity_pk, NULL, 0,
 +                          hs_get_time_period_num(0), &blinded_pk);
 +  if (BUG(ed25519_public_to_base64(base64_blinded_pk, &blinded_pk) < 0)) {
 +    return;
 +  }
 +  /* Purge last hidden service request from cache for this blinded key. */
 +  hs_purge_hid_serv_from_last_hid_serv_requests(base64_blinded_pk);
 +}
 +
 +/* Return true iff there is at least one pending directory descriptor request
 + * for the service identity_pk. */
 +static int
 +directory_request_is_pending(const ed25519_public_key_t *identity_pk)
 +{
 +  int ret = 0;
 +  smartlist_t *conns =
 +    connection_list_by_type_purpose(CONN_TYPE_DIR, DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_HSDESC);
 +
 +  SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(conns, connection_t *, conn) {
 +    const hs_ident_dir_conn_t *ident = TO_DIR_CONN(conn)->hs_ident;
 +    if (BUG(ident == NULL)) {
 +      /* A directory connection fetching a service descriptor can't have an
 +       * empty hidden service identifier. */
 +      continue;
 +    }
 +    if (!ed25519_pubkey_eq(identity_pk, &ident->identity_pk)) {
 +      continue;
 +    }
 +    ret = 1;
 +    break;
 +  } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(conn);
 +
 +  /* No ownership of the objects in this list. */
 +  smartlist_free(conns);
 +  return ret;
 +}
 +
 +/* Helper function that changes the state of an entry connection to waiting
 + * for a circuit. For this to work properly, the connection timestamps are set
 + * to now and the connection is then marked as pending for a circuit. */
 +static void
 +mark_conn_as_waiting_for_circuit(connection_t *conn, time_t now)
 +{
 +  tor_assert(conn);
 +
 +  /* Because the connection can now proceed to opening circuit and ultimately
 +   * connect to the service, reset those timestamp so the connection is
 +   * considered "fresh" and can continue without being closed too early. */
 +  conn->timestamp_created = now;
 +  conn->timestamp_last_read_allowed = now;
 +  conn->timestamp_last_write_allowed = now;
 +  /* Change connection's state into waiting for a circuit. */
 +  conn->state = AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT;
 +
 +  connection_ap_mark_as_pending_circuit(TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn));
 +}
 +
 +/* We failed to fetch a descriptor for the service with <b>identity_pk</b>
 + * because of <b>status</b>. Find all pending SOCKS connections for this
 + * service that are waiting on the descriptor and close them with
 + * <b>reason</b>. */
 +static void
 +close_all_socks_conns_waiting_for_desc(const ed25519_public_key_t *identity_pk,
 +                                       hs_client_fetch_status_t status,
 +                                       int reason)
 +{
 +  unsigned int count = 0;
 +  time_t now = approx_time();
 +  smartlist_t *conns =
 +    connection_list_by_type_state(CONN_TYPE_AP, AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT);
 +
 +  SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(conns, connection_t *, base_conn) {
 +    entry_connection_t *entry_conn = TO_ENTRY_CONN(base_conn);
 +    const edge_connection_t *edge_conn = ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(entry_conn);
 +
 +    /* Only consider the entry connections that matches the service for which
 +     * we tried to get the descriptor */
 +    if (!edge_conn->hs_ident ||
 +        !ed25519_pubkey_eq(identity_pk,
 +                           &edge_conn->hs_ident->identity_pk)) {
 +      continue;
 +    }
 +    assert_connection_ok(base_conn, now);
 +    /* Unattach the entry connection which will close for the reason. */
 +    connection_mark_unattached_ap(entry_conn, reason);
 +    count++;
 +  } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(base_conn);
 +
 +  if (count > 0) {
 +    char onion_address[HS_SERVICE_ADDR_LEN_BASE32 + 1];
 +    hs_build_address(identity_pk, HS_VERSION_THREE, onion_address);
 +    log_notice(LD_REND, "Closed %u streams for service %s.onion "
 +                        "for reason %s. Fetch status: %s.",
 +               count, safe_str_client(onion_address),
 +               stream_end_reason_to_string(reason),
 +               fetch_status_to_string(status));
 +  }
 +
 +  /* No ownership of the object(s) in this list. */
 +  smartlist_free(conns);
 +}
 +
 +/* Find all pending SOCKS connection waiting for a descriptor and retry them
 + * all. This is called when the directory information changed. */
 +STATIC void
 +retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc(void)
 +{
 +  smartlist_t *conns =
 +    connection_list_by_type_state(CONN_TYPE_AP, AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT);
 +
 +  SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(conns, connection_t *, base_conn) {
 +    hs_client_fetch_status_t status;
 +    const edge_connection_t *edge_conn =
 +      ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(TO_ENTRY_CONN(base_conn));
 +
 +    /* Ignore non HS or non v3 connection. */
 +    if (edge_conn->hs_ident == NULL) {
 +      continue;
 +    }
 +    /* In this loop, we will possibly try to fetch a descriptor for the
 +     * pending connections because we just got more directory information.
 +     * However, the refetch process can cleanup all SOCKS request to the same
 +     * service if an internal error happens. Thus, we can end up with closed
 +     * connections in our list. */
 +    if (base_conn->marked_for_close) {
 +      continue;
 +    }
 +
 +    /* XXX: There is an optimization we could do which is that for a service
 +     * key, we could check if we can fetch and remember that decision. */
 +
 +    /* Order a refetch in case it works this time. */
 +    status = hs_client_refetch_hsdesc(&edge_conn->hs_ident->identity_pk);
 +    if (status == HS_CLIENT_FETCH_HAVE_DESC) {
 +      /* This is a rare case where a SOCKS connection is in state waiting for
 +       * a descriptor but we do have it in the cache.
 +       *
 +       * This can happen is tor comes back from suspend where it previously
 +       * had the descriptor but the intro points were not usuable. Once it
 +       * came back to life, the intro point failure cache was cleaned up and
 +       * thus the descriptor became usable again leaving us in this code path.
 +       *
 +       * We'll mark the connection as waiting for a circuit so the descriptor
 +       * can be retried. This is safe because a connection in state waiting
 +       * for a descriptor can not be in the entry connection pending list. */
 +      mark_conn_as_waiting_for_circuit(base_conn, approx_time());
 +      continue;
 +    }
 +    /* In the case of an error, either all SOCKS connections have been
 +     * closed or we are still missing directory information. Leave the
 +     * connection in renddesc wait state so when we get more info, we'll be
 +     * able to try it again. */
 +  } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(base_conn);
 +
 +  /* We don't have ownership of those objects. */
 +  smartlist_free(conns);
 +}
 +
 +/* A v3 HS circuit successfully connected to the hidden service. Update the
 + * stream state at <b>hs_conn_ident</b> appropriately. */
 +static void
 +note_connection_attempt_succeeded(const hs_ident_edge_conn_t *hs_conn_ident)
 +{
 +  tor_assert(hs_conn_ident);
 +
 +  /* Remove from the hid serv cache all requests for that service so we can
 +   * query the HSDir again later on for various reasons. */
 +  purge_hid_serv_request(&hs_conn_ident->identity_pk);
 +
 +  /* The v2 subsystem cleans up the intro point time out flag at this stage.
 +   * We don't try to do it here because we still need to keep intact the intro
 +   * point state for future connections. Even though we are able to connect to
 +   * the service, doesn't mean we should reset the timed out intro points.
 +   *
 +   * It is not possible to have successfully connected to an intro point
 +   * present in our cache that was on error or timed out. Every entry in that
 +   * cache have a 2 minutes lifetime so ultimately the intro point(s) state
 +   * will be reset and thus possible to be retried. */
 +}
 +
 +/* Given the pubkey of a hidden service in <b>onion_identity_pk</b>, fetch its
 + * descriptor by launching a dir connection to <b>hsdir</b>. Return a
 + * hs_client_fetch_status_t status code depending on how it went. */
 +static hs_client_fetch_status_t
 +directory_launch_v3_desc_fetch(const ed25519_public_key_t *onion_identity_pk,
 +                               const routerstatus_t *hsdir)
 +{
 +  uint64_t current_time_period = hs_get_time_period_num(0);
 +  ed25519_public_key_t blinded_pubkey;
 +  char base64_blinded_pubkey[ED25519_BASE64_LEN + 1];
 +  hs_ident_dir_conn_t hs_conn_dir_ident;
 +  int retval;
 +
 +  tor_assert(hsdir);
 +  tor_assert(onion_identity_pk);
 +
 +  /* Get blinded pubkey */
 +  hs_build_blinded_pubkey(onion_identity_pk, NULL, 0,
 +                          current_time_period, &blinded_pubkey);
 +  /* ...and base64 it. */
 +  retval = ed25519_public_to_base64(base64_blinded_pubkey, &blinded_pubkey);
 +  if (BUG(retval < 0)) {
 +    return HS_CLIENT_FETCH_ERROR;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Copy onion pk to a dir_ident so that we attach it to the dir conn */
 +  hs_ident_dir_conn_init(onion_identity_pk, &blinded_pubkey,
 +                         &hs_conn_dir_ident);
 +
 +  /* Setup directory request */
 +  directory_request_t *req =
 +    directory_request_new(DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_HSDESC);
 +  directory_request_set_routerstatus(req, hsdir);
 +  directory_request_set_indirection(req, DIRIND_ANONYMOUS);
 +  directory_request_set_resource(req, base64_blinded_pubkey);
 +  directory_request_fetch_set_hs_ident(req, &hs_conn_dir_ident);
 +  directory_initiate_request(req);
 +  directory_request_free(req);
 +
 +  log_info(LD_REND, "Descriptor fetch request for service %s with blinded "
 +                    "key %s to directory %s",
 +           safe_str_client(ed25519_fmt(onion_identity_pk)),
 +           safe_str_client(base64_blinded_pubkey),
 +           safe_str_client(routerstatus_describe(hsdir)));
 +
 +  /* Fire a REQUESTED event on the control port. */
 +  hs_control_desc_event_requested(onion_identity_pk, base64_blinded_pubkey,
 +                                  hsdir);
 +
 +  /* Cleanup memory. */
 +  memwipe(&blinded_pubkey, 0, sizeof(blinded_pubkey));
 +  memwipe(base64_blinded_pubkey, 0, sizeof(base64_blinded_pubkey));
 +  memwipe(&hs_conn_dir_ident, 0, sizeof(hs_conn_dir_ident));
 +
 +  return HS_CLIENT_FETCH_LAUNCHED;
 +}
 +
 +/** Return the HSDir we should use to fetch the descriptor of the hidden
 + *  service with identity key <b>onion_identity_pk</b>. */
 +STATIC routerstatus_t *
 +pick_hsdir_v3(const ed25519_public_key_t *onion_identity_pk)
 +{
 +  int retval;
 +  char base64_blinded_pubkey[ED25519_BASE64_LEN + 1];
 +  uint64_t current_time_period = hs_get_time_period_num(0);
 +  smartlist_t *responsible_hsdirs = NULL;
 +  ed25519_public_key_t blinded_pubkey;
 +  routerstatus_t *hsdir_rs = NULL;
 +
 +  tor_assert(onion_identity_pk);
 +
 +  /* Get blinded pubkey of hidden service */
 +  hs_build_blinded_pubkey(onion_identity_pk, NULL, 0,
 +                          current_time_period, &blinded_pubkey);
 +  /* ...and base64 it. */
 +  retval = ed25519_public_to_base64(base64_blinded_pubkey, &blinded_pubkey);
 +  if (BUG(retval < 0)) {
 +    return NULL;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Get responsible hsdirs of service for this time period */
 +  responsible_hsdirs = smartlist_new();
 +
 +  hs_get_responsible_hsdirs(&blinded_pubkey, current_time_period,
 +                            0, 1, responsible_hsdirs);
 +
 +  log_debug(LD_REND, "Found %d responsible HSDirs and about to pick one.",
 +           smartlist_len(responsible_hsdirs));
 +
 +  /* Pick an HSDir from the responsible ones. The ownership of
 +   * responsible_hsdirs is given to this function so no need to free it. */
 +  hsdir_rs = hs_pick_hsdir(responsible_hsdirs, base64_blinded_pubkey);
 +
 +  return hsdir_rs;
 +}
 +
 +/** Fetch a v3 descriptor using the given <b>onion_identity_pk</b>.
 + *
 + * On success, HS_CLIENT_FETCH_LAUNCHED is returned. Otherwise, an error from
 + * hs_client_fetch_status_t is returned. */
 +MOCK_IMPL(STATIC hs_client_fetch_status_t,
 +fetch_v3_desc, (const ed25519_public_key_t *onion_identity_pk))
 +{
 +  routerstatus_t *hsdir_rs =NULL;
 +
 +  tor_assert(onion_identity_pk);
 +
 +  hsdir_rs = pick_hsdir_v3(onion_identity_pk);
 +  if (!hsdir_rs) {
 +    log_info(LD_REND, "Couldn't pick a v3 hsdir.");
 +    return HS_CLIENT_FETCH_NO_HSDIRS;
 +  }
 +
 +  return directory_launch_v3_desc_fetch(onion_identity_pk, hsdir_rs);
 +}
 +
 +/* Make sure that the given v3 origin circuit circ is a valid correct
 + * introduction circuit. This will BUG() on any problems and hard assert if
 + * the anonymity of the circuit is not ok. Return 0 on success else -1 where
 + * the circuit should be mark for closed immediately. */
 +static int
 +intro_circ_is_ok(const origin_circuit_t *circ)
 +{
 +  int ret = 0;
 +
 +  tor_assert(circ);
 +
 +  if (BUG(TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING &&
 +          TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT &&
 +          TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACKED)) {
 +    ret = -1;
 +  }
 +  if (BUG(circ->hs_ident == NULL)) {
 +    ret = -1;
 +  }
 +  if (BUG(!hs_ident_intro_circ_is_valid(circ->hs_ident))) {
 +    ret = -1;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* This can stop the tor daemon but we want that since if we don't have
 +   * anonymity on this circuit, something went really wrong. */
 +  assert_circ_anonymity_ok(circ, get_options());
 +  return ret;
 +}
 +
 +/* Find a descriptor intro point object that matches the given ident in the
 + * given descriptor desc. Return NULL if not found. */
 +static const hs_desc_intro_point_t *
 +find_desc_intro_point_by_ident(const hs_ident_circuit_t *ident,
 +                               const hs_descriptor_t *desc)
 +{
 +  const hs_desc_intro_point_t *intro_point = NULL;
 +
 +  tor_assert(ident);
 +  tor_assert(desc);
 +
 +  SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(desc->encrypted_data.intro_points,
 +                          const hs_desc_intro_point_t *, ip) {
 +    if (ed25519_pubkey_eq(&ident->intro_auth_pk,
 +                          &ip->auth_key_cert->signed_key)) {
 +      intro_point = ip;
 +      break;
 +    }
 +  } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(ip);
 +
 +  return intro_point;
 +}
 +
 +/* Find a descriptor intro point object from the descriptor object desc that
 + * matches the given legacy identity digest in legacy_id. Return NULL if not
 + * found. */
 +static hs_desc_intro_point_t *
 +find_desc_intro_point_by_legacy_id(const char *legacy_id,
 +                                   const hs_descriptor_t *desc)
 +{
 +  hs_desc_intro_point_t *ret_ip = NULL;
 +
 +  tor_assert(legacy_id);
 +  tor_assert(desc);
 +
 +  /* We will go over every intro point and try to find which one is linked to
 +   * that circuit. Those lists are small so it's not that expensive. */
 +  SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(desc->encrypted_data.intro_points,
 +                          hs_desc_intro_point_t *, ip) {
 +    SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(ip->link_specifiers,
 +                            const hs_desc_link_specifier_t *, lspec) {
 +      /* Not all tor node have an ed25519 identity key so we still rely on the
 +       * legacy identity digest. */
 +      if (lspec->type != LS_LEGACY_ID) {
 +        continue;
 +      }
 +      if (fast_memneq(legacy_id, lspec->u.legacy_id, DIGEST_LEN)) {
 +        break;
 +      }
 +      /* Found it. */
 +      ret_ip = ip;
 +      goto end;
 +    } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(lspec);
 +  } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(ip);
 +
 + end:
 +  return ret_ip;
 +}
 +
 +/* Send an INTRODUCE1 cell along the intro circuit and populate the rend
 + * circuit identifier with the needed key material for the e2e encryption.
 + * Return 0 on success, -1 if there is a transient error such that an action
 + * has been taken to recover and -2 if there is a permanent error indicating
 + * that both circuits were closed. */
 +static int
 +send_introduce1(origin_circuit_t *intro_circ,
 +                origin_circuit_t *rend_circ)
 +{
 +  int status;
 +  char onion_address[HS_SERVICE_ADDR_LEN_BASE32 + 1];
 +  const ed25519_public_key_t *service_identity_pk = NULL;
 +  const hs_desc_intro_point_t *ip;
 +
 +  tor_assert(rend_circ);
 +  if (intro_circ_is_ok(intro_circ) < 0) {
 +    goto perm_err;
 +  }
 +
 +  service_identity_pk = &intro_circ->hs_ident->identity_pk;
 +  /* For logging purposes. There will be a time where the hs_ident will have a
 +   * version number but for now there is none because it's all v3. */
 +  hs_build_address(service_identity_pk, HS_VERSION_THREE, onion_address);
 +
 +  log_info(LD_REND, "Sending INTRODUCE1 cell to service %s on circuit %u",
 +           safe_str_client(onion_address), TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ)->n_circ_id);
 +
 +  /* 1) Get descriptor from our cache. */
 +  const hs_descriptor_t *desc =
 +    hs_cache_lookup_as_client(service_identity_pk);
 +  if (desc == NULL || !hs_client_any_intro_points_usable(service_identity_pk,
 +                                                         desc)) {
 +    log_info(LD_REND, "Request to %s %s. Trying to fetch a new descriptor.",
 +             safe_str_client(onion_address),
 +             (desc) ? "didn't have usable intro points" :
 +             "didn't have a descriptor");
 +    hs_client_refetch_hsdesc(service_identity_pk);
 +    /* We just triggered a refetch, make sure every connections are back
 +     * waiting for that descriptor. */
 +    flag_all_conn_wait_desc(service_identity_pk);
 +    /* We just asked for a refetch so this is a transient error. */
 +    goto tran_err;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* We need to find which intro point in the descriptor we are connected to
 +   * on intro_circ. */
 +  ip = find_desc_intro_point_by_ident(intro_circ->hs_ident, desc);
 +  if (BUG(ip == NULL)) {
 +    /* If we can find a descriptor from this introduction circuit ident, we
 +     * must have a valid intro point object. Permanent error. */
 +    goto perm_err;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Send the INTRODUCE1 cell. */
 +  if (hs_circ_send_introduce1(intro_circ, rend_circ, ip,
 +                              desc->subcredential) < 0) {
 +    if (TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ)->marked_for_close) {
 +      /* If the introduction circuit was closed, we were unable to send the
 +       * cell for some reasons. In any case, the intro circuit has to be
 +       * closed by the above function. We'll return a transient error so tor
 +       * can recover and pick a new intro point. To avoid picking that same
 +       * intro point, we'll note down the intro point failure so it doesn't
 +       * get reused. */
 +      hs_cache_client_intro_state_note(service_identity_pk,
 +                                       &intro_circ->hs_ident->intro_auth_pk,
 +                                       INTRO_POINT_FAILURE_GENERIC);
 +    }
 +    /* It is also possible that the rendezvous circuit was closed due to being
 +     * unable to use the rendezvous point node_t so in that case, we also want
 +     * to recover and let tor pick a new one. */
 +    goto tran_err;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Cell has been sent successfully. Copy the introduction point
 +   * authentication and encryption key in the rendezvous circuit identifier so
 +   * we can compute the ntor keys when we receive the RENDEZVOUS2 cell. */
 +  memcpy(&rend_circ->hs_ident->intro_enc_pk, &ip->enc_key,
 +         sizeof(rend_circ->hs_ident->intro_enc_pk));
 +  ed25519_pubkey_copy(&rend_circ->hs_ident->intro_auth_pk,
 +                      &intro_circ->hs_ident->intro_auth_pk);
 +
 +  /* Now, we wait for an ACK or NAK on this circuit. */
 +  circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ),
 +                         CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT);
 +  /* Set timestamp_dirty, because circuit_expire_building expects it to
 +   * specify when a circuit entered the _C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT state. */
 +  TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ)->timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
 +  pathbias_count_use_attempt(intro_circ);
 +
 +  /* Success. */
 +  status = 0;
 +  goto end;
 +
 + perm_err:
 +  /* Permanent error: it is possible that the intro circuit was closed prior
 +   * because we weren't able to send the cell. Make sure we don't double close
 +   * it which would result in a warning. */
 +  if (!TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ)->marked_for_close) {
 +    circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL);
 +  }
 +  circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(rend_circ), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL);
 +  status = -2;
 +  goto end;
 +
 + tran_err:
 +  status = -1;
 +
 + end:
 +  memwipe(onion_address, 0, sizeof(onion_address));
 +  return status;
 +}
 +
 +/* Using the introduction circuit circ, setup the authentication key of the
 + * intro point this circuit has extended to. */
 +static void
 +setup_intro_circ_auth_key(origin_circuit_t *circ)
 +{
 +  const hs_descriptor_t *desc;
 +  const hs_desc_intro_point_t *ip;
 +
 +  tor_assert(circ);
 +
 +  desc = hs_cache_lookup_as_client(&circ->hs_ident->identity_pk);
 +  if (BUG(desc == NULL)) {
 +    /* Opening intro circuit without the descriptor is no good... */
 +    goto end;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* We will go over every intro point and try to find which one is linked to
 +   * that circuit. Those lists are small so it's not that expensive. */
 +  ip = find_desc_intro_point_by_legacy_id(
 +                       circ->build_state->chosen_exit->identity_digest, desc);
 +  if (ip) {
 +    /* We got it, copy its authentication key to the identifier. */
 +    ed25519_pubkey_copy(&circ->hs_ident->intro_auth_pk,
 +                        &ip->auth_key_cert->signed_key);
 +    goto end;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Reaching this point means we didn't find any intro point for this circuit
 +   * which is not suppose to happen. */
 +  tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached();
 +
 + end:
 +  return;
 +}
 +
 +/* Called when an introduction circuit has opened. */
 +static void
 +client_intro_circ_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ)
 +{
 +  tor_assert(circ);
 +  tor_assert(TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING);
 +  log_info(LD_REND, "Introduction circuit %u has opened. Attaching streams.",
 +           (unsigned int) TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id);
 +
 +  /* This is an introduction circuit so we'll attach the correct
 +   * authentication key to the circuit identifier so it can be identified
 +   * properly later on. */
 +  setup_intro_circ_auth_key(circ);
 +
 +  connection_ap_attach_pending(1);
 +}
 +
 +/* Called when a rendezvous circuit has opened. */
 +static void
 +client_rendezvous_circ_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ)
 +{
 +  tor_assert(circ);
 +  tor_assert(TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND);
 +
 +  const extend_info_t *rp_ei = circ->build_state->chosen_exit;
 +
 +  /* Check that we didn't accidentally choose a node that does not understand
 +   * the v3 rendezvous protocol */
 +  if (rp_ei) {
 +    const node_t *rp_node = node_get_by_id(rp_ei->identity_digest);
 +    if (rp_node) {
 +      if (BUG(!node_supports_v3_rendezvous_point(rp_node))) {
 +        return;
 +      }
 +    }
 +  }
 +
 +  log_info(LD_REND, "Rendezvous circuit has opened to %s.",
 +           safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(rp_ei)));
 +
 +  /* Ignore returned value, nothing we can really do. On failure, the circuit
 +   * will be marked for close. */
 +  hs_circ_send_establish_rendezvous(circ);
 +
 +  /* Register rend circuit in circuitmap if it's still alive. */
 +  if (!TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->marked_for_close) {
 +    hs_circuitmap_register_rend_circ_client_side(circ,
 +                                     circ->hs_ident->rendezvous_cookie);
 +  }
 +}
 +
 +/* This is an helper function that convert a descriptor intro point object ip
 + * to a newly allocated extend_info_t object fully initialized. Return NULL if
 + * we can't convert it for which chances are that we are missing or malformed
 + * link specifiers. */
 +STATIC extend_info_t *
 +desc_intro_point_to_extend_info(const hs_desc_intro_point_t *ip)
 +{
 +  extend_info_t *ei;
 +  smartlist_t *lspecs = smartlist_new();
 +
 +  tor_assert(ip);
 +
 +  /* We first encode the descriptor link specifiers into the binary
 +   * representation which is a trunnel object. */
 +  SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(ip->link_specifiers,
 +                          const hs_desc_link_specifier_t *, desc_lspec) {
 +    link_specifier_t *lspec = hs_desc_lspec_to_trunnel(desc_lspec);
 +    smartlist_add(lspecs, lspec);
 +  } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(desc_lspec);
 +
 +  /* Explicitly put the direct connection option to 0 because this is client
 +   * side and there is no such thing as a non anonymous client. */
 +  ei = hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs(lspecs, &ip->onion_key, 0);
 +
 +  SMARTLIST_FOREACH(lspecs, link_specifier_t *, ls, link_specifier_free(ls));
 +  smartlist_free(lspecs);
 +  return ei;
 +}
 +
 +/* Return true iff the intro point ip for the service service_pk is usable.
 + * This function checks if the intro point is in the client intro state cache
 + * and checks at the failures. It is considered usable if:
 + *   - No error happened (INTRO_POINT_FAILURE_GENERIC)
 + *   - It is not flagged as timed out (INTRO_POINT_FAILURE_TIMEOUT)
 + *   - The unreachable count is lower than
 + *     MAX_INTRO_POINT_REACHABILITY_FAILURES (INTRO_POINT_FAILURE_UNREACHABLE)
 + */
 +static int
 +intro_point_is_usable(const ed25519_public_key_t *service_pk,
 +                      const hs_desc_intro_point_t *ip)
 +{
 +  const hs_cache_intro_state_t *state;
 +
 +  tor_assert(service_pk);
 +  tor_assert(ip);
 +
 +  state = hs_cache_client_intro_state_find(service_pk,
 +                                           &ip->auth_key_cert->signed_key);
 +  if (state == NULL) {
 +    /* This means we've never encountered any problem thus usable. */
 +    goto usable;
 +  }
 +  if (state->error) {
 +    log_info(LD_REND, "Intro point with auth key %s had an error. Not usable",
 +             safe_str_client(ed25519_fmt(&ip->auth_key_cert->signed_key)));
 +    goto not_usable;
 +  }
 +  if (state->timed_out) {
 +    log_info(LD_REND, "Intro point with auth key %s timed out. Not usable",
 +             safe_str_client(ed25519_fmt(&ip->auth_key_cert->signed_key)));
 +    goto not_usable;
 +  }
 +  if (state->unreachable_count >= MAX_INTRO_POINT_REACHABILITY_FAILURES) {
 +    log_info(LD_REND, "Intro point with auth key %s unreachable. Not usable",
 +             safe_str_client(ed25519_fmt(&ip->auth_key_cert->signed_key)));
 +    goto not_usable;
 +  }
 +
 + usable:
 +  return 1;
 + not_usable:
 +  return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/* Using a descriptor desc, return a newly allocated extend_info_t object of a
 + * randomly picked introduction point from its list. Return NULL if none are
 + * usable. */
 +STATIC extend_info_t *
 +client_get_random_intro(const ed25519_public_key_t *service_pk)
 +{
 +  extend_info_t *ei = NULL, *ei_excluded = NULL;
 +  smartlist_t *usable_ips = NULL;
 +  const hs_descriptor_t *desc;
 +  const hs_desc_encrypted_data_t *enc_data;
 +  const or_options_t *options = get_options();
 +  /* Calculate the onion address for logging purposes */
 +  char onion_address[HS_SERVICE_ADDR_LEN_BASE32 + 1];
 +
 +  tor_assert(service_pk);
 +
 +  desc = hs_cache_lookup_as_client(service_pk);
 +  /* Assume the service is v3 if the descriptor is missing. This is ok,
 +   * because we only use the address in log messages */
 +  hs_build_address(service_pk,
 +                   desc ? desc->plaintext_data.version : HS_VERSION_THREE,
 +                   onion_address);
 +  if (desc == NULL || !hs_client_any_intro_points_usable(service_pk,
 +                                                         desc)) {
 +    log_info(LD_REND, "Unable to randomly select an introduction point "
 +             "for service %s because descriptor %s. We can't connect.",
 +             safe_str_client(onion_address),
 +             (desc) ? "doesn't have any usable intro points"
 +                    : "is missing (assuming v3 onion address)");
 +    goto end;
 +  }
 +
 +  enc_data = &desc->encrypted_data;
 +  usable_ips = smartlist_new();
 +  smartlist_add_all(usable_ips, enc_data->intro_points);
 +  while (smartlist_len(usable_ips) != 0) {
 +    int idx;
 +    const hs_desc_intro_point_t *ip;
 +
 +    /* Pick a random intro point and immediately remove it from the usable
 +     * list so we don't pick it again if we have to iterate more. */
 +    idx = crypto_rand_int(smartlist_len(usable_ips));
 +    ip = smartlist_get(usable_ips, idx);
 +    smartlist_del(usable_ips, idx);
 +
 +    /* We need to make sure we have a usable intro points which is in a good
 +     * state in our cache. */
 +    if (!intro_point_is_usable(service_pk, ip)) {
 +      continue;
 +    }
 +
 +    /* Generate an extend info object from the intro point object. */
 +    ei = desc_intro_point_to_extend_info(ip);
 +    if (ei == NULL) {
 +      /* We can get here for instance if the intro point is a private address
 +       * and we aren't allowed to extend to those. */
 +      log_info(LD_REND, "Unable to select introduction point with auth key %s "
 +               "for service %s, because we could not extend to it.",
 +               safe_str_client(ed25519_fmt(&ip->auth_key_cert->signed_key)),
 +               safe_str_client(onion_address));
 +      continue;
 +    }
 +
 +    /* Test the pick against ExcludeNodes. */
 +    if (routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->ExcludeNodes, ei)) {
 +      /* If this pick is in the ExcludeNodes list, we keep its reference so if
 +       * we ever end up not being able to pick anything else and StrictNodes is
 +       * unset, we'll use it. */
 +      if (ei_excluded) {
 +        /* If something was already here free it. After the loop is gone we
 +         * will examine the last excluded intro point, and that's fine since
 +         * that's random anyway */
 +        extend_info_free(ei_excluded);
 +      }
 +      ei_excluded = ei;
 +      continue;
 +    }
 +
 +    /* Good pick! Let's go with this. */
 +    goto end;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Reaching this point means a couple of things. Either we can't use any of
 +   * the intro point listed because the IP address can't be extended to or it
 +   * is listed in the ExcludeNodes list. In the later case, if StrictNodes is
 +   * set, we are forced to not use anything. */
 +  ei = ei_excluded;
 +  if (options->StrictNodes) {
 +    log_warn(LD_REND, "Every introduction point for service %s is in the "
 +             "ExcludeNodes set and StrictNodes is set. We can't connect.",
 +             safe_str_client(onion_address));
 +    extend_info_free(ei);
 +    ei = NULL;
 +  } else {
 +    log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_REND, "Every introduction point for service "
 +           "%s is unusable or we can't extend to it. We can't connect.",
 +           safe_str_client(onion_address));
 +  }
 +
 + end:
 +  smartlist_free(usable_ips);
 +  memwipe(onion_address, 0, sizeof(onion_address));
 +  return ei;
 +}
 +
 +/* For this introduction circuit, we'll look at if we have any usable
 + * introduction point left for this service. If so, we'll use the circuit to
 + * re-extend to a new intro point. Else, we'll close the circuit and its
 + * corresponding rendezvous circuit. Return 0 if we are re-extending else -1
 + * if we are closing the circuits.
 + *
 + * This is called when getting an INTRODUCE_ACK cell with a NACK. */
 +static int
 +close_or_reextend_intro_circ(origin_circuit_t *intro_circ)
 +{
 +  int ret = -1;
 +  const hs_descriptor_t *desc;
 +  origin_circuit_t *rend_circ;
 +
 +  tor_assert(intro_circ);
 +
 +  desc = hs_cache_lookup_as_client(&intro_circ->hs_ident->identity_pk);
 +  if (BUG(desc == NULL)) {
 +    /* We can't continue without a descriptor. */
 +    goto close;
 +  }
 +  /* We still have the descriptor, great! Let's try to see if we can
 +   * re-extend by looking up if there are any usable intro points. */
 +  if (!hs_client_any_intro_points_usable(&intro_circ->hs_ident->identity_pk,
 +                                         desc)) {
 +    goto close;
 +  }
 +  /* Try to re-extend now. */
 +  if (hs_client_reextend_intro_circuit(intro_circ) < 0) {
 +    goto close;
 +  }
 +  /* Success on re-extending. Don't return an error. */
 +  ret = 0;
 +  goto end;
 +
 + close:
 +  /* Change the intro circuit purpose before so we don't report an intro point
 +   * failure again triggering an extra descriptor fetch. The circuit can
 +   * already be closed on failure to re-extend. */
 +  if (!TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ)->marked_for_close) {
 +    circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ),
 +                           CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACKED);
 +    circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ), END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED);
 +  }
 +  /* Close the related rendezvous circuit. */
 +  rend_circ = hs_circuitmap_get_rend_circ_client_side(
 +                                     intro_circ->hs_ident->rendezvous_cookie);
 +  /* The rendezvous circuit might have collapsed while the INTRODUCE_ACK was
 +   * inflight so we can't expect one every time. */
 +  if (rend_circ) {
 +    circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(rend_circ), END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED);
 +  }
 +
 + end:
 +  return ret;
 +}
 +
 +/* Called when we get an INTRODUCE_ACK success status code. Do the appropriate
 + * actions for the rendezvous point and finally close intro_circ. */
 +static void
 +handle_introduce_ack_success(origin_circuit_t *intro_circ)
 +{
 +  origin_circuit_t *rend_circ = NULL;
 +
 +  tor_assert(intro_circ);
 +
 +  log_info(LD_REND, "Received INTRODUCE_ACK ack! Informing rendezvous");
 +
 +  /* Get the rendezvous circuit for this rendezvous cookie. */
 +  uint8_t *rendezvous_cookie = intro_circ->hs_ident->rendezvous_cookie;
 +  rend_circ =
 +  hs_circuitmap_get_established_rend_circ_client_side(rendezvous_cookie);
 +  if (rend_circ == NULL) {
 +    log_warn(LD_REND, "Can't find any rendezvous circuit. Stopping");
 +    goto end;
 +  }
 +
 +  assert_circ_anonymity_ok(rend_circ, get_options());
 +
 +  /* It is possible to get a RENDEZVOUS2 cell before the INTRODUCE_ACK which
 +   * means that the circuit will be joined and already transmitting data. In
 +   * that case, simply skip the purpose change and close the intro circuit
 +   * like it should be. */
 +  if (TO_CIRCUIT(rend_circ)->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED) {
 +    goto end;
 +  }
 +  circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(rend_circ),
 +                         CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED);
 +  /* Set timestamp_dirty, because circuit_expire_building expects it to
 +   * specify when a circuit entered the
 +   * CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED state. */
 +  TO_CIRCUIT(rend_circ)->timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
 +
 + end:
 +  /* We don't need the intro circuit anymore. It did what it had to do! */
 +  circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ),
 +                         CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACKED);
 +  circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ), END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED);
 +
 +  /* XXX: Close pending intro circuits we might have in parallel. */
 +  return;
 +}
 +
 +/* Called when we get an INTRODUCE_ACK failure status code. Depending on our
 + * failure cache status, either close the circuit or re-extend to a new
 + * introduction point. */
 +static void
 +handle_introduce_ack_bad(origin_circuit_t *circ, int status)
 +{
 +  tor_assert(circ);
 +
 +  log_info(LD_REND, "Received INTRODUCE_ACK nack by %s. Reason: %u",
 +      safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(circ->build_state->chosen_exit)),
 +      status);
 +
 +  /* It's a NAK. The introduction point didn't relay our request. */
 +  circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING);
 +
 +  /* Note down this failure in the intro point failure cache. Depending on how
 +   * many times we've tried this intro point, close it or reextend. */
 +  hs_cache_client_intro_state_note(&circ->hs_ident->identity_pk,
 +                                   &circ->hs_ident->intro_auth_pk,
 +                                   INTRO_POINT_FAILURE_GENERIC);
 +}
 +
 +/* Called when we get an INTRODUCE_ACK on the intro circuit circ. The encoded
 + * cell is in payload of length payload_len. Return 0 on success else a
 + * negative value. The circuit is either close or reuse to re-extend to a new
 + * introduction point. */
 +static int
 +handle_introduce_ack(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *payload,
 +                     size_t payload_len)
 +{
 +  int status, ret = -1;
 +
 +  tor_assert(circ);
 +  tor_assert(circ->build_state);
 +  tor_assert(circ->build_state->chosen_exit);
 +  assert_circ_anonymity_ok(circ, get_options());
 +  tor_assert(payload);
 +
 +  status = hs_cell_parse_introduce_ack(payload, payload_len);
 +  switch (status) {
-   case HS_CELL_INTRO_ACK_SUCCESS:
++  case TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_SUCCESS:
 +    ret = 0;
 +    handle_introduce_ack_success(circ);
 +    goto end;
-   case HS_CELL_INTRO_ACK_FAILURE:
-   case HS_CELL_INTRO_ACK_BADFMT:
-   case HS_CELL_INTRO_ACK_NORELAY:
++  case TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_UNKNOWN_ID:
++  case TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_BAD_FORMAT:
++  /* It is possible that the intro point can send us an unknown status code
++   * for the NACK that we do not know about like a new code for instance.
++   * Just fallthrough so we can note down the NACK and re-extend. */
++  default:
 +    handle_introduce_ack_bad(circ, status);
 +    /* We are going to see if we have to close the circuits (IP and RP) or we
 +     * can re-extend to a new intro point. */
 +    ret = close_or_reextend_intro_circ(circ);
 +    break;
-   default:
-     log_info(LD_PROTOCOL, "Unknown INTRODUCE_ACK status code %u from %s",
-         status,
-         safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(circ->build_state->chosen_exit)));
-     break;
 +  }
 +
 + end:
 +  return ret;
 +}
 +
 +/* Called when we get a RENDEZVOUS2 cell on the rendezvous circuit circ. The
 + * encoded cell is in payload of length payload_len. Return 0 on success or a
 + * negative value on error. On error, the circuit is marked for close. */
 +STATIC int
 +handle_rendezvous2(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *payload,
 +                   size_t payload_len)
 +{
 +  int ret = -1;
 +  curve25519_public_key_t server_pk;
 +  uint8_t auth_mac[DIGEST256_LEN] = {0};
 +  uint8_t handshake_info[CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN + sizeof(auth_mac)] = {0};
 +  hs_ntor_rend_cell_keys_t keys;
 +  const hs_ident_circuit_t *ident;
 +
 +  tor_assert(circ);
 +  tor_assert(payload);
 +
 +  /* Make things easier. */
 +  ident = circ->hs_ident;
 +  tor_assert(ident);
 +
 +  if (hs_cell_parse_rendezvous2(payload, payload_len, handshake_info,
 +                                sizeof(handshake_info)) < 0) {
 +    goto err;
 +  }
 +  /* Get from the handshake info the SERVER_PK and AUTH_MAC. */
 +  memcpy(&server_pk, handshake_info, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
 +  memcpy(auth_mac, handshake_info + CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN, sizeof(auth_mac));
 +
 +  /* Generate the handshake info. */
 +  if (hs_ntor_client_get_rendezvous1_keys(&ident->intro_auth_pk,
 +                                          &ident->rendezvous_client_kp,
 +                                          &ident->intro_enc_pk, &server_pk,
 +                                          &keys) < 0) {
 +    log_info(LD_REND, "Unable to compute the rendezvous keys.");
 +    goto err;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Critical check, make sure that the MAC matches what we got with what we
 +   * computed just above. */
 +  if (!hs_ntor_client_rendezvous2_mac_is_good(&keys, auth_mac)) {
 +    log_info(LD_REND, "Invalid MAC in RENDEZVOUS2. Rejecting cell.");
 +    goto err;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Setup the e2e encryption on the circuit and finalize its state. */
 +  if (hs_circuit_setup_e2e_rend_circ(circ, keys.ntor_key_seed,
 +                                     sizeof(keys.ntor_key_seed), 0) < 0) {
 +    log_info(LD_REND, "Unable to setup the e2e encryption.");
 +    goto err;
 +  }
 +  /* Success. Hidden service connection finalized! */
 +  ret = 0;
 +  goto end;
 +
 + err:
 +  circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
 + end:
 +  memwipe(&keys, 0, sizeof(keys));
 +  return ret;
 +}
 +
 +/* Return true iff the client can fetch a descriptor for this service public
 + * identity key and status_out if not NULL is untouched. If the client can
 + * _not_ fetch the descriptor and if status_out is not NULL, it is set with
 + * the fetch status code. */
 +static unsigned int
 +can_client_refetch_desc(const ed25519_public_key_t *identity_pk,
 +                        hs_client_fetch_status_t *status_out)
 +{
 +  hs_client_fetch_status_t status;
 +
 +  tor_assert(identity_pk);
 +
 +  /* Are we configured to fetch descriptors? */
 +  if (!get_options()->FetchHidServDescriptors) {
 +    log_warn(LD_REND, "We received an onion address for a hidden service "
 +                      "descriptor but we are configured to not fetch.");
 +    status = HS_CLIENT_FETCH_NOT_ALLOWED;
 +    goto cannot;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Without a live consensus we can't do any client actions. It is needed to
 +   * compute the hashring for a service. */
 +  if (!networkstatus_get_live_consensus(approx_time())) {
 +    log_info(LD_REND, "Can't fetch descriptor for service %s because we "
 +                      "are missing a live consensus. Stalling connection.",
 +             safe_str_client(ed25519_fmt(identity_pk)));
 +    status = HS_CLIENT_FETCH_MISSING_INFO;
 +    goto cannot;
 +  }
 +
 +  if (!router_have_minimum_dir_info()) {
 +    log_info(LD_REND, "Can't fetch descriptor for service %s because we "
 +                      "dont have enough descriptors. Stalling connection.",
 +             safe_str_client(ed25519_fmt(identity_pk)));
 +    status = HS_CLIENT_FETCH_MISSING_INFO;
 +    goto cannot;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Check if fetching a desc for this HS is useful to us right now */
 +  {
 +    const hs_descriptor_t *cached_desc = NULL;
 +    cached_desc = hs_cache_lookup_as_client(identity_pk);
 +    if (cached_desc && hs_client_any_intro_points_usable(identity_pk,
 +                                                         cached_desc)) {
 +      log_info(LD_GENERAL, "We would fetch a v3 hidden service descriptor "
 +                           "but we already have a usable descriptor.");
 +      status = HS_CLIENT_FETCH_HAVE_DESC;
 +      goto cannot;
 +    }
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Don't try to refetch while we have a pending request for it. */
 +  if (directory_request_is_pending(identity_pk)) {
 +    log_info(LD_REND, "Already a pending directory request. Waiting on it.");
 +    status = HS_CLIENT_FETCH_PENDING;
 +    goto cannot;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Yes, client can fetch! */
 +  return 1;
 + cannot:
 +  if (status_out) {
 +    *status_out = status;
 +  }
 +  return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/* Return the client auth in the map using the service identity public key.
 + * Return NULL if it does not exist in the map. */
 +static hs_client_service_authorization_t *
 +find_client_auth(const ed25519_public_key_t *service_identity_pk)
 +{
 +  /* If the map is not allocated, we can assume that we do not have any client
 +   * auth information. */
 +  if (!client_auths) {
 +    return NULL;
 +  }
 +  return digest256map_get(client_auths, service_identity_pk->pubkey);
 +}
 +
 +/* ========== */
 +/* Public API */
 +/* ========== */
 +
 +/** A circuit just finished connecting to a hidden service that the stream
 + *  <b>conn</b> has been waiting for. Let the HS subsystem know about this. */
 +void
 +hs_client_note_connection_attempt_succeeded(const edge_connection_t *conn)
 +{
 +  tor_assert(connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(conn));
 +
 +  if (BUG(conn->rend_data && conn->hs_ident)) {
 +    log_warn(LD_BUG, "Stream had both rend_data and hs_ident..."
 +             "Prioritizing hs_ident");
 +  }
 +
 +  if (conn->hs_ident) { /* It's v3: pass it to the prop224 handler */
 +    note_connection_attempt_succeeded(conn->hs_ident);
 +    return;
 +  } else if (conn->rend_data) { /* It's v2: pass it to the legacy handler */
 +    rend_client_note_connection_attempt_ended(conn->rend_data);
 +    return;
 +  }
 +}
 +
 +/* With the given encoded descriptor in desc_str and the service key in
 + * service_identity_pk, decode the descriptor and set the desc pointer with a
 + * newly allocated descriptor object.
 + *
 + * Return 0 on success else a negative value and desc is set to NULL. */
 +int
 +hs_client_decode_descriptor(const char *desc_str,
 +                            const ed25519_public_key_t *service_identity_pk,
 +                            hs_descriptor_t **desc)
 +{
 +  int ret;
 +  uint8_t subcredential[DIGEST256_LEN];
 +  ed25519_public_key_t blinded_pubkey;
 +  hs_client_service_authorization_t *client_auth = NULL;
 +  curve25519_secret_key_t *client_auht_sk = NULL;
 +
 +  tor_assert(desc_str);
 +  tor_assert(service_identity_pk);
 +  tor_assert(desc);
 +
 +  /* Check if we have a client authorization for this service in the map. */
 +  client_auth = find_client_auth(service_identity_pk);
 +  if (client_auth) {
 +    client_auht_sk = &client_auth->enc_seckey;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Create subcredential for this HS so that we can decrypt */
 +  {
 +    uint64_t current_time_period = hs_get_time_period_num(0);
 +    hs_build_blinded_pubkey(service_identity_pk, NULL, 0, current_time_period,
 +                            &blinded_pubkey);
 +    hs_get_subcredential(service_identity_pk, &blinded_pubkey, subcredential);
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Parse descriptor */
 +  ret = hs_desc_decode_descriptor(desc_str, subcredential,
 +                                  client_auht_sk, desc);
 +  memwipe(subcredential, 0, sizeof(subcredential));
 +  if (ret < 0) {
 +    goto err;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Make sure the descriptor signing key cross certifies with the computed
 +   * blinded key. Without this validation, anyone knowing the subcredential
 +   * and onion address can forge a descriptor. */
 +  tor_cert_t *cert = (*desc)->plaintext_data.signing_key_cert;
 +  if (tor_cert_checksig(cert,
 +                        &blinded_pubkey, approx_time()) < 0) {
 +    log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Descriptor signing key certificate signature "
 +             "doesn't validate with computed blinded key: %s",
 +             tor_cert_describe_signature_status(cert));
 +    goto err;
 +  }
 +
 +  return 0;
 + err:
 +  return -1;
 +}
 +
 +/* Return true iff there are at least one usable intro point in the service
 + * descriptor desc. */
 +int
 +hs_client_any_intro_points_usable(const ed25519_public_key_t *service_pk,
 +                                  const hs_descriptor_t *desc)
 +{
 +  tor_assert(service_pk);
 +  tor_assert(desc);
 +
 +  SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(desc->encrypted_data.intro_points,
 +                          const hs_desc_intro_point_t *, ip) {
 +    if (intro_point_is_usable(service_pk, ip)) {
 +      goto usable;
 +    }
 +  } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(ip);
 +
 +  return 0;
 + usable:
 +  return 1;
 +}
 +
 +/** Launch a connection to a hidden service directory to fetch a hidden
 + * service descriptor using <b>identity_pk</b> to get the necessary keys.
 + *
 + * A hs_client_fetch_status_t code is returned. */
 +int
 +hs_client_refetch_hsdesc(const ed25519_public_key_t *identity_pk)
 +{
 +  hs_client_fetch_status_t status;
 +
 +  tor_assert(identity_pk);
 +
 +  if (!can_client_refetch_desc(identity_pk, &status)) {
 +    return status;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Try to fetch the desc and if we encounter an unrecoverable error, mark
 +   * the desc as unavailable for now. */
 +  status = fetch_v3_desc(identity_pk);
 +  if (fetch_status_should_close_socks(status)) {
 +    close_all_socks_conns_waiting_for_desc(identity_pk, status,
 +                                           END_STREAM_REASON_RESOLVEFAILED);
 +    /* Remove HSDir fetch attempts so that we can retry later if the user
 +     * wants us to regardless of if we closed any connections. */
 +    purge_hid_serv_request(identity_pk);
 +  }
 +  return status;
 +}
 +
 +/* This is called when we are trying to attach an AP connection to these
 + * hidden service circuits from connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit().
 + * Return 0 on success, -1 for a transient error that is actions were
 + * triggered to recover or -2 for a permenent error where both circuits will
 + * marked for close.
 + *
 + * The following supports every hidden service version. */
 +int
 +hs_client_send_introduce1(origin_circuit_t *intro_circ,
 +                          origin_circuit_t *rend_circ)
 +{
 +  return (intro_circ->hs_ident) ? send_introduce1(intro_circ, rend_circ) :
 +                                  rend_client_send_introduction(intro_circ,
 +                                                                rend_circ);
 +}
 +
 +/* Called when the client circuit circ has been established. It can be either
 + * an introduction or rendezvous circuit. This function handles all hidden
 + * service versions. */
 +void
 +hs_client_circuit_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ)
 +{
 +  tor_assert(circ);
 +
 +  /* Handle both version. v2 uses rend_data and v3 uses the hs circuit
 +   * identifier hs_ident. Can't be both. */
 +  switch (TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose) {
 +  case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING:
 +    if (circ->hs_ident) {
 +      client_intro_circ_has_opened(circ);
 +    } else {
 +      rend_client_introcirc_has_opened(circ);
 +    }
 +    break;
 +  case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND:
 +    if (circ->hs_ident) {
 +      client_rendezvous_circ_has_opened(circ);
 +    } else {
 +      rend_client_rendcirc_has_opened(circ);
 +    }
 +    break;
 +  default:
 +    tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached();
 +  }
 +}
 +
 +/* Called when we receive a RENDEZVOUS_ESTABLISHED cell. Change the state of
 + * the circuit to CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY. Return 0 on success else a
 + * negative value and the circuit marked for close. */
 +int
 +hs_client_receive_rendezvous_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ,
 +                                   const uint8_t *payload, size_t payload_len)
 +{
 +  tor_assert(circ);
 +  tor_assert(payload);
 +
 +  (void) payload_len;
 +
 +  if (TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND) {
 +    log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Got a RENDEZVOUS_ESTABLISHED but we were not "
 +                          "expecting one. Closing circuit.");
 +    goto err;
 +  }
 +
 +  log_info(LD_REND, "Received an RENDEZVOUS_ESTABLISHED. This circuit is "
 +                    "now ready for rendezvous.");
 +  circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY);
 +
 +  /* Set timestamp_dirty, because circuit_expire_building expects it to
 +   * specify when a circuit entered the _C_REND_READY state. */
 +  TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
 +
 +  /* From a path bias point of view, this circuit is now successfully used.
 +   * Waiting any longer opens us up to attacks from malicious hidden services.
 +   * They could induce the client to attempt to connect to their hidden
 +   * service and never reply to the client's rend requests */
 +  pathbias_mark_use_success(circ);
 +
 +  /* If we already have the introduction circuit built, make sure we send
 +   * the INTRODUCE cell _now_ */
 +  connection_ap_attach_pending(1);
 +
 +  return 0;
 + err:
 +  circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
 +  return -1;
 +}
 +
 +#define client_service_authorization_free(auth)                      \
 +  FREE_AND_NULL(hs_client_service_authorization_t,                   \
 +                client_service_authorization_free_, (auth))
 +
 +static void
 +client_service_authorization_free_(hs_client_service_authorization_t *auth)
 +{
 +  if (auth) {
 +    memwipe(auth, 0, sizeof(*auth));
 +  }
 +  tor_free(auth);
 +}
 +
 +/** Helper for digest256map_free. */
 +static void
 +client_service_authorization_free_void(void *auth)
 +{
 +  client_service_authorization_free_(auth);
 +}
 +
 +static void
 +client_service_authorization_free_all(void)
 +{
 +  if (!client_auths) {
 +    return;
 +  }
 +  digest256map_free(client_auths, client_service_authorization_free_void);
 +}
 +
 +/* Check if the auth key file name is valid or not. Return 1 if valid,
 + * otherwise return 0. */
 +STATIC int
 +auth_key_filename_is_valid(const char *filename)
 +{
 +  int ret = 1;
 +  const char *valid_extension = ".auth_private";
 +
 +  tor_assert(filename);
 +
 +  /* The length of the filename must be greater than the length of the
 +   * extension and the valid extension must be at the end of filename. */
 +  if (!strcmpend(filename, valid_extension) &&
 +      strlen(filename) != strlen(valid_extension)) {
 +    ret = 1;
 +  } else {
 +    ret = 0;
 +  }
 +
 +  return ret;
 +}
 +
 +STATIC hs_client_service_authorization_t *
 +parse_auth_file_content(const char *client_key_str)
 +{
 +  char *onion_address = NULL;
 +  char *auth_type = NULL;
 +  char *key_type = NULL;
 +  char *seckey_b32 = NULL;
 +  hs_client_service_authorization_t *auth = NULL;
 +  smartlist_t *fields = smartlist_new();
 +
 +  tor_assert(client_key_str);
 +
 +  smartlist_split_string(fields, client_key_str, ":",
 +                         SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE, 0);
 +  /* Wrong number of fields. */
 +  if (smartlist_len(fields) != 4) {
 +    goto err;
 +  }
 +
 +  onion_address = smartlist_get(fields, 0);
 +  auth_type = smartlist_get(fields, 1);
 +  key_type = smartlist_get(fields, 2);
 +  seckey_b32 = smartlist_get(fields, 3);
 +
 +  /* Currently, the only supported auth type is "descriptor" and the only
 +   * supported key type is "x25519". */
 +  if (strcmp(auth_type, "descriptor") || strcmp(key_type, "x25519")) {
 +    goto err;
 +  }
 +
 +  if (strlen(seckey_b32) != BASE32_NOPAD_LEN(CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) {
 +    log_warn(LD_REND, "Client authorization encoded base32 private key "
 +                      "length is invalid: %s", seckey_b32);
 +    goto err;
 +  }
 +
 +  auth = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(hs_client_service_authorization_t));
 +  if (base32_decode((char *) auth->enc_seckey.secret_key,
 +                    sizeof(auth->enc_seckey.secret_key),
 +                    seckey_b32, strlen(seckey_b32)) < 0) {
 +    goto err;
 +  }
 +  strncpy(auth->onion_address, onion_address, HS_SERVICE_ADDR_LEN_BASE32);
 +
 +  /* Success. */
 +  goto done;
 +
 + err:
 +  client_service_authorization_free(auth);
 + done:
 +  /* It is also a good idea to wipe the private key. */
 +  if (seckey_b32) {
 +    memwipe(seckey_b32, 0, strlen(seckey_b32));
 +  }
 +  tor_assert(fields);
 +  SMARTLIST_FOREACH(fields, char *, s, tor_free(s));
 +  smartlist_free(fields);
 +  return auth;
 +}
 +
 +/* From a set of <b>options</b>, setup every client authorization detail
 + * found. Return 0 on success or -1 on failure. If <b>validate_only</b>
 + * is set, parse, warn and return as normal, but don't actually change
 + * the configuration. */
 +int
 +hs_config_client_authorization(const or_options_t *options,
 +                               int validate_only)
 +{
 +  int ret = -1;
 +  digest256map_t *auths = digest256map_new();
 +  char *key_dir = NULL;
 +  smartlist_t *file_list = NULL;
 +  char *client_key_str = NULL;
 +  char *client_key_file_path = NULL;
 +
 +  tor_assert(options);
 +
 +  /* There is no client auth configured. We can just silently ignore this
 +   * function. */
 +  if (!options->ClientOnionAuthDir) {
 +    ret = 0;
 +    goto end;
 +  }
 +
 +  key_dir = tor_strdup(options->ClientOnionAuthDir);
 +
 +  /* Make sure the directory exists and is private enough. */
 +  if (check_private_dir(key_dir, 0, options->User) < 0) {
 +    goto end;
 +  }
 +
 +  file_list = tor_listdir(key_dir);
 +  if (file_list == NULL) {
 +    log_warn(LD_REND, "Client authorization key directory %s can't be listed.",
 +             key_dir);
 +    goto end;
 +  }
 +
 +  SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(file_list, char *, filename) {
 +
 +    hs_client_service_authorization_t *auth = NULL;
 +    ed25519_public_key_t identity_pk;
 +    log_info(LD_REND, "Loading a client authorization key file %s...",
 +             filename);
 +
 +    if (!auth_key_filename_is_valid(filename)) {
 +      log_notice(LD_REND, "Client authorization unrecognized filename %s. "
 +                          "File must end in .auth_private. Ignoring.",
 +                 filename);
 +      continue;
 +    }
 +
 +    /* Create a full path for a file. */
 +    client_key_file_path = hs_path_from_filename(key_dir, filename);
 +    client_key_str = read_file_to_str(client_key_file_path, 0, NULL);
 +    /* Free the file path immediately after using it. */
 +    tor_free(client_key_file_path);
 +
 +    /* If we cannot read the file, continue with the next file. */
 +    if (!client_key_str) {
 +      log_warn(LD_REND, "The file %s cannot be read.", filename);
 +      continue;
 +    }
 +
 +    auth = parse_auth_file_content(client_key_str);
 +    /* Free immediately after using it. */
 +    tor_free(client_key_str);
 +
 +    if (auth) {
 +      /* Parse the onion address to get an identity public key and use it
 +       * as a key of global map in the future. */
 +      if (hs_parse_address(auth->onion_address, &identity_pk,
 +                           NULL, NULL) < 0) {
 +        log_warn(LD_REND, "The onion address "%s" is invalid in "
 +                          "file %s", filename, auth->onion_address);
 +        client_service_authorization_free(auth);
 +        continue;
 +      }
 +
 +      if (digest256map_get(auths, identity_pk.pubkey)) {
 +        log_warn(LD_REND, "Duplicate authorization for the same hidden "
 +                          "service address %s.",
 +                 safe_str_client_opts(options, auth->onion_address));
 +        client_service_authorization_free(auth);
 +        goto end;
 +      }
 +
 +      digest256map_set(auths, identity_pk.pubkey, auth);
 +      log_info(LD_REND, "Loaded a client authorization key file %s.",
 +               filename);
 +    }
 +  } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(filename);
 +
 +  /* Success. */
 +  ret = 0;
 +
 + end:
 +  tor_free(key_dir);
 +  tor_free(client_key_str);
 +  tor_free(client_key_file_path);
 +  if (file_list) {
 +    SMARTLIST_FOREACH(file_list, char *, s, tor_free(s));
 +    smartlist_free(file_list);
 +  }
 +
 +  if (!validate_only && ret == 0) {
 +    client_service_authorization_free_all();
 +    client_auths = auths;
 +  } else {
 +    digest256map_free(auths, client_service_authorization_free_void);
 +  }
 +
 +  return ret;
 +}
 +
 +/* This is called when a descriptor has arrived following a fetch request and
 + * has been stored in the client cache. Every entry connection that matches
 + * the service identity key in the ident will get attached to the hidden
 + * service circuit. */
 +void
 +hs_client_desc_has_arrived(const hs_ident_dir_conn_t *ident)
 +{
 +  time_t now = time(NULL);
 +  smartlist_t *conns = NULL;
 +
 +  tor_assert(ident);
 +
 +  conns = connection_list_by_type_state(CONN_TYPE_AP,
 +                                        AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT);
 +  SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(conns, connection_t *, base_conn) {
 +    const hs_descriptor_t *desc;
 +    entry_connection_t *entry_conn = TO_ENTRY_CONN(base_conn);
 +    const edge_connection_t *edge_conn = ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(entry_conn);
 +
 +    /* Only consider the entry connections that matches the service for which
 +     * we just fetched its descriptor. */
 +    if (!edge_conn->hs_ident ||
 +        !ed25519_pubkey_eq(&ident->identity_pk,
 +                           &edge_conn->hs_ident->identity_pk)) {
 +      continue;
 +    }
 +    assert_connection_ok(base_conn, now);
 +
 +    /* We were just called because we stored the descriptor for this service
 +     * so not finding a descriptor means we have a bigger problem. */
 +    desc = hs_cache_lookup_as_client(&ident->identity_pk);
 +    if (BUG(desc == NULL)) {
 +      goto end;
 +    }
 +
 +    if (!hs_client_any_intro_points_usable(&ident->identity_pk, desc)) {
 +      log_info(LD_REND, "Hidden service descriptor is unusable. "
 +                        "Closing streams.");
 +      connection_mark_unattached_ap(entry_conn,
 +                                    END_STREAM_REASON_RESOLVEFAILED);
 +      /* We are unable to use the descriptor so remove the directory request
 +       * from the cache so the next connection can try again. */
 +      note_connection_attempt_succeeded(edge_conn->hs_ident);
 +      continue;
 +    }
 +
 +    log_info(LD_REND, "Descriptor has arrived. Launching circuits.");
 +
 +    /* Mark connection as waiting for a circuit since we do have a usable
 +     * descriptor now. */
 +    mark_conn_as_waiting_for_circuit(base_conn, now);
 +  } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(base_conn);
 +
 + end:
 +  /* We don't have ownership of the objects in this list. */
 +  smartlist_free(conns);
 +}
 +
 +/* Return a newly allocated extend_info_t for a randomly chosen introduction
 + * point for the given edge connection identifier ident. Return NULL if we
 + * can't pick any usable introduction points. */
 +extend_info_t *
 +hs_client_get_random_intro_from_edge(const edge_connection_t *edge_conn)
 +{
 +  tor_assert(edge_conn);
 +
 +  return (edge_conn->hs_ident) ?
 +    client_get_random_intro(&edge_conn->hs_ident->identity_pk) :
 +    rend_client_get_random_intro(edge_conn->rend_data);
 +}
 +
 +/* Called when get an INTRODUCE_ACK cell on the introduction circuit circ.
 + * Return 0 on success else a negative value is returned. The circuit will be
 + * closed or reuse to extend again to another intro point. */
 +int
 +hs_client_receive_introduce_ack(origin_circuit_t *circ,
 +                                const uint8_t *payload, size_t payload_len)
 +{
 +  int ret = -1;
 +
 +  tor_assert(circ);
 +  tor_assert(payload);
 +
 +  if (TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT) {
 +    log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Unexpected INTRODUCE_ACK on circuit %u.",
 +             (unsigned int) TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id);
 +    circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
 +    goto end;
 +  }
 +
 +  ret = (circ->hs_ident) ? handle_introduce_ack(circ, payload, payload_len) :
 +                           rend_client_introduction_acked(circ, payload,
 +                                                          payload_len);
 +  /* For path bias: This circuit was used successfully. NACK or ACK counts. */
 +  pathbias_mark_use_success(circ);
 +
 + end:
 +  return ret;
 +}
 +
 +/* Called when get a RENDEZVOUS2 cell on the rendezvous circuit circ.  Return
 + * 0 on success else a negative value is returned. The circuit will be closed
 + * on error. */
 +int
 +hs_client_receive_rendezvous2(origin_circuit_t *circ,
 +                              const uint8_t *payload, size_t payload_len)
 +{
 +  int ret = -1;
 +
 +  tor_assert(circ);
 +  tor_assert(payload);
 +
 +  /* Circuit can possibly be in both state because we could receive a
 +   * RENDEZVOUS2 cell before the INTRODUCE_ACK has been received. */
 +  if (TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY &&
 +      TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED) {
 +    log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Unexpected RENDEZVOUS2 cell on circuit %u. "
 +                          "Closing circuit.",
 +             (unsigned int) TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id);
 +    circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
 +    goto end;
 +  }
 +
 +  log_info(LD_REND, "Got RENDEZVOUS2 cell from hidden service on circuit %u.",
 +           TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id);
 +
 +  ret = (circ->hs_ident) ? handle_rendezvous2(circ, payload, payload_len) :
 +                           rend_client_receive_rendezvous(circ, payload,
 +                                                          payload_len);
 + end:
 +  return ret;
 +}
 +
 +/* Extend the introduction circuit circ to another valid introduction point
 + * for the hidden service it is trying to connect to, or mark it and launch a
 + * new circuit if we can't extend it.  Return 0 on success or possible
 + * success. Return -1 and mark the introduction circuit for close on permanent
 + * failure.
 + *
 + * On failure, the caller is responsible for marking the associated rendezvous
 + * circuit for close. */
 +int
 +hs_client_reextend_intro_circuit(origin_circuit_t *circ)
 +{
 +  int ret = -1;
 +  extend_info_t *ei;
 +
 +  tor_assert(circ);
 +
 +  ei = (circ->hs_ident) ?
 +    client_get_random_intro(&circ->hs_ident->identity_pk) :
 +    rend_client_get_random_intro(circ->rend_data);
 +  if (ei == NULL) {
 +    log_warn(LD_REND, "No usable introduction points left. Closing.");
 +    circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL);
 +    goto end;
 +  }
 +
 +  if (circ->remaining_relay_early_cells) {
 +    log_info(LD_REND, "Re-extending circ %u, this time to %s.",
 +             (unsigned int) TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id,
 +             safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(ei)));
 +    ret = circuit_extend_to_new_exit(circ, ei);
 +    if (ret == 0) {
 +      /* We were able to extend so update the timestamp so we avoid expiring
 +       * this circuit too early. The intro circuit is short live so the
 +       * linkability issue is minimized, we just need the circuit to hold a
 +       * bit longer so we can introduce. */
 +      TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
 +    }
 +  } else {
 +    log_info(LD_REND, "Closing intro circ %u (out of RELAY_EARLY cells).",
 +             (unsigned int) TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id);
 +    circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED);
 +    /* connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit will launch a new intro circ. */
 +    ret = 0;
 +  }
 +
 + end:
 +  extend_info_free(ei);
 +  return ret;
 +}
 +
 +/* Close all client introduction circuits related to the given descriptor.
 + * This is called with a descriptor that is about to get replaced in the
 + * client cache.
 + *
 + * Even though the introduction point might be exactly the same, we'll rebuild
 + * them if needed but the odds are very low that an existing matching
 + * introduction circuit exists at that stage. */
 +void
 +hs_client_close_intro_circuits_from_desc(const hs_descriptor_t *desc)
 +{
 +  origin_circuit_t *ocirc = NULL;
 +
 +  tor_assert(desc);
 +
 +  /* We iterate over all client intro circuits because they aren't kept in the
 +   * HS circuitmap. That is probably something we want to do one day. */
 +  while ((ocirc = circuit_get_next_intro_circ(ocirc, true))) {
 +    if (ocirc->hs_ident == NULL) {
 +      /* Not a v3 circuit, ignore it. */
 +      continue;
 +    }
 +
 +    /* Does it match any IP in the given descriptor? If not, ignore. */
 +    if (find_desc_intro_point_by_ident(ocirc->hs_ident, desc) == NULL) {
 +      continue;
 +    }
 +
 +    /* We have a match. Close the circuit as consider it expired. */
 +    circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(ocirc), END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED);
 +  }
 +}
 +
 +/* Release all the storage held by the client subsystem. */
 +void
 +hs_client_free_all(void)
 +{
 +  /* Purge the hidden service request cache. */
 +  hs_purge_last_hid_serv_requests();
 +  client_service_authorization_free_all();
 +}
 +
 +/* Purge all potentially remotely-detectable state held in the hidden
 + * service client code. Called on SIGNAL NEWNYM. */
 +void
 +hs_client_purge_state(void)
 +{
 +  /* v2 subsystem. */
 +  rend_client_purge_state();
 +
 +  /* Cancel all descriptor fetches. Do this first so once done we are sure
 +   * that our descriptor cache won't modified. */
 +  cancel_descriptor_fetches();
 +  /* Purge the introduction point state cache. */
 +  hs_cache_client_intro_state_purge();
 +  /* Purge the descriptor cache. */
 +  hs_cache_purge_as_client();
 +  /* Purge the last hidden service request cache. */
 +  hs_purge_last_hid_serv_requests();
 +
 +  log_info(LD_REND, "Hidden service client state has been purged.");
 +}
 +
 +/* Called when our directory information has changed. */
 +void
 +hs_client_dir_info_changed(void)
 +{
 +  /* We have possibly reached the minimum directory information or new
 +   * consensus so retry all pending SOCKS connection in
 +   * AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT state in order to fetch the descriptor. */
 +  retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc();
 +}
 +
 +#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS
 +
 +STATIC digest256map_t *
 +get_hs_client_auths_map(void)
 +{
 +  return client_auths;
 +}
 +
 +#endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */
diff --cc src/feature/hs/hs_intropoint.c
index b28a5c2b8,000000000..7717ed53d
mode 100644,000000..100644
--- a/src/feature/hs/hs_intropoint.c
+++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_intropoint.c
@@@ -1,608 -1,0 +1,609 @@@
 +/* Copyright (c) 2016-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */
 +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
 +
 +/**
 + * \file hs_intropoint.c
 + * \brief Implement next generation introductions point functionality
 + **/
 +
 +#define HS_INTROPOINT_PRIVATE
 +
 +#include "core/or/or.h"
 +#include "app/config/config.h"
 +#include "core/or/circuitlist.h"
 +#include "core/or/circuituse.h"
 +#include "core/or/relay.h"
 +#include "feature/rend/rendmid.h"
 +#include "feature/stats/rephist.h"
 +#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_format.h"
 +
 +/* Trunnel */
 +#include "trunnel/ed25519_cert.h"
 +#include "trunnel/hs/cell_common.h"
 +#include "trunnel/hs/cell_establish_intro.h"
 +#include "trunnel/hs/cell_introduce1.h"
 +
 +#include "feature/hs/hs_circuitmap.h"
 +#include "feature/hs/hs_descriptor.h"
 +#include "feature/hs/hs_intropoint.h"
 +#include "feature/hs/hs_common.h"
 +
 +#include "core/or/or_circuit_st.h"
 +
 +/** Extract the authentication key from an ESTABLISH_INTRO or INTRODUCE1 using
 + * the given <b>cell_type</b> from <b>cell</b> and place it in
 + * <b>auth_key_out</b>. */
 +STATIC void
 +get_auth_key_from_cell(ed25519_public_key_t *auth_key_out,
 +                       unsigned int cell_type, const void *cell)
 +{
 +  size_t auth_key_len;
 +  const uint8_t *key_array;
 +
 +  tor_assert(auth_key_out);
 +  tor_assert(cell);
 +
 +  switch (cell_type) {
 +  case RELAY_COMMAND_ESTABLISH_INTRO:
 +  {
 +    const trn_cell_establish_intro_t *c_cell = cell;
 +    key_array = trn_cell_establish_intro_getconstarray_auth_key(c_cell);
 +    auth_key_len = trn_cell_establish_intro_getlen_auth_key(c_cell);
 +    break;
 +  }
 +  case RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE1:
 +  {
 +    const trn_cell_introduce1_t *c_cell = cell;
 +    key_array = trn_cell_introduce1_getconstarray_auth_key(cell);
 +    auth_key_len = trn_cell_introduce1_getlen_auth_key(c_cell);
 +    break;
 +  }
 +  default:
 +    /* Getting here is really bad as it means we got a unknown cell type from
 +     * this file where every call has an hardcoded value. */
 +    tor_assert_unreached(); /* LCOV_EXCL_LINE */
 +  }
 +  tor_assert(key_array);
 +  tor_assert(auth_key_len == sizeof(auth_key_out->pubkey));
 +  memcpy(auth_key_out->pubkey, key_array, auth_key_len);
 +}
 +
 +/** We received an ESTABLISH_INTRO <b>cell</b>. Verify its signature and MAC,
 + *  given <b>circuit_key_material</b>. Return 0 on success else -1 on error. */
 +STATIC int
 +verify_establish_intro_cell(const trn_cell_establish_intro_t *cell,
 +                            const uint8_t *circuit_key_material,
 +                            size_t circuit_key_material_len)
 +{
 +  /* We only reach this function if the first byte of the cell is 0x02 which
 +   * means that auth_key_type is of ed25519 type, hence this check should
 +   * always pass. See hs_intro_received_establish_intro().  */
-   if (BUG(cell->auth_key_type != HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_ED25519)) {
++  if (BUG(cell->auth_key_type != TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_ED25519)) {
 +    return -1;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Make sure the auth key length is of the right size for this type. For
 +   * EXTRA safety, we check both the size of the array and the length which
 +   * must be the same. Safety first!*/
 +  if (trn_cell_establish_intro_getlen_auth_key(cell) != ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN ||
 +      trn_cell_establish_intro_get_auth_key_len(cell) != ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN) {
 +    log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
 +           "ESTABLISH_INTRO auth key length is invalid");
 +    return -1;
 +  }
 +
 +  const uint8_t *msg = cell->start_cell;
 +
 +  /* Verify the sig */
 +  {
 +    ed25519_signature_t sig_struct;
 +    const uint8_t *sig_array =
 +      trn_cell_establish_intro_getconstarray_sig(cell);
 +
 +    /* Make sure the signature length is of the right size. For EXTRA safety,
 +     * we check both the size of the array and the length which must be the
 +     * same. Safety first!*/
 +    if (trn_cell_establish_intro_getlen_sig(cell) != sizeof(sig_struct.sig) ||
 +        trn_cell_establish_intro_get_sig_len(cell) != sizeof(sig_struct.sig)) {
 +      log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
 +             "ESTABLISH_INTRO sig len is invalid");
 +      return -1;
 +    }
 +    /* We are now sure that sig_len is of the right size. */
 +    memcpy(sig_struct.sig, sig_array, cell->sig_len);
 +
 +    ed25519_public_key_t auth_key;
 +    get_auth_key_from_cell(&auth_key, RELAY_COMMAND_ESTABLISH_INTRO, cell);
 +
 +    const size_t sig_msg_len = cell->end_sig_fields - msg;
 +    int sig_mismatch = ed25519_checksig_prefixed(&sig_struct,
 +                                                 msg, sig_msg_len,
 +                                                 ESTABLISH_INTRO_SIG_PREFIX,
 +                                                 &auth_key);
 +    if (sig_mismatch) {
 +      log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
 +             "ESTABLISH_INTRO signature not as expected");
 +      return -1;
 +    }
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Verify the MAC */
 +  {
 +    const size_t auth_msg_len = cell->end_mac_fields - msg;
 +    uint8_t mac[DIGEST256_LEN];
 +    crypto_mac_sha3_256(mac, sizeof(mac),
 +                        circuit_key_material, circuit_key_material_len,
 +                        msg, auth_msg_len);
 +    if (tor_memneq(mac, cell->handshake_mac, sizeof(mac))) {
 +      log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
 +             "ESTABLISH_INTRO handshake_auth not as expected");
 +      return -1;
 +    }
 +  }
 +
 +  return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/* Send an INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell to <b>circ</b>. */
 +MOCK_IMPL(int,
 +hs_intro_send_intro_established_cell,(or_circuit_t *circ))
 +{
 +  int ret;
 +  uint8_t *encoded_cell = NULL;
 +  ssize_t encoded_len, result_len;
 +  trn_cell_intro_established_t *cell;
 +  trn_cell_extension_t *ext;
 +
 +  tor_assert(circ);
 +
 +  /* Build the cell payload. */
 +  cell = trn_cell_intro_established_new();
 +  ext = trn_cell_extension_new();
 +  trn_cell_extension_set_num(ext, 0);
 +  trn_cell_intro_established_set_extensions(cell, ext);
 +  /* Encode the cell to binary format. */
 +  encoded_len = trn_cell_intro_established_encoded_len(cell);
 +  tor_assert(encoded_len > 0);
 +  encoded_cell = tor_malloc_zero(encoded_len);
 +  result_len = trn_cell_intro_established_encode(encoded_cell, encoded_len,
 +                                                cell);
 +  tor_assert(encoded_len == result_len);
 +
 +  ret = relay_send_command_from_edge(0, TO_CIRCUIT(circ),
 +                                     RELAY_COMMAND_INTRO_ESTABLISHED,
 +                                     (char *) encoded_cell, encoded_len,
 +                                     NULL);
 +  /* On failure, the above function will close the circuit. */
 +  trn_cell_intro_established_free(cell);
 +  tor_free(encoded_cell);
 +  return ret;
 +}
 +
 +/** We received an ESTABLISH_INTRO <b>parsed_cell</b> on <b>circ</b>. It's
 + *  well-formed and passed our verifications. Perform appropriate actions to
 + *  establish an intro point. */
 +static int
 +handle_verified_establish_intro_cell(or_circuit_t *circ,
 +                               const trn_cell_establish_intro_t *parsed_cell)
 +{
 +  /* Get the auth key of this intro point */
 +  ed25519_public_key_t auth_key;
 +  get_auth_key_from_cell(&auth_key, RELAY_COMMAND_ESTABLISH_INTRO,
 +                         parsed_cell);
 +
 +  /* Then notify the hidden service that the intro point is established by
 +     sending an INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell */
 +  if (hs_intro_send_intro_established_cell(circ)) {
 +    log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Couldn't send INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell.");
 +    return -1;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Associate intro point auth key with this circuit. */
 +  hs_circuitmap_register_intro_circ_v3_relay_side(circ, &auth_key);
 +  /* Repurpose this circuit into an intro circuit. */
 +  circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_INTRO_POINT);
 +
 +  return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/** We just received an ESTABLISH_INTRO cell in <b>circ</b> with payload in
 + *  <b>request</b>. Handle it by making <b>circ</b> an intro circuit. Return 0
 + *  if everything went well, or -1 if there were errors. */
 +static int
 +handle_establish_intro(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request,
 +                       size_t request_len)
 +{
 +  int cell_ok, retval = -1;
 +  trn_cell_establish_intro_t *parsed_cell = NULL;
 +
 +  tor_assert(circ);
 +  tor_assert(request);
 +
 +  log_info(LD_REND, "Received an ESTABLISH_INTRO request on circuit %" PRIu32,
 +           circ->p_circ_id);
 +
 +  /* Check that the circuit is in shape to become an intro point */
 +  if (!hs_intro_circuit_is_suitable_for_establish_intro(circ)) {
 +    goto err;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Parse the cell */
 +  ssize_t parsing_result = trn_cell_establish_intro_parse(&parsed_cell,
 +                                                         request, request_len);
 +  if (parsing_result < 0) {
 +    log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
 +           "Rejecting %s ESTABLISH_INTRO cell.",
 +           parsing_result == -1 ? "invalid" : "truncated");
 +    goto err;
 +  }
 +
 +  cell_ok = verify_establish_intro_cell(parsed_cell,
 +                                        (uint8_t *) circ->rend_circ_nonce,
 +                                        sizeof(circ->rend_circ_nonce));
 +  if (cell_ok < 0) {
 +    log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
 +           "Failed to verify ESTABLISH_INTRO cell.");
 +    goto err;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* This cell is legit. Take the appropriate actions. */
 +  cell_ok = handle_verified_establish_intro_cell(circ, parsed_cell);
 +  if (cell_ok < 0) {
 +    goto err;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* We are done! */
 +  retval = 0;
 +  goto done;
 +
 + err:
 +  /* When sending the intro establish ack, on error the circuit can be marked
 +   * as closed so avoid a double close. */
 +  if (!TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->marked_for_close) {
 +    circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
 +  }
 +
 + done:
 +  trn_cell_establish_intro_free(parsed_cell);
 +  return retval;
 +}
 +
 +/* Return True if circuit is suitable for being an intro circuit. */
 +static int
 +circuit_is_suitable_intro_point(const or_circuit_t *circ,
 +                                const char *log_cell_type_str)
 +{
 +  tor_assert(circ);
 +  tor_assert(log_cell_type_str);
 +
 +  /* Basic circuit state sanity checks. */
 +  if (circ->base_.purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR) {
 +    log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
 +           "Rejecting %s on non-OR circuit.", log_cell_type_str);
 +    return 0;
 +  }
 +
 +  if (circ->base_.n_chan) {
 +    log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
 +           "Rejecting %s on non-edge circuit.", log_cell_type_str);
 +    return 0;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Suitable. */
 +  return 1;
 +}
 +
 +/* Return True if circuit is suitable for being service-side intro circuit. */
 +int
 +hs_intro_circuit_is_suitable_for_establish_intro(const or_circuit_t *circ)
 +{
 +  return circuit_is_suitable_intro_point(circ, "ESTABLISH_INTRO");
 +}
 +
 +/* We just received an ESTABLISH_INTRO cell in <b>circ</b>. Figure out of it's
 + * a legacy or a next gen cell, and pass it to the appropriate handler. */
 +int
 +hs_intro_received_establish_intro(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request,
 +                            size_t request_len)
 +{
 +  tor_assert(circ);
 +  tor_assert(request);
 +
 +  if (request_len == 0) {
 +    log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, "Empty ESTABLISH_INTRO cell.");
 +    goto err;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Using the first byte of the cell, figure out the version of
 +   * ESTABLISH_INTRO and pass it to the appropriate cell handler */
 +  const uint8_t first_byte = request[0];
 +  switch (first_byte) {
-     case HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_LEGACY0:
-     case HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_LEGACY1:
++    case TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_LEGACY0:
++    case TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_LEGACY1:
 +      return rend_mid_establish_intro_legacy(circ, request, request_len);
-     case HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_ED25519:
++    case TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_ED25519:
 +      return handle_establish_intro(circ, request, request_len);
 +    default:
 +      log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
 +             "Unrecognized AUTH_KEY_TYPE %u.", first_byte);
 +      goto err;
 +  }
 +
 + err:
 +  circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
 +  return -1;
 +}
 +
 +/* Send an INTRODUCE_ACK cell onto the circuit <b>circ</b> with the status
 + * value in <b>status</b>. Depending on the status, it can be ACK or a NACK.
 + * Return 0 on success else a negative value on error which will close the
 + * circuit. */
 +static int
- send_introduce_ack_cell(or_circuit_t *circ, hs_intro_ack_status_t status)
++send_introduce_ack_cell(or_circuit_t *circ, uint16_t status)
 +{
 +  int ret = -1;
 +  uint8_t *encoded_cell = NULL;
 +  ssize_t encoded_len, result_len;
 +  trn_cell_introduce_ack_t *cell;
 +  trn_cell_extension_t *ext;
 +
 +  tor_assert(circ);
 +
 +  /* Setup the INTRODUCE_ACK cell. We have no extensions so the N_EXTENSIONS
 +   * field is set to 0 by default with a new object. */
 +  cell = trn_cell_introduce_ack_new();
 +  ret = trn_cell_introduce_ack_set_status(cell, status);
 +  /* We have no cell extensions in an INTRODUCE_ACK cell. */
 +  ext = trn_cell_extension_new();
 +  trn_cell_extension_set_num(ext, 0);
 +  trn_cell_introduce_ack_set_extensions(cell, ext);
 +  /* A wrong status is a very bad code flow error as this value is controlled
 +   * by the code in this file and not an external input. This means we use a
 +   * code that is not known by the trunnel ABI. */
 +  tor_assert(ret == 0);
 +  /* Encode the payload. We should never fail to get the encoded length. */
 +  encoded_len = trn_cell_introduce_ack_encoded_len(cell);
 +  tor_assert(encoded_len > 0);
 +  encoded_cell = tor_malloc_zero(encoded_len);
 +  result_len = trn_cell_introduce_ack_encode(encoded_cell, encoded_len, cell);
 +  tor_assert(encoded_len == result_len);
 +
 +  ret = relay_send_command_from_edge(CONTROL_CELL_ID, TO_CIRCUIT(circ),
 +                                     RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE_ACK,
 +                                     (char *) encoded_cell, encoded_len,
 +                                     NULL);
 +  /* On failure, the above function will close the circuit. */
 +  trn_cell_introduce_ack_free(cell);
 +  tor_free(encoded_cell);
 +  return ret;
 +}
 +
 +/* Validate a parsed INTRODUCE1 <b>cell</b>. Return 0 if valid or else a
 + * negative value for an invalid cell that should be NACKed. */
 +STATIC int
 +validate_introduce1_parsed_cell(const trn_cell_introduce1_t *cell)
 +{
 +  size_t legacy_key_id_len;
 +  const uint8_t *legacy_key_id;
 +
 +  tor_assert(cell);
 +
 +  /* This code path SHOULD NEVER be reached if the cell is a legacy type so
 +   * safety net here. The legacy ID must be zeroes in this case. */
 +  legacy_key_id_len = trn_cell_introduce1_getlen_legacy_key_id(cell);
 +  legacy_key_id = trn_cell_introduce1_getconstarray_legacy_key_id(cell);
 +  if (BUG(!tor_mem_is_zero((char *) legacy_key_id, legacy_key_id_len))) {
 +    goto invalid;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* The auth key of an INTRODUCE1 should be of type ed25519 thus leading to a
 +   * known fixed length as well. */
 +  if (trn_cell_introduce1_get_auth_key_type(cell) !=
-       HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_ED25519) {
++      TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_ED25519) {
 +    log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
 +           "Rejecting invalid INTRODUCE1 cell auth key type. "
 +           "Responding with NACK.");
 +    goto invalid;
 +  }
 +  if (trn_cell_introduce1_get_auth_key_len(cell) != ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN ||
 +      trn_cell_introduce1_getlen_auth_key(cell) != ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN) {
 +    log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
 +           "Rejecting invalid INTRODUCE1 cell auth key length. "
 +           "Responding with NACK.");
 +    goto invalid;
 +  }
 +  if (trn_cell_introduce1_getlen_encrypted(cell) == 0) {
 +    log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
 +           "Rejecting invalid INTRODUCE1 cell encrypted length. "
 +           "Responding with NACK.");
 +    goto invalid;
 +  }
 +
 +  return 0;
 + invalid:
 +  return -1;
 +}
 +
 +/* We just received a non legacy INTRODUCE1 cell on <b>client_circ</b> with
 + * the payload in <b>request</b> of size <b>request_len</b>. Return 0 if
 + * everything went well, or -1 if an error occurred. This function is in charge
 + * of sending back an INTRODUCE_ACK cell and will close client_circ on error.
 + */
 +STATIC int
 +handle_introduce1(or_circuit_t *client_circ, const uint8_t *request,
 +                  size_t request_len)
 +{
 +  int ret = -1;
 +  or_circuit_t *service_circ;
 +  trn_cell_introduce1_t *parsed_cell;
-   hs_intro_ack_status_t status = HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_SUCCESS;
++  uint16_t status = TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_SUCCESS;
 +
 +  tor_assert(client_circ);
 +  tor_assert(request);
 +
 +  /* Parse cell. Note that we can only parse the non encrypted section for
 +   * which we'll use the authentication key to find the service introduction
 +   * circuit and relay the cell on it. */
 +  ssize_t cell_size = trn_cell_introduce1_parse(&parsed_cell, request,
 +                                               request_len);
 +  if (cell_size < 0) {
 +    log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
 +           "Rejecting %s INTRODUCE1 cell. Responding with NACK.",
 +           cell_size == -1 ? "invalid" : "truncated");
 +    /* Inform client that the INTRODUCE1 has a bad format. */
-     status = HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_BAD_FORMAT;
++    status = TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_BAD_FORMAT;
 +    goto send_ack;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Once parsed validate the cell format. */
 +  if (validate_introduce1_parsed_cell(parsed_cell) < 0) {
 +    /* Inform client that the INTRODUCE1 has bad format. */
-     status = HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_BAD_FORMAT;
++    status = TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_BAD_FORMAT;
 +    goto send_ack;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Find introduction circuit through our circuit map. */
 +  {
 +    ed25519_public_key_t auth_key;
 +    get_auth_key_from_cell(&auth_key, RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE1, parsed_cell);
 +    service_circ = hs_circuitmap_get_intro_circ_v3_relay_side(&auth_key);
 +    if (service_circ == NULL) {
 +      char b64_key[ED25519_BASE64_LEN + 1];
 +      ed25519_public_to_base64(b64_key, &auth_key);
 +      log_info(LD_REND, "No intro circuit found for INTRODUCE1 cell "
 +                        "with auth key %s from circuit %" PRIu32 ". "
 +                        "Responding with NACK.",
 +               safe_str(b64_key), client_circ->p_circ_id);
 +      /* Inform the client that we don't know the requested service ID. */
-       status = HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_UNKNOWN_ID;
++      status = TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_UNKNOWN_ID;
 +      goto send_ack;
 +    }
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Relay the cell to the service on its intro circuit with an INTRODUCE2
 +   * cell which is the same exact payload. */
 +  if (relay_send_command_from_edge(CONTROL_CELL_ID, TO_CIRCUIT(service_circ),
 +                                   RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE2,
 +                                   (char *) request, request_len, NULL)) {
 +    log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Unable to send INTRODUCE2 cell to the service.");
-     /* Inform the client that we can't relay the cell. */
-     status = HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_CANT_RELAY;
++    /* Inform the client that we can't relay the cell. Use the unknown ID
++     * status code since it means that we do not know the service. */
++    status = TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_UNKNOWN_ID;
 +    goto send_ack;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Success! Send an INTRODUCE_ACK success status onto the client circuit. */
-   status = HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_SUCCESS;
++  status = TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_SUCCESS;
 +  ret = 0;
 +
 + send_ack:
 +  /* Send INTRODUCE_ACK or INTRODUCE_NACK to client */
 +  if (send_introduce_ack_cell(client_circ, status) < 0) {
 +    log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Unable to send an INTRODUCE ACK status %d "
 +                          "to client.", status);
 +    /* Circuit has been closed on failure of transmission. */
 +    goto done;
 +  }
 + done:
 +  trn_cell_introduce1_free(parsed_cell);
 +  return ret;
 +}
 +
 +/* Identify if the encoded cell we just received is a legacy one or not. The
 + * <b>request</b> should be at least DIGEST_LEN bytes long. */
 +STATIC int
 +introduce1_cell_is_legacy(const uint8_t *request)
 +{
 +  tor_assert(request);
 +
 +  /* If the first 20 bytes of the cell (DIGEST_LEN) are NOT zeroes, it
 +   * indicates a legacy cell (v2). */
 +  if (!tor_mem_is_zero((const char *) request, DIGEST_LEN)) {
 +    /* Legacy cell. */
 +    return 1;
 +  }
 +  /* Not a legacy cell. */
 +  return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/* Return true iff the circuit <b>circ</b> is suitable for receiving an
 + * INTRODUCE1 cell. */
 +STATIC int
 +circuit_is_suitable_for_introduce1(const or_circuit_t *circ)
 +{
 +  tor_assert(circ);
 +
 +  /* Is this circuit an intro point circuit? */
 +  if (!circuit_is_suitable_intro_point(circ, "INTRODUCE1")) {
 +    return 0;
 +  }
 +
 +  if (circ->already_received_introduce1) {
 +    log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_REND,
 +           "Blocking multiple introductions on the same circuit. "
 +           "Someone might be trying to attack a hidden service through "
 +           "this relay.");
 +    return 0;
 +  }
 +
 +  return 1;
 +}
 +
 +/* We just received an INTRODUCE1 cell on <b>circ</b>. Figure out which type
 + * it is and pass it to the appropriate handler. Return 0 on success else a
 + * negative value and the circuit is closed. */
 +int
 +hs_intro_received_introduce1(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request,
 +                             size_t request_len)
 +{
 +  int ret;
 +
 +  tor_assert(circ);
 +  tor_assert(request);
 +
 +  /* A cell that can't hold a DIGEST_LEN is invalid as we need to check if
 +   * it's a legacy cell or not using the first DIGEST_LEN bytes. */
 +  if (request_len < DIGEST_LEN) {
 +    log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, "Invalid INTRODUCE1 cell length.");
 +    goto err;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Make sure we have a circuit that can have an INTRODUCE1 cell on it. */
 +  if (!circuit_is_suitable_for_introduce1(circ)) {
 +    /* We do not send a NACK because the circuit is not suitable for any kind
 +     * of response or transmission as it's a violation of the protocol. */
 +    goto err;
 +  }
 +  /* Mark the circuit that we got this cell. None are allowed after this as a
 +   * DoS mitigation since one circuit with one client can hammer a service. */
 +  circ->already_received_introduce1 = 1;
 +
 +  /* We are sure here to have at least DIGEST_LEN bytes. */
 +  if (introduce1_cell_is_legacy(request)) {
 +    /* Handle a legacy cell. */
 +    ret = rend_mid_introduce_legacy(circ, request, request_len);
 +  } else {
 +    /* Handle a non legacy cell. */
 +    ret = handle_introduce1(circ, request, request_len);
 +  }
 +  return ret;
 +
 + err:
 +  circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
 +  return -1;
 +}
 +
 +/* Clear memory allocated by the given intropoint object ip (but don't free the
 + * object itself). */
 +void
 +hs_intropoint_clear(hs_intropoint_t *ip)
 +{
 +  if (ip == NULL) {
 +    return;
 +  }
 +  tor_cert_free(ip->auth_key_cert);
 +  SMARTLIST_FOREACH(ip->link_specifiers, hs_desc_link_specifier_t *, ls,
 +                    hs_desc_link_specifier_free(ls));
 +  smartlist_free(ip->link_specifiers);
 +  memset(ip, 0, sizeof(hs_intropoint_t));
 +}
diff --cc src/feature/hs/hs_intropoint.h
index 659a9ad05,000000000..e82575f05
mode 100644,000000..100644
--- a/src/feature/hs/hs_intropoint.h
+++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_intropoint.h
@@@ -1,79 -1,0 +1,64 @@@
 +/* Copyright (c) 2016-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */
 +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
 +
 +/**
 + * \file hs_intropoint.h
 + * \brief Header file for hs_intropoint.c.
 + **/
 +
 +#ifndef TOR_HS_INTRO_H
 +#define TOR_HS_INTRO_H
 +
 +#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_curve25519.h"
 +#include "feature/nodelist/torcert.h"
 +
- /* Authentication key type in an ESTABLISH_INTRO cell. */
- typedef enum {
-   HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_LEGACY0 = 0x00,
-   HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_LEGACY1 = 0x01,
-   HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_ED25519 = 0x02,
- } hs_intro_auth_key_type_t;
- 
- /* INTRODUCE_ACK status code. */
- typedef enum {
-   HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_SUCCESS    = 0x0000,
-   HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_UNKNOWN_ID = 0x0001,
-   HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_BAD_FORMAT = 0x0002,
-   HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_CANT_RELAY = 0x0003,
- } hs_intro_ack_status_t;
- 
 +/* Object containing introduction point common data between the service and
 + * the client side. */
 +typedef struct hs_intropoint_t {
 +  /* Does this intro point only supports legacy ID ?. */
 +  unsigned int is_only_legacy : 1;
 +
 +  /* Authentication key certificate from the descriptor. */
 +  tor_cert_t *auth_key_cert;
 +  /* A list of link specifier. */
 +  smartlist_t *link_specifiers;
 +} hs_intropoint_t;
 +
 +int hs_intro_received_establish_intro(or_circuit_t *circ,
 +                                      const uint8_t *request,
 +                                      size_t request_len);
 +int hs_intro_received_introduce1(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request,
 +                                 size_t request_len);
 +
 +MOCK_DECL(int, hs_intro_send_intro_established_cell,(or_circuit_t *circ));
 +
 +/* also used by rendservice.c */
 +int hs_intro_circuit_is_suitable_for_establish_intro(const or_circuit_t *circ);
 +
 +hs_intropoint_t *hs_intro_new(void);
 +void hs_intropoint_clear(hs_intropoint_t *ip);
 +
 +#ifdef HS_INTROPOINT_PRIVATE
 +
 +#include "trunnel/hs/cell_establish_intro.h"
 +#include "trunnel/hs/cell_introduce1.h"
 +
 +STATIC int
 +verify_establish_intro_cell(const trn_cell_establish_intro_t *out,
 +                            const uint8_t *circuit_key_material,
 +                            size_t circuit_key_material_len);
 +
 +STATIC void
 +get_auth_key_from_cell(ed25519_public_key_t *auth_key_out,
 +                       unsigned int cell_type, const void *cell);
 +
 +STATIC int introduce1_cell_is_legacy(const uint8_t *request);
 +STATIC int handle_introduce1(or_circuit_t *client_circ,
 +                             const uint8_t *request, size_t request_len);
 +STATIC int validate_introduce1_parsed_cell(const trn_cell_introduce1_t *cell);
 +STATIC int circuit_is_suitable_for_introduce1(const or_circuit_t *circ);
 +
 +#endif /* defined(HS_INTROPOINT_PRIVATE) */
 +
 +#endif /* !defined(TOR_HS_INTRO_H) */
 +

    

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[tor-commits] [tor/maint-0.3.5] Merge remote-tracking branch 'nickm/ticket30454_034_01_squashed' into ticket30454_035_01