[tor-commits] r24981: {website} dev version is now 0.2.3.2-alpha, also fix stable manpage (in website/trunk: . docs/en)

Author: sebastian Date: 2011-08-29 22:28:35 +0000 (Mon, 29 Aug 2011) New Revision: 24981 Modified: website/trunk/Makefile website/trunk/docs/en/tor-manual.wml Log: dev version is now 0.2.3.2-alpha, also fix stable manpage Modified: website/trunk/Makefile =================================================================== --- website/trunk/Makefile 2011-08-29 22:17:05 UTC (rev 24980) +++ website/trunk/Makefile 2011-08-29 22:28:35 UTC (rev 24981) @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ export TORGIT=/home/runa/tordev/tor/.git export STABLETAG=tor-0.2.2.32 -export DEVTAG=tor-0.2.2.32 +export DEVTAG=tor-0.2.3.2-alpha WMLBASE=. SUBDIRS=docs eff projects press about download getinvolved donate torbutton Modified: website/trunk/docs/en/tor-manual.wml =================================================================== --- website/trunk/docs/en/tor-manual.wml 2011-08-29 22:17:05 UTC (rev 24980) +++ website/trunk/docs/en/tor-manual.wml 2011-08-29 22:28:35 UTC (rev 24981) @@ -9,2321 +9,22 @@ <div id="breadcrumbs"> <a href="<page index>">Home » </a> <a href="<page docs/documentation>">Documentation » </a> - <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-osx>">Tor Manual</a> + <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-osx>">Tor Dev Manual</a> </div> - <div id="maincol"> - <h2 id="_synopsis">SYNOPSIS</h2> - <div class="sectionbody"> - <div class="paragraph"><p><strong>tor</strong> [<em>OPTION</em> <em>value</em>]…</p> - </div> - </div> - <h2 id="_description">DESCRIPTION</h2> - <div class="sectionbody"> - <div class="paragraph"><p><em>tor</em> is a connection-oriented anonymizing communication - service. Users choose a source-routed path through a set of nodes, and - negotiate a "virtual circuit" through the network, in which each node - knows its predecessor and successor, but no others. Traffic flowing down - the circuit is unwrapped by a symmetric key at each node, which reveals - the downstream node.<br /></p></div> - - <div class="paragraph"><p>Basically <em>tor</em> provides a distributed network of servers ("onion routers"). - Users bounce their TCP streams — web traffic, ftp, ssh, etc — around the - routers, and recipients, observers, and even the routers themselves have - difficulty tracking the source of the stream.</p></div> - </div> - <h2 id="_options">OPTIONS</h2> - <div class="sectionbody"> - <div class="dlist"><dl> - <dt class="hdlist1"> - <strong>-h</strong>, <strong>-help</strong> - </dt> - <dd> - <p> - Display a short help message and exit. - </p> - </dd> - <dt class="hdlist1"> - <strong>-f</strong> <em>FILE</em> - </dt> - <dd> - <p> - FILE contains further "option value" pairs. (Default: @CONFDIR@/torrc) - </p> - </dd> - <dt class="hdlist1"> - <strong>--hash-password</strong> - </dt> - <dd> - <p> - Generates a hashed password for control port access. - </p> - </dd> - <dt class="hdlist1"> - <strong>--list-fingerprint</strong> - </dt> - <dd> - <p> - Generate your keys and output your nickname and fingerprint. - </p> - </dd> - <dt class="hdlist1"> - <strong>--verify-config</strong> - </dt> - <dd> - <p> - Verify the configuration file is valid. - </p> - </dd> - <dt class="hdlist1"> - <strong>--nt-service</strong> - </dt> - <dd> - <p> - <strong>--service [install|remove|start|stop]</strong> Manage the Tor Windows - NT/2000/XP service. Current instructions can be found at - <a href="<wiki>doc/TorFAQ#WinNTService">https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorFAQ#WinNTService</a> - </p> - </dd> - <dt class="hdlist1"> - <strong>--list-torrc-options</strong> - </dt> - <dd> - <p> - List all valid options. - </p> - </dd> - <dt class="hdlist1"> - <strong>--version</strong> - </dt> - <dd> - <p> - Display Tor version and exit. - </p> - </dd> - <dt class="hdlist1"> - <strong>--quiet</strong> - </dt> - <dd> - <p> - Do not start Tor with a console log unless explicitly requested to do so. - (By default, Tor starts out logging messages at level "notice" or higher to - the console, until it has parsed its configuration.) - </p> - </dd> - </dl> - </div> - <div class="paragraph"> - <p>Other options can be specified either on the command-line (--option - value), or in the configuration file (option value or option "value"). - Options are case-insensitive. C-style escaped characters are allowed inside - quoted values. Options on the command line take precedence over - options found in the configuration file, except indicated otherwise. To - split one configuration entry into multiple lines, use a single \ before - the end of the line. Comments can be used in such multiline entries, but - they must start at the beginning of a line.</p> - </div> - <div class="dlist"><dl> - <dt class="hdlist1"> - <strong>BandwidthRate</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>bytes</strong>|<strong>KB</strong>|<strong>MB</strong>|<strong>GB</strong> - </dt> - <dd> - <p> - A token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth usage on this node to - the specified number of bytes per second, and the average outgoing - bandwidth usage to that same value. If you want to run a relay in the - public network, this needs to be <em>at the very least</em> 20 KB (that is, - 20480 bytes). (Default: 5 MB) - </p> - </dd> - <dt class="hdlist1"> - <strong>BandwidthBurst</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>bytes</strong>|<strong>KB</strong>|<strong>MB</strong>|<strong>GB</strong> - </dt> - <dd> - <p> - Limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) to the given - number of bytes in each direction. (Default: 10 MB) - </p> - </dd> - <dt class="hdlist1"> - <strong>MaxAdvertisedBandwidth</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>bytes</strong>|<strong>KB</strong>|<strong>MB</strong>|<strong>GB</strong> - </dt> - <dd> - <p> - If set, we will not advertise more than this amount of bandwidth for our - BandwidthRate. Server operators who want to reduce the number of clients - who ask to build circuits through them (since this is proportional to - advertised bandwidth rate) can thus reduce the CPU demands on their server - without impacting network performance. - </p> - </dd> - <dt class="hdlist1"> - <strong>RelayBandwidthRate</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>bytes</strong>|<strong>KB</strong>|<strong>MB</strong>|<strong>GB</strong> - </dt> - <dd> - <p> - If not 0, a separate token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth - usage for _relayed traffic_ on this node to the specified number of bytes - per second, and the average outgoing bandwidth usage to that same value. - Relayed traffic currently is calculated to include answers to directory - requests, but that may change in future versions. (Default: 0) - </p> - </dd> - <dt class="hdlist1"> - <strong>RelayBandwidthBurst</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>bytes</strong>|<strong>KB</strong>|<strong>MB</strong>|<strong>GB</strong> - </dt> - <dd> - <p> - If not 0, limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) for - _relayed traffic_ to the given number of bytes in each direction. - (Default: 0) - </p> - </dd> - <dt class="hdlist1"> - <strong>ConnLimit</strong> <em>NUM</em> - </dt> - <dd> - <p> - The minimum number of file descriptors that must be available to the Tor - process before it will start. Tor will ask the OS for as many file - descriptors as the OS will allow (you can find this by "ulimit -H -n"). - If this number is less than ConnLimit, then Tor will refuse to start.<br /> - <br /> - You probably don’t need to adjust this. It has no effect on Windows - since that platform lacks getrlimit(). (Default: 1000) - </p> - </dd> - <dt class="hdlist1"> - <strong>ConstrainedSockets</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> - </dt> - <dd> - <p> - If set, Tor will tell the kernel to attempt to shrink the buffers for all - sockets to the size specified in <strong>ConstrainedSockSize</strong>. This is useful for - virtual servers and other environments where system level TCP buffers may - be limited. If you’re on a virtual server, and you encounter the "Error - creating network socket: No buffer space available" message, you are - likely experiencing this problem.<br /> - <br /> - The preferred solution is to have the admin increase the buffer pool for - the host itself via /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_mem or equivalent facility; - this configuration option is a second-resort.<br /> - <br /> - The DirPort option should also not be used if TCP buffers are scarce. The - cached directory requests consume additional sockets which exacerbates - the problem.<br /> - <br /> - You should <strong>not</strong> enable this feature unless you encounter the "no buffer - space available" issue. Reducing the TCP buffers affects window size for - the TCP stream and will reduce throughput in proportion to round trip - time on long paths. (Default: 0.) - </p> - </dd> - <dt class="hdlist1"> - <strong>ConstrainedSockSize</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>bytes</strong>|<strong>KB</strong> - </dt> - <dd> - <p> - When <strong>ConstrainedSockets</strong> is enabled the receive and transmit buffers for - all sockets will be set to this limit. Must be a value between 2048 and - 262144, in 1024 byte increments. Default of 8192 is recommended. - </p> - </dd> - <dt class="hdlist1"> - <strong>ControlPort</strong> <em>Port</em> - </dt> - <dd> - <p> - If set, Tor will accept connections on this port and allow those - connections to control the Tor process using the Tor Control Protocol - (described in control-spec.txt). Note: unless you also specify one of - <strong>HashedControlPassword</strong> or <strong>CookieAuthentication</strong>, setting this option will - cause Tor to allow any process on the local host to control it. This - option is required for many Tor controllers; most use the value of 9051. - </p> - </dd> - <dt class="hdlist1"> - <strong>ControlListenAddress</strong> <em>IP</em>[:<em>PORT</em>] - </dt> - <dd> - <p> - Bind the controller listener to this address. If you specify a port, bind - to this port rather than the one specified in ControlPort. We strongly - recommend that you leave this alone unless you know what you’re doing, - since giving attackers access to your control listener is really - dangerous. (Default: 127.0.0.1) This directive can be specified multiple - times to bind to multiple addresses/ports. - </p> - </dd> - <dt class="hdlist1"> - <strong>ControlSocket</strong> <em>Path</em> - </dt> - <dd> - <p> - Like ControlPort, but listens on a Unix domain socket, rather than a TCP - socket. (Unix and Unix-like systems only.) - </p> - </dd> - <dt class="hdlist1"> - <strong>HashedControlPassword</strong> <em>hashed_password</em> - </dt> - <dd> - <p> - Don’t allow any connections on the control port except when the other - process knows the password whose one-way hash is <em>hashed_password</em>. You - can compute the hash of a password by running "tor --hash-password - <em>password</em>". You can provide several acceptable passwords by using more - than one HashedControlPassword line. - </p> - </dd> - <dt class="hdlist1"> - <strong>CookieAuthentication</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> - </dt> - <dd> - <p> - If this option is set to 1, don’t allow any connections on the control port - except when the connecting process knows the contents of a file named - "control_auth_cookie", which Tor will create in its data directory. This - authentication method should only be used on systems with good filesystem - security. (Default: 0) - </p> - </dd> - <dt class="hdlist1"> - <strong>CookieAuthFile</strong> <em>Path</em> - </dt> - <dd> - <p> - If set, this option overrides the default location and file name - for Tor’s cookie file. (See CookieAuthentication above.) - </p> - </dd> - <dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>CookieAuthFileGroupReadable</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>|<em>Groupname</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - If this option is set to 0, don’t allow the filesystem group to read the - cookie file. If the option is set to 1, make the cookie file readable by - the default GID. [Making the file readable by other groups is not yet - implemented; let us know if you need this for some reason.] (Default: 0). -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>DataDirectory</strong> <em>DIR</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Store working data in DIR (Default: @LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>DirServer</strong> [<em>nickname</em>] [<strong>flags</strong>] <em>address</em>:<em>port</em> <em>fingerprint</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Use a nonstandard authoritative directory server at the provided address - and port, with the specified key fingerprint. This option can be repeated - many times, for multiple authoritative directory servers. Flags are - separated by spaces, and determine what kind of an authority this directory - is. By default, every authority is authoritative for current ("v2")-style - directories, unless the "no-v2" flag is given. If the "v1" flags is - provided, Tor will use this server as an authority for old-style (v1) - directories as well. (Only directory mirrors care about this.) Tor will - use this server as an authority for hidden service information if the "hs" - flag is set, or if the "v1" flag is set and the "no-hs" flag is <strong>not</strong> set. - Tor will use this authority as a bridge authoritative directory if the - "bridge" flag is set. If a flag "orport=<strong>port</strong>" is given, Tor will use the - given port when opening encrypted tunnels to the dirserver. Lastly, if a - flag "v3ident=<strong>fp</strong>" is given, the dirserver is a v3 directory authority - whose v3 long-term signing key has the fingerprint <strong>fp</strong>.<br /> -<br /> - If no <strong>dirserver</strong> line is given, Tor will use the default directory - servers. NOTE: this option is intended for setting up a private Tor - network with its own directory authorities. If you use it, you will be - distinguishable from other users, because you won’t believe the same - authorities they do. -</p> -</dd> -</dl></div> -<div class="paragraph"><p><strong>AlternateDirAuthority</strong> [<em>nickname</em>] [<strong>flags</strong>] <em>address</em>:<em>port</em> <em>fingerprint</em><br /></p></div> -<div class="paragraph"><p><strong>AlternateHSAuthority</strong> [<em>nickname</em>] [<strong>flags</strong>] <em>address</em>:<em>port</em> <em>fingerprint</em><br /></p></div> -<div class="dlist"><dl> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>AlternateBridgeAuthority</strong> [<em>nickname</em>] [<strong>flags</strong>] <em>address</em>:<em>port</em> <em> fingerprint</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - As DirServer, but replaces less of the default directory authorities. Using - AlternateDirAuthority replaces the default Tor directory authorities, but - leaves the hidden service authorities and bridge authorities in place. - Similarly, Using AlternateHSAuthority replaces the default hidden service - authorities, but not the directory or bridge authorities. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>FetchDirInfoEarly</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - If set to 1, Tor will always fetch directory information like other - directory caches, even if you don’t meet the normal criteria for fetching - early. Normal users should leave it off. (Default: 0) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>FetchHidServDescriptors</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any hidden service descriptors from the - rendezvous directories. This option is only useful if you’re using a Tor - controller that handles hidden service fetches for you. (Default: 1) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>FetchServerDescriptors</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any network status summaries or server - descriptors from the directory servers. This option is only useful if - you’re using a Tor controller that handles directory fetches for you. - (Default: 1) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>FetchUselessDescriptors</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - If set to 1, Tor will fetch every non-obsolete descriptor from the - authorities that it hears about. Otherwise, it will avoid fetching useless - descriptors, for example for routers that are not running. This option is - useful if you’re using the contributed "exitlist" script to enumerate Tor - nodes that exit to certain addresses. (Default: 0) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>HTTPProxy</strong> <em>host</em>[:<em>port</em>] -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Tor will make all its directory requests through this host:port (or host:80 - if port is not specified), rather than connecting directly to any directory - servers. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>HTTPProxyAuthenticator</strong> <em>username:password</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic HTTP proxy - authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of HTTP - proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a patch if you - want it to support others. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>HTTPSProxy</strong> <em>host</em>[:<em>port</em>] -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Tor will make all its OR (SSL) connections through this host:port (or - host:443 if port is not specified), via HTTP CONNECT rather than connecting - directly to servers. You may want to set <strong>FascistFirewall</strong> to restrict - the set of ports you might try to connect to, if your HTTPS proxy only - allows connecting to certain ports. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>HTTPSProxyAuthenticator</strong> <em>username:password</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic HTTPS proxy - authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of HTTPS - proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a patch if you - want it to support others. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>KeepalivePeriod</strong> <em>NUM</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - To keep firewalls from expiring connections, send a padding keepalive cell - every NUM seconds on open connections that are in use. If the connection - has no open circuits, it will instead be closed after NUM seconds of - idleness. (Default: 5 minutes) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>Log</strong> <em>minSeverity</em>[-<em>maxSeverity</em>] <strong>stderr</strong>|<strong>stdout</strong>|<strong>syslog</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Send all messages between <em>minSeverity</em> and <em>maxSeverity</em> to the standard - output stream, the standard error stream, or to the system log. (The - "syslog" value is only supported on Unix.) Recognized severity levels are - debug, info, notice, warn, and err. We advise using "notice" in most cases, - since anything more verbose may provide sensitive information to an - attacker who obtains the logs. If only one severity level is given, all - messages of that level or higher will be sent to the listed destination. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>Log</strong> <em>minSeverity</em>[-<em>maxSeverity</em>] <strong>file</strong> <em>FILENAME</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - As above, but send log messages to the listed filename. The - "Log" option may appear more than once in a configuration file. - Messages are sent to all the logs that match their severity - level. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>OutboundBindAddress</strong> <em>IP</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Make all outbound connections originate from the IP address specified. This - is only useful when you have multiple network interfaces, and you want all - of Tor’s outgoing connections to use a single one. This setting will be - ignored for connections to the loopback addresses (127.0.0.0/8 and ::1). -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>PidFile</strong> <em>FILE</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - On startup, write our PID to FILE. On clean shutdown, remove - FILE. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>ProtocolWarnings</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - If 1, Tor will log with severity 'warn' various cases of other parties not - following the Tor specification. Otherwise, they are logged with severity - 'info'. (Default: 0) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>RunAsDaemon</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - If 1, Tor forks and daemonizes to the background. This option has no effect - on Windows; instead you should use the --service command-line option. - (Default: 0) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>SafeLogging</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Tor can scrub potentially sensitive strings from log messages (e.g. - addresses) by replacing them with the string [scrubbed]. This way logs can - still be useful, but they don’t leave behind personally identifying - information about what sites a user might have visited.<br /> -<br /> - If this option is set to 0, Tor will not perform any scrubbing, if it is - set to 1, all potentially sensitive strings are replaced. (Default: 1) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>User</strong> <em>UID</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - On startup, setuid to this user and setgid to their primary group. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>HardwareAccel</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - If non-zero, try to use built-in (static) crypto hardware acceleration when - available. This is untested and probably buggy. (Default: 0) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>AvoidDiskWrites</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - If non-zero, try to write to disk less frequently than we would otherwise. - This is useful when running on flash memory or other media that support - only a limited number of writes. (Default: 0) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>TunnelDirConns</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - If non-zero, when a directory server we contact supports it, we will build - a one-hop circuit and make an encrypted connection via its ORPort. - (Default: 1) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>PreferTunneledDirConns</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - If non-zero, we will avoid directory servers that don’t support tunneled - directory connections, when possible. (Default: 1) -</p> -</dd> -</dl></div> -</div> -<h2 id="_client_options">CLIENT OPTIONS</h2> -<div class="sectionbody"> -<div class="paragraph"><p>The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if -<strong>SocksPort</strong> is non-zero):</p></div> -<div class="dlist"><dl> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>AllowInvalidNodes</strong> <strong>entry</strong>|<strong>exit</strong>|<strong>middle</strong>|<strong>introduction</strong>|<strong>rendezvous</strong>|<strong>…</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - If some Tor servers are obviously not working right, the directory - authorities can manually mark them as invalid, meaning that it’s not - recommended you use them for entry or exit positions in your circuits. You - can opt to use them in some circuit positions, though. The default is - "middle,rendezvous", and other choices are not advised. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>ExcludeSingleHopRelays</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - This option controls whether circuits built by Tor will include relays with - the AllowSingleHopExits flag set to true. If ExcludeSingleHopRelays is set - to 0, these relays will be included. Note that these relays might be at - higher risk of being seized or observed, so they are not normally - included. Also note that relatively few clients turn off this option, - so using these relays might make your client stand out. - (Default: 1) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>Bridge</strong> <em>IP</em>:<em>ORPort</em> [fingerprint] -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - When set along with UseBridges, instructs Tor to use the relay at - "IP:ORPort" as a "bridge" relaying into the Tor network. If "fingerprint" - is provided (using the same format as for DirServer), we will verify that - the relay running at that location has the right fingerprint. We also use - fingerprint to look up the bridge descriptor at the bridge authority, if - it’s provided and if UpdateBridgesFromAuthority is set too. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>CircuitBuildTimeout</strong> <em>NUM</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Try for at most NUM seconds when building circuits. If the circuit isn't - open in that time, give up on it. (Default: 1 minute.) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>CircuitIdleTimeout</strong> <em>NUM</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - If we have kept a clean (never used) circuit around for NUM seconds, then - close it. This way when the Tor client is entirely idle, it can expire all - of its circuits, and then expire its TLS connections. Also, if we end up - making a circuit that is not useful for exiting any of the requests we’re - receiving, it won’t forever take up a slot in the circuit list. (Default: 1 - hour.) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>ClientOnly</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - If set to 1, Tor will under no circumstances run as a server or serve - directory requests. The default is to run as a client unless ORPort is - configured. (Usually, you don’t need to set this; Tor is pretty smart at - figuring out whether you are reliable and high-bandwidth enough to be a - useful server.) (Default: 0) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>ExcludeNodes</strong> <em>node</em>,<em>node</em>,<em>…</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address - patterns of nodes to never use when building a circuit. (Example: - ExcludeNodes SlowServer, $ EFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF, {cc}, 255.254.0.0/8) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>ExcludeExitNodes</strong> <em>node</em>,<em>node</em>,<em>…</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address - patterns of nodes to never use when picking an exit node. Note that any - node listed in ExcludeNodes is automatically considered to be part of this - list. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>EntryNodes</strong> <em>node</em>,<em>node</em>,<em>…</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames and address - patterns of nodes to use for the first hop in normal circuits. These are - treated only as preferences unless StrictNodes (see below) is also set. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>ExitNodes</strong> <em>node</em>,<em>node</em>,<em>…</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address - patterns of nodes to use for the last hop in normal exit circuits. These - are treated only as preferences unless StrictNodes (see below) is also set. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>StrictEntryNodes</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - If 1, Tor will never use any nodes besides those listed in "EntryNodes" for - the first hop of a circuit. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>StrictExitNodes</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - If 1, Tor will never use any nodes besides those listed in "ExitNodes" for - the last hop of a circuit. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>FascistFirewall</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - If 1, Tor will only create outgoing connections to ORs running on ports - that your firewall allows (defaults to 80 and 443; see <strong>FirewallPorts</strong>). - This will allow you to run Tor as a client behind a firewall with - restrictive policies, but will not allow you to run as a server behind such - a firewall. If you prefer more fine-grained control, use - ReachableAddresses instead. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>FirewallPorts</strong> <em>PORTS</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - A list of ports that your firewall allows you to connect to. Only used when - <strong>FascistFirewall</strong> is set. This option is deprecated; use ReachableAddresses - instead. (Default: 80, 443) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>HidServAuth</strong> <em>onion-address</em> <em>auth-cookie</em> [<em>service-name</em>] -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Client authorization for a hidden service. Valid onion addresses contain 16 - characters in a-z2-7 plus ".onion", and valid auth cookies contain 22 - characters in A-Za-z0-9+/. The service name is only used for internal - purposes, e.g., for Tor controllers. This option may be used multiple times - for different hidden services. If a hidden service uses authorization and - this option is not set, the hidden service is not accessible. Hidden - services can be configured to require authorization using the - <strong>HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient</strong> option. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>ReachableAddresses</strong> <em>ADDR</em>[/<em>MASK</em>][:<em>PORT</em>]… -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - A comma-separated list of IP addresses and ports that your firewall allows - you to connect to. The format is as for the addresses in ExitPolicy, except - that "accept" is understood unless "reject" is explicitly provided. For - example, 'ReachableAddresses 99.0.0.0/8, reject 18.0.0.0/8:80, accept - *:80' means that your firewall allows connections to everything inside net - 99, rejects port 80 connections to net 18, and accepts connections to port - 80 otherwise. (Default: 'accept *:*'.) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>ReachableDirAddresses</strong> <em>ADDR</em>[/<em>MASK</em>][:<em>PORT</em>]… -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Like <strong>ReachableAddresses</strong>, a list of addresses and ports. Tor will obey - these restrictions when fetching directory information, using standard HTTP - GET requests. If not set explicitly then the value of - <strong>ReachableAddresses</strong> is used. If <strong>HTTPProxy</strong> is set then these - connections will go through that proxy. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>ReachableORAddresses</strong> <em>ADDR</em>[/<em>MASK</em>][:<em>PORT</em>]… -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Like <strong>ReachableAddresses</strong>, a list of addresses and ports. Tor will obey - these restrictions when connecting to Onion Routers, using TLS/SSL. If not - set explicitly then the value of <strong>ReachableAddresses</strong> is used. If - <strong>HTTPSProxy</strong> is set then these connections will go through that proxy.<br /> -<br /> - The separation between <strong>ReachableORAddresses</strong> and - <strong>ReachableDirAddresses</strong> is only interesting when you are connecting - through proxies (see <strong>HTTPProxy</strong> and <strong>HTTPSProxy</strong>). Most proxies limit - TLS connections (which Tor uses to connect to Onion Routers) to port 443, - and some limit HTTP GET requests (which Tor uses for fetching directory - information) to port 80. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>LongLivedPorts</strong> <em>PORTS</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - A list of ports for services that tend to have long-running connections - (e.g. chat and interactive shells). Circuits for streams that use these - ports will contain only high-uptime nodes, to reduce the chance that a node - will go down before the stream is finished. (Default: 21, 22, 706, 1863, - 5050, 5190, 5222, 5223, 6667, 6697, 8300) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>MapAddress</strong> <em>address</em> <em>newaddress</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - When a request for address arrives to Tor, it will rewrite it to newaddress - before processing it. For example, if you always want connections to - www.indymedia.org to exit via <em>torserver</em> (where <em>torserver</em> is the - nickname of the server), use "MapAddress www.indymedia.org - www.indymedia.org.torserver.exit". -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>NewCircuitPeriod</strong> <em>NUM</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Every NUM seconds consider whether to build a new circuit. (Default: 30 - seconds) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>MaxCircuitDirtiness</strong> <em>NUM</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Feel free to reuse a circuit that was first used at most NUM seconds ago, - but never attach a new stream to a circuit that is too old. (Default: 10 - minutes) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>NodeFamily</strong> <em>node</em>,<em>node</em>,<em>…</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - The Tor servers, defined by their identity fingerprints or nicknames, - constitute a "family" of similar or co-administered servers, so never use - any two of them in the same circuit. Defining a NodeFamily is only needed - when a server doesn’t list the family itself (with MyFamily). This option - can be used multiple times. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>EnforceDistinctSubnets</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - If 1, Tor will not put two servers whose IP addresses are "too close" on - the same circuit. Currently, two addresses are "too close" if they lie in - the same /16 range. (Default: 1) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>SocksPort</strong> <em>PORT</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Advertise this port to listen for connections from Socks-speaking - applications. Set this to 0 if you don’t want to allow application - connections. (Default: 9050) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>SocksListenAddress</strong> <em>IP</em>[:<em>PORT</em>] -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Bind to this address to listen for connections from Socks-speaking - applications. (Default: 127.0.0.1) You can also specify a port (e.g. - 192.168.0.1:9100). This directive can be specified multiple times to bind - to multiple addresses/ports. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>SocksPolicy</strong> <em>policy</em>,<em>policy</em>,<em>…</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the - SocksPort and DNSPort ports. The policies have the same form as exit - policies below. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>SocksTimeout</strong> <em>NUM</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Let a socks connection wait NUM seconds handshaking, and NUM seconds - unattached waiting for an appropriate circuit, before we fail it. (Default: - 2 minutes.) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>TrackHostExits</strong> <em>host</em>,<em>.domain</em>,<em>…</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - For each value in the comma separated list, Tor will track recent - connections to hosts that match this value and attempt to reuse the same - exit node for each. If the value is prepended with a '.', it is treated as - matching an entire domain. If one of the values is just a '.', it means - match everything. This option is useful if you frequently connect to sites - that will expire all your authentication cookies (i.e. log you out) if - your IP address changes. Note that this option does have the disadvantage - of making it more clear that a given history is associated with a single - user. However, most people who would wish to observe this will observe it - through cookies or other protocol-specific means anyhow. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>TrackHostExitsExpire</strong> <em>NUM</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Since exit servers go up and down, it is desirable to expire the - association between host and exit server after NUM seconds. The default is - 1800 seconds (30 minutes). -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>UpdateBridgesFromAuthority</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - When set (along with UseBridges), Tor will try to fetch bridge descriptors - from the configured bridge authorities when feasible. It will fall back to - a direct request if the authority responds with a 404. (Default: 0) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>UseBridges</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - When set, Tor will fetch descriptors for each bridge listed in the "Bridge" - config lines, and use these relays as both entry guards and directory - guards. (Default: 0) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>UseEntryGuards</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - If this option is set to 1, we pick a few long-term entry servers, and try - to stick with them. This is desirable because constantly changing servers - increases the odds that an adversary who owns some servers will observe a - fraction of your paths. (Defaults to 1.) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>NumEntryGuards</strong> <em>NUM</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - If UseEntryGuards is set to 1, we will try to pick a total of NUM routers - as long-term entries for our circuits. (Defaults to 3.) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>SafeSocks</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - When this option is enabled, Tor will reject application connections that - use unsafe variants of the socks protocol — ones that only provide an IP - address, meaning the application is doing a DNS resolve first. - Specifically, these are socks4 and socks5 when not doing remote DNS. - (Defaults to 0.) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>TestSocks</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - When this option is enabled, Tor will make a notice-level log entry for - each connection to the Socks port indicating whether the request used a - safe socks protocol or an unsafe one (see above entry on SafeSocks). This - helps to determine whether an application using Tor is possibly leaking - DNS requests. (Default: 0) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>VirtualAddrNetwork</strong> <em>Address</em>/<em>bits</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - When Tor needs to assign a virtual (unused) address because of a MAPADDRESS - command from the controller or the AutomapHostsOnResolve feature, Tor - picks an unassigned address from this range. (Default: - 127.192.0.0/10)<br /> -<br /> - When providing proxy server service to a network of computers using a tool - like dns-proxy-tor, change this address to "10.192.0.0/10" or - "172.16.0.0/12". The default <strong>VirtualAddrNetwork</strong> address range on a - properly configured machine will route to the loopback interface. For - local use, no change to the default VirtualAddrNetwork setting is needed. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>AllowNonRFC953Hostnames</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - When this option is disabled, Tor blocks hostnames containing illegal - characters (like @ and :) rather than sending them to an exit node to be - resolved. This helps trap accidental attempts to resolve URLs and so on. - (Default: 0) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>FastFirstHopPK</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - When this option is disabled, Tor uses the public key step for the first - hop of creating circuits. Skipping it is generally safe since we have - already used TLS to authenticate the relay and to establish forward-secure - keys. Turning this option off makes circuit building slower.<br /> -<br /> - Note that Tor will always use the public key step for the first hop if it’s - operating as a relay, and it will never use the public key step if it - doesn’t yet know the onion key of the first hop. (Default: 1) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>TransPort</strong> <em>PORT</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - If non-zero, enables transparent proxy support on <em>PORT</em> (by convention, - 9040). Requires OS support for transparent proxies, such as BSDs' pf or - Linux’s IPTables. If you’re planning to use Tor as a transparent proxy for - a network, you’ll want to examine and change VirtualAddrNetwork from the - default setting. You’ll also want to set the TransListenAddress option for - the network you’d like to proxy. (Default: 0). -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>TransListenAddress</strong> <em>IP</em>[:<em>PORT</em>] -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Bind to this address to listen for transparent proxy connections. (Default: - 127.0.0.1). This is useful for exporting a transparent proxy server to an - entire network. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>NATDPort</strong> <em>PORT</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Allow old versions of ipfw (as included in old versions of FreeBSD, etc.) - to send connections through Tor using the NATD protocol. This option is - only for people who cannot use TransPort. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>NATDListenAddress</strong> <em>IP</em>[:<em>PORT</em>] -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Bind to this address to listen for NATD connections. (Default: 127.0.0.1). -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>AutomapHostsOnResolve</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - When this option is enabled, and we get a request to resolve an address - that ends with one of the suffixes in <strong>AutomapHostsSuffixes</strong>, we map an - unused virtual address to that address, and return the new virtual address. - This is handy for making ".onion" addresses work with applications that - resolve an address and then connect to it. (Default: 0). -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>AutomapHostsSuffixes</strong> <em>SUFFIX</em>,<em>SUFFIX</em>,<em>…</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - A comma-separated list of suffixes to use with <strong>AutomapHostsOnResolve</strong>. - The "." suffix is equivalent to "all addresses." (Default: .exit,.onion). -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>DNSPort</strong> <em>PORT</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - If non-zero, Tor listens for UDP DNS requests on this port and resolves - them anonymously. (Default: 0). -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>DNSListenAddress</strong> <em>IP</em>[:<em>PORT</em>] -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Bind to this address to listen for DNS connections. (Default: 127.0.0.1). -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - If true, Tor does not believe any anonymously retrieved DNS answer that - tells it that an address resolves to an internal address (like 127.0.0.1 or - 192.168.0.1). This option prevents certain browser-based attacks; don’t - turn it off unless you know what you’re doing. (Default: 1). -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>DownloadExtraInfo</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - If true, Tor downloads and caches "extra-info" documents. These documents - contain information about servers other than the information in their - regular router descriptors. Tor does not use this information for anything - itself; to save bandwidth, leave this option turned off. (Default: 0). -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>FallbackNetworkstatusFile</strong> <em>FILENAME</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - If Tor doesn’t have a cached networkstatus file, it starts out using this - one instead. Even if this file is out of date, Tor can still use it to - learn about directory mirrors, so it doesn’t need to put load on the - authorities. (Default: None). -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>WarnPlaintextPorts</strong> <em>port</em>,<em>port</em>,<em>…</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Tells Tor to issue a warnings whenever the user tries to make an anonymous - connection to one of these ports. This option is designed to alert users - to services that risk sending passwords in the clear. (Default: - 23,109,110,143). -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>RejectPlaintextPorts</strong> <em>port</em>,<em>port</em>,<em>…</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Like WarnPlaintextPorts, but instead of warning about risky port uses, Tor - will instead refuse to make the connection. (Default: None). -</p> -</dd> -</dl></div> -</div> -<h2 id="_server_options">SERVER OPTIONS</h2> -<div class="sectionbody"> -<div class="paragraph"><p>The following options are useful only for servers (that is, if ORPort -is non-zero):</p></div> -<div class="dlist"><dl> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>Address</strong> <em>address</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - The IP address or fully qualified domain name of this server (e.g. - moria.mit.edu). You can leave this unset, and Tor will guess your IP - address. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>AllowSingleHopExits</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - This option controls whether clients can use this server as a single hop - proxy. If set to 1, clients can use this server as an exit even if it is - the only hop in the circuit. Note that most clients will refuse to use - servers that set this option, since most clients have - ExcludeSingleHopRelays set. (Default: 0) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>AssumeReachable</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - This option is used when bootstrapping a new Tor network. If set to 1, - don’t do self-reachability testing; just upload your server descriptor - immediately. If <strong>AuthoritativeDirectory</strong> is also set, this option - instructs the dirserver to bypass remote reachability testing too and list - all connected servers as running. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>BridgeRelay</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Sets the relay to act as a "bridge" with respect to relaying connections - from bridge users to the Tor network. It mainly causes Tor to publish a - server descriptor to the bridge database, rather than publishing a relay - descriptor to the public directory authorities. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>ContactInfo</strong> <em>email_address</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Administrative contact information for server. This line might get picked - up by spam harvesters, so you may want to obscure the fact that it’s an - email address. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>ExitPolicy</strong> <em>policy</em>,<em>policy</em>,<em>…</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Set an exit policy for this server. Each policy is of the form - "<strong>accept</strong>|<strong>reject</strong> <em>ADDR</em>[/<em>MASK</em>][:<em>PORT</em>]". If /<em>MASK</em> is - omitted then this policy just applies to the host given. Instead of giving - a host or network you can also use "*" to denote the universe (0.0.0.0/0). - <em>PORT</em> can be a single port number, an interval of ports - "<em>FROM_PORT</em>-<em>TO_PORT</em>", or "*". If <em>PORT</em> is omitted, that means - "*".<br /> -<br /> - For example, "accept 18.7.22.69:*,reject 18.0.0.0/8:*,accept *:*" would - reject any traffic destined for MIT except for web.mit.edu, and accept - anything else.<br /> -<br /> - To specify all internal and link-local networks (including 0.0.0.0/8, - 169.254.0.0/16, 127.0.0.0/8, 192.168.0.0/16, 10.0.0.0/8, and - 172.16.0.0/12), you can use the "private" alias instead of an address. - These addresses are rejected by default (at the beginning of your exit - policy), along with your public IP address, unless you set the - ExitPolicyRejectPrivate config option to 0. For example, once you’ve done - that, you could allow HTTP to 127.0.0.1 and block all other connections to - internal networks with "accept 127.0.0.1:80,reject private:*", though that - may also allow connections to your own computer that are addressed to its - public (external) IP address. See RFC 1918 and RFC 3330 for more details - about internal and reserved IP address space.<br /> -<br /> - This directive can be specified multiple times so you don’t have to put it - all on one line.<br /> -<br /> - Policies are considered first to last, and the first match wins. If you - want to _replace_ the default exit policy, end your exit policy with - either a reject *:* or an accept *:*. Otherwise, you’re _augmenting_ - (prepending to) the default exit policy. The default exit policy is:<br /> -</p> -<div class="literalblock"> -<div class="content"> -<pre><tt>reject *:25^M -reject *:119^M -reject *:135-139^M -reject *:445^M -reject *:563^M -reject *:1214^M -reject *:4661-4666^M -reject *:6346-6429^M -reject *:6699^M -reject *:6881-6999^M -accept *:*</tt></pre> -</div></div> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>ExitPolicyRejectPrivate</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Reject all private (local) networks, along with your own public IP address, - at the beginning of your exit policy. See above entry on ExitPolicy. - (Default: 1) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>MaxOnionsPending</strong> <em>NUM</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - If you have more than this number of onionskins queued for decrypt, reject - new ones. (Default: 100) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>MyFamily</strong> <em>node</em>,<em>node</em>,<em>…</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Declare that this Tor server is controlled or administered by a group or - organization identical or similar to that of the other servers, defined by - their identity fingerprints or nicknames. When two servers both declare - that they are in the same 'family', Tor clients will not use them in the - same circuit. (Each server only needs to list the other servers in its - family; it doesn’t need to list itself, but it won’t hurt.) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>Nickname</strong> <em>name</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Set the server’s nickname to 'name'. Nicknames must be between 1 and 19 - characters inclusive, and must contain only the characters [a-zA-Z0-9]. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>NumCPUs</strong> <em>num</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - How many processes to use at once for decrypting onionskins. (Default: 1) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>ORPort</strong> <em>PORT</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Advertise this port to listen for connections from Tor clients and servers. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>ORListenAddress</strong> <em>IP</em>[:<em>PORT</em>] -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Bind to this IP address to listen for connections from Tor clients and - servers. If you specify a port, bind to this port rather than the one - specified in ORPort. (Default: 0.0.0.0) This directive can be specified - multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>PublishServerDescriptor</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>|<strong>v1</strong>|<strong>v2</strong>|<strong>v3</strong>|<strong>bridge</strong>,<strong>…</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - This option specifies which descriptors Tor will publish when acting as - a relay. You can - choose multiple arguments, separated by commas. -<br /> - If this option is set to 0, Tor will not publish its - descriptors to any directories. (This is useful if you’re testing - out your server, or if you’re using a Tor controller that handles directory - publishing for you.) Otherwise, Tor will publish its descriptors of all - type(s) specified. The default is "1", - which means "if running as a server, publish the - appropriate descriptors to the authorities". -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>ShutdownWaitLength</strong> <em>NUM</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - When we get a SIGINT and we’re a server, we begin shutting down: - we close listeners and start refusing new circuits. After <strong>NUM</strong> - seconds, we exit. If we get a second SIGINT, we exit immedi- - ately. (Default: 30 seconds) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>AccountingMax</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>bytes</strong>|<strong>KB</strong>|<strong>MB</strong>|<strong>GB</strong>|<strong>TB</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Never send more than the specified number of bytes in a given accounting - period, or receive more than that number in the period. For example, with - AccountingMax set to 1 GB, a server could send 900 MB and receive 800 MB - and continue running. It will only hibernate once one of the two reaches 1 - GB. When the number of bytes gets low, Tor will stop accepting new - connections and circuits. When the number of bytes - is exhausted, Tor will hibernate until some - time in the next accounting period. To prevent all servers from waking at - the same time, Tor will also wait until a random point in each period - before waking up. If you have bandwidth cost issues, enabling hibernation - is preferable to setting a low bandwidth, since it provides users with a - collection of fast servers that are up some of the time, which is more - useful than a set of slow servers that are always "available". -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>AccountingStart</strong> <strong>day</strong>|<strong>week</strong>|<strong>month</strong> [<em>day</em>] <em>HH:MM</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Specify how long accounting periods last. If <strong>month</strong> is given, each - accounting period runs from the time <em>HH:MM</em> on the <em>dayth</em> day of one - month to the same day and time of the next. (The day must be between 1 and - 28.) If <strong>week</strong> is given, each accounting period runs from the time <em>HH:MM</em> - of the <em>dayth</em> day of one week to the same day and time of the next week, - with Monday as day 1 and Sunday as day 7. If <strong>day</strong> is given, each - accounting period runs from the time <em>HH:MM</em> each day to the same time on - the next day. All times are local, and given in 24-hour time. (Defaults to - "month 1 0:00".) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>ServerDNSResolvConfFile</strong> <em>filename</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Overrides the default DNS configuration with the configuration in - <em>filename</em>. The file format is the same as the standard Unix - "<strong>resolv.conf</strong>" file (7). This option, like all other ServerDNS options, - only affects name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients. - (Defaults to use the system DNS configuration.) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - If this option is false, Tor exits immediately if there are problems - parsing the system DNS configuration or connecting to nameservers. - Otherwise, Tor continues to periodically retry the system nameservers until - it eventually succeeds. (Defaults to "1".) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>ServerDNSSearchDomains</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - If set to 1, then we will search for addresses in the local search domain. - For example, if this system is configured to believe it is in - "example.com", and a client tries to connect to "www", the client will be - connected to "www.example.com". This option only affects name lookups that - your server does on behalf of clients. (Defaults to "0".) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>ServerDNSDetectHijacking</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - When this option is set to 1, we will test periodically to determine - whether our local nameservers have been configured to hijack failing DNS - requests (usually to an advertising site). If they are, we will attempt to - correct this. This option only affects name lookups that your server does - on behalf of clients. (Defaults to "1".) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>ServerDNSTestAddresses</strong> <em>address</em>,<em>address</em>,<em>…</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - When we’re detecting DNS hijacking, make sure that these <em>valid</em> addresses - aren’t getting redirected. If they are, then our DNS is completely useless, - and we’ll reset our exit policy to "reject <strong>:</strong>". This option only affects - name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients. (Defaults to - "www.google.com, www.mit.edu, www.yahoo.com, www.slashdot.org".) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>ServerDNSAllowNonRFC953Hostnames</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - When this option is disabled, Tor does not try to resolve hostnames - containing illegal characters (like @ and :) rather than sending them to an - exit node to be resolved. This helps trap accidental attempts to resolve - URLs and so on. This option only affects name lookups that your server does - on behalf of clients. (Default: 0) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>BridgeRecordUsageByCountry</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - When this option is enabled and BridgeRelay is also enabled, and we have - GeoIP data, Tor keeps a keep a per-country count of how many client - addresses have contacted it so that it can help the bridge authority guess - which countries have blocked access to it. (Default: 1) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>ServerDNSRandomizeCase</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - When this option is set, Tor sets the case of each character randomly in - outgoing DNS requests, and makes sure that the case matches in DNS replies. - This so-called "0x20 hack" helps resist some types of DNS poisoning attack. - For more information, see "Increased DNS Forgery Resistance through - 0x20-Bit Encoding". This option only affects name lookups that your server - does on behalf of clients. (Default: 1) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>GeoIPFile</strong> <em>filename</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - A filename containing GeoIP data, for use with BridgeRecordUsageByCountry. -</p> -</dd> -</dl></div> -</div> -<h2 id="_directory_server_options">DIRECTORY SERVER OPTIONS</h2> -<div class="sectionbody"> -<div class="paragraph"><p>The following options are useful only for directory servers (that is, -if DirPort is non-zero):</p></div> -<div class="dlist"><dl> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>AuthoritativeDirectory</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - When this option is set to 1, Tor operates as an authoritative directory - server. Instead of caching the directory, it generates its own list of - good servers, signs it, and sends that to the clients. Unless the clients - already have you listed as a trusted directory, you probably do not want - to set this option. Please coordinate with the other admins at - <a href="mailto:tor-ops@torproject.org">tor-ops@torproject.org</a> if you think you should be a directory. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>DirPortFrontPage</strong> <em>FILENAME</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - When this option is set, it takes an HTML file and publishes it as "/" on - the DirPort. Now relay operators can provide a disclaimer without needing - to set up a separate webserver. There’s a sample disclaimer in - contrib/tor-exit-notice.html. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>V1AuthoritativeDirectory</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - When this option is set in addition to <strong>AuthoritativeDirectory</strong>, Tor - generates version 1 directory and running-routers documents (for legacy - Tor clients up to 0.1.0.x). -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>V2AuthoritativeDirectory</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - When this option is set in addition to <strong>AuthoritativeDirectory</strong>, Tor - generates version 2 network statuses and serves descriptors, etc as - described in doc/spec/dir-spec-v2.txt (for Tor clients and servers running - 0.1.1.x and 0.1.2.x). -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>V3AuthoritativeDirectory</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - When this option is set in addition to <strong>AuthoritativeDirectory</strong>, Tor - generates version 3 network statuses and serves descriptors, etc as - described in doc/spec/dir-spec.txt (for Tor clients and servers running at - least 0.2.0.x). -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - When this option is set to 1, Tor adds information on which versions of - Tor are still believed safe for use to the published directory. Each - version 1 authority is automatically a versioning authority; version 2 - authorities provide this service optionally. See <strong>RecommendedVersions</strong>, - <strong>RecommendedClientVersions</strong>, and <strong>RecommendedServerVersions</strong>. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>NamingAuthoritativeDirectory</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - When this option is set to 1, then the server advertises that it has - opinions about nickname-to-fingerprint bindings. It will include these - opinions in its published network-status pages, by listing servers with - the flag "Named" if a correct binding between that nickname and fingerprint - has been registered with the dirserver. Naming dirservers will refuse to - accept or publish descriptors that contradict a registered binding. See - <strong>approved-routers</strong> in the <strong>FILES</strong> section below. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>HSAuthoritativeDir</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - When this option is set in addition to - <strong>AuthoritativeDirectory</strong>, Tor also accepts and serves hidden - service descriptors. (Default: 0) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>HSAuthorityRecordStats</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - When this option is set in addition to <strong>HSAuthoritativeDir</strong>, - Tor periodically (every 15 minutes) writes statistics about hidden service - usage to a file <strong>hsusage</strong> in its data directory. (Default: - 0) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>HidServDirectoryV2</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - When this option is set, Tor accepts and serves v2 hidden service - descriptors. Setting DirPort is not required for this, because clients - connect via the ORPort by default. (Default: 1) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>BridgeAuthoritativeDir</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - When this option is set in addition to <strong>AuthoritativeDirectory</strong>, Tor - accepts and serves router descriptors, but it caches and serves the main - networkstatus documents rather than generating its own. (Default: 0) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>seconds</strong>|<strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong>|<strong>days</strong>|<strong>weeks</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Minimum uptime of a v2 hidden service directory to be accepted as such by - authoritative directories. (Default: 24 hours) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>DirPort</strong> <em>PORT</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Advertise the directory service on this port. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>DirListenAddress</strong> <em>IP</em>[:<em>PORT</em>] -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Bind the directory service to this address. If you specify a port, bind to - this port rather than the one specified in DirPort. (Default: 0.0.0.0) - This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple - addresses/ports. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>DirPolicy</strong> <em>policy</em>,<em>policy</em>,<em>…</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the - directory ports. The policies have the same form as exit policies above. -</p> -</dd> -</dl></div> -</div> -<h2 id="_directory_authority_server_options">DIRECTORY AUTHORITY SERVER OPTIONS</h2> -<div class="sectionbody"> -<div class="dlist"><dl> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>RecommendedVersions</strong> <em>STRING</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be - safe. The list is included in each directory, and nodes which pull down the - directory learn whether they need to upgrade. This option can appear - multiple times: the values from multiple lines are spliced together. When - this is set then <strong>VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory</strong> should be set too. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>RecommendedClientVersions</strong> <em>STRING</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be - safe for clients to use. This information is included in version 2 - directories. If this is not set then the value of <strong>RecommendedVersions</strong> - is used. When this is set then <strong>VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory</strong> should - be set too. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>RecommendedServerVersions</strong> <em>STRING</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be - safe for servers to use. This information is included in version 2 - directories. If this is not set then the value of <strong>RecommendedVersions</strong> - is used. When this is set then <strong>VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory</strong> should - be set too. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>DirAllowPrivateAddresses</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - If set to 1, Tor will accept router descriptors with arbitrary "Address" - elements. Otherwise, if the address is not an IP address or is a private IP - address, it will reject the router descriptor. Defaults to 0. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>AuthDirBadDir</strong> <em>AddressPattern…</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that - will be listed as bad directories in any network status document this - authority publishes, if <strong>AuthDirListBadDirs</strong> is set. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>AuthDirBadExit</strong> <em>AddressPattern…</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that - will be listed as bad exits in any network status document this authority - publishes, if <strong>AuthDirListBadExits</strong> is set. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>AuthDirInvalid</strong> <em>AddressPattern…</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that - will never be listed as "valid" in any network status document that this - authority publishes. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>AuthDirReject</strong> <em>AddressPattern</em>… -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that - will never be listed at all in any network status document that this - authority publishes, or accepted as an OR address in any descriptor - submitted for publication by this authority. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>AuthDirListBadDirs</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, this directory has some - opinion about which nodes are unsuitable as directory caches. (Do not set - this to 1 unless you plan to list non-functioning directories as bad; - otherwise, you are effectively voting in favor of every declared - directory.) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>AuthDirListBadExits</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, this directory has some - opinion about which nodes are unsuitable as exit nodes. (Do not set this to - 1 unless you plan to list non-functioning exits as bad; otherwise, you are - effectively voting in favor of every declared exit as an exit.) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>AuthDirRejectUnlisted</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, the directory server rejects - all uploaded server descriptors that aren’t explicitly listed in the - fingerprints file. This acts as a "panic button" if we get hit with a Sybil - attack. (Default: 0) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr</strong> <em>NUM</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Authoritative directories only. The maximum number of servers that we will - list as acceptable on a single IP address. Set this to "0" for "no limit". - (Default: 2) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>AuthDirMaxServersPerAuthAddr</strong> <em>NUM</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Authoritative directories only. Like AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr, but applies - to addresses shared with directory authorities. (Default: 5) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>V3AuthVotingInterval</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server’s preferred voting - interval. Note that voting will <em>actually</em> happen at an interval chosen - by consensus from all the authorities' preferred intervals. This time - SHOULD divide evenly into a day. (Default: 1 hour) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>V3AuthVoteDelay</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server’s preferred delay - between publishing its vote and assuming it has all the votes from all the - other authorities. Note that the actual time used is not the server’s - preferred time, but the consensus of all preferences. (Default: 5 minutes.) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>V3AuthDistDelay</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server’s preferred delay - between publishing its consensus and signature and assuming it has all the - signatures from all the other authorities. Note that the actual time used - is not the server’s preferred time, but the consensus of all preferences. - (Default: 5 minutes.) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>V3AuthNIntervalsValid</strong> <em>NUM</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the number of VotingIntervals - for which each consensus should be valid for. Choosing high numbers - increases network partitioning risks; choosing low numbers increases - directory traffic. Note that the actual number of intervals used is not the - server’s preferred number, but the consensus of all preferences. Must be at - least 2. (Default: 3.) -</p> -</dd> -</dl></div> -</div> -<h2 id="_hidden_service_options">HIDDEN SERVICE OPTIONS</h2> -<div class="sectionbody"> -<div class="paragraph"><p>The following options are used to configure a hidden service.</p></div> -<div class="dlist"><dl> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>HiddenServiceDir</strong> <em>DIRECTORY</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Store data files for a hidden service in DIRECTORY. Every hidden service - must have a separate directory. You may use this option multiple times to - specify multiple services. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>HiddenServicePort</strong> <em>VIRTPORT</em> [<em>TARGET</em>] -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Configure a virtual port VIRTPORT for a hidden service. You may use this - option multiple times; each time applies to the service using the most - recent hiddenservicedir. By default, this option maps the virtual port to - the same port on 127.0.0.1. You may override the target port, address, or - both by specifying a target of addr, port, or addr:port. You may also have - multiple lines with the same VIRTPORT: when a user connects to that - VIRTPORT, one of the TARGETs from those lines will be chosen at random. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>PublishHidServDescriptors</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - If set to 0, Tor will run any hidden services you configure, but it won’t - advertise them to the rendezvous directory. This option is only useful if - you’re using a Tor controller that handles hidserv publishing for you. - (Default: 1) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>HiddenServiceVersion</strong> <em>version</em>,<em>version</em>,<em>…</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - A list of rendezvous service descriptor versions to publish for the hidden - service. Currently, only version 2 is supported. (Default: 2) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient</strong> <em>auth-type</em> <em>client-name</em>,<em>client-name</em>,<em>…</em> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - If configured, the hidden service is accessible for authorized clients - only. The auth-type can either be 'basic' for a general-purpose - authorization protocol or 'stealth' for a less scalable protocol that also - hides service activity from unauthorized clients. Only clients that are - listed here are authorized to access the hidden service. Valid client names - are 1 to 19 characters long and only use characters in A-Za-z0-9+-_ (no - spaces). If this option is set, the hidden service is not accessible for - clients without authorization any more. Generated authorization data can be - found in the hostname file. Clients need to put this authorization data in - their configuration file using <strong>HidServAuth</strong>. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>RendPostPeriod</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>seconds</strong>|<strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong>|<strong>days</strong>|<strong>weeks</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Every time the specified period elapses, Tor uploads any rendezvous - service descriptors to the directory servers. This information is also - uploaded whenever it changes. (Default: 1 hour) -</p> -</dd> -</dl></div> -</div> -<h2 id="_testing_network_options">TESTING NETWORK OPTIONS</h2> -<div class="sectionbody"> -<div class="paragraph"><p>The following options are used for running a testing Tor network.</p></div> -<div class="dlist"><dl> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>TestingTorNetwork</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - If set to 1, Tor adjusts default values of the configuration options below, - so that it is easier to set up a testing Tor network. May only be set if - non-default set of DirServers is set. Cannot be unset while Tor is running. - (Default: 0)<br /> -</p> -<div class="literalblock"> -<div class="content"> -<pre><tt>ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig 1^M -DirAllowPrivateAddresses 1^M -EnforceDistinctSubnets 0^M -AssumeReachable 1^M -AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr 0^M -AuthDirMaxServersPerAuthAddr 0^M -ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses 0^M -ExitPolicyRejectPrivate 0^M -V3AuthVotingInterval 5 minutes^M -V3AuthVoteDelay 20 seconds^M -V3AuthDistDelay 20 seconds^M -TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval 5 minutes^M -TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay 20 seconds^M -TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay 20 seconds^M -TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability 0 minutes^M -TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime 0 minutes</tt></pre> -</div></div> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Like V3AuthVotingInterval, but for initial voting interval before the first - consensus has been created. Changing this requires that - <strong>TestingTorNetwork</strong> is set. (Default: 30 minutes) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Like TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay, but for initial voting interval before - the first consensus has been created. Changing this requires that - <strong>TestingTorNetwork</strong> is set. (Default: 5 minutes) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Like TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay, but for initial voting interval before - the first consensus has been created. Changing this requires that - <strong>TestingTorNetwork</strong> is set. (Default: 5 minutes) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - After starting as an authority, do not make claims about whether routers - are Running until this much time has passed. Changing this requires - that <strong>TestingTorNetwork</strong> is set. (Default: 30 minutes) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Clients try downloading router descriptors from directory caches after this - time. Changing this requires that <strong>TestingTorNetwork</strong> is set. (Default: - 10 minutes) -</p> -</dd> -</dl></div> -</div> -<h2 id="_signals">SIGNALS</h2> -<div class="sectionbody"> -<div class="paragraph"><p>Tor catches the following signals:</p></div> -<div class="dlist"><dl> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>SIGTERM</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Tor will catch this, clean up and sync to disk if necessary, and exit. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>SIGINT</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Tor clients behave as with SIGTERM; but Tor servers will do a controlled - slow shutdown, closing listeners and waiting 30 seconds before exiting. - (The delay can be configured with the ShutdownWaitLength config option.) -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>SIGHUP</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - The signal instructs Tor to reload its configuration (including closing and - reopening logs), and kill and restart its helper processes if applicable. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>SIGUSR1</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Log statistics about current connections, past connections, and throughput. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>SIGUSR2</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Switch all logs to loglevel debug. You can go back to the old loglevels by - sending a SIGHUP. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>SIGCHLD</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Tor receives this signal when one of its helper processes has exited, so it - can clean up. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>SIGPIPE</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Tor catches this signal and ignores it. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>SIGXFSZ</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - If this signal exists on your platform, Tor catches and ignores it. -</p> -</dd> -</dl></div> -</div> -<h2 id="_files">FILES</h2> -<div class="sectionbody"> -<div class="dlist"><dl> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>@CONFDIR@/torrc</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - The configuration file, which contains "option value" pairs. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<strong>@LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor/</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - The tor process stores keys and other data here. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<em>DataDirectory</em><strong>/cached-status/</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - The most recently downloaded network status document for each authority. - Each file holds one such document; the filenames are the hexadecimal - identity key fingerprints of the directory authorities. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<em>DataDirectory</em><strong>/cached-descriptors</strong> and <strong>cached-descriptors.new</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - These files hold downloaded router statuses. Some routers may appear more - than once; if so, the most recently published descriptor is used. Lines - beginning with @-signs are annotations that contain more information about - a given router. The ".new" file is an append-only journal; when it gets - too large, all entries are merged into a new cached-descriptors file. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<em>DataDirectory</em><strong>/cached-routers</strong> and <strong>cached-routers.new</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Obsolete versions of cached-descriptors and cached-descriptors.new. When - Tor can’t find the newer files, it looks here instead. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<em>DataDirectory</em><strong>/state</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - A set of persistent key-value mappings. These are documented in - the file. These include: -</p> -<div class="ulist"><ul> -<li> -<p> -The current entry guards and their status. -</p> -</li> -<li> -<p> -The current bandwidth accounting values (unused so far; see - below). -</p> -</li> -<li> -<p> -When the file was last written -</p> -</li> -<li> -<p> -What version of Tor generated the state file -</p> -</li> -<li> -<p> -A short history of bandwidth usage, as produced in the router - descriptors. -</p> -</li> -</ul></div> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<em>DataDirectory</em><strong>/bw_accounting</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Used to track bandwidth accounting values (when the current period starts - and ends; how much has been read and written so far this period). This file - is obsolete, and the data is now stored in the 'state' file as well. Only - used when bandwidth accounting is enabled. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<em>DataDirectory</em><strong>/control_auth_cookie</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Used for cookie authentication with the controller. Location can be - overridden by the CookieAuthFile config option. Regenerated on startup. See - control-spec.txt for details. Only used when cookie authentication is - enabled. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<em>DataDirectory</em><strong>/keys/</strong>* -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Only used by servers. Holds identity keys and onion keys. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<em>DataDirectory</em><strong>/fingerprint</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Only used by servers. Holds the fingerprint of the server’s identity key. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<em>DataDirectory</em><strong>/approved-routers</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Only for naming authoritative directory servers (see - <strong>NamingAuthoritativeDirectory</strong>). This file lists nickname to identity - bindings. Each line lists a nickname and a fingerprint separated by - whitespace. See your <strong>fingerprint</strong> file in the <em>DataDirectory</em> for an - example line. If the nickname is <strong>!reject</strong> then descriptors from the - given identity (fingerprint) are rejected by this server. If it is - <strong>!invalid</strong> then descriptors are accepted but marked in the directory as - not valid, that is, not recommended. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<em>DataDirectory</em><strong>/router-stability</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Only used by authoritative directory servers. Tracks measurements for - router mean-time-between-failures so that authorities have a good idea of - how to set their Stable flags. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<em>HiddenServiceDirectory</em><strong>/hostname</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - The <base32-encoded-fingerprint>.onion domain name for this hidden service. - If the hidden service is restricted to authorized clients only, this file - also contains authorization data for all clients. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<em>HiddenServiceDirectory</em><strong>/private_key</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - The private key for this hidden service. -</p> -</dd> -<dt class="hdlist1"> -<em>HiddenServiceDirectory</em><strong>/client_keys</strong> -</dt> -<dd> -<p> - Authorization data for a hidden service that is only accessible by - authorized clients. -</p> -</dd> -</dl></div> -</div> -<h2 id="_see_also">SEE ALSO</h2> -<div class="sectionbody"> -<div class="paragraph"><p><strong>privoxy</strong>(1), <strong>tsocks</strong>(1), <strong>torify</strong>(1)<br /></p></div> -<div class="paragraph"><p><strong>https://www.torproject.org/</strong></p></div> -</div> -<h2 id="_bugs">BUGS</h2> -<div class="sectionbody"> -<div class="paragraph"><p>Plenty, probably. Tor is still in development. Please report them.</p></div> -</div> -<h2 id="_authors">AUTHORS</h2> -<div class="sectionbody"> -<div class="paragraph"><p>Roger Dingledine [arma at mit.edu], Nick Mathewson [nickm at alum.mit.edu].</p></div> -</div> -</div> + <div id="maincol"> + <: + die "Missing git clone at $(TORGIT)" unless -d "$(TORGIT)"; + my $man = `GIT_DIR=$(TORGIT) git show $(STABLETAG):doc/tor.1.txt | asciidoc -d manpage -s -o - -`; + die "No manpage because of asciidoc error or file not available from git" unless $man; + print $man; + :> + </div> <!-- END MAINCOL --> -<div id = "sidecol"> + <div id = "sidecol"> #include "side.wmi" #include "info.wmi" + </div> + <!-- END SIDECOL --> </div> -<!-- END SIDECOL --> -</div> <!-- END CONTENT --> -#include <foot.wmi> +#include <foot.wmi>