commit 49dd5ef3a3d1775fdc3c0a7d069d3097b3baeeec Author: Nick Mathewson nickm@torproject.org Date: Wed Nov 7 16:09:58 2012 -0500
Add and use and unlikely-to-be-eliminated memwipe()
Apparently some compilers like to eliminate memset() operations on data that's about to go out-of-scope. I've gone with the safest possible replacement, which might be a bit slow. I don't think this is critical path in any way that will affect performance, but if it is, we can work on that in 0.2.4.
Fixes bug 7352. --- changes/bug7352 | 12 ++++++ src/common/aes.c | 4 +- src/common/compat.c | 2 +- src/common/crypto.c | 89 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ src/common/crypto.h | 3 ++ src/common/mempool.c | 3 +- src/common/tortls.c | 4 +- src/common/util.c | 2 +- src/or/buffers.c | 6 ++-- src/or/circuitlist.c | 8 ++-- src/or/connection.c | 2 +- src/or/connection_edge.c | 4 +- src/or/connection_or.c | 8 ++-- src/or/networkstatus.c | 2 +- src/or/onion.c | 24 ++++++------ src/or/rendclient.c | 4 +- src/or/rendservice.c | 4 +- src/or/routerparse.c | 2 +- src/tools/tor-gencert.c | 6 ++-- 19 files changed, 124 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-)
diff --git a/changes/bug7352 b/changes/bug7352 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..74a878d --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug7352 @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ + o Major bugfixes: + - Tor tries to wipe potentially sensitive data after using it, so + that if some subsequent security failure exposes Tor's memory, + the damage will be limited. But we had a bug where the compiler + was eliminating these wipe operations when it decided that the + memory was no longer visible to a (correctly running) program, + hence defeating our attempt at defense in depth. We fix that + by using OpenSSL's OPENSSL_cleanse() operation, which a compiler + is unlikely to optimize away. Future versions of Tor may use + a less ridiculously heavy approach for this. Fixes bug 7352. + Reported in an article by Andrey Karpov. + diff --git a/src/common/aes.c b/src/common/aes.c index 59d864a..295a907 100644 --- a/src/common/aes.c +++ b/src/common/aes.c @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ aes_cipher_free(aes_cnt_cipher_t *cipher) if (!cipher) return; EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&cipher->evp); - memset(cipher, 0, sizeof(aes_cnt_cipher_t)); + memwipe(cipher, 0, sizeof(aes_cnt_cipher_t)); tor_free(cipher); } void @@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ aes_cipher_free(aes_cnt_cipher_t *cipher) if (cipher->using_evp) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&cipher->key.evp); } - memset(cipher, 0, sizeof(aes_cnt_cipher_t)); + memwipe(cipher, 0, sizeof(aes_cnt_cipher_t)); tor_free(cipher); }
diff --git a/src/common/compat.c b/src/common/compat.c index ca850a3..59e3898 100644 --- a/src/common/compat.c +++ b/src/common/compat.c @@ -332,7 +332,7 @@ tor_munmap_file(tor_mmap_t *handle) { char *d = (char*)handle->data; tor_free(d); - memset(handle, 0, sizeof(tor_mmap_t)); + memwipe(handle, 0, sizeof(tor_mmap_t)); tor_free(handle); } #endif diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c index a69e6c5..30990ec 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.c +++ b/src/common/crypto.c @@ -425,7 +425,7 @@ crypto_cipher_free(crypto_cipher_t *env)
tor_assert(env->cipher); aes_cipher_free(env->cipher); - memset(env, 0, sizeof(crypto_cipher_t)); + memwipe(env, 0, sizeof(crypto_cipher_t)); tor_free(env); }
@@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_filename(crypto_pk_t *env,
/* Try to parse it. */ r = crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_string(env, contents, -1); - memset(contents, 0, strlen(contents)); + memwipe(contents, 0, strlen(contents)); tor_free(contents); if (r) return -1; /* read_private_key_from_string already warned, so we don't.*/ @@ -671,7 +671,7 @@ crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_filename(crypto_pk_t *env, s[len]='\0'; r = write_str_to_file(fname, s, 0); BIO_free(bio); - memset(s, 0, strlen(s)); + memwipe(s, 0, strlen(s)); tor_free(s); return r; } @@ -981,7 +981,7 @@ crypto_pk_private_sign_digest(crypto_pk_t *env, char *to, size_t tolen, if (crypto_digest(digest,from,fromlen)<0) return -1; r = crypto_pk_private_sign(env,to,tolen,digest,DIGEST_LEN); - memset(digest, 0, sizeof(digest)); + memwipe(digest, 0, sizeof(digest)); return r; }
@@ -1045,14 +1045,14 @@ crypto_pk_public_hybrid_encrypt(crypto_pk_t *env, from+pkeylen-overhead-CIPHER_KEY_LEN, symlen);
if (r<0) goto err; - memset(buf, 0, pkeylen); + memwipe(buf, 0, pkeylen); tor_free(buf); crypto_cipher_free(cipher); tor_assert(outlen+symlen < INT_MAX); return (int)(outlen + symlen); err:
- memset(buf, 0, pkeylen); + memwipe(buf, 0, pkeylen); tor_free(buf); crypto_cipher_free(cipher); return -1; @@ -1103,13 +1103,13 @@ crypto_pk_private_hybrid_decrypt(crypto_pk_t *env, r = crypto_cipher_decrypt(cipher, to+outlen, from+pkeylen, fromlen-pkeylen); if (r<0) goto err; - memset(buf,0,pkeylen); + memwipe(buf,0,pkeylen); tor_free(buf); crypto_cipher_free(cipher); tor_assert(outlen + fromlen < INT_MAX); return (int)(outlen + (fromlen-pkeylen)); err: - memset(buf,0,pkeylen); + memwipe(buf,0,pkeylen); tor_free(buf); crypto_cipher_free(cipher); return -1; @@ -1509,7 +1509,7 @@ crypto_digest_free(crypto_digest_t *digest) { if (!digest) return; - memset(digest, 0, sizeof(crypto_digest_t)); + memwipe(digest, 0, sizeof(crypto_digest_t)); tor_free(digest); }
@@ -1571,7 +1571,7 @@ crypto_digest_get_digest(crypto_digest_t *digest, break; } memcpy(out, r, out_len); - memset(r, 0, sizeof(r)); + memwipe(r, 0, sizeof(r)); }
/** Allocate and return a new digest object with the same state as @@ -1673,10 +1673,10 @@ crypto_hmac_sha256(char *hmac_out, SHA256_Final((uint8_t*)hmac_out, &st);
/* Now clear everything. */ - memset(k, 0, sizeof(k)); - memset(pad, 0, sizeof(pad)); - memset(d, 0, sizeof(d)); - memset(&st, 0, sizeof(st)); + memwipe(k, 0, sizeof(k)); + memwipe(pad, 0, sizeof(pad)); + memwipe(d, 0, sizeof(d)); + memwipe(&st, 0, sizeof(st)); #undef BLOCKSIZE #undef DIGESTSIZE #endif @@ -2208,7 +2208,7 @@ crypto_dh_compute_secret(int severity, crypto_dh_t *dh, if (pubkey_bn) BN_free(pubkey_bn); if (secret_tmp) { - memset(secret_tmp, 0, secret_tmp_len); + memwipe(secret_tmp, 0, secret_tmp_len); tor_free(secret_tmp); } if (result < 0) @@ -2243,15 +2243,15 @@ crypto_expand_key_material(const char *key_in, size_t key_in_len, goto err; memcpy(cp, digest, MIN(DIGEST_LEN, key_out_len-(cp-key_out))); } - memset(tmp, 0, key_in_len+1); + memwipe(tmp, 0, key_in_len+1); tor_free(tmp); - memset(digest, 0, sizeof(digest)); + memwipe(digest, 0, sizeof(digest)); return 0;
err: - memset(tmp, 0, key_in_len+1); + memwipe(tmp, 0, key_in_len+1); tor_free(tmp); - memset(digest, 0, sizeof(digest)); + memwipe(digest, 0, sizeof(digest)); return -1; }
@@ -2343,7 +2343,7 @@ crypto_seed_rng(int startup) return rand_poll_status ? 0 : -1; } RAND_seed(buf, sizeof(buf)); - memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + memwipe(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); seed_weak_rng(); return 0; #else @@ -2360,7 +2360,7 @@ crypto_seed_rng(int startup) return -1; } RAND_seed(buf, (int)sizeof(buf)); - memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + memwipe(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); seed_weak_rng(); return 0; } @@ -2843,7 +2843,7 @@ base32_decode(char *dest, size_t destlen, const char *src, size_t srclen) } }
- memset(tmp, 0, srclen); + memwipe(tmp, 0, srclen); tor_free(tmp); tmp = NULL; return 0; @@ -2888,11 +2888,54 @@ secret_to_key(char *key_out, size_t key_out_len, const char *secret, } } crypto_digest_get_digest(d, key_out, key_out_len); - memset(tmp, 0, tmplen); + memwipe(tmp, 0, tmplen); tor_free(tmp); crypto_digest_free(d); }
+/** + * Destroy the <b>sz</b> bytes of data stored at <b>mem</b>, setting them to + * the value <b>byte</b>. + * + * This function is preferable to memset, since many compilers will happily + * optimize out memset() when they can convince themselves that the data being + * cleared will never be read. + * + * Right now, our convention is to use this function when we are wiping data + * that's about to become inaccessible, such as stack buffers that are about + * to go out of scope or structures that are about to get freed. (In + * practice, it appears that the compilers we're currently using will optimize + * out the memset()s for stack-allocated buffers, but not those for + * about-to-be-freed structures. That could change, though, so we're being + * wary.) If there are live reads for the data, then you can just use + * memset(). + */ +void +memwipe(void *mem, uint8_t byte, size_t sz) +{ + /* Because whole-program-optimization exists, we may not be able to just + * have this function call "memset". A smart compiler could inline it, then + * eliminate dead memsets, and declare itself to be clever. */ + + /* This is a slow and ugly function from OpenSSL that fills 'mem' with junk + * based on the pointer value, then uses that junk to update a global + * variable. It's an elaborate ruse to trick the compiler into not + * optimizing out the "wipe this memory" code. Read it if you like zany + * programming tricks! In later versions of Tor, we should look for better + * not-optimized-out memory wiping stuff. */ + OPENSSL_cleanse(mem, sz); + /* Just in case some caller of memwipe() is relying on getting a buffer + * filled with a particular value, fill the buffer. + * + * If this function gets inlined, this memset might get eliminated, but + * that's okay: We only care about this particular memset in the case where + * the caller should have been using memset(), and the memset() wouldn't get + * eliminated. In other words, this is here so that we won't break anything + * if somebody accidentally calls memwipe() instead of memset(). + **/ + memset(mem, byte, sz); +} + #ifdef TOR_IS_MULTITHREADED /** Helper: OpenSSL uses this callback to manipulate mutexes. */ static void diff --git a/src/common/crypto.h b/src/common/crypto.h index 76bcbf7..7d56271 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.h +++ b/src/common/crypto.h @@ -271,6 +271,9 @@ int digest256_from_base64(char *digest, const char *d64); void secret_to_key(char *key_out, size_t key_out_len, const char *secret, size_t secret_len, const char *s2k_specifier);
+/** OpenSSL-based utility functions. */ +void memwipe(void *mem, uint8_t byte, size_t sz); + #ifdef CRYPTO_PRIVATE /* Prototypes for private functions only used by tortls.c, crypto.c, and the * unit tests. */ diff --git a/src/common/mempool.c b/src/common/mempool.c index 2416bce..637f081 100644 --- a/src/common/mempool.c +++ b/src/common/mempool.c @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include "torint.h" +#include "crypto.h" #define MEMPOOL_PRIVATE #include "mempool.h"
@@ -519,7 +520,7 @@ mp_pool_destroy(mp_pool_t *pool) destroy_chunks(pool->empty_chunks); destroy_chunks(pool->used_chunks); destroy_chunks(pool->full_chunks); - memset(pool, 0xe0, sizeof(mp_pool_t)); + memwipe(pool, 0xe0, sizeof(mp_pool_t)); FREE(pool); }
diff --git a/src/common/tortls.c b/src/common/tortls.c index bec2c71..60aac64 100644 --- a/src/common/tortls.c +++ b/src/common/tortls.c @@ -713,7 +713,7 @@ tor_cert_free(tor_cert_t *cert) if (cert->cert) X509_free(cert->cert); tor_free(cert->encoded); - memset(cert, 0x03, sizeof(*cert)); + memwipe(cert, 0x03, sizeof(*cert)); tor_free(cert); }
@@ -2448,7 +2448,7 @@ tor_tls_get_tlssecrets(tor_tls_t *tls, uint8_t *secrets_out) (char*)tls->ssl->session->master_key, tls->ssl->session->master_key_length, buf, len); - memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + memwipe(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); return 0; }
diff --git a/src/common/util.c b/src/common/util.c index 6fb597a..005c2b5 100644 --- a/src/common/util.c +++ b/src/common/util.c @@ -3808,7 +3808,7 @@ tor_process_handle_destroy(process_handle_t *process_handle, fclose(process_handle->stderr_handle); #endif
- memset(process_handle, 0x0f, sizeof(process_handle_t)); + memwipe(process_handle, 0x0f, sizeof(process_handle_t)); tor_free(process_handle); }
diff --git a/src/or/buffers.c b/src/or/buffers.c index 9acc229..ad5ab83 100644 --- a/src/or/buffers.c +++ b/src/or/buffers.c @@ -1546,14 +1546,14 @@ socks_request_free(socks_request_t *req) if (!req) return; if (req->username) { - memset(req->username, 0x10, req->usernamelen); + memwipe(req->username, 0x10, req->usernamelen); tor_free(req->username); } if (req->password) { - memset(req->password, 0x04, req->passwordlen); + memwipe(req->password, 0x04, req->passwordlen); tor_free(req->password); } - memset(req, 0xCC, sizeof(socks_request_t)); + memwipe(req, 0xCC, sizeof(socks_request_t)); tor_free(req); }
diff --git a/src/or/circuitlist.c b/src/or/circuitlist.c index 7ed942c..93ba69d 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitlist.c +++ b/src/or/circuitlist.c @@ -612,11 +612,11 @@ circuit_free(circuit_t *circ)
tor_free(ocirc->dest_address); if (ocirc->socks_username) { - memset(ocirc->socks_username, 0x12, ocirc->socks_username_len); + memwipe(ocirc->socks_username, 0x12, ocirc->socks_username_len); tor_free(ocirc->socks_username); } if (ocirc->socks_password) { - memset(ocirc->socks_password, 0x06, ocirc->socks_password_len); + memwipe(ocirc->socks_password, 0x06, ocirc->socks_password_len); tor_free(ocirc->socks_password); } } else { @@ -657,7 +657,7 @@ circuit_free(circuit_t *circ) * "active" checks will be violated. */ cell_queue_clear(&circ->n_conn_cells);
- memset(mem, 0xAA, memlen); /* poison memory */ + memwipe(mem, 0xAA, memlen); /* poison memory */ tor_free(mem); }
@@ -721,7 +721,7 @@ circuit_free_cpath_node(crypt_path_t *victim) crypto_dh_free(victim->dh_handshake_state); extend_info_free(victim->extend_info);
- memset(victim, 0xBB, sizeof(crypt_path_t)); /* poison memory */ + memwipe(victim, 0xBB, sizeof(crypt_path_t)); /* poison memory */ tor_free(victim); }
diff --git a/src/or/connection.c b/src/or/connection.c index 364e491..eac9c4f 100644 --- a/src/or/connection.c +++ b/src/or/connection.c @@ -561,7 +561,7 @@ _connection_free(connection_t *conn) } #endif
- memset(mem, 0xCC, memlen); /* poison memory */ + memwipe(mem, 0xCC, memlen); /* poison memory */ tor_free(mem); }
diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index 1592033..9563ca6 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -3709,11 +3709,11 @@ circuit_clear_isolation(origin_circuit_t *circ) circ->session_group = -1; circ->nym_epoch = 0; if (circ->socks_username) { - memset(circ->socks_username, 0x11, circ->socks_username_len); + memwipe(circ->socks_username, 0x11, circ->socks_username_len); tor_free(circ->socks_username); } if (circ->socks_password) { - memset(circ->socks_password, 0x05, circ->socks_password_len); + memwipe(circ->socks_password, 0x05, circ->socks_password_len); tor_free(circ->socks_password); } circ->socks_username_len = circ->socks_password_len = 0; diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.c b/src/or/connection_or.c index 6293fe8..5eecee0 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_or.c +++ b/src/or/connection_or.c @@ -1657,7 +1657,7 @@ or_handshake_state_free(or_handshake_state_t *state) crypto_digest_free(state->digest_received); tor_cert_free(state->auth_cert); tor_cert_free(state->id_cert); - memset(state, 0xBE, sizeof(or_handshake_state_t)); + memwipe(state, 0xBE, sizeof(or_handshake_state_t)); tor_free(state); }
@@ -1698,7 +1698,7 @@ or_handshake_state_record_cell(or_handshake_state_t *state, this very often at all. */ cell_pack(&packed, cell); crypto_digest_add_bytes(d, packed.body, sizeof(packed.body)); - memset(&packed, 0, sizeof(packed)); + memwipe(&packed, 0, sizeof(packed)); }
/** Remember that a variable-length <b>cell</b> has been transmitted (if @@ -1733,7 +1733,7 @@ or_handshake_state_record_var_cell(or_handshake_state_t *state, crypto_digest_add_bytes(d, buf, sizeof(buf)); crypto_digest_add_bytes(d, (const char *)cell->payload, cell->payload_len);
- memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + memwipe(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); }
/** Set <b>conn</b>'s state to OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN, and tell other subsystems @@ -2090,7 +2090,7 @@ connection_or_send_auth_challenge_cell(or_connection_t *conn)
connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf(cell, conn); var_cell_free(cell); - memset(challenge, 0, sizeof(challenge)); + memwipe(challenge, 0, sizeof(challenge));
return 0; } diff --git a/src/or/networkstatus.c b/src/or/networkstatus.c index fadaf90..2553a74 100644 --- a/src/or/networkstatus.c +++ b/src/or/networkstatus.c @@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ networkstatus_vote_free(networkstatus_t *ns)
digestmap_free(ns->desc_digest_map, NULL);
- memset(ns, 11, sizeof(*ns)); + memwipe(ns, 11, sizeof(*ns)); tor_free(ns); }
diff --git a/src/or/onion.c b/src/or/onion.c index ff1556c..f8c4d72 100644 --- a/src/or/onion.c +++ b/src/or/onion.c @@ -206,12 +206,12 @@ onion_skin_create(crypto_pk_t *dest_router_key, PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, 1)<0) goto err;
- memset(challenge, 0, sizeof(challenge)); + memwipe(challenge, 0, sizeof(challenge)); *handshake_state_out = dh;
return 0; err: - memset(challenge, 0, sizeof(challenge)); + memwipe(challenge, 0, sizeof(challenge)); if (dh) crypto_dh_free(dh); return -1; } @@ -286,15 +286,15 @@ onion_skin_server_handshake(const char *onion_skin, /*ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN*/ /* use the rest of the key material for our shared keys, digests, etc */ memcpy(key_out, key_material+DIGEST_LEN, key_out_len);
- memset(challenge, 0, sizeof(challenge)); - memset(key_material, 0, key_material_len); + memwipe(challenge, 0, sizeof(challenge)); + memwipe(key_material, 0, key_material_len); tor_free(key_material); crypto_dh_free(dh); return 0; err: - memset(challenge, 0, sizeof(challenge)); + memwipe(challenge, 0, sizeof(challenge)); if (key_material) { - memset(key_material, 0, key_material_len); + memwipe(key_material, 0, key_material_len); tor_free(key_material); } if (dh) crypto_dh_free(dh); @@ -340,11 +340,11 @@ onion_skin_client_handshake(crypto_dh_t *handshake_state, /* use the rest of the key material for our shared keys, digests, etc */ memcpy(key_out, key_material+DIGEST_LEN, key_out_len);
- memset(key_material, 0, key_material_len); + memwipe(key_material, 0, key_material_len); tor_free(key_material); return 0; err: - memset(key_material, 0, key_material_len); + memwipe(key_material, 0, key_material_len); tor_free(key_material); return -1; } @@ -381,8 +381,8 @@ fast_server_handshake(const uint8_t *key_in, /* DIGEST_LEN bytes */ memcpy(key_out, out+DIGEST_LEN, key_out_len); r = 0; done: - memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); - memset(out, 0, out_len); + memwipe(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); + memwipe(out, 0, out_len); tor_free(out); return r; } @@ -426,8 +426,8 @@ fast_client_handshake(const uint8_t *handshake_state,/*DIGEST_LEN bytes*/ memcpy(key_out, out+DIGEST_LEN, key_out_len); r = 0; done: - memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); - memset(out, 0, out_len); + memwipe(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); + memwipe(out, 0, out_len); tor_free(out); return r; } diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index 6c751be..3a0cd1a 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -908,10 +908,10 @@ rend_client_receive_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request,
circuit_try_attaching_streams(circ);
- memset(keys, 0, sizeof(keys)); + memwipe(keys, 0, sizeof(keys)); return 0; err: - memset(keys, 0, sizeof(keys)); + memwipe(keys, 0, sizeof(keys)); circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL); return -1; } diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c index 6af4778..d235f08 100644 --- a/src/or/rendservice.c +++ b/src/or/rendservice.c @@ -1404,10 +1404,10 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request, memcpy(cpath->handshake_digest, keys, DIGEST_LEN); if (extend_info) extend_info_free(extend_info);
- memset(keys, 0, sizeof(keys)); + memwipe(keys, 0, sizeof(keys)); return 0; err: - memset(keys, 0, sizeof(keys)); + memwipe(keys, 0, sizeof(keys)); if (dh) crypto_dh_free(dh); if (launched) circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(launched), reason); diff --git a/src/or/routerparse.c b/src/or/routerparse.c index 2bf072b..299d07d 100644 --- a/src/or/routerparse.c +++ b/src/or/routerparse.c @@ -4596,7 +4596,7 @@ tor_version_parse(const char *s, tor_version_t *out) if (close_paren-cp > HEX_DIGEST_LEN) return -1; hexlen = (int)(close_paren-cp); - memset(digest, 0, sizeof(digest)); + memwipe(digest, 0, sizeof(digest)); if ( hexlen == 0 || (hexlen % 2) == 1) return -1; if (base16_decode(digest, hexlen/2, cp, hexlen)) diff --git a/src/tools/tor-gencert.c b/src/tools/tor-gencert.c index 38b2101..c7ab8dc 100644 --- a/src/tools/tor-gencert.c +++ b/src/tools/tor-gencert.c @@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ load_passphrase(void) cp = memchr(buf, '\n', n); passphrase_len = cp-buf; passphrase = tor_strndup(buf, passphrase_len); - memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + memwipe(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); return 0; }
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ static void clear_passphrase(void) { if (passphrase) { - memset(passphrase, 0, passphrase_len); + memwipe(passphrase, 0, passphrase_len); tor_free(passphrase); } } @@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ parse_commandline(int argc, char **argv) } }
- memset(&s, 0, sizeof(s)); + memwipe(&s, 0, sizeof(s)); if (verbose) set_log_severity_config(LOG_DEBUG, LOG_ERR, &s); else