commit e1d86d381714cb4e85f543fab0ca71f13e58767b
Author: Robert Hogan <robert(a)roberthogan.net>
Date: Thu Sep 30 21:41:20 2010 +0100
Issues with router_get_by_nickname()
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/1859
There are two problems in this bug:
1. When an OP makes a .exit request specifying itself as the exit, and the exit
is not yet listed, Tor gets all the routerinfos needed for the circuit but
discovers in …
[View More]circuit_is_acceptable() that its own routerinfo is not in the
routerdigest list and cannot be used. Tor then gets locked in a cycle of
repeating these two steps. When gathering the routerinfos for a circuit,
specifically when the exit has been chosen by .exit notation, Tor needs to
apply the same rules it uses later on when deciding if it can build a
circuit with those routerinfos.
2. A different bug arises in the above situation when the Tor instance's
routerinfo *is* listed in the routerlist, it shares its nickname with a
number of other Tor nodes, and it does not have 'Named' rights to its
nickname.
So for example, if (i) there are five nodes named Bob in the network, (ii) I
am running one of them but am flagged as 'Unnamed' because someone else
claimed the 'Bob' nickname first, and (iii) I run my Tor as both client
and exit the following can happen to me:
- I go to www.evil.com
- I click on a link www.evil.com.bob.exit
- My request will exit through my own Tor node rather than the 'Named'
node Bob or any of the others.
- www.evil.com now knows I am actually browsing from the same computer
that is running my 'Bob' node
So to solve both issues we need to ensure:
- When fulfilling a .exit request we only choose a routerinfo if it exists in
the routerlist, even when that routerinfo is ours.
- When getting a router by nickname we only return our own router information
if it is not going to be used for building a circuit.
We ensure this by removing the special treatment afforded our own router in
router_get_by_nickname(). This means the function will only return the
routerinfo of our own router if it is in the routerlist built from authority
info and has a unique nickname or is bound to a non-unique nickname.
There are some uses of router_get_by_nickname() where we are looking for the
router by name because of a configuration directive, specifically local
declaration of NodeFamilies and EntryNodes and other routers' declaration of
MyFamily. In these cases it is not at first clear if we need to continue
returning our own routerinfo even if our router is not listed and/or has a
non-unique nickname with the Unnamed flag.
The patch treats each of these cases as follows:
Other Routers' Declaration of MyFamily
This happens in routerlist_add_family(). If another router declares our router
in its family and our router has the Unnamed flag or is not in the routerlist
yet, should we take advantage of the fact that we know our own routerinfo to
add us in anyway? This patch says 'no, treat our own router just like any
other'. This is a safe choice because it ensures our client has the same view
of the network as other clients. We also have no good way of knowing if our
router is Named or not independently of the authorities, so we have to rely on
them in this.
Local declaration of NodeFamilies
Again, we have no way of knowing if the declaration 'NodeFamilies
Bob,Alice,Ringo' refers to our router Bob or the Named router Bob, so we have
to defer to the authorities and treat our own router like any other.
Local declaration of NodeFamilies
Again, same as above. There's also no good reason we would want our client to
choose it's own router as an entry guard if it does not meet the requirements
expected of any other router on the network.
In order to reduce the possibility of error, the patch also replaces two
instances where we were using router_get_by_nickname() with calls to
router_get_by_hexdigest() where the identity digest of the router
is available.
---
src/or/connection_edge.c | 2 +-
src/or/rendclient.c | 2 +-
src/or/routerlist.c | 3 ---
3 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c
index ded02e9..eba83ba 100644
--- a/src/or/connection_edge.c
+++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c
@@ -571,7 +571,7 @@ circuit_discard_optional_exit_enclaves(extend_info_t *info)
!edge_conn->chosen_exit_retries)
continue;
r1 = router_get_by_nickname(edge_conn->chosen_exit_name, 0);
- r2 = router_get_by_nickname(info->nickname, 0);
+ r2 = router_get_by_hexdigest(info->identity_digest);
if (!r1 || !r2 || r1 != r2)
continue;
tor_assert(edge_conn->socks_request);
diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c
index 7023b7f..97fb6f0 100644
--- a/src/or/rendclient.c
+++ b/src/or/rendclient.c
@@ -810,7 +810,7 @@ rend_client_get_random_intro(const rend_data_t *rend_query)
intro = smartlist_get(entry->parsed->intro_nodes, i);
/* Do we need to look up the router or is the extend info complete? */
if (!intro->extend_info->onion_key) {
- router = router_get_by_nickname(intro->extend_info->nickname, 0);
+ router = router_get_by_hexdigest(intro->extend_info->identity_digest);
if (!router) {
log_info(LD_REND, "Unknown router with nickname '%s'; trying another.",
intro->extend_info->nickname);
diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c
index 2fc8073..9622406 100644
--- a/src/or/routerlist.c
+++ b/src/or/routerlist.c
@@ -1989,9 +1989,6 @@ router_get_by_nickname(const char *nickname, int warn_if_unnamed)
return router_get_by_hexdigest(nickname);
if (!strcasecmp(nickname, UNNAMED_ROUTER_NICKNAME))
return NULL;
- if (server_mode(get_options()) &&
- !strcasecmp(nickname, get_options()->Nickname))
- return router_get_my_routerinfo();
maybedigest = (strlen(nickname) >= HEX_DIGEST_LEN) &&
(base16_decode(digest,DIGEST_LEN,nickname,HEX_DIGEST_LEN) == 0);
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commit 7488fe5a224bf1c40d22769ff3986361d947d6f7
Author: Robert Hogan <robert(a)roberthogan.net>
Date: Sun Oct 17 12:27:57 2010 +0100
Issues with router_get_by_nickname()
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/1859
Use router_get_by_digest() instead of router_get_by_hexdigest()
in circuit_discard_optional_exit_enclaves() and
rend_client_get_random_intro(), per Nick's comments.
Using router_get_by_digest() in rend_client_get_random_intro() …
[View More]will
break hidden services published by Tor versions pre 0.1.2.18 and
0.2.07-alpha as they only publish by nickname. This is acceptable
however as these versions only publish to authority tor26 and
don't work for versions in the 0.2.2.x series anyway.
---
src/or/connection_edge.c | 2 +-
src/or/rendclient.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c
index eba83ba..f72aa94 100644
--- a/src/or/connection_edge.c
+++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c
@@ -571,7 +571,7 @@ circuit_discard_optional_exit_enclaves(extend_info_t *info)
!edge_conn->chosen_exit_retries)
continue;
r1 = router_get_by_nickname(edge_conn->chosen_exit_name, 0);
- r2 = router_get_by_hexdigest(info->identity_digest);
+ r2 = router_get_by_digest(info->identity_digest);
if (!r1 || !r2 || r1 != r2)
continue;
tor_assert(edge_conn->socks_request);
diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c
index 97fb6f0..ca3f213 100644
--- a/src/or/rendclient.c
+++ b/src/or/rendclient.c
@@ -810,7 +810,7 @@ rend_client_get_random_intro(const rend_data_t *rend_query)
intro = smartlist_get(entry->parsed->intro_nodes, i);
/* Do we need to look up the router or is the extend info complete? */
if (!intro->extend_info->onion_key) {
- router = router_get_by_hexdigest(intro->extend_info->identity_digest);
+ router = router_get_by_digest(intro->extend_info->identity_digest);
if (!router) {
log_info(LD_REND, "Unknown router with nickname '%s'; trying another.",
intro->extend_info->nickname);
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commit 5cd7953a2112d6ae8702c741d73b8b6a2d0c5251
Author: Robert Hogan <robert(a)roberthogan.net>
Date: Sun Oct 17 15:12:25 2010 +0100
Issues with router_get_by_nickname() (3)
Add changes file
---
changes/bug1859 | 9 +++++++++
1 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/changes/bug1859 b/changes/bug1859
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5b139f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/changes/bug1859
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+ o Minor bugfixes:
+ - Bring the logic that …
[View More]gathers routerinfos and assesses the
+ acceptability of circuits into line. This prevents a Tor OP from getting
+ locked in a cycle of choosing its local OR as an exit for a path (due to
+ a .exit request) and then rejecting the circuit because its OR is not
+ listed yet. Also prevent Tor clients from using an OR running in the same
+ instance as an exit (due to a .exit request) if the OR does not meet the
+ same requirements expected of an OR running elsewhere.
+ Fixes bug 1859; bugfix on 0.2.0-alpha.
[View Less]