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[tor/master] Fix bug 1930
by nickm＠torproject.org 29 Apr '11

29 Apr '11

commit b8708b5bd30f5ef6dd34f7199a5588627486bcd2 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Tue Apr 26 02:21:25 2011 -0700 Fix bug 1930 --- changes/forget-rend-descs-on-newnym | 7 +++ src/or/rendclient.c | 103 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 2 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/forget-rend-descs-on-newnym b/changes/forget-rend-descs-on-newnym index 0ea09e0..da7afbe 100644 --- a/changes/forget-rend-descs-on-newnym +++ b/changes/forget-rend-descs-on-newnym @@ -2,6 +2,13 @@ - Forget all hidden service descriptors cached as a client when processing a SIGNAL NEWNYM command. Fixes bug 3000. Bugfix on 0.0.6. + o Major bugfixes: + - When we find that we have extended a hidden service's introduction + circuit to a relay which isn't listed as an introduction point in + the HS descriptor we currently have for the service, we now retry + one of the introduction points in the current HS descriptor. + Previously we would just give up. Bugfix on 0.2.0.10-alpha; fixes + bugs 1024 and 1930. o Minor bugfixes: - Don't allow v0 hidden service authorities to act as clients. Required by fix for bug 3000. diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index 8803875..8d024d8 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -66,6 +66,50 @@ rend_client_send_establish_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *circ) return 0; } +/** Extend the introduction circuit circ to another valid + * introduction point for the hidden service it is trying to connect + * to, or mark it and launch a new circuit if we can't extend it. + * Return 0 on success. Return -1 and mark the introduction + * circuit on failure. + * + * On failure, the caller is responsible for marking the associated + * rendezvous circuit for close. */ +static int +rend_client_reextend_intro_circuit(origin_circuit_t *circ) +{ + extend_info_t *extend_info; + int result; + extend_info = rend_client_get_random_intro(circ->rend_data); + if (!extend_info) { + log_warn(LD_REND, + "No usable introduction points left for %s. Closing.", + safe_str_client(circ->rend_data->onion_address)); + circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL); + return -1; + } + if (circ->remaining_relay_early_cells) { + log_info(LD_REND, + "Re-extending circ %d, this time to %s.", + circ->_base.n_circ_id, extend_info->nickname); + result = circuit_extend_to_new_exit(circ, extend_info); + } else { + log_info(LD_REND, + "Building a new introduction circuit, this time to %s.", + extend_info->nickname); + circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED); + if (!circuit_launch_by_extend_info(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING, + extend_info, + CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL)) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Building introduction circuit failed."); + result = -1; + } else { + result = 0; + } + } + extend_info_free(extend_info); + return result; +} + /** Called when we're trying to connect an ap conn; sends an INTRODUCE1 cell * down introcirc if possible. */ @@ -120,11 +164,18 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc, } }); if (!intro_key) { - log_info(LD_REND, "Our introduction point knowledge changed in " - "mid-connect! Could not find intro key; we only have a " - "v2 rend desc with %d intro points. Giving up.", + log_info(LD_REND, "Could not find intro key for %s at %s; we " + "have a v2 rend desc with %d intro points. " + "Trying a different intro point...", + safe_str_client(introcirc->rend_data->onion_address), + introcirc->build_state->chosen_exit->nickname, smartlist_len(entry->parsed->intro_nodes)); - goto perm_err; + + if (rend_client_reextend_intro_circuit(introcirc)) { + goto perm_err; + } else { + return -1; + } } if (crypto_pk_get_digest(intro_key, payload)<0) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't hash public key."); @@ -227,7 +278,8 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc, return 0; perm_err: - circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(introcirc), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL); + if (!introcirc->_base.marked_for_close) + circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(introcirc), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL); circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(rendcirc), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL); return -2; } @@ -290,45 +342,16 @@ rend_client_introduction_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ, * points. If any remain, extend to a new one and try again. * If none remain, refetch the service descriptor. */ + log_info(LD_REND, "Got nack for %s from %s...", + safe_str_client(circ->rend_data->onion_address), + circ->build_state->chosen_exit->nickname); if (rend_client_remove_intro_point(circ->build_state->chosen_exit, circ->rend_data) > 0) { /* There are introduction points left. Re-extend the circuit to * another intro point and try again. */ - extend_info_t *extend_info; - int result; - extend_info = rend_client_get_random_intro(circ->rend_data); - if (!extend_info) { - log_warn(LD_REND, "No introduction points left for %s. Closing.", - escaped_safe_str_client(circ->rend_data->onion_address)); - circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL); - return -1; - } - if (circ->remaining_relay_early_cells) { - log_info(LD_REND, - "Got nack for %s from %s. Re-extending circ %d, " - "this time to %s.", - escaped_safe_str_client(circ->rend_data->onion_address), - circ->build_state->chosen_exit->nickname, - circ->_base.n_circ_id, extend_info->nickname); - result = circuit_extend_to_new_exit(circ, extend_info); - } else { - log_info(LD_REND, - "Got nack for %s from %s. Building a new introduction " - "circuit, this time to %s.", - escaped_safe_str_client(circ->rend_data->onion_address), - circ->build_state->chosen_exit->nickname, - extend_info->nickname); - circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED); - if (!circuit_launch_by_extend_info(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING, - extend_info, - CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL)) { - log_warn(LD_REND, "Building introduction circuit failed."); - result = -1; - } else { - result = 0; - } - } - extend_info_free(extend_info); + int result = rend_client_reextend_intro_circuit(circ); + /* XXXX If that call failed, should we close the rend circuit, + * too? */ return result; } }

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[tor/master] Merge branch 'bug3000-022-part2-squashed' into maint-0.2.2
by nickm＠torproject.org 29 Apr '11

29 Apr '11

commit 30003e43180561eb92f4146d3bf2a5f74523cda6 Merge: 2dc9546 6dfc0d5 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Apr 28 18:13:17 2011 -0400 Merge branch 'bug3000-022-part2-squashed' into maint-0.2.2 changes/forget-rend-descs-on-newnym | 12 ++++ src/or/config.c | 4 ++ src/or/main.c | 7 +++ src/or/rendclient.c | 103 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------- src/or/router.c | 8 ++-- 5 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)

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[tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.2'
by nickm＠torproject.org 29 Apr '11

29 Apr '11

commit f38ecd5ac0f21d25c838be6004925372d26a45aa Merge: 8b33928 30003e4 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Apr 28 18:14:50 2011 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.2' changes/forget-rend-descs-on-newnym | 12 ++++ src/or/config.c | 4 ++ src/or/main.c | 7 +++ src/or/rendclient.c | 103 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------- src/or/router.c | 8 ++-- 5 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)

1 0

[tor/maint-0.2.2] Don't allow v0 HS auths to act as clients
by nickm＠torproject.org 29 Apr '11

29 Apr '11

commit df5c7fedbd938c5d4634eadcf53693e07d2c8182 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Wed Apr 20 15:20:10 2011 -0700 Don't allow v0 HS auths to act as clients A v0 HS authority stores v0 HS descriptors in the same descriptor cache that its HS client functionality uses. Thus, if the HS authority operator clears its client HS descriptor cache, ALL v0 HS descriptors will be lost. That would be bad. --- changes/forget-rend-descs-on-newnym | 3 +++ src/or/config.c | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/forget-rend-descs-on-newnym b/changes/forget-rend-descs-on-newnym index ab2fd61..f8758c2 100644 --- a/changes/forget-rend-descs-on-newnym +++ b/changes/forget-rend-descs-on-newnym @@ -2,6 +2,9 @@ - Forget all hidden service descriptors cached as a client when processing a SIGNAL NEWNYM command. Fixes bug 3000. Bugfix on 0.0.6. + o Minor bugfixes: + - Don't allow v0 hidden service authorities to act as clients. + Required by fix for bug 3000. o Code simplifications and refactoring: - Allow rend_client_send_introduction to fail without closing the AP connection permanently. diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index f003e4d..9384b3a 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -3078,6 +3078,10 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options, REJECT("FetchDirInfoExtraEarly requires that you also set " "FetchDirInfoEarly"); + if (options->HSAuthoritativeDir && proxy_mode(options)) + REJECT("Running as authoritative v0 HS directory, but also configured " + "as a client."); + if (options->ConnLimit <= 0) { tor_asprintf(msg, "ConnLimit must be greater than 0, but was set to %d",

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Avoid false positives from proxy_mode()
by nickm＠torproject.org 29 Apr '11

29 Apr '11

commit 6dfc0d530113e055d91b68969c81595ddc749f07 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Apr 28 17:45:41 2011 -0400 Avoid false positives from proxy_mode() Previously it would erroneously return true if ListenAddr was set for a client port, even if that port itself was 0. This would give false positives, which were not previously harmful... but which were about to become. --- src/or/router.c | 8 ++++---- 1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/router.c b/src/or/router.c index 0ef4728..65afd49 100644 --- a/src/or/router.c +++ b/src/or/router.c @@ -1107,10 +1107,10 @@ set_server_advertised(int s) int proxy_mode(or_options_t *options) { - return (options->SocksPort != 0 || options->SocksListenAddress || - options->TransPort != 0 || options->TransListenAddress || - options->NATDPort != 0 || options->NATDListenAddress || - options->DNSPort != 0 || options->DNSListenAddress); + return (options->SocksPort != 0 || + options->TransPort != 0 || + options->NATDPort != 0 || + options->DNSPort != 0); } /** Decide if we're a publishable server. We are a publishable server if:

1 0

[tor/maint-0.2.2] Ignore SIGNAL NEWNYM on relay-only Tor instances
by nickm＠torproject.org 29 Apr '11

29 Apr '11

commit ddd1b7be2dce0845e6c08dcb5404ae65940b9edb Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Wed Apr 20 17:01:41 2011 -0700 Ignore SIGNAL NEWNYM on relay-only Tor instances --- changes/forget-rend-descs-on-newnym | 2 ++ src/or/main.c | 7 +++++++ 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/forget-rend-descs-on-newnym b/changes/forget-rend-descs-on-newnym index f8758c2..0ea09e0 100644 --- a/changes/forget-rend-descs-on-newnym +++ b/changes/forget-rend-descs-on-newnym @@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ o Minor bugfixes: - Don't allow v0 hidden service authorities to act as clients. Required by fix for bug 3000. + - Ignore SIGNAL NEWNYM commands on relay-only Tor instances. + Required by fix for bug 3000. o Code simplifications and refactoring: - Allow rend_client_send_introduction to fail without closing the AP connection permanently. diff --git a/src/or/main.c b/src/or/main.c index 3bf2169..a26be39 100644 --- a/src/or/main.c +++ b/src/or/main.c @@ -842,6 +842,13 @@ run_connection_housekeeping(int i, time_t now) static void signewnym_impl(time_t now) { + or_options_t *options = get_options(); + if (!proxy_mode(options)) { + log_info(LD_CONTROL, "Ignoring SIGNAL NEWNYM because client functionality " + "is disabled."); + return; + } + circuit_expire_all_dirty_circs(); addressmap_clear_transient(); rend_cache_purge();

1 0

[tor/maint-0.2.2] Merge branch 'bug3000-022-part2-squashed' into maint-0.2.2
by nickm＠torproject.org 29 Apr '11

29 Apr '11

commit 30003e43180561eb92f4146d3bf2a5f74523cda6 Merge: 2dc9546 6dfc0d5 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Apr 28 18:13:17 2011 -0400 Merge branch 'bug3000-022-part2-squashed' into maint-0.2.2 changes/forget-rend-descs-on-newnym | 12 ++++ src/or/config.c | 4 ++ src/or/main.c | 7 +++ src/or/rendclient.c | 103 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------- src/or/router.c | 8 ++-- 5 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)

1 0

[tor/maint-0.2.2] Fix bug 1930
by nickm＠torproject.org 29 Apr '11

29 Apr '11

commit b8708b5bd30f5ef6dd34f7199a5588627486bcd2 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Tue Apr 26 02:21:25 2011 -0700 Fix bug 1930 --- changes/forget-rend-descs-on-newnym | 7 +++ src/or/rendclient.c | 103 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 2 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/forget-rend-descs-on-newnym b/changes/forget-rend-descs-on-newnym index 0ea09e0..da7afbe 100644 --- a/changes/forget-rend-descs-on-newnym +++ b/changes/forget-rend-descs-on-newnym @@ -2,6 +2,13 @@ - Forget all hidden service descriptors cached as a client when processing a SIGNAL NEWNYM command. Fixes bug 3000. Bugfix on 0.0.6. + o Major bugfixes: + - When we find that we have extended a hidden service's introduction + circuit to a relay which isn't listed as an introduction point in + the HS descriptor we currently have for the service, we now retry + one of the introduction points in the current HS descriptor. + Previously we would just give up. Bugfix on 0.2.0.10-alpha; fixes + bugs 1024 and 1930. o Minor bugfixes: - Don't allow v0 hidden service authorities to act as clients. Required by fix for bug 3000. diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index 8803875..8d024d8 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -66,6 +66,50 @@ rend_client_send_establish_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *circ) return 0; } +/** Extend the introduction circuit circ to another valid + * introduction point for the hidden service it is trying to connect + * to, or mark it and launch a new circuit if we can't extend it. + * Return 0 on success. Return -1 and mark the introduction + * circuit on failure. + * + * On failure, the caller is responsible for marking the associated + * rendezvous circuit for close. */ +static int +rend_client_reextend_intro_circuit(origin_circuit_t *circ) +{ + extend_info_t *extend_info; + int result; + extend_info = rend_client_get_random_intro(circ->rend_data); + if (!extend_info) { + log_warn(LD_REND, + "No usable introduction points left for %s. Closing.", + safe_str_client(circ->rend_data->onion_address)); + circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL); + return -1; + } + if (circ->remaining_relay_early_cells) { + log_info(LD_REND, + "Re-extending circ %d, this time to %s.", + circ->_base.n_circ_id, extend_info->nickname); + result = circuit_extend_to_new_exit(circ, extend_info); + } else { + log_info(LD_REND, + "Building a new introduction circuit, this time to %s.", + extend_info->nickname); + circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED); + if (!circuit_launch_by_extend_info(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING, + extend_info, + CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL)) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Building introduction circuit failed."); + result = -1; + } else { + result = 0; + } + } + extend_info_free(extend_info); + return result; +} + /** Called when we're trying to connect an ap conn; sends an INTRODUCE1 cell * down introcirc if possible. */ @@ -120,11 +164,18 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc, } }); if (!intro_key) { - log_info(LD_REND, "Our introduction point knowledge changed in " - "mid-connect! Could not find intro key; we only have a " - "v2 rend desc with %d intro points. Giving up.", + log_info(LD_REND, "Could not find intro key for %s at %s; we " + "have a v2 rend desc with %d intro points. " + "Trying a different intro point...", + safe_str_client(introcirc->rend_data->onion_address), + introcirc->build_state->chosen_exit->nickname, smartlist_len(entry->parsed->intro_nodes)); - goto perm_err; + + if (rend_client_reextend_intro_circuit(introcirc)) { + goto perm_err; + } else { + return -1; + } } if (crypto_pk_get_digest(intro_key, payload)<0) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't hash public key."); @@ -227,7 +278,8 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc, return 0; perm_err: - circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(introcirc), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL); + if (!introcirc->_base.marked_for_close) + circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(introcirc), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL); circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(rendcirc), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL); return -2; } @@ -290,45 +342,16 @@ rend_client_introduction_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ, * points. If any remain, extend to a new one and try again. * If none remain, refetch the service descriptor. */ + log_info(LD_REND, "Got nack for %s from %s...", + safe_str_client(circ->rend_data->onion_address), + circ->build_state->chosen_exit->nickname); if (rend_client_remove_intro_point(circ->build_state->chosen_exit, circ->rend_data) > 0) { /* There are introduction points left. Re-extend the circuit to * another intro point and try again. */ - extend_info_t *extend_info; - int result; - extend_info = rend_client_get_random_intro(circ->rend_data); - if (!extend_info) { - log_warn(LD_REND, "No introduction points left for %s. Closing.", - escaped_safe_str_client(circ->rend_data->onion_address)); - circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL); - return -1; - } - if (circ->remaining_relay_early_cells) { - log_info(LD_REND, - "Got nack for %s from %s. Re-extending circ %d, " - "this time to %s.", - escaped_safe_str_client(circ->rend_data->onion_address), - circ->build_state->chosen_exit->nickname, - circ->_base.n_circ_id, extend_info->nickname); - result = circuit_extend_to_new_exit(circ, extend_info); - } else { - log_info(LD_REND, - "Got nack for %s from %s. Building a new introduction " - "circuit, this time to %s.", - escaped_safe_str_client(circ->rend_data->onion_address), - circ->build_state->chosen_exit->nickname, - extend_info->nickname); - circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED); - if (!circuit_launch_by_extend_info(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING, - extend_info, - CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL)) { - log_warn(LD_REND, "Building introduction circuit failed."); - result = -1; - } else { - result = 0; - } - } - extend_info_free(extend_info); + int result = rend_client_reextend_intro_circuit(circ); + /* XXXX If that call failed, should we close the rend circuit, + * too? */ return result; } }

1 0

[tor/master] Detect and handle NULL returns from (gm/local)time_r
by nickm＠torproject.org 29 Apr '11

29 Apr '11

commit 51e551d3837990b7c4491253a88bedd2513fe1de Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Dec 7 14:37:50 2010 -0500 Detect and handle NULL returns from (gm/local)time_r These functions can return NULL for otherwise-valid values of time_t. Notably, the glibc gmtime manpage says it can return NULL if the year if greater than INT_MAX, and the windows MSDN gmtime page says it can return NULL for negative time_t values. Also, our formatting code is not guaranteed to correctly handle years after 9999 CE. This patch tries to correct this by detecting NULL values from gmtime/localtime_r, and trying to clip them to a reasonable end of the scale. If they are in the middle of the scale, we call it a downright error. Arguably, it's a bug to get out-of-bounds dates like this to begin with. But we've had bugs of this kind in the past, and warning when we see a bug is much kinder than doing a NULL-pointer dereference. Boboper found this one too. --- changes/gmtime_null | 6 +++ src/common/compat.c | 104 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ src/common/compat.h | 9 ---- 3 files changed, 98 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/gmtime_null b/changes/gmtime_null new file mode 100644 index 0000000..16a2540 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/gmtime_null @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ + o Minor bugfixes + - On some platforms, gmtime and localtime can return NULL under + certain circumstances even for well-defined values of time_t. + Try to detect and make up for this deficiency. Possible fix for + bug 2077. Bugfix on all versions of Tor. Found by boboper. + diff --git a/src/common/compat.c b/src/common/compat.c index 27489e5..9b7c0b7 100644 --- a/src/common/compat.c +++ b/src/common/compat.c @@ -1996,14 +1996,88 @@ tor_gettimeofday(struct timeval *timeval) #define TIME_FNS_NEED_LOCKS #endif +static struct tm * +correct_tm(int islocal, const time_t *timep, struct tm *resultbuf, + struct tm *r) +{ + const char *outcome; + + if (PREDICT_LIKELY(r)) { + if (r->tm_year > 8099) { /* We can't strftime dates after 9999 CE. */ + r->tm_year = 8099; + r->tm_mon = 11; + r->tm_mday = 31; + r->tm_yday = 365; + r->tm_hour = 23; + r->tm_min = 59; + r->tm_sec = 59; + } + return r; + } + + /* If we get here, gmtime or localtime returned NULL. It might have done + * this because of overrun or underrun, or it might have done it because of + * some other weird issue. */ + if (timep) { + if (*timep < 0) { + r = resultbuf; + r->tm_year = 70; /* 1970 CE */ + r->tm_mon = 0; + r->tm_mday = 1; + r->tm_yday = 1; + r->tm_hour = 0; + r->tm_min = 0 ; + r->tm_sec = 0; + outcome = "Rounding up to 1970"; + goto done; + } else if (*timep >= INT32_MAX) { + /* Rounding down to INT32_MAX isn't so great, but keep in mind that we + * only do it if gmtime/localtime tells us NULL. */ + r = resultbuf; + r->tm_year = 137; /* 2037 CE */ + r->tm_mon = 11; + r->tm_mday = 31; + r->tm_yday = 365; + r->tm_hour = 23; + r->tm_min = 59; + r->tm_sec = 59; + outcome = "Rounding down to 2037"; + goto done; + } + } + + /* If we get here, then gmtime/localtime failed without getting an extreme + * value for *timep */ + + tor_fragile_assert(); + r = resultbuf; + memset(resultbuf, 0, sizeof(struct tm)); + outcome="can't recover"; + done: + log_warn(LD_BUG, "%s("I64_FORMAT") failed with error %s: %s", + islocal?"localtime":"gmtime", + timep?I64_PRINTF_ARG(*timep):0, + strerror(errno), + outcome); + return r; +} + + /** @{ */ /** As localtime_r, but defined for platforms that don't have it: * * Convert *timep to a struct tm in local time, and store the value in * *result. Return the result on success, or NULL on failure. */ -#ifndef HAVE_LOCALTIME_R -#ifdef TIME_FNS_NEED_LOCKS +#ifdef HAVE_LOCALTIME_R +struct tm * +tor_localtime_r(const time_t *timep, struct tm *result) +{ + struct tm *r; + r = localtime_r(timep, result); + return correct_tm(1, timep, result, r); +} +#elif defined(TIME_FNS_NEED_LOCKS) struct tm * tor_localtime_r(const time_t *timep, struct tm *result) { @@ -2013,9 +2087,10 @@ tor_localtime_r(const time_t *timep, struct tm *result) tor_assert(result); tor_mutex_acquire(m); r = localtime(timep); - memcpy(result, r, sizeof(struct tm)); + if (r) + memcpy(result, r, sizeof(struct tm)); tor_mutex_release(m); - return result; + return correct_tm(1, timep, result, r); } #else struct tm * @@ -2024,11 +2099,11 @@ tor_localtime_r(const time_t *timep, struct tm *result) struct tm *r; tor_assert(result); r = localtime(timep); - memcpy(result, r, sizeof(struct tm)); - return result; + if (r) + memcpy(result, r, sizeof(struct tm)); + return correct_tm(1, timep, result, r); } #endif -#endif /** @} */ /** @{ */ @@ -2038,7 +2113,14 @@ tor_localtime_r(const time_t *timep, struct tm *result) * *result. Return the result on success, or NULL on failure. */ #ifndef HAVE_GMTIME_R -#ifdef TIME_FNS_NEED_LOCKS +struct tm * +tor_gmtime_r(const time_t *timep, struct tm *result) +{ + struct tm *r; + r = gmtime_r(timep, result); + return correct_tm(0, timep, result, r); +} +#elif defined(TIME_FNS_NEED_LOCKS) struct tm * tor_gmtime_r(const time_t *timep, struct tm *result) { @@ -2050,7 +2132,7 @@ tor_gmtime_r(const time_t *timep, struct tm *result) r = gmtime(timep); memcpy(result, r, sizeof(struct tm)); tor_mutex_release(m); - return result; + return correct_tm(0, timep, result, r); } #else struct tm * @@ -2060,11 +2142,9 @@ tor_gmtime_r(const time_t *timep, struct tm *result) tor_assert(result); r = gmtime(timep); memcpy(result, r, sizeof(struct tm)); - return result; + return correct_tm(0, timep, result, r); } #endif -#endif -/** @} */ #if defined(USE_WIN32_THREADS) void diff --git a/src/common/compat.h b/src/common/compat.h index 550c08b..af795ff 100644 --- a/src/common/compat.h +++ b/src/common/compat.h @@ -321,17 +321,8 @@ struct timeval { void tor_gettimeofday(struct timeval *timeval); -#ifdef HAVE_LOCALTIME_R -#define tor_localtime_r localtime_r -#else struct tm *tor_localtime_r(const time_t *timep, struct tm *result); -#endif - -#ifdef HAVE_GMTIME_R -#define tor_gmtime_r gmtime_r -#else struct tm *tor_gmtime_r(const time_t *timep, struct tm *result); -#endif #ifndef timeradd /** Replacement for timeradd on platforms that do not have it: sets tvout to

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[tor/master] Correct the logic from f14754fbd for tor_gmtime_r
by nickm＠torproject.org 29 Apr '11

29 Apr '11

commit 2dc9546eef6d748245d90b288f28ace1aa9b6f14 Author: John Brooks <special(a)dereferenced.net> Date: Mon Jan 3 21:36:09 2011 -0700 Correct the logic from f14754fbd for tor_gmtime_r --- src/common/compat.c | 8 +++++--- 1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/compat.c b/src/common/compat.c index 9b7c0b7..3644bd9 100644 --- a/src/common/compat.c +++ b/src/common/compat.c @@ -2112,7 +2112,7 @@ tor_localtime_r(const time_t *timep, struct tm *result) * Convert *timep to a struct tm in UTC, and store the value in * *result. Return the result on success, or NULL on failure. */ -#ifndef HAVE_GMTIME_R +#ifdef HAVE_GMTIME_R struct tm * tor_gmtime_r(const time_t *timep, struct tm *result) { @@ -2130,7 +2130,8 @@ tor_gmtime_r(const time_t *timep, struct tm *result) tor_assert(result); tor_mutex_acquire(m); r = gmtime(timep); - memcpy(result, r, sizeof(struct tm)); + if (r) + memcpy(result, r, sizeof(struct tm)); tor_mutex_release(m); return correct_tm(0, timep, result, r); } @@ -2141,7 +2142,8 @@ tor_gmtime_r(const time_t *timep, struct tm *result) struct tm *r; tor_assert(result); r = gmtime(timep); - memcpy(result, r, sizeof(struct tm)); + if (r) + memcpy(result, r, sizeof(struct tm)); return correct_tm(0, timep, result, r); } #endif

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