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[bridgedb/master] Fix http utf8 issue: Add a content-type header to the HTML.
by karsten＠torproject.org 11 Apr '11

11 Apr '11

commit c69bc14f88e8b903bcf90538e8e5fac147805748 Author: Christian Fromme <kaner(a)strace.org> Date: Sat Apr 9 12:03:41 2011 +0200 Fix http utf8 issue: Add a content-type header to the HTML. --- lib/bridgedb/Server.py | 5 ++++- 1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/lib/bridgedb/Server.py b/lib/bridgedb/Server.py index 7b7ff55..2becee8 100644 --- a/lib/bridgedb/Server.py +++ b/lib/bridgedb/Server.py @@ -100,7 +100,10 @@ class WebResource(twisted.web.resource.Resource): + "".join(("<li>%s</li>"%d for d in self.domains)) + "</ul>" else: email_domain_list = "<p>" + t.gettext(I18n.BRIDGEDB_TEXT[8]) + "</p>" - html_msg = "<html><body>" \ + html_msg = "<html><head>"\ + + "<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html;"\ + + " charset=UTF-8\"/>" \ + + "</head><body>" \ + "<p>" + t.gettext(I18n.BRIDGEDB_TEXT[0]) \ + "<pre id=\"bridges\">" \ + "%s" \

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[bridgedb/master] Add new translation files for cs, es, pl_PL, sl_SI and zh_CN
by karsten＠torproject.org 11 Apr '11

11 Apr '11

commit 0512c91c5daada79c3e3630c02c7aec86df11e3b Author: Christian Fromme <kaner(a)strace.org> Date: Sat Apr 9 20:34:21 2011 +0200 Add new translation files for cs, es, pl_PL, sl_SI and zh_CN --- i18n/cs/bridgedb.po | 90 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ i18n/es/bridgedb.po | 92 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ i18n/pl_PL/bridgedb.po | 89 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ i18n/sl_SI/bridgedb.po | 90 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ i18n/zh_CN/bridgedb.po | 77 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 438 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/i18n/cs/bridgedb.po b/i18n/cs/bridgedb.po new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b4ee341 --- /dev/null +++ b/i18n/cs/bridgedb.po @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +# SOME DESCRIPTIVE TITLE. +# Copyright (C) YEAR THE PACKAGE'S COPYRIGHT HOLDER +# This file is distributed under the same license as the PACKAGE package. +# Christian Fromme <kaner(a)strace.org>, 2010 +# +msgid "" +msgstr "" +"Project-Id-Version: The Tor Project\n" +"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2011-01-01 07:48-0800\n" +"PO-Revision-Date: 2011-03-22 16:45+0000\n" +"Last-Translator: Elisa <valhalla(a)gishpuppy.com>\n" +"Language-Team: LANGUAGE <LL(a)li.org>\n" +"MIME-Version: 1.0\n" +"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" +"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n" +"Language: cs\n" +"Plural-Forms: nplurals=3; plural=(n==1) ? 0 : (n>=2 && n<=4) ? 1 : 2\n" + +#: lib/bridgedb/I18n.py:21 +msgid "Here are your bridge relays: " +msgstr "Tady jsou vaše přemosťující spojení:" + +#: lib/bridgedb/I18n.py:23 +msgid "" +"Bridge relays (or \"bridges\" for short) are Tor relays that aren't listed\n" +"in the main directory. Since there is no complete public list of them,\n" +"even if your ISP is filtering connections to all the known Tor relays,\n" +"they probably won't be able to block all the bridges." +msgstr "" +"Přemosťující spojení (nebo zkráceně \"mosty\") jsou Tor síťové uzly, které nejsou zaznamenány\n" +"v hlavním adresáři Tor uzlů. Protože neexistuje veřejný seznam těchto uzlů,\n" +"proto ani váš internet poskytovatel, který by filtroval známé Tor uzly,\n" +"nebude pravděpodobně schopen blokovat všechny Tor mosty." + +#: lib/bridgedb/I18n.py:28 +msgid "" +"To use the above lines, go to Vidalia's Network settings page, and click\n" +"\"My ISP blocks connections to the Tor network\". Then add each bridge\n" +"address one at a time." +msgstr "" +"Aby jste použít výš zmiňované, jděte do síťového nastavení Vidalia a klikněte na\n" +"\"Můj ISP blokuje připojení do Tor sítě\". Pak přidejte adresu každého\n" +"mostu, po jednom..." + +#: lib/bridgedb/I18n.py:32 +msgid "" +"Configuring more than one bridge address will make your Tor connection\n" +"more stable, in case some of the bridges become unreachable." +msgstr "" +"Nastavením více než jednoho mostu udělá vaše Tor připojení\n" +"více stabilní, v případě, že by se staly některé mosty nedostupné." + +#: lib/bridgedb/I18n.py:35 +msgid "" +"Another way to find public bridge addresses is to send mail to\n" +"bridges(a)torproject.org with the line \"get bridges\" by itself in the body\n" +"of the mail. However, so we can make it harder for an attacker to learn\n" +"lots of bridge addresses, you must send this request from an email address at\n" +"one of the following domains:" +msgstr "" +"Jiný způsob najít veřejné adresy mostů je, poslat mail na\n" +"bridges(a)torproject.org s řádkem \"get bridges\" v těle zprávy\n" +"mailu. Ačkoli můžeme ztížit útočníku, aby se\n" +"dověděl mnoho adres mostů, musíte poslat tuto žádost z některých email. adres z\n" +"těchto domén:" + +#: lib/bridgedb/I18n.py:41 +msgid "[This is an automated message; please do not reply.]" +msgstr "[Tohle je automatická odpověď; prosím, neodpovídejte na ni]" + +#: lib/bridgedb/I18n.py:43 +msgid "" +"Another way to find public bridge addresses is to visit\n" +"https://bridges.torproject.org/. The answers you get from that page\n" +"will change every few days, so check back periodically if you need more\n" +"bridge addresses." +msgstr "" +"Další způsob, jak najít adresy veřejných mostů, je jít na\n" +"https://bridges.torproject.org/. Odpovědi, které naleznete na stránce\n" +"se pravidelně mění, takže stránku pravidelně kontrolujte, pokud potřebujete víc\n" +"adres mostů." + +#: lib/bridgedb/I18n.py:48 +msgid "(no bridges currently available)" +msgstr "(nejsou momentálně dostupné žádné mosty)" + +#: lib/bridgedb/I18n.py:50 +msgid "(e-mail requests not currently supported)" +msgstr "(e-mail žádosti nejsou momentálně podporovány)" diff --git a/i18n/es/bridgedb.po b/i18n/es/bridgedb.po new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a3f7edf --- /dev/null +++ b/i18n/es/bridgedb.po @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +# SOME DESCRIPTIVE TITLE. +# Copyright (C) YEAR THE PACKAGE'S COPYRIGHT HOLDER +# This file is distributed under the same license as the PACKAGE package. +# Christian Fromme <kaner(a)strace.org>, 2010 +# +msgid "" +msgstr "" +"Project-Id-Version: The Tor Project\n" +"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2011-01-01 07:48-0800\n" +"PO-Revision-Date: 2011-03-22 16:45+0000\n" +"Last-Translator: NinjaTuna <nort0ngh0st(a)hotmail.com>\n" +"Language-Team: Spanish (Castilian) <None>\n" +"MIME-Version: 1.0\n" +"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" +"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n" +"Language: es\n" +"Plural-Forms: nplurals=2; plural=(n != 1)\n" + +#: lib/bridgedb/I18n.py:21 +msgid "Here are your bridge relays: " +msgstr "Aquí tiene sus relés de puente" + +#: lib/bridgedb/I18n.py:23 +msgid "" +"Bridge relays (or \"bridges\" for short) are Tor relays that aren't listed\n" +"in the main directory. Since there is no complete public list of them,\n" +"even if your ISP is filtering connections to all the known Tor relays,\n" +"they probably won't be able to block all the bridges." +msgstr "" +"Relés de puente(o \"puentes\") son relés de Tor que no están puestos en el " +"directorio principal. Desde ahí no hay una lista pública completa para " +"ellos, aún cuando tu proveedor de internet este filtrando conexiones de " +"todos los conocidos relés de Tor, ellos probablemente no serán capaz de " +"bloquear todos los puentes." + +#: lib/bridgedb/I18n.py:28 +msgid "" +"To use the above lines, go to Vidalia's Network settings page, and click\n" +"\"My ISP blocks connections to the Tor network\". Then add each bridge\n" +"address one at a time." +msgstr "" +"Para usar las lineas de arriba, ir a la página de la red de Vadalia, y " +"cliquear en \"Mí proveedor de internet bloquea las conexiones de la red de " +"Tor\"." + +#: lib/bridgedb/I18n.py:32 +msgid "" +"Configuring more than one bridge address will make your Tor connection\n" +"more stable, in case some of the bridges become unreachable." +msgstr "" +"Configurando más de un puente de dirección hará que tu conexión de Tor sea " +"mas estable, en algunos casos los puentes se hacen inalcanzables." + +#: lib/bridgedb/I18n.py:35 +msgid "" +"Another way to find public bridge addresses is to send mail to\n" +"bridges(a)torproject.org with the line \"get bridges\" by itself in the body\n" +"of the mail. However, so we can make it harder for an attacker to learn\n" +"lots of bridge addresses, you must send this request from an email address at\n" +"one of the following domains:" +msgstr "" +"Otra manera de encontrar puentes de direcciones públicas es enviando un " +"correo a bridges(a)torproject.org con la linea \"conseguir puentes\" por esto " +"mismo en el cuerpo del correo. Como sea, de esta manera nosotros podemos " +"hacer más difícil para que un atacante aprenda muchos puentes de " +"direcciones, tu debes enviar este pedido por una dirección de correo a uno " +"de los siguientes dominios:" + +#: lib/bridgedb/I18n.py:41 +msgid "[This is an automated message; please do not reply.]" +msgstr "[Esto es un mensaje automatizado, porfavor no responder]" + +#: lib/bridgedb/I18n.py:43 +msgid "" +"Another way to find public bridge addresses is to visit\n" +"https://bridges.torproject.org/. The answers you get from that page\n" +"will change every few days, so check back periodically if you need more\n" +"bridge addresses." +msgstr "" +"Otra manera de encontrar direcciones de puente público es visitando " +"'https://bridges.torproject.org/. Las respuestas que consigues de la página " +"cambiarán diariamente, por eso veelas periódicamente si necesitas mas " +"direcciones de puente." + +#: lib/bridgedb/I18n.py:48 +msgid "(no bridges currently available)" +msgstr "(no hay puentes disponibles)" + +#: lib/bridgedb/I18n.py:50 +msgid "(e-mail requests not currently supported)" +msgstr "(peticiones por correo no están disponibles por el momento)" diff --git a/i18n/pl_PL/bridgedb.po b/i18n/pl_PL/bridgedb.po new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a53539b --- /dev/null +++ b/i18n/pl_PL/bridgedb.po @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +# SOME DESCRIPTIVE TITLE. +# Copyright (C) YEAR THE PACKAGE'S COPYRIGHT HOLDER +# This file is distributed under the same license as the PACKAGE package. +# Christian Fromme <kaner(a)strace.org>, 2010 +# +msgid "" +msgstr "" +"Project-Id-Version: The Tor Project\n" +"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2011-01-01 07:48-0800\n" +"PO-Revision-Date: 2011-03-22 16:45+0000\n" +"Last-Translator: bogdrozd <bog.d(a)gazeta.pl>\n" +"Language-Team: LANGUAGE <LL(a)li.org>\n" +"MIME-Version: 1.0\n" +"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" +"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n" +"Language: pl_PL\n" +"Plural-Forms: nplurals=3; plural=(n==1 ? 0 : n%10>=2 && n%10<=4 && (n%100<10 || n%100>=20) ? 1 : 2)\n" + +#: lib/bridgedb/I18n.py:21 +msgid "Here are your bridge relays: " +msgstr "Oto Twoje przekaźniki mostkowe: " + +#: lib/bridgedb/I18n.py:23 +msgid "" +"Bridge relays (or \"bridges\" for short) are Tor relays that aren't listed\n" +"in the main directory. Since there is no complete public list of them,\n" +"even if your ISP is filtering connections to all the known Tor relays,\n" +"they probably won't be able to block all the bridges." +msgstr "" +"Mostkowe przekaźniki sieci (lub po prostu \"mostki\") to węzły sieci Tora, \n" +"które nie są wpisane do głównego katalogu. Jako że nie ma pełnej publicznej\n" +"listy mostków, to nawet jeśli Twój dostawca internetu blokuje połączenia do\n" +"wszystkich znanychwęzłów Tora, prawdopodobnie nie będzie mógł zablokować wszystkich mostków." + +#: lib/bridgedb/I18n.py:28 +msgid "" +"To use the above lines, go to Vidalia's Network settings page, and click\n" +"\"My ISP blocks connections to the Tor network\". Then add each bridge\n" +"address one at a time." +msgstr "" +"By skorzystać z powyższych linii, wejdź do ustawień sieciowych programu Vidalia i kliknij\n" +" \"Mój dostawca blokuje połączenia do sieci Tor\" (\"My ISP blocks connections to the Tor network\").\n" +" Dodawaj adresy mostków jeden po drugim." + +#: lib/bridgedb/I18n.py:32 +msgid "" +"Configuring more than one bridge address will make your Tor connection\n" +"more stable, in case some of the bridges become unreachable." +msgstr "" +"Skonfigurowanie więcej niż jednego mostka uczyni Twoje połączenie z\n" +"siecią Tora bardziej stabilnym, w razie gdyby część z mostków stała się nieosiągalna." + +#: lib/bridgedb/I18n.py:35 +msgid "" +"Another way to find public bridge addresses is to send mail to\n" +"bridges(a)torproject.org with the line \"get bridges\" by itself in the body\n" +"of the mail. However, so we can make it harder for an attacker to learn\n" +"lots of bridge addresses, you must send this request from an email address at\n" +"one of the following domains:" +msgstr "" +"Innym sposobem na znalezienie publicznych adresów mostków jest wysłanie\n" +"listue-mail na adres bridges(a)torproject.org o treści zawierającej tylko\n" +"jedną linię mówiącą \"get bridges\". Aby utrudnić napastnikom poznanie mnóstwa\n" +"adresów mostków, musisz wysłać swój list z konta na jednej z poniższych domen:" + +#: lib/bridgedb/I18n.py:41 +msgid "[This is an automated message; please do not reply.]" +msgstr "[To jest automatyczna wiadomość; proszę nie odpowiadać.]" + +#: lib/bridgedb/I18n.py:43 +msgid "" +"Another way to find public bridge addresses is to visit\n" +"https://bridges.torproject.org/. The answers you get from that page\n" +"will change every few days, so check back periodically if you need more\n" +"bridge addresses." +msgstr "" +"Innym sposobem na znalezienie publicznych adresów mostków jest odwiedzenie\n" +"https://bridges.torproject.org/. Odpowiedzi, które otrzymasz na tej stronie\n" +"będą się zmieniać co kilka dni, więc sprawdzają ją okresowo, jeśli potrzebujesz\n" +"więcej adresów mostków." + +#: lib/bridgedb/I18n.py:48 +msgid "(no bridges currently available)" +msgstr "(aktualnie nie ma dostępnych mostków)" + +#: lib/bridgedb/I18n.py:50 +msgid "(e-mail requests not currently supported)" +msgstr "(żądania e-mail aktualnie nie są obsługiwane)" diff --git a/i18n/sl_SI/bridgedb.po b/i18n/sl_SI/bridgedb.po new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a1be720 --- /dev/null +++ b/i18n/sl_SI/bridgedb.po @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +# SOME DESCRIPTIVE TITLE. +# Copyright (C) YEAR THE PACKAGE'S COPYRIGHT HOLDER +# This file is distributed under the same license as the PACKAGE package. +# Christian Fromme <kaner(a)strace.org>, 2010 +# +msgid "" +msgstr "" +"Project-Id-Version: The Tor Project\n" +"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2011-01-01 07:48-0800\n" +"PO-Revision-Date: 2011-03-22 16:45+0000\n" +"Last-Translator: snezak <mr.marko(a)gmail.com>\n" +"Language-Team: LANGUAGE <LL(a)li.org>\n" +"MIME-Version: 1.0\n" +"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" +"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n" +"Language: sl_SI\n" +"Plural-Forms: nplurals=4; plural=(n%100==1 ? 0 : n%100==2 ? 1 : n%100==3 || n%100==4 ? 2 : 3)\n" + +#: lib/bridgedb/I18n.py:21 +msgid "Here are your bridge relays: " +msgstr "Tukaj so vaši mostni releji:" + +#: lib/bridgedb/I18n.py:23 +msgid "" +"Bridge relays (or \"bridges\" for short) are Tor relays that aren't listed\n" +"in the main directory. Since there is no complete public list of them,\n" +"even if your ISP is filtering connections to all the known Tor relays,\n" +"they probably won't be able to block all the bridges." +msgstr "" +"Mostni releji (ali \"mostovi\" na kratko), so Tor releji, ki niso na seznamu" +" v glavnem imeniku. Ker popoln javni seznam Tor relejev ne obstaja, tudi če " +"vaš ISP filtrira povezave do vseh znanih Tor relejev, verjetno ne bo mogel " +"blokirati vseh mostov." + +#: lib/bridgedb/I18n.py:28 +msgid "" +"To use the above lines, go to Vidalia's Network settings page, and click\n" +"\"My ISP blocks connections to the Tor network\". Then add each bridge\n" +"address one at a time." +msgstr "" +"Za uporabo zgornjih vrstic, pojdite na Vidalia Network stran z nastavitvami " +"in kliknite »Moj ISP blokira povezave na Tor omrežje\". Nato posamično " +"dodajte naslov vsakega mostu." + +#: lib/bridgedb/I18n.py:32 +msgid "" +"Configuring more than one bridge address will make your Tor connection\n" +"more stable, in case some of the bridges become unreachable." +msgstr "" +"Nastavitev več kot enega naslova mostu vam bo omogočila bolj stabilno Tor " +"povezavo v primeru, da kateri izmed mostov postane nedosegljiv." + +#: lib/bridgedb/I18n.py:35 +msgid "" +"Another way to find public bridge addresses is to send mail to\n" +"bridges(a)torproject.org with the line \"get bridges\" by itself in the body\n" +"of the mail. However, so we can make it harder for an attacker to learn\n" +"lots of bridge addresses, you must send this request from an email address at\n" +"one of the following domains:" +msgstr "" +"Drug način, kako poiskati naslove javnih mostov, je, da pošljete e-pošto na " +"bridges(a)torproject.org, ki bo imela v vsebini sporočila samo vrstico \"get " +"bridges\". Da bi onemogočili napadalcem poizvedbo velikega števila naslovov " +"mostov, je zahtevo potrebno poslati iz e-poštnega naslova ene izmed " +"naslednjih domen:" + +#: lib/bridgedb/I18n.py:41 +msgid "[This is an automated message; please do not reply.]" +msgstr "[To je samodejno sporočilo, prosimo, da nanj ne odgovarjate.]" + +#: lib/bridgedb/I18n.py:43 +msgid "" +"Another way to find public bridge addresses is to visit\n" +"https://bridges.torproject.org/. The answers you get from that page\n" +"will change every few days, so check back periodically if you need more\n" +"bridge addresses." +msgstr "" +"Drug način, kako poiskati naslove javnih mostov, je, da obiščete " +"https://bridges.torproject.org/. Odgovor, ki ga boste dobili na tej strani, " +"se bo spremenil vsakih nekaj dni, zato v primeru, da potrebujete več " +"naslovov mostov, preverjajte to stran redno." + +#: lib/bridgedb/I18n.py:48 +msgid "(no bridges currently available)" +msgstr "(Trenutno ni na voljo nobenega mostu)" + +#: lib/bridgedb/I18n.py:50 +msgid "(e-mail requests not currently supported)" +msgstr "(Zahteve preko e-pošte trenutno niso podprte)" diff --git a/i18n/zh_CN/bridgedb.po b/i18n/zh_CN/bridgedb.po new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e5c634c --- /dev/null +++ b/i18n/zh_CN/bridgedb.po @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +# SOME DESCRIPTIVE TITLE. +# Copyright (C) YEAR THE PACKAGE'S COPYRIGHT HOLDER +# This file is distributed under the same license as the PACKAGE package. +# Christian Fromme <kaner(a)strace.org>, 2010 +# +msgid "" +msgstr "" +"Project-Id-Version: The Tor Project\n" +"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2011-01-01 07:48-0800\n" +"PO-Revision-Date: 2011-04-08 21:34+0000\n" +"Last-Translator: hanl <iamh4n(a)gmail.com>\n" +"Language-Team: LANGUAGE <LL(a)li.org>\n" +"MIME-Version: 1.0\n" +"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" +"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n" +"Language: zh_CN\n" +"Plural-Forms: nplurals=1; plural=0\n" + +#: lib/bridgedb/I18n.py:21 +msgid "Here are your bridge relays: " +msgstr "以下为桥接中继服务器地址：" + +#: lib/bridgedb/I18n.py:23 +msgid "" +"Bridge relays (or \"bridges\" for short) are Tor relays that aren't listed\n" +"in the main directory. Since there is no complete public list of them,\n" +"even if your ISP is filtering connections to all the known Tor relays,\n" +"they probably won't be able to block all the bridges." +msgstr "" +"网桥中继服务器（Bridge relays），简称网桥（bridges)为未公开在主目录的中继服务器⏎\n" +"因为完整的网桥地址是不公开的，即使您的ISP过滤所有的 Tor 的中继服务器他们估计无法封锁所有的网桥。" + +#: lib/bridgedb/I18n.py:28 +msgid "" +"To use the above lines, go to Vidalia's Network settings page, and click\n" +"\"My ISP blocks connections to the Tor network\". Then add each bridge\n" +"address one at a time." +msgstr "使用下列地址，请打开 Vidalia 网络设置。选中“我的 ISP 阻挡了对 Tor 网络的连接\"。之后请依次添加服务器。" + +#: lib/bridgedb/I18n.py:32 +msgid "" +"Configuring more than one bridge address will make your Tor connection\n" +"more stable, in case some of the bridges become unreachable." +msgstr "如果桥接变得不稳定，配置两个桥接会使你的链接更稳定。" + +#: lib/bridgedb/I18n.py:35 +msgid "" +"Another way to find public bridge addresses is to send mail to\n" +"bridges(a)torproject.org with the line \"get bridges\" by itself in the body\n" +"of the mail. However, so we can make it harder for an attacker to learn\n" +"lots of bridge addresses, you must send this request from an email address at\n" +"one of the following domains:" +msgstr "" +"您也可以发送内容为“get bridges” 的邮件到 bridges(a)torproject.org " +"获取更多的公开网桥地址。为了使攻击者难以获取网桥地址，你必须从以下域名（邮件服务商）发送邮件：" + +#: lib/bridgedb/I18n.py:41 +msgid "[This is an automated message; please do not reply.]" +msgstr "自动生成内容，请勿回复。" + +#: lib/bridgedb/I18n.py:43 +msgid "" +"Another way to find public bridge addresses is to visit\n" +"https://bridges.torproject.org/. The answers you get from that page\n" +"will change every few days, so check back periodically if you need more\n" +"bridge addresses." +msgstr "" +"您也可以访问 https://bridges.torproject.org 获取公开网桥服务器地址。网桥服务器地址会经常更新，请定期回访。" + +#: lib/bridgedb/I18n.py:48 +msgid "(no bridges currently available)" +msgstr "暂无网桥服务器" + +#: lib/bridgedb/I18n.py:50 +msgid "(e-mail requests not currently supported)" +msgstr "电子邮件请求尚未支持"

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r24580: {website} Update design doc to reflect the planned shift from the Togg (website/trunk/torbutton/en/design)
by Mike Perry 11 Apr '11

11 Apr '11

Author: mikeperry Date: 2011-04-11 04:55:29 +0000 (Mon, 11 Apr 2011) New Revision: 24580 Modified: website/trunk/torbutton/en/design/FF40_AUDIT website/trunk/torbutton/en/design/design.xml website/trunk/torbutton/en/design/index.html.en Log: Update design doc to reflect the planned shift from the Toggle Model to Tor Browser. Modified: website/trunk/torbutton/en/design/FF40_AUDIT =================================================================== --- website/trunk/torbutton/en/design/FF40_AUDIT 2011-04-11 00:51:45 UTC (rev 24579) +++ website/trunk/torbutton/en/design/FF40_AUDIT 2011-04-11 04:55:29 UTC (rev 24580) @@ -17,6 +17,12 @@ - Fingerprinting issues: - New screen attributes - https://developer.mozilla.org/en/DOM/window.mozInnerScreenX, Y + - High Res Animation Timers: + - https://developer.mozilla.org/en/DOM/window.mozAnimationStartTime + - https://developer.mozilla.org/en/DOM/Animations_using_MozBeforePaint + - 50-60hz max.. Can we leverage this? + - timeStamps on keystroke events + - https://developer.mozilla.org/en/DOM/event.timeStamp - Bounding rectangles -> window sizes? - Maybe not display sizes, but seems possible to fingerprint rendered content size.. ugh. Modified: website/trunk/torbutton/en/design/design.xml =================================================================== (Binary files differ) Modified: website/trunk/torbutton/en/design/index.html.en =================================================================== --- website/trunk/torbutton/en/design/index.html.en 2011-04-11 00:51:45 UTC (rev 24579) +++ website/trunk/torbutton/en/design/index.html.en 2011-04-11 04:55:29 UTC (rev 24580) @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> -<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8" /><title>Torbutton Design Documentation</title><meta name="generator" content="DocBook XSL Stylesheets V1.75.2" /></head><body><div class="article" title="Torbutton Design Documentation"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a id="design"></a>Torbutton Design Documentation</h2></div><div><div class="author"><h3 class="author"><span class="firstname">Mike</span> <span class="surname">Perry</span></h3><div class="affiliation"><div class="address"><p><code class="email"><<a class="email" href="mailto:mikeperry.fscked/org">mikeperry.fscked/org</a>></code></p></div></div></div></div><div><p class="pubdate">Apr 4 2011</p></div></div><hr /></div><div class="toc"><p><b>Table of Contents</b></p><dl><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#id2657298">1. Introduction</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#adversary">1.1. Adversary Model</a>< /span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#requirements">1.2. Torbutton Requirements</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#layout">1.3. Extension Layout</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#components">2. Components</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#hookedxpcom">2.1. Hooked Components</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2682565">2.2. New Components</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#id2661538">3. Chrome</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2683477">3.1. XUL Windows and Overlays</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2679782">3.2. Major Chrome Observers</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#id2682210">4. Toggle Code Path</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2678571">4.1. Button Click</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2677555">4.2. Proxy Update</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a hre f="#id2671739">4.3. Settings Update</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#preferences">4.4. Firefox preferences touched during Toggle</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#id2684076">5. Description of Options</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2686457">5.1. Proxy Settings</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2685583">5.2. Dynamic Content Settings</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2695607">5.3. History and Forms Settings</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2695921">5.4. Cache Settings</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2696030">5.5. Cookie and Auth Settings</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2696343">5.6. Startup Settings</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2696457">5.7. Shutdown Settings</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2696517">5.8. Header Settings</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#Fir efoxBugs">6. Relevant Firefox Bugs</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#FirefoxSecurity">6.1. Bugs impacting security</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#FirefoxWishlist">6.2. Bugs blocking functionality</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#FirefoxMiscBugs">6.3. Low Priority Bugs</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#TestPlan">7. Testing</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#SingleStateTesting">7.1. Single state testing</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2698010">7.2. Multi-state testing</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#HackTorbutton">7.3. Active testing (aka How to Hack Torbutton)</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></div><div class="sect1" title="1. Introduction"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a id="id2657298"></a>1. Introduction</h2></div></div></div><p> +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8" /><title>Torbutton Design Documentation</title><meta name="generator" content="DocBook XSL Stylesheets V1.75.2" /></head><body><div class="article" title="Torbutton Design Documentation"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a id="design"></a>Torbutton Design Documentation</h2></div><div><div class="author"><h3 class="author"><span class="firstname">Mike</span> <span class="surname">Perry</span></h3><div class="affiliation"><div class="address"><p><code class="email"><<a class="email" href="mailto:mikeperry.fscked/org">mikeperry.fscked/org</a>></code></p></div></div></div></div><div><p class="pubdate">Apr 10 2011</p></div></div><hr /></div><div class="toc"><p><b>Table of Contents</b></p><dl><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#id2666923">1. Introduction</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#adversary">1.1. Adversary Model</a> </span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#requirements">1.2. Torbutton Requirements</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#layout">1.3. Extension Layout</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#components">2. Components</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#hookedxpcom">2.1. Hooked Components</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2690319">2.2. New Components</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#id2681735">3. Chrome</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2702019">3.1. XUL Windows and Overlays</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2694797">3.2. Major Chrome Observers</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#id2696524">4. Toggle Code Path</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2699452">4.1. Button Click</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2697978">4.2. Proxy Update</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a hr ef="#id2697015">4.3. Settings Update</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#preferences">4.4. Firefox preferences touched during Toggle</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#id2702702">5. Description of Options</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2704948">5.1. Proxy Settings</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2686645">5.2. Dynamic Content Settings</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2705261">5.3. History and Forms Settings</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2705577">5.4. Cache Settings</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2705686">5.5. Cookie and Auth Settings</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2705999">5.6. Startup Settings</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2706113">5.7. Shutdown Settings</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2706173">5.8. Header Settings</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#Fi refoxBugs">6. Relevant Firefox Bugs</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#TorBrowserBugs">6.1. Tor Browser Bugs</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#ToggleModelBugs">6.2. Toggle Model Bugs</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#TestPlan">7. Testing</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#SingleStateTesting">7.1. Single state testing</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2707624">7.2. Multi-state testing</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#HackTorbutton">7.3. Active testing (aka How to Hack Torbutton)</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></div><div class="sect1" title="1. Introduction"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a id="id2666923"></a>1. Introduction</h2></div></div></div><p> This document describes the goals, operation, and testing procedures of the Torbutton Firefox extension. It is current as of Torbutton 1.3.2. @@ -195,11 +195,16 @@ MUST NOT bypass Tor proxy settings for any content.</p></li><li class="listitem"><a id="state"></a><span class="command"><strong>State Separation</strong></span><p>Browser state (cookies, cache, history, 'DOM storage'), accumulated in one Tor state MUST NOT be accessible via the network in another Tor state.</p></li><li class="listitem"><a id="isolation"></a><span class="command"><strong>Network Isolation</strong></span><p>Pages MUST NOT perform any network activity in a Tor state different - from the state they were originally loaded in.</p></li><li class="listitem"><a id="undiscoverability"></a><span class="command"><strong>Tor Undiscoverability</strong></span><p>With + from the state they were originally loaded in.</p><p>Note that this requirement is +being de-emphasized due to the coming shift to supporting only the Tor Browser +Bundles, which do not support a Toggle operation.</p></li><li class="listitem"><a id="undiscoverability"></a><span class="command"><strong>Tor Undiscoverability</strong></span><p>With the advent of bridge support in Tor 0.2.0.x, there are now a class of Tor users whose network fingerprint does not obviously betray the fact that they are using Tor. This should extend to the browser as well - Torbutton MUST NOT -reveal its presence while Tor is disabled.</p></li><li class="listitem"><a id="disk"></a><span class="command"><strong>Disk Avoidance</strong></span><p>The browser SHOULD NOT write any Tor-related state to disk, or store it +reveal its presence while Tor is disabled. +</p><p>Note that this requirement is +being de-emphasized due to the coming shift to supporting only the Tor Browser +Bundles, which do not support a Toggle operation.</p></li><li class="listitem"><a id="disk"></a><span class="command"><strong>Disk Avoidance</strong></span><p>The browser SHOULD NOT write any Tor-related state to disk, or store it in memory beyond the duration of one Tor toggle.</p></li><li class="listitem"><a id="location"></a><span class="command"><strong>Location Neutrality</strong></span><p>The browser SHOULD NOT leak location-specific information, such as timezone or locale via Tor.</p></li><li class="listitem"><a id="setpreservation"></a><span class="command"><strong>Anonymity Set Preservation</strong></span><p>The browser SHOULD NOT leak any other anonymity @@ -250,7 +255,7 @@ back to arbitrary servers outside of Tor with no user intervention. Fixing this issue helps to satisfy Torbutton's <a class="link" href="#proxy">Proxy Obedience</a> Requirement. - </p></div><div class="sect3" title="@mozilla.org/browser/global-history;2 - components/ignore-history.js"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2669566"></a><a class="ulink" href="http://www.oxymoronical.com/experiments/xpcomref/applications/Firefox/3.5/c…" target="_top">@mozilla.org/browser/global-history;2</a> + </p></div><div class="sect3" title="@mozilla.org/browser/global-history;2 - components/ignore-history.js"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2696239"></a><a class="ulink" href="http://www.oxymoronical.com/experiments/xpcomref/applications/Firefox/3.5/c…" target="_top">@mozilla.org/browser/global-history;2</a> - <a class="ulink" href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbutton.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/src/components…" target="_top">components/ignore-history.js</a></h4></div></div></div><p>This component was contributed by <a class="ulink" href="http://www.collinjackson.com/" target="_top">Collin Jackson</a> as a method for defeating CSS and Javascript-based methods of history disclosure. The global-history component is what is used by Firefox to determine if a link was visited or not @@ -278,7 +283,7 @@ This component helps satisfy the <a class="link" href="#isolation">Network Isolation</a> and <a class="link" href="#setpreservation">Anonymity Set Preservation</a> requirements. -</p></div></div><div class="sect2" title="2.2. New Components"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2682565"></a>2.2. New Components</h3></div></div></div><p>Torbutton creates four new components that are used throughout the +</p></div></div><div class="sect2" title="2.2. New Components"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2690319"></a>2.2. New Components</h3></div></div></div><p>Torbutton creates four new components that are used throughout the extension. These components do not hook any interfaces, nor are they used anywhere besides Torbutton itself.</p><div class="sect3" title="@torproject.org/cookie-jar-selector;2 - components/cookie-jar-selector.js"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="cookiejar"></a><a class="ulink" href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbutton.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/src/components…" target="_top">@torproject.org/cookie-jar-selector;2 - components/cookie-jar-selector.js</a></h4></div></div></div><p>The cookie jar selector (also based on code from <a class="ulink" href="http://www.collinjackson.com/" target="_top">Collin @@ -290,7 +295,7 @@ </p><p> This component helps to address the <a class="link" href="#state">State Isolation</a> requirement of Torbutton. -</p></div><div class="sect3" title="@torproject.org/torbutton-logger;1 - components/torbutton-logger.js"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2694914"></a><a class="ulink" href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbutton.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/src/components…" target="_top">@torproject.org/torbutton-logger;1 +</p></div><div class="sect3" title="@torproject.org/torbutton-logger;1 - components/torbutton-logger.js"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2683534"></a><a class="ulink" href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbutton.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/src/components…" target="_top">@torproject.org/torbutton-logger;1 - components/torbutton-logger.js</a></h4></div></div></div><p>The torbutton logger component allows on-the-fly redirection of torbutton logging messages to either Firefox stderr (<span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.logmethod=0</strong></span>), the Javascript error console @@ -371,17 +376,17 @@ </p><p> This helps to fulfill both the <a class="link" href="#setpreservation">Anonymity Set Preservation</a> and the <a class="link" href="#undiscoverability">Tor Undiscoverability</a> requirements of -Torbutton.</p></div></div></div><div class="sect1" title="3. Chrome"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a id="id2661538"></a>3. Chrome</h2></div></div></div><p>The chrome is where all the torbutton graphical elements and windows are -located. </p><div class="sect2" title="3.1. XUL Windows and Overlays"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2683477"></a>3.1. XUL Windows and Overlays</h3></div></div></div><p> +Torbutton.</p></div></div></div><div class="sect1" title="3. Chrome"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a id="id2681735"></a>3. Chrome</h2></div></div></div><p>The chrome is where all the torbutton graphical elements and windows are +located. </p><div class="sect2" title="3.1. XUL Windows and Overlays"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2702019"></a>3.1. XUL Windows and Overlays</h3></div></div></div><p> Each window is described as an <a class="ulink" href="http://developer.mozilla.org/en/docs/XUL_Reference" target="_top">XML file</a>, with zero or more Javascript files attached. The scope of these Javascript files is their containing window. XUL files that add new elements and script to existing Firefox windows are called overlays.</p><div class="sect3" title="Browser Overlay - torbutton.xul"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="browseroverlay"></a>Browser Overlay - <a class="ulink" href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbutton.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/src/chrome/con…" target="_top">torbutton.xul</a></h4></div></div></div><p>The browser overlay, torbutton.xul, defines the toolbar button, the status bar, and events for toggling the button. The overlay code is in <a class="ulink" href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbutton.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/src/chrome/con…" target="_top">chrome/content/torbutton.js</a>. It contains event handlers for preference update, shutdown, upgrade, and -location change events.</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Preferences Window - preferences.xul"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2672297"></a>Preferences Window - <a class="ulink" href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbutton.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/src/chrome/con…" target="_top">preferences.xul</a></h4></div></div></div><p>The preferences window of course lays out the Torbutton preferences, with -handlers located in <a class="ulink" href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbutton.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/src/chrome/con…" target="_top">chrome/content/preferences.js</a>.</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Other Windows"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2689726"></a>Other Windows</h4></div></div></div><p>There are additional windows that describe popups for right clicking on -the status bar, the toolbutton, and the about page.</p></div></div><div class="sect2" title="3.2. Major Chrome Observers"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2679782"></a>3.2. Major Chrome Observers</h3></div></div></div><p> +location change events.</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Preferences Window - preferences.xul"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2704559"></a>Preferences Window - <a class="ulink" href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbutton.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/src/chrome/con…" target="_top">preferences.xul</a></h4></div></div></div><p>The preferences window of course lays out the Torbutton preferences, with +handlers located in <a class="ulink" href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbutton.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/src/chrome/con…" target="_top">chrome/content/preferences.js</a>.</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Other Windows"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2669673"></a>Other Windows</h4></div></div></div><p>There are additional windows that describe popups for right clicking on +the status bar, the toolbutton, and the about page.</p></div></div><div class="sect2" title="3.2. Major Chrome Observers"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2694797"></a>3.2. Major Chrome Observers</h3></div></div></div><p> In addition to the <a class="link" href="#components" title="2. Components">components described above</a>, Torbutton also instantiates several observers in the browser overlay window. These mostly grew due to scoping convenience, and many should @@ -435,7 +440,7 @@ <a class="ulink" href="https://developer.mozilla.org/en/DOM/window.screen" target="_top">window.screen</a> object to obfuscate browser and desktop resolution information. -</p></li></ol></div></div></div><div class="sect1" title="4. Toggle Code Path"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a id="id2682210"></a>4. Toggle Code Path</h2></div></div></div><p> +</p></li></ol></div></div></div><div class="sect1" title="4. Toggle Code Path"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a id="id2696524"></a>4. Toggle Code Path</h2></div></div></div><p> The act of toggling is connected to <code class="function">torbutton_toggle()</code> via the <a class="ulink" href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbutton.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/src/chrome/con…" target="_top">torbutton.xul</a> @@ -456,7 +461,7 @@ 409737</a> unfixed. The content policy does not allow any network activity whatsoever during this three stage transition. - </p><div class="sect2" title="4.1. Button Click"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2678571"></a>4.1. Button Click</h3></div></div></div><p> + </p><div class="sect2" title="4.1. Button Click"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2699452"></a>4.1. Button Click</h3></div></div></div><p> This is the first step in the toggling process. When the user clicks the toggle button or the toolbar, <code class="function">torbutton_toggle()</code> is @@ -469,7 +474,7 @@ <span class="command"><strong>torbutton_unique_pref_observer</strong></span> to perform the rest of the toggle. - </p></div><div class="sect2" title="4.2. Proxy Update"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2677555"></a>4.2. Proxy Update</h3></div></div></div><p> + </p></div><div class="sect2" title="4.2. Proxy Update"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2697978"></a>4.2. Proxy Update</h3></div></div></div><p> When Torbutton receives any proxy change notifications via its <span class="command"><strong>torbutton_unique_pref_observer</strong></span>, it calls @@ -484,7 +489,7 @@ observer so that other addons (such as SwitchProxy) can switch the proxy settings between multiple proxies. - </p></div><div class="sect2" title="4.3. Settings Update"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2671739"></a>4.3. Settings Update</h3></div></div></div><p> + </p></div><div class="sect2" title="4.3. Settings Update"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2697015"></a>4.3. Settings Update</h3></div></div></div><p> The next stage is also handled by <code class="function">torbutton_update_status()</code>. This function sets scores of @@ -611,10 +616,10 @@ Avoidance</a> and <a class="link" href="#state">State Separation</a> requirements. - </p></li></ol></div></div></div><div class="sect1" title="5. Description of Options"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a id="id2684076"></a>5. Description of Options</h2></div></div></div><p>This section provides a detailed description of Torbutton's options. Each + </p></li></ol></div></div></div><div class="sect1" title="5. Description of Options"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a id="id2702702"></a>5. Description of Options</h2></div></div></div><p>This section provides a detailed description of Torbutton's options. Each option is presented as the string from the preferences window, a summary, the preferences it touches, and the effect this has on the components, chrome, and -browser properties.</p><div class="sect2" title="5.1. Proxy Settings"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2686457"></a>5.1. Proxy Settings</h3></div></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Test Settings"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2688146"></a>Test Settings</h4></div></div></div><p> +browser properties.</p><div class="sect2" title="5.1. Proxy Settings"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2704948"></a>5.1. Proxy Settings</h3></div></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Test Settings"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2683681"></a>Test Settings</h4></div></div></div><p> This button under the Proxy Settings tab provides a way to verify that the proxy settings are correct, and actually do route through the Tor network. It performs this check by issuing an <a class="ulink" href="http://developer.mozilla.org/en/docs/XMLHttpRequest" target="_top">XMLHTTPRequest</a> @@ -629,7 +634,7 @@ window</a> callback <code class="function">torbutton_prefs_test_settings()</code> in <a class="ulink" href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbutton.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/src/chrome/con…" target="_top">preferences.js</a>. - </p></div></div><div class="sect2" title="5.2. Dynamic Content Settings"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2685583"></a>5.2. Dynamic Content Settings</h3></div></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Disable plugins on Tor Usage (crucial)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="plugins"></a>Disable plugins on Tor Usage (crucial)</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.no_tor_plugins</strong></span></p><p>Java and plugins <a class="ulink" href="http://java.sun.com/j2se/1.5.0/docs/api/java/net/class-use/NetworkInterface…" target="_top">can query</a> the <a class="ulink" href="http://www.rgagnon.com/javadetails/java-0095.html" target="_top">local IP + </p></div></div><div class="sect2" title="5.2. Dynamic Content Settings"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2686645"></a>5.2. Dynamic Content Settings</h3></div></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Disable plugins on Tor Usage (crucial)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="plugins"></a>Disable plugins on Tor Usage (crucial)</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.no_tor_plugins</strong></span></p><p>Java and plugins <a class="ulink" href="http://java.sun.com/j2se/1.5.0/docs/api/java/net/class-use/NetworkInterface…" target="_top">can query</a> the <a class="ulink" href="http://www.rgagnon.com/javadetails/java-0095.html" target="_top">local IP address</a> and report it back to the remote site. They can also <a class="ulink" href="http://decloak.net" target="_top">bypass proxy settings</a> and directly connect to a remote site without Tor. Every browser plugin we have tested with Firefox has @@ -673,7 +678,7 @@ Since most plugins completely ignore browser proxy settings, the actions performed by this setting are crucial to satisfying the <a class="link" href="#proxy">Proxy Obedience</a> requirement. - </p></div><div class="sect3" title="Isolate Dynamic Content to Tor State (crucial)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2684833"></a>Isolate Dynamic Content to Tor State (crucial)</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.isolate_content</strong></span></p><p>Enabling this preference is what enables the <a class="ulink" href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbutton.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/src/components…" target="_top">@torproject.org/cssblocker;1</a> content policy + </p></div><div class="sect3" title="Isolate Dynamic Content to Tor State (crucial)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2688604"></a>Isolate Dynamic Content to Tor State (crucial)</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.isolate_content</strong></span></p><p>Enabling this preference is what enables the <a class="ulink" href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbutton.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/src/components…" target="_top">@torproject.org/cssblocker;1</a> content policy mentioned above, and causes it to block content load attempts in pages an opposite Tor state from the current state. Freshly loaded <a class="ulink" href="https://developer.mozilla.org/en/XUL/tabbrowser" target="_top">browser tabs</a> are tagged @@ -725,8 +730,9 @@ -</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Resize windows to multiples of 50px during Tor usage (recommended)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2653668"></a>Resize windows to multiples of 50px during Tor usage (recommended)</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.resize_windows</strong></span></p><p> +</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Resize windows to multiples of 50px during Tor usage (recommended)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2663307"></a>Resize windows to multiples of 50px during Tor usage (recommended)</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.resize_windows</strong></span></p><p> + This option drastically cuts down on the number of distinct anonymity sets that divide the Tor web userbase. Without this setting, the dimensions for a typical browser window range from 600-1200 horizontal pixels and 400-1000 @@ -760,7 +766,7 @@ </p><p> This setting helps to meet the <a class="link" href="#setpreservation">Anonymity Set Preservation</a> requirements. -</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Disable Search Suggestions during Tor (recommended)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2653753"></a>Disable Search Suggestions during Tor (recommended)</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.no_search</strong></span></p><p> +</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Disable Search Suggestions during Tor (recommended)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2663391"></a>Disable Search Suggestions during Tor (recommended)</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.no_search</strong></span></p><p> This setting causes Torbutton to disable <a class="ulink" href="http://kb.mozillazine.org/Browser.search.suggest.enabled" target="_top"><span class="command"><strong>browser.search.suggest.enabled</strong></span></a> during Tor usage. This governs if you get Google search suggestions during Tor @@ -771,7 +777,7 @@ While this setting doesn't satisfy any Torbutton requirements, the fact that cookies are transmitted for partially typed queries does not seem desirable for Tor usage. -</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Disable Updates During Tor"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2653792"></a>Disable Updates During Tor</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.no_updates</strong></span></p><p>This setting causes Torbutton to disable the four <a class="ulink" href="http://wiki.mozilla.org/Update:Users/Checking_For_Updates#Preference_Contro…" target="_top">Firefox +</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Disable Updates During Tor"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2663430"></a>Disable Updates During Tor</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.no_updates</strong></span></p><p>This setting causes Torbutton to disable the four <a class="ulink" href="http://wiki.mozilla.org/Update:Users/Checking_For_Updates#Preference_Contro…" target="_top">Firefox update settings</a> during Tor usage: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.update.enabled</strong></span>, <span class="command"><strong>app.update.enabled</strong></span>, @@ -781,7 +787,7 @@ checking for search plugin updates while Tor is enabled. </p><p> This setting satisfies the <a class="link" href="#updates">Update Safety</a> requirement. -</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Redirect Torbutton Updates Via Tor (recommended)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2653854"></a>Redirect Torbutton Updates Via Tor (recommended)</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.update_torbutton_via_tor</strong></span></p><p>This setting causes Torbutton to install an +</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Redirect Torbutton Updates Via Tor (recommended)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2663492"></a>Redirect Torbutton Updates Via Tor (recommended)</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.update_torbutton_via_tor</strong></span></p><p>This setting causes Torbutton to install an <a class="ulink" href="https://developer.mozilla.org/en/nsIProtocolProxyFilter" target="_top">nsIProtocolProxyFilter</a> in order to redirect all version update checks and Torbutton update downloads @@ -790,7 +796,7 @@ help censored users meet the <a class="link" href="#undiscoverability">Tor Undiscoverability</a> requirement. - </p></div><div class="sect3" title="Disable livemarks updates during Tor usage (recommended)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2653898"></a>Disable livemarks updates during Tor usage (recommended)</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: + </p></div><div class="sect3" title="Disable livemarks updates during Tor usage (recommended)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2663536"></a>Disable livemarks updates during Tor usage (recommended)</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: </p><table border="0" summary="Simple list" class="simplelist"><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.disable_livemarks</strong></span></td></tr></table><p> </p><p> @@ -805,7 +811,7 @@ This helps satisfy the <a class="link" href="#isolation">Network Isolation</a> and <a class="link" href="#setpreservation">Anonymity Set Preservation</a> requirements. -</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Block Tor/Non-Tor access to network from file:// urls (recommended)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2653969"></a>Block Tor/Non-Tor access to network from file:// urls (recommended)</h4></div></div></div><p>Options: +</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Block Tor/Non-Tor access to network from file:// urls (recommended)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2663607"></a>Block Tor/Non-Tor access to network from file:// urls (recommended)</h4></div></div></div><p>Options: </p><table border="0" summary="Simple list" class="simplelist"><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.block_tor_file_net</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.block_nontor_file_net</strong></span></td></tr></table><p> </p><p> @@ -825,7 +831,7 @@ operations in opposite Tor states. Also, allowing pages to submit arbitrary files to arbitrary sites just generally seems like a bad idea. -</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Close all Tor/Non-Tor tabs and windows on toggle (optional)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2654041"></a>Close all Tor/Non-Tor tabs and windows on toggle (optional)</h4></div></div></div><p>Options: +</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Close all Tor/Non-Tor tabs and windows on toggle (optional)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2663679"></a>Close all Tor/Non-Tor tabs and windows on toggle (optional)</h4></div></div></div><p>Options: </p><table border="0" summary="Simple list" class="simplelist"><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.close_nontor</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.close_tor</strong></span></td></tr></table><p> </p><p> @@ -849,7 +855,7 @@ While this setting doesn't satisfy any Torbutton requirements, the fact that cookies are transmitted for partially typed queries does not seem desirable for Tor usage. -</p></div></div><div class="sect2" title="5.3. History and Forms Settings"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2695607"></a>5.3. History and Forms Settings</h3></div></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Isolate Access to History navigation to Tor state (crucial)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2695612"></a>Isolate Access to History navigation to Tor state (crucial)</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.block_js_history</strong></span></p><p> +</p></div></div><div class="sect2" title="5.3. History and Forms Settings"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2705261"></a>5.3. History and Forms Settings</h3></div></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Isolate Access to History navigation to Tor state (crucial)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2705267"></a>Isolate Access to History navigation to Tor state (crucial)</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.block_js_history</strong></span></p><p> This setting determines if Torbutton installs an <a class="ulink" href="http://www.oxymoronical.com/experiments/apidocs/interface/nsISHistoryListen…" target="_top">nsISHistoryListener</a> attached to the <a class="ulink" href="http://www.oxymoronical.com/experiments/apidocs/interface/nsISHistory" target="_top">sessionHistory</a> of of each browser's <a class="ulink" href="https://developer.mozilla.org/en/XUL%3aProperty%3awebNavigation" target="_top">webNavigatator</a>. @@ -877,7 +883,7 @@ Separation</a> and (until Bug 409737 is fixed) <a class="link" href="#isolation">Network Isolation</a> requirements. - </p></div><div class="sect3" title="History Access Settings"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2695690"></a>History Access Settings</h4></div></div></div><p>Options: + </p></div><div class="sect3" title="History Access Settings"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2705344"></a>History Access Settings</h4></div></div></div><p>Options: </p><table border="0" summary="Simple list" class="simplelist"><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.block_thread</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.block_nthread</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.block_thwrite</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.block_nthwrite</strong></span></td></tr></table><p> </p><p>On Firefox 3.x, these four settings govern the behavior of the <a class="ulink" href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbutton.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/src/components…" target="_top">components/ignore-history.js</a> history blocker component mentioned above. By hooking the browser's view of @@ -898,12 +904,12 @@ history store while set. </p><p> This setting helps to satisfy the <a class="link" href="#state">State Separation</a> and <a class="link" href="#disk">Disk Avoidance</a> requirements. -</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Clear History During Tor Toggle (optional)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2695816"></a>Clear History During Tor Toggle (optional)</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.clear_history</strong></span></p><p>This setting governs if Torbutton calls +</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Clear History During Tor Toggle (optional)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2705472"></a>Clear History During Tor Toggle (optional)</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.clear_history</strong></span></p><p>This setting governs if Torbutton calls <a class="ulink" href="https://developer.mozilla.org/en/nsIBrowserHistory#removeAllPages.28.29" target="_top">nsIBrowserHistory.removeAllPages</a> and <a class="ulink" href="http://www.oxymoronical.com/experiments/apidocs/interface/nsISHistory" target="_top">nsISHistory.PurgeHistory</a> for each tab on Tor toggle.</p><p> This setting is an optional way to help satisfy the <a class="link" href="#state">State Separation</a> requirement. -</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Block Password+Form saving during Tor/Non-Tor"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2695859"></a>Block Password+Form saving during Tor/Non-Tor</h4></div></div></div><p>Options: +</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Block Password+Form saving during Tor/Non-Tor"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2705515"></a>Block Password+Form saving during Tor/Non-Tor</h4></div></div></div><p>Options: </p><table border="0" summary="Simple list" class="simplelist"><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.block_tforms</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.block_ntforms</strong></span></td></tr></table><p> </p><p>These settings govern if Torbutton disables <span class="command"><strong>browser.formfill.enable</strong></span> @@ -912,19 +918,19 @@ more important than it seems. </p><p> This setting helps to satisfy the <a class="link" href="#state">State Separation</a> and <a class="link" href="#disk">Disk Avoidance</a> requirements. -</p></div></div><div class="sect2" title="5.4. Cache Settings"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2695921"></a>5.4. Cache Settings</h3></div></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Block Tor disk cache and clear all cache on Tor Toggle"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2695926"></a>Block Tor disk cache and clear all cache on Tor Toggle</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.clear_cache</strong></span> +</p></div></div><div class="sect2" title="5.4. Cache Settings"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2705577"></a>5.4. Cache Settings</h3></div></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Block Tor disk cache and clear all cache on Tor Toggle"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2705582"></a>Block Tor disk cache and clear all cache on Tor Toggle</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.clear_cache</strong></span> </p><p>This option causes Torbutton to call <a class="ulink" href="https://developer.mozilla.org/en/nsICacheService#evictEntries.28.29" target="_top">nsICacheService.evictEntries(0)</a> on Tor toggle to remove all entries from the cache. In addition, this setting causes Torbutton to set <a class="ulink" href="http://kb.mozillazine.org/Browser.cache.disk.enable" target="_top">browser.cache.disk.enable</a> to false. </p><p> This setting helps to satisfy the <a class="link" href="#state">State Separation</a> and <a class="link" href="#disk">Disk Avoidance</a> requirements. -</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Block disk and memory cache during Tor"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2695976"></a>Block disk and memory cache during Tor</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.block_cache</strong></span></p><p>This setting +</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Block disk and memory cache during Tor"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2705632"></a>Block disk and memory cache during Tor</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.block_cache</strong></span></p><p>This setting causes Torbutton to set <a class="ulink" href="http://kb.mozillazine.org/Browser.cache.memory.enable" target="_top">browser.cache.memory.enable</a>, <a class="ulink" href="http://kb.mozillazine.org/Browser.cache.disk.enable" target="_top">browser.cache.disk.enable</a> and <a class="ulink" href="http://kb.mozillazine.org/Network.http.use-cache" target="_top">network.http.use-cache</a> to false during tor usage. </p><p> This setting helps to satisfy the <a class="link" href="#state">State Separation</a> and <a class="link" href="#disk">Disk Avoidance</a> requirements. -</p></div></div><div class="sect2" title="5.5. Cookie and Auth Settings"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2696030"></a>5.5. Cookie and Auth Settings</h3></div></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Clear Cookies on Tor Toggle"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2696035"></a>Clear Cookies on Tor Toggle</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.clear_cookies</strong></span> +</p></div></div><div class="sect2" title="5.5. Cookie and Auth Settings"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2705686"></a>5.5. Cookie and Auth Settings</h3></div></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Clear Cookies on Tor Toggle"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2705691"></a>Clear Cookies on Tor Toggle</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.clear_cookies</strong></span> </p><p> This setting causes Torbutton to call <a class="ulink" href="https://developer.mozilla.org/en/nsICookieManager#removeAll.28.29" target="_top">nsICookieManager.removeAll()</a> on @@ -934,7 +940,7 @@ </p><p> This setting helps to satisfy the <a class="link" href="#state">State Separation</a> and <a class="link" href="#disk">Disk Avoidance</a> requirements. -</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Store Non-Tor cookies in a protected jar"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2696086"></a>Store Non-Tor cookies in a protected jar</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.cookie_jars</strong></span> +</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Store Non-Tor cookies in a protected jar"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2705742"></a>Store Non-Tor cookies in a protected jar</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.cookie_jars</strong></span> </p><p> This setting causes Torbutton to use <a class="ulink" href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbutton.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/src/components…" target="_top">@torproject.org/cookie-jar-selector;2</a> to store @@ -947,15 +953,15 @@ </p><p> This setting helps to satisfy the <a class="link" href="#state">State Separation</a> and <a class="link" href="#disk">Disk Avoidance</a> requirements. -</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Store both Non-Tor and Tor cookies in a protected jar (dangerous)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2696143"></a>Store both Non-Tor and Tor cookies in a protected jar (dangerous)</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.dual_cookie_jars</strong></span> +</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Store both Non-Tor and Tor cookies in a protected jar (dangerous)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2705799"></a>Store both Non-Tor and Tor cookies in a protected jar (dangerous)</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.dual_cookie_jars</strong></span> </p><p> This setting causes Torbutton to use <a class="ulink" href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbutton.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/src/components…" target="_top">@torproject.org/cookie-jar-selector;2</a> to store both Tor and Non-Tor cookies into protected jars. </p><p> This setting helps to satisfy the <a class="link" href="#state">State Separation</a> requirement. -</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Manage My Own Cookies (dangerous)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2696185"></a>Manage My Own Cookies (dangerous)</h4></div></div></div><p>Options: None</p><p>This setting disables all Torbutton cookie handling by setting the above -cookie prefs all to false.</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Disable DOM Storage during Tor usage (crucial)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2696201"></a>Disable DOM Storage during Tor usage (crucial)</h4></div></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Do not write Tor/Non-Tor cookies to disk"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2696203"></a>Do not write Tor/Non-Tor cookies to disk</h4></div></div></div><p>Options: +</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Manage My Own Cookies (dangerous)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2705841"></a>Manage My Own Cookies (dangerous)</h4></div></div></div><p>Options: None</p><p>This setting disables all Torbutton cookie handling by setting the above +cookie prefs all to false.</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Disable DOM Storage during Tor usage (crucial)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2705856"></a>Disable DOM Storage during Tor usage (crucial)</h4></div></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Do not write Tor/Non-Tor cookies to disk"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2705859"></a>Do not write Tor/Non-Tor cookies to disk</h4></div></div></div><p>Options: </p><table border="0" summary="Simple list" class="simplelist"><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.tor_memory_jar</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.nontor_memory_jar</strong></span></td></tr></table><p> </p><p> These settings (contributed by arno) cause Torbutton to set <a class="ulink" href="http://kb.mozillazine.org/Network.cookie.lifetimePolicy" target="_top">network.cookie.lifetimePolicy</a> @@ -975,13 +981,13 @@ <a class="ulink" href="http://developer.mozilla.org/en/docs/DOM:Storage" target="_top">DOM Storage</a> from being used to store persistent information across Tor states.</p><p> This setting helps to satisfy the <a class="link" href="#state">State Separation</a> requirement. -</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Clear HTTP Auth on Tor Toggle (recommended)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2696304"></a>Clear HTTP Auth on Tor Toggle (recommended)</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.clear_http_auth</strong></span> +</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Clear HTTP Auth on Tor Toggle (recommended)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2705960"></a>Clear HTTP Auth on Tor Toggle (recommended)</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.clear_http_auth</strong></span> </p><p> This setting causes Torbutton to call <a class="ulink" href="http://www.oxymoronical.com/experiments/apidocs/interface/nsIHttpAuthManager" target="_top">nsIHttpAuthManager.clearAll()</a> every time Tor is toggled. </p><p> This setting helps to satisfy the <a class="link" href="#state">State Separation</a> requirement. -</p></div></div><div class="sect2" title="5.6. Startup Settings"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2696343"></a>5.6. Startup Settings</h3></div></div></div><div class="sect3" title="On Browser Startup, set Tor state to: Tor, Non-Tor"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2696348"></a>On Browser Startup, set Tor state to: Tor, Non-Tor</h4></div></div></div><p>Options: +</p></div></div><div class="sect2" title="5.6. Startup Settings"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2705999"></a>5.6. Startup Settings</h3></div></div></div><div class="sect3" title="On Browser Startup, set Tor state to: Tor, Non-Tor"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2706004"></a>On Browser Startup, set Tor state to: Tor, Non-Tor</h4></div></div></div><p>Options: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.restore_tor</strong></span> </p><p>This option governs what Tor state tor is loaded in to. <code class="function">torbutton_set_initial_state()</code> covers the case where the @@ -995,7 +1001,7 @@ requirement in the event of Firefox crashes by ensuring all cookies, settings and saved sessions are reloaded from a fixed Tor state. -</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Prevent session store from saving Non-Tor/Tor-loaded tabs"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2696399"></a>Prevent session store from saving Non-Tor/Tor-loaded tabs</h4></div></div></div><p>Options: +</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Prevent session store from saving Non-Tor/Tor-loaded tabs"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2706055"></a>Prevent session store from saving Non-Tor/Tor-loaded tabs</h4></div></div></div><p>Options: </p><table border="0" summary="Simple list" class="simplelist"><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.nonontor_sessionstore</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.notor_sessionstore</strong></span></td></tr></table><p> </p><p>If these options are enabled, the <a class="link" href="#tbsessionstore" title="@torproject.org/torbutton-ss-blocker;1">tbSessionStore.js</a> component uses the session store listeners to filter out the appropriate tabs before writing the session @@ -1005,7 +1011,7 @@ requirement, and also helps to satisfy the <a class="link" href="#state">State Separation</a> requirement in the event of Firefox crashes. -</p></div></div><div class="sect2" title="5.7. Shutdown Settings"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2696457"></a>5.7. Shutdown Settings</h3></div></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Clear cookies on Tor/Non-Tor shutdown"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2696463"></a>Clear cookies on Tor/Non-Tor shutdown</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.shutdown_method</strong></span> +</p></div></div><div class="sect2" title="5.7. Shutdown Settings"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2706113"></a>5.7. Shutdown Settings</h3></div></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Clear cookies on Tor/Non-Tor shutdown"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2706119"></a>Clear cookies on Tor/Non-Tor shutdown</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.shutdown_method</strong></span> </p><p> This option variable can actually take 3 values: 0, 1, and 2. 0 means no cookie clearing, 1 means clear only during Tor-enabled shutdown, and 2 means clear for both Tor and Non-Tor shutdown. When set to 1 or 2, Torbutton listens @@ -1014,7 +1020,7 @@ to clear out all cookies and all cookie jars upon shutdown. </p><p> This setting helps to satisfy the <a class="link" href="#state">State Separation</a> requirement. -</p></div></div><div class="sect2" title="5.8. Header Settings"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2696517"></a>5.8. Header Settings</h3></div></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Set user agent during Tor usage (crucial)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2696523"></a>Set user agent during Tor usage (crucial)</h4></div></div></div><p>Options: +</p></div></div><div class="sect2" title="5.8. Header Settings"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2706173"></a>5.8. Header Settings</h3></div></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Set user agent during Tor usage (crucial)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2706179"></a>Set user agent during Tor usage (crucial)</h4></div></div></div><p>Options: </p><table border="0" summary="Simple list" class="simplelist"><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.set_uagent</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.platform_override</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.oscpu_override</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.buildID_override</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.productsub_override</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.appname_override</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.appversion_override</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.useragent_override</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.useragent_vendor</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.useragent_vendorSub</strong></span></td></tr></table><p> </p><p>On face, user agent switching appears to be straight-forward in Firefox. It provides several options for controlling the browser user agent string: @@ -1038,7 +1044,7 @@ </p><p> This setting helps to satisfy the <a class="link" href="#setpreservation">Anonymity Set Preservation</a> requirement. -</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Spoof US English Browser"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2696697"></a>Spoof US English Browser</h4></div></div></div><p>Options: +</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Spoof US English Browser"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2706353"></a>Spoof US English Browser</h4></div></div></div><p>Options: </p><table border="0" summary="Simple list" class="simplelist"><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.spoof_english</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.spoof_charset</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.spoof_language</strong></span></td></tr></table><p> </p><p> This option causes Torbutton to set <span class="command"><strong>general.useragent.locale</strong></span> @@ -1049,7 +1055,7 @@ well as hooking <span class="command"><strong>navigator.language</strong></span> via its <a class="link" href="#jshooks" title="Hook Dangerous Javascript">javascript hooks</a>. </p><p> This setting helps to satisfy the <a class="link" href="#setpreservation">Anonymity Set Preservation</a> and <a class="link" href="#location">Location Neutrality</a> requirements. -</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Referer Spoofing Options"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2696790"></a>Referer Spoofing Options</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.refererspoof</strong></span> +</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Referer Spoofing Options"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2706446"></a>Referer Spoofing Options</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.refererspoof</strong></span> </p><p> This option variable has three values. If it is 0, "smart" referer spoofing is enabled. If it is 1, the referer behaves as normal. If it is 2, no referer is @@ -1059,7 +1065,7 @@ </p><p> This setting also does not directly satisfy any Torbutton requirement, but some may desire to mask their referer for general privacy concerns. -</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Strip platform and language off of Google Search Box queries"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2696824"></a>Strip platform and language off of Google Search Box queries</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.fix_google_srch</strong></span> +</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Strip platform and language off of Google Search Box queries"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2706480"></a>Strip platform and language off of Google Search Box queries</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.fix_google_srch</strong></span> </p><p> This option causes Torbutton to use the <a class="ulink" href="https://wiki.mozilla.org/Search_Service:API" target="_top">@mozilla.org/browser/search-service;1</a> @@ -1069,7 +1075,7 @@ </p><p> This setting helps Torbutton to fulfill its <a class="link" href="#setpreservation">Anonymity Set Preservation</a> requirement. -</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Automatically use an alternate search engine when presented with a Google Captcha"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2696865"></a>Automatically use an alternate search engine when presented with a +</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Automatically use an alternate search engine when presented with a Google Captcha"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2706521"></a>Automatically use an alternate search engine when presented with a Google Captcha</h4></div></div></div><p>Options: </p><table border="0" summary="Simple list" class="simplelist"><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.asked_google_captcha</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.dodge_google_captcha</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.google_redir_url</strong></span></td></tr></table><p> </p><p> @@ -1094,7 +1100,7 @@ encoded in the preferences <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.redir_url.[1-5]</strong></span>. -</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Store SSL/CA Certs in separate jars for Tor/Non-Tor (recommended)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2696945"></a>Store SSL/CA Certs in separate jars for Tor/Non-Tor (recommended)</h4></div></div></div><p>Options: +</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Store SSL/CA Certs in separate jars for Tor/Non-Tor (recommended)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2706601"></a>Store SSL/CA Certs in separate jars for Tor/Non-Tor (recommended)</h4></div></div></div><p>Options: </p><table border="0" summary="Simple list" class="simplelist"><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.jar_certs</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.jar_ca_certs</strong></span></td></tr></table><p> </p><p> @@ -1120,38 +1126,31 @@ is currently not exposed via the preferences UI. </p></div></div></div><div class="sect1" title="6. Relevant Firefox Bugs"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a id="FirefoxBugs"></a>6. Relevant Firefox Bugs</h2></div></div></div><p> +Future releases of Torbutton are going to be designed around supporting only +<a class="ulink" href="https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser.html.en" target="_top">Tor +Browser Bundle</a>, which greatly simplifies the number and nature of Firefox +bugs we must fix. This allows us to abandon the complexities of <a class="link" href="#state">State +Separation</a> and <a class="link" href="#isolation">Network Isolation</a> requirements +associated with the Toggle Model. + </p><div class="sect2" title="6.1. Tor Browser Bugs"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="TorBrowserBugs"></a>6.1. Tor Browser Bugs</h3></div></div></div><p> +The list of Firefox patches we must create to improve privacy on the +Tor Browser Bundle are collected in the Tor Bug Tracker under <a class="ulink" href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2871" target="_top">ticket +#2871</a>. These bugs are also applicable to the Toggle Model, and +should be considered higher priority than all Toggle Model specific bugs +below. + </p></div><div class="sect2" title="6.2. Toggle Model Bugs"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="ToggleModelBugs"></a>6.2. Toggle Model Bugs</h3></div></div></div><p> +In addition to the Tor Browser bugs, the Torbutton Toggle Model suffers from +additional bugs specific to the need to isolate state across the toggle. +Toggle model bugs are considered a lower priority than the bugs against the +Tor Browser model. + </p><div class="sect3" title="Bugs impacting security"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="FirefoxSecurity"></a>Bugs impacting security</h4></div></div></div><p> - </p><div class="sect2" title="6.1. Bugs impacting security"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="FirefoxSecurity"></a>6.1. Bugs impacting security</h3></div></div></div><p> - Torbutton has to work around a number of Firefox bugs that impact its security. Most of these are mentioned elsewhere in this document, but they have also been gathered here for reference. In order of decreasing severity, they are: - </p><div class="orderedlist"><ol class="orderedlist" type="1"><li class="listitem"><a class="ulink" href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=429070" target="_top">Bug 429070 - exposing -Components.interfaces to untrusted content leaks information about installed -extensions</a><p> -<a class="ulink" href="http://pseudo-flaw.net/" target="_top">Gregory Fleischer</a> demonstrated at Defcon 17 that these interfaces can -also be used to <a class="ulink" href="http://pseudo-flaw.net/tor/torbutton/fingerprint-firefox.html" target="_top">fingerprint -Firefox down the to the minor version</a>. Note that his test has not been -updated since 3.5.3, hence it reports 3.5.3 for more recent Firefoxes. This -bug interferes with Torbutton's ability to satisfy its <a class="link" href="#setpreservation">Anonymity Set Preservation</a> requirement. - </p></li><li class="listitem"><a class="ulink" href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=418986" target="_top">Bug 418986 - window.screen -provides a large amount of identifiable information</a><p> - -As <a class="link" href="#fingerprinting">mentioned above</a>, a large amount of -information is available from <a class="ulink" href="http://developer.mozilla.org/en/docs/DOM:window.screen" target="_top">window.screen</a>. -The most sensitive data to anonymity is actually that which is not used in -rendering - such as desktop resolution, and window decoration size. -Currently, there is no way to obscure this information without Javascript -hooking. In addition, many of this same desktop and window decoration -resolution information is available via <a class="ulink" href="https://developer.mozilla.org/En/CSS/Media_queries" target="_top">CSS Media -Queries</a>, so perhaps some more lower-level rendering controls or -preferences need to be provided. These issues interfere with Torbutton's -ability to fulfill its <a class="link" href="#setpreservation">Anonymity Set -Preservation</a> requirement. - - </p></li><li class="listitem"><a class="ulink" href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=435159" target="_top">Bug 435159 - + </p><div class="orderedlist"><ol class="orderedlist" type="1"><li class="listitem"><a class="ulink" href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=435159" target="_top">Bug 435159 - nsNSSCertificateDB::DeleteCertificate has race conditions</a><p> In Torbutton 1.2.0rc1, code was added to attempt to isolate SSL certificates @@ -1182,20 +1181,7 @@ TLS channel, so every addon to date (including Perspectives) is actually providing users with notification *after* their authentication tokens have already been compromised. This obviously needs to be fixed. - </p></li><li class="listitem"><a class="ulink" href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=575230" target="_top">Bug 575230 - Provide option to -reduce precision of Date()</a><p> - -Currently it is possible to <a class="ulink" href="http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/02/firm-uses-typing-cadence-to…" target="_top">fingerprint -users based on their typing cadence</a> using the high precision timer -available to javascript. Using this same precision, it is possible to compute -an identifier based upon the clock drift of the client from some nominal -source. The latter is not much of a concern for Tor users, as the variable -delay to load and run a page is measured on the order of seconds, but the high -precision timer can still be used to fingerprint aspects of a browser's -javascript engine and processor, and apparently also a user's typing cadence. -This bug hinders Torbutton's ability to satisfy its <a class="link" href="#setpreservation">Anonymity Set Preservation</a> requirement. - - </p></li><li class="listitem"><a class="ulink" href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=122752" target="_top">Bug 122752 - SOCKS + </p></li><li class="listitem"><a class="ulink" href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=122752" target="_top">Bug 122752 - SOCKS Username/Password Support</a><p> We need <a class="ulink" href="https://developer.mozilla.org/en/nsIProxyInfo" target="_top">Firefox APIs</a> or about:config settings to control the SOCKS Username and @@ -1229,7 +1215,7 @@ impedes Torbutton from fully meeting its <a class="link" href="#setpreservation">Anonymity Set Preservation</a> requirement on Firefox 3. - </p></li></ol></div></div><div class="sect2" title="6.2. Bugs blocking functionality"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="FirefoxWishlist"></a>6.2. Bugs blocking functionality</h3></div></div></div><p> + </p></li></ol></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Bugs blocking functionality"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="FirefoxWishlist"></a>Bugs blocking functionality</h4></div></div></div><p> The following bugs impact Torbutton and similar extensions' functionality. </p><div class="orderedlist"><ol class="orderedlist" type="1"><li class="listitem"><a class="ulink" href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=629820" target="_top">Bug 629820 - nsIContentPolicy::shouldLoad not called for web request in Firefox Mobile</a><p> @@ -1251,7 +1237,7 @@ extensions that would like to do per-tab settings and content filters (such as FoxyProxy) difficult to impossible to implement securely. - </p></li></ol></div></div><div class="sect2" title="6.3. Low Priority Bugs"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="FirefoxMiscBugs"></a>6.3. Low Priority Bugs</h3></div></div></div><p> + </p></li></ol></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Low Priority Bugs"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="FirefoxMiscBugs"></a>Low Priority Bugs</h4></div></div></div><p> The following bugs have an effect upon Torbutton, but are superseded by more practical and more easily fixable variant bugs above; or have stable, simple workarounds. @@ -1302,50 +1288,8 @@ perform this workaround has been subverted at least once already by Kyle Williams. - </p></li><li class="listitem"><a class="ulink" href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=419598" target="_top">Bug 419598 - 'var -Date' is deletable</a><p> + </p></li></ol></div></div></div></div><div class="sect1" title="7. Testing"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a id="TestPlan"></a>7. Testing</h2></div></div></div><p> -Based on Page 62 of the <a class="ulink" href="http://www.ecma-international.org/publications/files/ECMA-ST/Ecma-262.pdf" target="_top">ECMA-262 -Javascript spec</a>, it seems like it should be possible to do something -like the following to prevent the Date object from being unmasked: -</p><pre class="screen"> -with(window) { - var Date = fakeDate; - var otherVariable = 42; -} - -delete window.Date; // Should fail. Instead succeeds, revealing original Date. -delete window.otherVariable; // Fails, leaving window.otherVariable set to 42. -</pre><p> - -From the ECMA-262 spec: - -</p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"> -If the variable statement occurs inside a FunctionDeclaration, the variables -are defined with function-local scope in that function, as described in -s10.1.3. Otherwise, they are defined with global scope (that is, they are -created as members of the global object, as described in 10.1.3) using -property attributes { DontDelete }. Variables are created when the execution -scope is entered. A Block does not define a new execution scope. Only Program -and FunctionDeclaration produce a new scope. Variables are initialized to -undefined when created. A variable with an Initialiser is assigned the value -of its AssignmentExpression when the VariableStatement is executed, not when -the variable is created. -</blockquote></div><p> - -In fact, this is exactly how the with statement with a variable declaration -behaves <span class="emphasis"><em>for all other variables other than ones that shadow system -variables</em></span>. Some variables (such as -<span class="command"><strong>window.screen</strong></span>, and <span class="command"><strong>window.history</strong></span>) can't -even be shadowed in this way, and give an error about lacking a setter. If -such shadowing were possible, it would greatly simplify the Javascript hooking -code, which currently relies on undocumented semantics of -<span class="command"><strong>__proto__</strong></span> to copy the original values in the event of a -delete. This <span class="command"><strong>__proto__</strong></span> hack unfortunately does not work for -the Date object though. - - </p></li></ol></div></div></div><div class="sect1" title="7. Testing"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a id="TestPlan"></a>7. Testing</h2></div></div></div><p> - The purpose of this section is to cover all the known ways that Tor browser security can be subverted from a penetration testing perspective. The hope is that it will be useful both for creating a "Tor Safety Check" @@ -1430,13 +1374,13 @@ with a bit of work. </p></li></ol></div><p> - </p></div><div class="sect2" title="7.2. Multi-state testing"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2698010"></a>7.2. Multi-state testing</h3></div></div></div><p> + </p></div><div class="sect2" title="7.2. Multi-state testing"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2707624"></a>7.2. Multi-state testing</h3></div></div></div><p> The tests in this section are geared towards a page that would instruct the user to toggle their Tor state after the fetch and perform some operations: mouseovers, stray clicks, and potentially reloads. - </p><div class="sect3" title="Cookies and Cache Correlation"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2698022"></a>Cookies and Cache Correlation</h4></div></div></div><p> + </p><div class="sect3" title="Cookies and Cache Correlation"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2707636"></a>Cookies and Cache Correlation</h4></div></div></div><p> The most obvious test is to set a cookie, ask the user to toggle tor, and then have them reload the page. The cookie should no longer be set if they are using the default Torbutton settings. In addition, it is possible to leverage @@ -1444,11 +1388,11 @@ identifiers</a>. The default settings of Torbutton should also protect against these from persisting across Tor Toggle. - </p></div><div class="sect3" title="Javascript timers and event handlers"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2698045"></a>Javascript timers and event handlers</h4></div></div></div><p> + </p></div><div class="sect3" title="Javascript timers and event handlers"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2707658"></a>Javascript timers and event handlers</h4></div></div></div><p> Javascript can set timers and register event handlers in the hopes of fetching URLs after the user has toggled Torbutton. - </p></div><div class="sect3" title="CSS Popups and non-script Dynamic Content"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2698058"></a>CSS Popups and non-script Dynamic Content</h4></div></div></div><p> + </p></div><div class="sect3" title="CSS Popups and non-script Dynamic Content"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2707671"></a>CSS Popups and non-script Dynamic Content</h4></div></div></div><p> Even if Javascript is disabled, CSS is still able to <a class="ulink" href="http://www.tjkdesign.com/articles/css%20pop%20ups/" target="_top">create popup-like @@ -1473,7 +1417,7 @@ submitting the test cases back to be run in the standard batch of Torbutton tests. - </p><div class="sect3" title="Some suggested vectors to investigate"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2698112"></a>Some suggested vectors to investigate</h4></div></div></div><p> + </p><div class="sect3" title="Some suggested vectors to investigate"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2707726"></a>Some suggested vectors to investigate</h4></div></div></div><p> </p><div class="itemizedlist"><ul class="itemizedlist" type="disc"><li class="listitem">Strange ways to register Javascript <a class="ulink" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DOM_Events" target="_top">events</a> and <a class="ulink" href="http://www.devshed.com/c/a/JavaScript/Using-Timers-in-JavaScript/" target="_top">timeouts</a> should be verified to actually be ineffective after Tor has been toggled.</li><li class="listitem">Other ways to cause Javascript to be executed after <span class="command"><strong>javascript.enabled</strong></span> has been toggled off.</li><li class="listitem">Odd ways to attempt to load plugins. Kyle Williams has had

1 0

[torbutton/master] Update Firefox Bug list.
by mikeperry＠torproject.org 11 Apr '11

11 Apr '11

commit 00eb2516e06d9a47ef27dc0862e65dac9eb175be Author: Mike Perry <mikeperry-git(a)fscked.org> Date: Sun Apr 10 21:52:01 2011 -0700 Update Firefox Bug list. The changes reflect the planned move away from the Toggle Model in favor of Tor Browser Bundle. --- website/design/design.xml | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/website/design/design.xml b/website/design/design.xml index 680a32b..e562146 100644 --- a/website/design/design.xml +++ b/website/design/design.xml @@ -338,12 +338,20 @@ MUST NOT bypass Tor proxy settings for any content.</para></listitem> another Tor state.</para></listitem> <listitem id="isolation"><command>Network Isolation</command> <para>Pages MUST NOT perform any network activity in a Tor state different - from the state they were originally loaded in.</para></listitem> + from the state they were originally loaded in.</para> + <para>Note that this requirement is +being de-emphasized due to the coming shift to supporting only the Tor Browser +Bundles, which do not support a Toggle operation.</para></listitem> <listitem id="undiscoverability"><command>Tor Undiscoverability</command><para>With the advent of bridge support in Tor 0.2.0.x, there are now a class of Tor users whose network fingerprint does not obviously betray the fact that they are using Tor. This should extend to the browser as well - Torbutton MUST NOT -reveal its presence while Tor is disabled.</para></listitem> +reveal its presence while Tor is disabled. +</para> + <para>Note that this requirement is +being de-emphasized due to the coming shift to supporting only the Tor Browser +Bundles, which do not support a Toggle operation.</para> +</listitem> <listitem id="disk"><command>Disk Avoidance</command><para>The browser SHOULD NOT write any Tor-related state to disk, or store it in memory beyond the duration of one Tor toggle.</para></listitem> <listitem id="location"><command>Location Neutrality</command><para>The browser SHOULD NOT leak location-specific information, such as @@ -1336,6 +1344,7 @@ url="http://pseudo-flaw.net/tor/torbutton/unmask-components-lookupmethod.html">C We are still looking for a workaround as of Torbutton 1.3.2.  + </para> </sect3> @@ -2162,9 +2171,34 @@ is currently not exposed via the preferences UI. <sect1 id="FirefoxBugs"> <title>Relevant Firefox Bugs</title> <para> - +Future releases of Torbutton are going to be designed around supporting only +<ulink url="https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser.html.en">Tor +Browser Bundle</ulink>, which greatly simplifies the number and nature of Firefox +bugs we must fix. This allows us to abandon the complexities of <link +linkend="state">State +Separation</link> and <link linkend="isolation">Network Isolation</link> requirements +associated with the Toggle Model. </para> - <sect2 id="FirefoxSecurity"> + <sect2 id="TorBrowserBugs"> + <title>Tor Browser Bugs</title> + <para> +The list of Firefox patches we must create to improve privacy on the +Tor Browser Bundle are collected in the Tor Bug Tracker under <ulink +url="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2871">ticket +#2871</ulink>. These bugs are also applicable to the Toggle Model, and +should be considered higher priority than all Toggle Model specific bugs +below. + </para> + </sect2> + <sect2 id="ToggleModelBugs"> + <title>Toggle Model Bugs</title> + <para> +In addition to the Tor Browser bugs, the Torbutton Toggle Model suffers from +additional bugs specific to the need to isolate state across the toggle. +Toggle model bugs are considered a lower priority than the bugs against the +Tor Browser model. + </para> + <sect3 id="FirefoxSecurity"> <title>Bugs impacting security</title> <para> @@ -2175,6 +2209,8 @@ they are: </para> <orderedlist> + <listitem><ulink url="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=418986">Bug 418986 - window.screen provides a large amount of identifiable information</ulink> @@ -2225,6 +2259,7 @@ Preservation</link> requirement. </para> </listitem> +--> <listitem><ulink url="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=435159">Bug 435159 - nsNSSCertificateDB::DeleteCertificate has race conditions</ulink> @@ -2266,6 +2301,8 @@ providing users with notification *after* their authentication tokens have already been compromised. This obviously needs to be fixed. </para> </listitem> + <listitem><ulink url="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=122752">Bug 122752 - SOCKS Username/Password Support</ulink> @@ -2335,9 +2373,9 @@ requirement on Firefox 3. </para> </listitem> </orderedlist> - </sect2> + </sect3>  - <sect2 id="FirefoxWishlist"> + <sect3 id="FirefoxWishlist"> <title>Bugs blocking functionality</title> <para> The following bugs impact Torbutton and similar extensions' functionality. @@ -2472,8 +2510,8 @@ subset of the <link linkend="requirements">requirements</link> is of course fine </orderedlist> - </sect2> - <sect2 id="FirefoxMiscBugs"> + </sect3> + <sect3 id="FirefoxMiscBugs"> <title>Low Priority Bugs</title> <para> The following bugs have an effect upon Torbutton, but are superseded by more @@ -2576,6 +2614,8 @@ Williams. </para> </listitem> + </orderedlist> - </sect2> + </sect3> + </sect2> </sect1> <sect1 id="TestPlan">

1 0

[torbutton/master] Add some info on highres timers to audit doc.
by mikeperry＠torproject.org 11 Apr '11

11 Apr '11

commit de60254182da3842e620229e9d8d7077531bf80b Author: Mike Perry <mikeperry-git(a)fscked.org> Date: Sun Apr 10 21:50:35 2011 -0700 Add some info on highres timers to audit doc. --- website/design/FF40_AUDIT | 6 ++++++ 1 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/website/design/FF40_AUDIT b/website/design/FF40_AUDIT index efa16cc..7830eb3 100644 --- a/website/design/FF40_AUDIT +++ b/website/design/FF40_AUDIT @@ -17,6 +17,12 @@ - Fingerprinting issues: - New screen attributes - https://developer.mozilla.org/en/DOM/window.mozInnerScreenX, Y + - High Res Animation Timers: + - https://developer.mozilla.org/en/DOM/window.mozAnimationStartTime + - https://developer.mozilla.org/en/DOM/Animations_using_MozBeforePaint + - 50-60hz max.. Can we leverage this? + - timeStamps on keystroke events + - https://developer.mozilla.org/en/DOM/event.timeStamp - Bounding rectangles -> window sizes? - Maybe not display sizes, but seems possible to fingerprint rendered content size.. ugh.

1 0

[torbutton/master] Update date of design doc.
by mikeperry＠torproject.org 11 Apr '11

11 Apr '11

commit 42aa646f7f3b33ba730bf086fd8e2a0b93ab2aae Author: Mike Perry <mikeperry-git(a)fscked.org> Date: Sun Apr 10 21:53:11 2011 -0700 Update date of design doc. --- website/design/design.xml | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/website/design/design.xml b/website/design/design.xml index e562146..588d6f4 100644 --- a/website/design/design.xml +++ b/website/design/design.xml @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ <address><email>mikeperry.fscked/org</email></address> </affiliation> </author> - <pubdate>Apr 4 2011</pubdate> + <pubdate>Apr 10 2011</pubdate> </articleinfo> <sect1>

1 0

[torbutton/master] Update compiled html for design doc.
by mikeperry＠torproject.org 11 Apr '11

11 Apr '11

commit 6f4d18c705dd82c8888da00512f022ed1ea8e41e Author: Mike Perry <mikeperry-git(a)fscked.org> Date: Sun Apr 10 21:53:26 2011 -0700 Update compiled html for design doc. --- website/design/index.html.en | 218 ++++++++++++++++-------------------------- 1 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 137 deletions(-) diff --git a/website/design/index.html.en b/website/design/index.html.en index 41c19c5..1afe9e4 100644 --- a/website/design/index.html.en +++ b/website/design/index.html.en @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> -<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8" /><title>Torbutton Design Documentation</title><meta name="generator" content="DocBook XSL Stylesheets V1.75.2" /></head><body><div class="article" title="Torbutton Design Documentation"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a id="design"></a>Torbutton Design Documentation</h2></div><div><div class="author"><h3 class="author"><span class="firstname">Mike</span> <span class="surname">Perry</span></h3><div class="affiliation"><div class="address"><p><code class="email"><<a class="email" href="mailto:mikeperry.fscked/org">mikeperry.fscked/org</a>></code></p></div></div></div></div><div><p class="pubdate">Apr 4 2011</p></div></div><hr /></div><div class="toc"><p><b>Table of Contents</b></p><dl><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#id2657298">1. Introduction</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#adversary">1.1. Adversary Model</a>< /span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#requirements">1.2. Torbutton Requirements</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#layout">1.3. Extension Layout</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#components">2. Components</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#hookedxpcom">2.1. Hooked Components</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2682565">2.2. New Components</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#id2661538">3. Chrome</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2683477">3.1. XUL Windows and Overlays</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2679782">3.2. Major Chrome Observers</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#id2682210">4. Toggle Code Path</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2678571">4.1. Button Click</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2677555">4.2. Proxy Update</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a hre f="#id2671739">4.3. Settings Update</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#preferences">4.4. Firefox preferences touched during Toggle</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#id2684076">5. Description of Options</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2686457">5.1. Proxy Settings</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2685583">5.2. Dynamic Content Settings</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2695607">5.3. History and Forms Settings</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2695921">5.4. Cache Settings</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2696030">5.5. Cookie and Auth Settings</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2696343">5.6. Startup Settings</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2696457">5.7. Shutdown Settings</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2696517">5.8. Header Settings</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#Fir efoxBugs">6. Relevant Firefox Bugs</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#FirefoxSecurity">6.1. Bugs impacting security</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#FirefoxWishlist">6.2. Bugs blocking functionality</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#FirefoxMiscBugs">6.3. Low Priority Bugs</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#TestPlan">7. Testing</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#SingleStateTesting">7.1. Single state testing</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2698010">7.2. Multi-state testing</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#HackTorbutton">7.3. Active testing (aka How to Hack Torbutton)</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></div><div class="sect1" title="1. Introduction"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a id="id2657298"></a>1. Introduction</h2></div></div></div><p> +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8" /><title>Torbutton Design Documentation</title><meta name="generator" content="DocBook XSL Stylesheets V1.75.2" /></head><body><div class="article" title="Torbutton Design Documentation"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a id="design"></a>Torbutton Design Documentation</h2></div><div><div class="author"><h3 class="author"><span class="firstname">Mike</span> <span class="surname">Perry</span></h3><div class="affiliation"><div class="address"><p><code class="email"><<a class="email" href="mailto:mikeperry.fscked/org">mikeperry.fscked/org</a>></code></p></div></div></div></div><div><p class="pubdate">Apr 10 2011</p></div></div><hr /></div><div class="toc"><p><b>Table of Contents</b></p><dl><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#id2666923">1. Introduction</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#adversary">1.1. Adversary Model</a> </span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#requirements">1.2. Torbutton Requirements</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#layout">1.3. Extension Layout</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#components">2. Components</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#hookedxpcom">2.1. Hooked Components</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2690319">2.2. New Components</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#id2681735">3. Chrome</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2702019">3.1. XUL Windows and Overlays</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2694797">3.2. Major Chrome Observers</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#id2696524">4. Toggle Code Path</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2699452">4.1. Button Click</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2697978">4.2. Proxy Update</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a hr ef="#id2697015">4.3. Settings Update</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#preferences">4.4. Firefox preferences touched during Toggle</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#id2702702">5. Description of Options</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2704948">5.1. Proxy Settings</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2686645">5.2. Dynamic Content Settings</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2705261">5.3. History and Forms Settings</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2705577">5.4. Cache Settings</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2705686">5.5. Cookie and Auth Settings</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2705999">5.6. Startup Settings</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2706113">5.7. Shutdown Settings</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2706173">5.8. Header Settings</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#Fi refoxBugs">6. Relevant Firefox Bugs</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#TorBrowserBugs">6.1. Tor Browser Bugs</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#ToggleModelBugs">6.2. Toggle Model Bugs</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#TestPlan">7. Testing</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#SingleStateTesting">7.1. Single state testing</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2707624">7.2. Multi-state testing</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#HackTorbutton">7.3. Active testing (aka How to Hack Torbutton)</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></div><div class="sect1" title="1. Introduction"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a id="id2666923"></a>1. Introduction</h2></div></div></div><p> This document describes the goals, operation, and testing procedures of the Torbutton Firefox extension. It is current as of Torbutton 1.3.2. @@ -195,11 +195,16 @@ From the above Adversary Model, a number of requirements become clear. MUST NOT bypass Tor proxy settings for any content.</p></li><li class="listitem"><a id="state"></a><span class="command"><strong>State Separation</strong></span><p>Browser state (cookies, cache, history, 'DOM storage'), accumulated in one Tor state MUST NOT be accessible via the network in another Tor state.</p></li><li class="listitem"><a id="isolation"></a><span class="command"><strong>Network Isolation</strong></span><p>Pages MUST NOT perform any network activity in a Tor state different - from the state they were originally loaded in.</p></li><li class="listitem"><a id="undiscoverability"></a><span class="command"><strong>Tor Undiscoverability</strong></span><p>With + from the state they were originally loaded in.</p><p>Note that this requirement is +being de-emphasized due to the coming shift to supporting only the Tor Browser +Bundles, which do not support a Toggle operation.</p></li><li class="listitem"><a id="undiscoverability"></a><span class="command"><strong>Tor Undiscoverability</strong></span><p>With the advent of bridge support in Tor 0.2.0.x, there are now a class of Tor users whose network fingerprint does not obviously betray the fact that they are using Tor. This should extend to the browser as well - Torbutton MUST NOT -reveal its presence while Tor is disabled.</p></li><li class="listitem"><a id="disk"></a><span class="command"><strong>Disk Avoidance</strong></span><p>The browser SHOULD NOT write any Tor-related state to disk, or store it +reveal its presence while Tor is disabled. +</p><p>Note that this requirement is +being de-emphasized due to the coming shift to supporting only the Tor Browser +Bundles, which do not support a Toggle operation.</p></li><li class="listitem"><a id="disk"></a><span class="command"><strong>Disk Avoidance</strong></span><p>The browser SHOULD NOT write any Tor-related state to disk, or store it in memory beyond the duration of one Tor toggle.</p></li><li class="listitem"><a id="location"></a><span class="command"><strong>Location Neutrality</strong></span><p>The browser SHOULD NOT leak location-specific information, such as timezone or locale via Tor.</p></li><li class="listitem"><a id="setpreservation"></a><span class="command"><strong>Anonymity Set Preservation</strong></span><p>The browser SHOULD NOT leak any other anonymity @@ -250,7 +255,7 @@ do not obey proxy settings, they can be manipulated to automatically connect back to arbitrary servers outside of Tor with no user intervention. Fixing this issue helps to satisfy Torbutton's <a class="link" href="#proxy">Proxy Obedience</a> Requirement. - </p></div><div class="sect3" title="@mozilla.org/browser/global-history;2 - components/ignore-history.js"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2669566"></a><a class="ulink" href="http://www.oxymoronical.com/experiments/xpcomref/applications/Firefox/3.5/c…" target="_top">@mozilla.org/browser/global-history;2</a> + </p></div><div class="sect3" title="@mozilla.org/browser/global-history;2 - components/ignore-history.js"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2696239"></a><a class="ulink" href="http://www.oxymoronical.com/experiments/xpcomref/applications/Firefox/3.5/c…" target="_top">@mozilla.org/browser/global-history;2</a> - <a class="ulink" href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbutton.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/src/components…" target="_top">components/ignore-history.js</a></h4></div></div></div><p>This component was contributed by <a class="ulink" href="http://www.collinjackson.com/" target="_top">Collin Jackson</a> as a method for defeating CSS and Javascript-based methods of history disclosure. The global-history component is what is used by Firefox to determine if a link was visited or not @@ -278,7 +283,7 @@ firing in the event the browser starts in Tor mode. This component helps satisfy the <a class="link" href="#isolation">Network Isolation</a> and <a class="link" href="#setpreservation">Anonymity Set Preservation</a> requirements. -</p></div></div><div class="sect2" title="2.2. New Components"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2682565"></a>2.2. New Components</h3></div></div></div><p>Torbutton creates four new components that are used throughout the +</p></div></div><div class="sect2" title="2.2. New Components"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2690319"></a>2.2. New Components</h3></div></div></div><p>Torbutton creates four new components that are used throughout the extension. These components do not hook any interfaces, nor are they used anywhere besides Torbutton itself.</p><div class="sect3" title="@torproject.org/cookie-jar-selector;2 - components/cookie-jar-selector.js"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="cookiejar"></a><a class="ulink" href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbutton.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/src/components…" target="_top">@torproject.org/cookie-jar-selector;2 - components/cookie-jar-selector.js</a></h4></div></div></div><p>The cookie jar selector (also based on code from <a class="ulink" href="http://www.collinjackson.com/" target="_top">Collin @@ -290,7 +295,7 @@ state from the XML store. </p><p> This component helps to address the <a class="link" href="#state">State Isolation</a> requirement of Torbutton. -</p></div><div class="sect3" title="@torproject.org/torbutton-logger;1 - components/torbutton-logger.js"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2694914"></a><a class="ulink" href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbutton.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/src/components…" target="_top">@torproject.org/torbutton-logger;1 +</p></div><div class="sect3" title="@torproject.org/torbutton-logger;1 - components/torbutton-logger.js"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2683534"></a><a class="ulink" href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbutton.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/src/components…" target="_top">@torproject.org/torbutton-logger;1 - components/torbutton-logger.js</a></h4></div></div></div><p>The torbutton logger component allows on-the-fly redirection of torbutton logging messages to either Firefox stderr (<span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.logmethod=0</strong></span>), the Javascript error console @@ -371,17 +376,17 @@ reason are not passed to the Firefox content policy itself (see Firefox Bugs </p><p> This helps to fulfill both the <a class="link" href="#setpreservation">Anonymity Set Preservation</a> and the <a class="link" href="#undiscoverability">Tor Undiscoverability</a> requirements of -Torbutton.</p></div></div></div><div class="sect1" title="3. Chrome"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a id="id2661538"></a>3. Chrome</h2></div></div></div><p>The chrome is where all the torbutton graphical elements and windows are -located. </p><div class="sect2" title="3.1. XUL Windows and Overlays"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2683477"></a>3.1. XUL Windows and Overlays</h3></div></div></div><p> +Torbutton.</p></div></div></div><div class="sect1" title="3. Chrome"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a id="id2681735"></a>3. Chrome</h2></div></div></div><p>The chrome is where all the torbutton graphical elements and windows are +located. </p><div class="sect2" title="3.1. XUL Windows and Overlays"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2702019"></a>3.1. XUL Windows and Overlays</h3></div></div></div><p> Each window is described as an <a class="ulink" href="http://developer.mozilla.org/en/docs/XUL_Reference" target="_top">XML file</a>, with zero or more Javascript files attached. The scope of these Javascript files is their containing window. XUL files that add new elements and script to existing Firefox windows are called overlays.</p><div class="sect3" title="Browser Overlay - torbutton.xul"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="browseroverlay"></a>Browser Overlay - <a class="ulink" href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbutton.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/src/chrome/con…" target="_top">torbutton.xul</a></h4></div></div></div><p>The browser overlay, torbutton.xul, defines the toolbar button, the status bar, and events for toggling the button. The overlay code is in <a class="ulink" href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbutton.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/src/chrome/con…" target="_top">chrome/content/torbutton.js</a>. It contains event handlers for preference update, shutdown, upgrade, and -location change events.</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Preferences Window - preferences.xul"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2672297"></a>Preferences Window - <a class="ulink" href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbutton.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/src/chrome/con…" target="_top">preferences.xul</a></h4></div></div></div><p>The preferences window of course lays out the Torbutton preferences, with -handlers located in <a class="ulink" href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbutton.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/src/chrome/con…" target="_top">chrome/content/preferences.js</a>.</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Other Windows"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2689726"></a>Other Windows</h4></div></div></div><p>There are additional windows that describe popups for right clicking on -the status bar, the toolbutton, and the about page.</p></div></div><div class="sect2" title="3.2. Major Chrome Observers"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2679782"></a>3.2. Major Chrome Observers</h3></div></div></div><p> +location change events.</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Preferences Window - preferences.xul"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2704559"></a>Preferences Window - <a class="ulink" href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbutton.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/src/chrome/con…" target="_top">preferences.xul</a></h4></div></div></div><p>The preferences window of course lays out the Torbutton preferences, with +handlers located in <a class="ulink" href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbutton.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/src/chrome/con…" target="_top">chrome/content/preferences.js</a>.</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Other Windows"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2669673"></a>Other Windows</h4></div></div></div><p>There are additional windows that describe popups for right clicking on +the status bar, the toolbutton, and the about page.</p></div></div><div class="sect2" title="3.2. Major Chrome Observers"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2694797"></a>3.2. Major Chrome Observers</h3></div></div></div><p> In addition to the <a class="link" href="#components" title="2. Components">components described above</a>, Torbutton also instantiates several observers in the browser overlay window. These mostly grew due to scoping convenience, and many should @@ -435,7 +440,7 @@ state tags, plugin permissions, and install the Javascript hooks to hook the <a class="ulink" href="https://developer.mozilla.org/en/DOM/window.screen" target="_top">window.screen</a> object to obfuscate browser and desktop resolution information. -</p></li></ol></div></div></div><div class="sect1" title="4. Toggle Code Path"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a id="id2682210"></a>4. Toggle Code Path</h2></div></div></div><p> +</p></li></ol></div></div></div><div class="sect1" title="4. Toggle Code Path"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a id="id2696524"></a>4. Toggle Code Path</h2></div></div></div><p> The act of toggling is connected to <code class="function">torbutton_toggle()</code> via the <a class="ulink" href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbutton.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/src/chrome/con…" target="_top">torbutton.xul</a> @@ -456,7 +461,7 @@ conditions and leakage, especially with <a class="ulink" href="https://bugzilla. 409737</a> unfixed. The content policy does not allow any network activity whatsoever during this three stage transition. - </p><div class="sect2" title="4.1. Button Click"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2678571"></a>4.1. Button Click</h3></div></div></div><p> + </p><div class="sect2" title="4.1. Button Click"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2699452"></a>4.1. Button Click</h3></div></div></div><p> This is the first step in the toggling process. When the user clicks the toggle button or the toolbar, <code class="function">torbutton_toggle()</code> is @@ -469,7 +474,7 @@ observer</a> <span class="command"><strong>torbutton_unique_pref_observer</strong></span> to perform the rest of the toggle. - </p></div><div class="sect2" title="4.2. Proxy Update"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2677555"></a>4.2. Proxy Update</h3></div></div></div><p> + </p></div><div class="sect2" title="4.2. Proxy Update"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2697978"></a>4.2. Proxy Update</h3></div></div></div><p> When Torbutton receives any proxy change notifications via its <span class="command"><strong>torbutton_unique_pref_observer</strong></span>, it calls @@ -484,7 +489,7 @@ value. This is decoupled from the button click functionality via the pref observer so that other addons (such as SwitchProxy) can switch the proxy settings between multiple proxies. - </p></div><div class="sect2" title="4.3. Settings Update"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2671739"></a>4.3. Settings Update</h3></div></div></div><p> + </p></div><div class="sect2" title="4.3. Settings Update"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2697015"></a>4.3. Settings Update</h3></div></div></div><p> The next stage is also handled by <code class="function">torbutton_update_status()</code>. This function sets scores of @@ -611,10 +616,10 @@ enabled. This helps Torbutton fulfill its <a class="link" href="#disk">Disk Avoidance</a> and <a class="link" href="#state">State Separation</a> requirements. - </p></li></ol></div></div></div><div class="sect1" title="5. Description of Options"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a id="id2684076"></a>5. Description of Options</h2></div></div></div><p>This section provides a detailed description of Torbutton's options. Each + </p></li></ol></div></div></div><div class="sect1" title="5. Description of Options"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a id="id2702702"></a>5. Description of Options</h2></div></div></div><p>This section provides a detailed description of Torbutton's options. Each option is presented as the string from the preferences window, a summary, the preferences it touches, and the effect this has on the components, chrome, and -browser properties.</p><div class="sect2" title="5.1. Proxy Settings"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2686457"></a>5.1. Proxy Settings</h3></div></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Test Settings"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2688146"></a>Test Settings</h4></div></div></div><p> +browser properties.</p><div class="sect2" title="5.1. Proxy Settings"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2704948"></a>5.1. Proxy Settings</h3></div></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Test Settings"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2683681"></a>Test Settings</h4></div></div></div><p> This button under the Proxy Settings tab provides a way to verify that the proxy settings are correct, and actually do route through the Tor network. It performs this check by issuing an <a class="ulink" href="http://developer.mozilla.org/en/docs/XMLHttpRequest" target="_top">XMLHTTPRequest</a> @@ -629,7 +634,7 @@ Presenting the results to the user is handled by the <a class="ulink" href="http window</a> callback <code class="function">torbutton_prefs_test_settings()</code> in <a class="ulink" href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbutton.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/src/chrome/con…" target="_top">preferences.js</a>. - </p></div></div><div class="sect2" title="5.2. Dynamic Content Settings"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2685583"></a>5.2. Dynamic Content Settings</h3></div></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Disable plugins on Tor Usage (crucial)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="plugins"></a>Disable plugins on Tor Usage (crucial)</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.no_tor_plugins</strong></span></p><p>Java and plugins <a class="ulink" href="http://java.sun.com/j2se/1.5.0/docs/api/java/net/class-use/NetworkInterface…" target="_top">can query</a> the <a class="ulink" href="http://www.rgagnon.com/javadetails/java-0095.html" target="_top">local IP + </p></div></div><div class="sect2" title="5.2. Dynamic Content Settings"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2686645"></a>5.2. Dynamic Content Settings</h3></div></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Disable plugins on Tor Usage (crucial)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="plugins"></a>Disable plugins on Tor Usage (crucial)</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.no_tor_plugins</strong></span></p><p>Java and plugins <a class="ulink" href="http://java.sun.com/j2se/1.5.0/docs/api/java/net/class-use/NetworkInterface…" target="_top">can query</a> the <a class="ulink" href="http://www.rgagnon.com/javadetails/java-0095.html" target="_top">local IP address</a> and report it back to the remote site. They can also <a class="ulink" href="http://decloak.net" target="_top">bypass proxy settings</a> and directly connect to a remote site without Tor. Every browser plugin we have tested with Firefox has @@ -673,7 +678,7 @@ all this and the plugin managed to find some way to load. Since most plugins completely ignore browser proxy settings, the actions performed by this setting are crucial to satisfying the <a class="link" href="#proxy">Proxy Obedience</a> requirement. - </p></div><div class="sect3" title="Isolate Dynamic Content to Tor State (crucial)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2684833"></a>Isolate Dynamic Content to Tor State (crucial)</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.isolate_content</strong></span></p><p>Enabling this preference is what enables the <a class="ulink" href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbutton.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/src/components…" target="_top">@torproject.org/cssblocker;1</a> content policy + </p></div><div class="sect3" title="Isolate Dynamic Content to Tor State (crucial)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2688604"></a>Isolate Dynamic Content to Tor State (crucial)</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.isolate_content</strong></span></p><p>Enabling this preference is what enables the <a class="ulink" href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbutton.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/src/components…" target="_top">@torproject.org/cssblocker;1</a> content policy mentioned above, and causes it to block content load attempts in pages an opposite Tor state from the current state. Freshly loaded <a class="ulink" href="https://developer.mozilla.org/en/XUL/tabbrowser" target="_top">browser tabs</a> are tagged @@ -725,7 +730,8 @@ We are still looking for a workaround as of Torbutton 1.3.2. -</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Resize windows to multiples of 50px during Tor usage (recommended)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2653668"></a>Resize windows to multiples of 50px during Tor usage (recommended)</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.resize_windows</strong></span></p><p> + +</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Resize windows to multiples of 50px during Tor usage (recommended)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2663307"></a>Resize windows to multiples of 50px during Tor usage (recommended)</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.resize_windows</strong></span></p><p> This option drastically cuts down on the number of distinct anonymity sets that divide the Tor web userbase. Without this setting, the dimensions for a @@ -760,7 +766,7 @@ infer toolbar size/presence by the distance to the nearest 50 pixel roundoff). </p><p> This setting helps to meet the <a class="link" href="#setpreservation">Anonymity Set Preservation</a> requirements. -</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Disable Search Suggestions during Tor (recommended)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2653753"></a>Disable Search Suggestions during Tor (recommended)</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.no_search</strong></span></p><p> +</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Disable Search Suggestions during Tor (recommended)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2663391"></a>Disable Search Suggestions during Tor (recommended)</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.no_search</strong></span></p><p> This setting causes Torbutton to disable <a class="ulink" href="http://kb.mozillazine.org/Browser.search.suggest.enabled" target="_top"><span class="command"><strong>browser.search.suggest.enabled</strong></span></a> during Tor usage. This governs if you get Google search suggestions during Tor @@ -771,7 +777,7 @@ this is recommended to be disabled. While this setting doesn't satisfy any Torbutton requirements, the fact that cookies are transmitted for partially typed queries does not seem desirable for Tor usage. -</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Disable Updates During Tor"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2653792"></a>Disable Updates During Tor</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.no_updates</strong></span></p><p>This setting causes Torbutton to disable the four <a class="ulink" href="http://wiki.mozilla.org/Update:Users/Checking_For_Updates#Preference_Contro…" target="_top">Firefox +</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Disable Updates During Tor"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2663430"></a>Disable Updates During Tor</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.no_updates</strong></span></p><p>This setting causes Torbutton to disable the four <a class="ulink" href="http://wiki.mozilla.org/Update:Users/Checking_For_Updates#Preference_Contro…" target="_top">Firefox update settings</a> during Tor usage: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.update.enabled</strong></span>, <span class="command"><strong>app.update.enabled</strong></span>, @@ -781,7 +787,7 @@ update settings</a> during Tor checking for search plugin updates while Tor is enabled. </p><p> This setting satisfies the <a class="link" href="#updates">Update Safety</a> requirement. -</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Redirect Torbutton Updates Via Tor (recommended)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2653854"></a>Redirect Torbutton Updates Via Tor (recommended)</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.update_torbutton_via_tor</strong></span></p><p>This setting causes Torbutton to install an +</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Redirect Torbutton Updates Via Tor (recommended)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2663492"></a>Redirect Torbutton Updates Via Tor (recommended)</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.update_torbutton_via_tor</strong></span></p><p>This setting causes Torbutton to install an <a class="ulink" href="https://developer.mozilla.org/en/nsIProtocolProxyFilter" target="_top">nsIProtocolProxyFilter</a> in order to redirect all version update checks and Torbutton update downloads @@ -790,7 +796,7 @@ concerns about data retention done by <a class="ulink" href="https://www.addons. help censored users meet the <a class="link" href="#undiscoverability">Tor Undiscoverability</a> requirement. - </p></div><div class="sect3" title="Disable livemarks updates during Tor usage (recommended)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2653898"></a>Disable livemarks updates during Tor usage (recommended)</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: + </p></div><div class="sect3" title="Disable livemarks updates during Tor usage (recommended)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2663536"></a>Disable livemarks updates during Tor usage (recommended)</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: </p><table border="0" summary="Simple list" class="simplelist"><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.disable_livemarks</strong></span></td></tr></table><p> </p><p> @@ -805,7 +811,7 @@ service</a> when Tor is enabled. This helps satisfy the <a class="link" href="#isolation">Network Isolation</a> and <a class="link" href="#setpreservation">Anonymity Set Preservation</a> requirements. -</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Block Tor/Non-Tor access to network from file:// urls (recommended)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2653969"></a>Block Tor/Non-Tor access to network from file:// urls (recommended)</h4></div></div></div><p>Options: +</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Block Tor/Non-Tor access to network from file:// urls (recommended)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2663607"></a>Block Tor/Non-Tor access to network from file:// urls (recommended)</h4></div></div></div><p>Options: </p><table border="0" summary="Simple list" class="simplelist"><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.block_tor_file_net</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.block_nontor_file_net</strong></span></td></tr></table><p> </p><p> @@ -825,7 +831,7 @@ Isolation</a> requirement, by preventing file urls from executing network operations in opposite Tor states. Also, allowing pages to submit arbitrary files to arbitrary sites just generally seems like a bad idea. -</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Close all Tor/Non-Tor tabs and windows on toggle (optional)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2654041"></a>Close all Tor/Non-Tor tabs and windows on toggle (optional)</h4></div></div></div><p>Options: +</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Close all Tor/Non-Tor tabs and windows on toggle (optional)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2663679"></a>Close all Tor/Non-Tor tabs and windows on toggle (optional)</h4></div></div></div><p>Options: </p><table border="0" summary="Simple list" class="simplelist"><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.close_nontor</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.close_tor</strong></span></td></tr></table><p> </p><p> @@ -849,7 +855,7 @@ out longer than necessary. While this setting doesn't satisfy any Torbutton requirements, the fact that cookies are transmitted for partially typed queries does not seem desirable for Tor usage. -</p></div></div><div class="sect2" title="5.3. History and Forms Settings"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2695607"></a>5.3. History and Forms Settings</h3></div></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Isolate Access to History navigation to Tor state (crucial)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2695612"></a>Isolate Access to History navigation to Tor state (crucial)</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.block_js_history</strong></span></p><p> +</p></div></div><div class="sect2" title="5.3. History and Forms Settings"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2705261"></a>5.3. History and Forms Settings</h3></div></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Isolate Access to History navigation to Tor state (crucial)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2705267"></a>Isolate Access to History navigation to Tor state (crucial)</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.block_js_history</strong></span></p><p> This setting determines if Torbutton installs an <a class="ulink" href="http://www.oxymoronical.com/experiments/apidocs/interface/nsISHistoryListen…" target="_top">nsISHistoryListener</a> attached to the <a class="ulink" href="http://www.oxymoronical.com/experiments/apidocs/interface/nsISHistory" target="_top">sessionHistory</a> of of each browser's <a class="ulink" href="https://developer.mozilla.org/en/XUL%3aProperty%3awebNavigation" target="_top">webNavigatator</a>. @@ -877,7 +883,7 @@ This setting helps to fulfill Torbutton's <a class="link" href="#state">State Separation</a> and (until Bug 409737 is fixed) <a class="link" href="#isolation">Network Isolation</a> requirements. - </p></div><div class="sect3" title="History Access Settings"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2695690"></a>History Access Settings</h4></div></div></div><p>Options: + </p></div><div class="sect3" title="History Access Settings"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2705344"></a>History Access Settings</h4></div></div></div><p>Options: </p><table border="0" summary="Simple list" class="simplelist"><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.block_thread</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.block_nthread</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.block_thwrite</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.block_nthwrite</strong></span></td></tr></table><p> </p><p>On Firefox 3.x, these four settings govern the behavior of the <a class="ulink" href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbutton.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/src/components…" target="_top">components/ignore-history.js</a> history blocker component mentioned above. By hooking the browser's view of @@ -898,12 +904,12 @@ above prefs. We then only need to link the write prefs to history store while set. </p><p> This setting helps to satisfy the <a class="link" href="#state">State Separation</a> and <a class="link" href="#disk">Disk Avoidance</a> requirements. -</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Clear History During Tor Toggle (optional)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2695816"></a>Clear History During Tor Toggle (optional)</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.clear_history</strong></span></p><p>This setting governs if Torbutton calls +</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Clear History During Tor Toggle (optional)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2705472"></a>Clear History During Tor Toggle (optional)</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.clear_history</strong></span></p><p>This setting governs if Torbutton calls <a class="ulink" href="https://developer.mozilla.org/en/nsIBrowserHistory#removeAllPages.28.29" target="_top">nsIBrowserHistory.removeAllPages</a> and <a class="ulink" href="http://www.oxymoronical.com/experiments/apidocs/interface/nsISHistory" target="_top">nsISHistory.PurgeHistory</a> for each tab on Tor toggle.</p><p> This setting is an optional way to help satisfy the <a class="link" href="#state">State Separation</a> requirement. -</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Block Password+Form saving during Tor/Non-Tor"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2695859"></a>Block Password+Form saving during Tor/Non-Tor</h4></div></div></div><p>Options: +</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Block Password+Form saving during Tor/Non-Tor"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2705515"></a>Block Password+Form saving during Tor/Non-Tor</h4></div></div></div><p>Options: </p><table border="0" summary="Simple list" class="simplelist"><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.block_tforms</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.block_ntforms</strong></span></td></tr></table><p> </p><p>These settings govern if Torbutton disables <span class="command"><strong>browser.formfill.enable</strong></span> @@ -912,19 +918,19 @@ Since form fields can be read at any time by Javascript, this setting is a lot more important than it seems. </p><p> This setting helps to satisfy the <a class="link" href="#state">State Separation</a> and <a class="link" href="#disk">Disk Avoidance</a> requirements. -</p></div></div><div class="sect2" title="5.4. Cache Settings"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2695921"></a>5.4. Cache Settings</h3></div></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Block Tor disk cache and clear all cache on Tor Toggle"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2695926"></a>Block Tor disk cache and clear all cache on Tor Toggle</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.clear_cache</strong></span> +</p></div></div><div class="sect2" title="5.4. Cache Settings"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2705577"></a>5.4. Cache Settings</h3></div></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Block Tor disk cache and clear all cache on Tor Toggle"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2705582"></a>Block Tor disk cache and clear all cache on Tor Toggle</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.clear_cache</strong></span> </p><p>This option causes Torbutton to call <a class="ulink" href="https://developer.mozilla.org/en/nsICacheService#evictEntries.28.29" target="_top">nsICacheService.evictEntries(0)</a> on Tor toggle to remove all entries from the cache. In addition, this setting causes Torbutton to set <a class="ulink" href="http://kb.mozillazine.org/Browser.cache.disk.enable" target="_top">browser.cache.disk.enable</a> to false. </p><p> This setting helps to satisfy the <a class="link" href="#state">State Separation</a> and <a class="link" href="#disk">Disk Avoidance</a> requirements. -</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Block disk and memory cache during Tor"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2695976"></a>Block disk and memory cache during Tor</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.block_cache</strong></span></p><p>This setting +</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Block disk and memory cache during Tor"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2705632"></a>Block disk and memory cache during Tor</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.block_cache</strong></span></p><p>This setting causes Torbutton to set <a class="ulink" href="http://kb.mozillazine.org/Browser.cache.memory.enable" target="_top">browser.cache.memory.enable</a>, <a class="ulink" href="http://kb.mozillazine.org/Browser.cache.disk.enable" target="_top">browser.cache.disk.enable</a> and <a class="ulink" href="http://kb.mozillazine.org/Network.http.use-cache" target="_top">network.http.use-cache</a> to false during tor usage. </p><p> This setting helps to satisfy the <a class="link" href="#state">State Separation</a> and <a class="link" href="#disk">Disk Avoidance</a> requirements. -</p></div></div><div class="sect2" title="5.5. Cookie and Auth Settings"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2696030"></a>5.5. Cookie and Auth Settings</h3></div></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Clear Cookies on Tor Toggle"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2696035"></a>Clear Cookies on Tor Toggle</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.clear_cookies</strong></span> +</p></div></div><div class="sect2" title="5.5. Cookie and Auth Settings"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2705686"></a>5.5. Cookie and Auth Settings</h3></div></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Clear Cookies on Tor Toggle"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2705691"></a>Clear Cookies on Tor Toggle</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.clear_cookies</strong></span> </p><p> This setting causes Torbutton to call <a class="ulink" href="https://developer.mozilla.org/en/nsICookieManager#removeAll.28.29" target="_top">nsICookieManager.removeAll()</a> on @@ -934,7 +940,7 @@ which prevents them from being written to disk. </p><p> This setting helps to satisfy the <a class="link" href="#state">State Separation</a> and <a class="link" href="#disk">Disk Avoidance</a> requirements. -</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Store Non-Tor cookies in a protected jar"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2696086"></a>Store Non-Tor cookies in a protected jar</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.cookie_jars</strong></span> +</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Store Non-Tor cookies in a protected jar"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2705742"></a>Store Non-Tor cookies in a protected jar</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.cookie_jars</strong></span> </p><p> This setting causes Torbutton to use <a class="ulink" href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbutton.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/src/components…" target="_top">@torproject.org/cookie-jar-selector;2</a> to store @@ -947,15 +953,15 @@ which prevents them from being written to disk. </p><p> This setting helps to satisfy the <a class="link" href="#state">State Separation</a> and <a class="link" href="#disk">Disk Avoidance</a> requirements. -</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Store both Non-Tor and Tor cookies in a protected jar (dangerous)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2696143"></a>Store both Non-Tor and Tor cookies in a protected jar (dangerous)</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.dual_cookie_jars</strong></span> +</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Store both Non-Tor and Tor cookies in a protected jar (dangerous)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2705799"></a>Store both Non-Tor and Tor cookies in a protected jar (dangerous)</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.dual_cookie_jars</strong></span> </p><p> This setting causes Torbutton to use <a class="ulink" href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbutton.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/src/components…" target="_top">@torproject.org/cookie-jar-selector;2</a> to store both Tor and Non-Tor cookies into protected jars. </p><p> This setting helps to satisfy the <a class="link" href="#state">State Separation</a> requirement. -</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Manage My Own Cookies (dangerous)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2696185"></a>Manage My Own Cookies (dangerous)</h4></div></div></div><p>Options: None</p><p>This setting disables all Torbutton cookie handling by setting the above -cookie prefs all to false.</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Disable DOM Storage during Tor usage (crucial)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2696201"></a>Disable DOM Storage during Tor usage (crucial)</h4></div></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Do not write Tor/Non-Tor cookies to disk"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2696203"></a>Do not write Tor/Non-Tor cookies to disk</h4></div></div></div><p>Options: +</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Manage My Own Cookies (dangerous)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2705841"></a>Manage My Own Cookies (dangerous)</h4></div></div></div><p>Options: None</p><p>This setting disables all Torbutton cookie handling by setting the above +cookie prefs all to false.</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Disable DOM Storage during Tor usage (crucial)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2705856"></a>Disable DOM Storage during Tor usage (crucial)</h4></div></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Do not write Tor/Non-Tor cookies to disk"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2705859"></a>Do not write Tor/Non-Tor cookies to disk</h4></div></div></div><p>Options: </p><table border="0" summary="Simple list" class="simplelist"><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.tor_memory_jar</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.nontor_memory_jar</strong></span></td></tr></table><p> </p><p> These settings (contributed by arno) cause Torbutton to set <a class="ulink" href="http://kb.mozillazine.org/Network.cookie.lifetimePolicy" target="_top">network.cookie.lifetimePolicy</a> @@ -975,13 +981,13 @@ usage to prevent <a class="ulink" href="http://developer.mozilla.org/en/docs/DOM:Storage" target="_top">DOM Storage</a> from being used to store persistent information across Tor states.</p><p> This setting helps to satisfy the <a class="link" href="#state">State Separation</a> requirement. -</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Clear HTTP Auth on Tor Toggle (recommended)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2696304"></a>Clear HTTP Auth on Tor Toggle (recommended)</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.clear_http_auth</strong></span> +</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Clear HTTP Auth on Tor Toggle (recommended)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2705960"></a>Clear HTTP Auth on Tor Toggle (recommended)</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.clear_http_auth</strong></span> </p><p> This setting causes Torbutton to call <a class="ulink" href="http://www.oxymoronical.com/experiments/apidocs/interface/nsIHttpAuthManager" target="_top">nsIHttpAuthManager.clearAll()</a> every time Tor is toggled. </p><p> This setting helps to satisfy the <a class="link" href="#state">State Separation</a> requirement. -</p></div></div><div class="sect2" title="5.6. Startup Settings"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2696343"></a>5.6. Startup Settings</h3></div></div></div><div class="sect3" title="On Browser Startup, set Tor state to: Tor, Non-Tor"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2696348"></a>On Browser Startup, set Tor state to: Tor, Non-Tor</h4></div></div></div><p>Options: +</p></div></div><div class="sect2" title="5.6. Startup Settings"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2705999"></a>5.6. Startup Settings</h3></div></div></div><div class="sect3" title="On Browser Startup, set Tor state to: Tor, Non-Tor"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2706004"></a>On Browser Startup, set Tor state to: Tor, Non-Tor</h4></div></div></div><p>Options: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.restore_tor</strong></span> </p><p>This option governs what Tor state tor is loaded in to. <code class="function">torbutton_set_initial_state()</code> covers the case where the @@ -995,7 +1001,7 @@ setting helps to satisfy the <a class="link" href="#state">State Separation</a> requirement in the event of Firefox crashes by ensuring all cookies, settings and saved sessions are reloaded from a fixed Tor state. -</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Prevent session store from saving Non-Tor/Tor-loaded tabs"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2696399"></a>Prevent session store from saving Non-Tor/Tor-loaded tabs</h4></div></div></div><p>Options: +</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Prevent session store from saving Non-Tor/Tor-loaded tabs"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2706055"></a>Prevent session store from saving Non-Tor/Tor-loaded tabs</h4></div></div></div><p>Options: </p><table border="0" summary="Simple list" class="simplelist"><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.nonontor_sessionstore</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.notor_sessionstore</strong></span></td></tr></table><p> </p><p>If these options are enabled, the <a class="link" href="#tbsessionstore" title="@torproject.org/torbutton-ss-blocker;1">tbSessionStore.js</a> component uses the session store listeners to filter out the appropriate tabs before writing the session @@ -1005,7 +1011,7 @@ This setting helps to satisfy the <a class="link" href="#disk">Disk Avoidance</a requirement, and also helps to satisfy the <a class="link" href="#state">State Separation</a> requirement in the event of Firefox crashes. -</p></div></div><div class="sect2" title="5.7. Shutdown Settings"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2696457"></a>5.7. Shutdown Settings</h3></div></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Clear cookies on Tor/Non-Tor shutdown"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2696463"></a>Clear cookies on Tor/Non-Tor shutdown</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.shutdown_method</strong></span> +</p></div></div><div class="sect2" title="5.7. Shutdown Settings"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2706113"></a>5.7. Shutdown Settings</h3></div></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Clear cookies on Tor/Non-Tor shutdown"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2706119"></a>Clear cookies on Tor/Non-Tor shutdown</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.shutdown_method</strong></span> </p><p> This option variable can actually take 3 values: 0, 1, and 2. 0 means no cookie clearing, 1 means clear only during Tor-enabled shutdown, and 2 means clear for both Tor and Non-Tor shutdown. When set to 1 or 2, Torbutton listens @@ -1014,7 +1020,7 @@ for the <a class="ulink" href="http://developer.mozilla.org/en/docs/Observer_Not to clear out all cookies and all cookie jars upon shutdown. </p><p> This setting helps to satisfy the <a class="link" href="#state">State Separation</a> requirement. -</p></div></div><div class="sect2" title="5.8. Header Settings"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2696517"></a>5.8. Header Settings</h3></div></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Set user agent during Tor usage (crucial)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2696523"></a>Set user agent during Tor usage (crucial)</h4></div></div></div><p>Options: +</p></div></div><div class="sect2" title="5.8. Header Settings"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2706173"></a>5.8. Header Settings</h3></div></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Set user agent during Tor usage (crucial)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2706179"></a>Set user agent during Tor usage (crucial)</h4></div></div></div><p>Options: </p><table border="0" summary="Simple list" class="simplelist"><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.set_uagent</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.platform_override</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.oscpu_override</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.buildID_override</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.productsub_override</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.appname_override</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.appversion_override</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.useragent_override</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.useragent_vendor</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.useragent_vendorSub</strong></span></td></tr></table><p> </p><p>On face, user agent switching appears to be straight-forward in Firefox. It provides several options for controlling the browser user agent string: @@ -1038,7 +1044,7 @@ certain resource:// files</a>. These cases are handled by Torbutton's </p><p> This setting helps to satisfy the <a class="link" href="#setpreservation">Anonymity Set Preservation</a> requirement. -</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Spoof US English Browser"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2696697"></a>Spoof US English Browser</h4></div></div></div><p>Options: +</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Spoof US English Browser"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2706353"></a>Spoof US English Browser</h4></div></div></div><p>Options: </p><table border="0" summary="Simple list" class="simplelist"><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.spoof_english</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.spoof_charset</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.spoof_language</strong></span></td></tr></table><p> </p><p> This option causes Torbutton to set <span class="command"><strong>general.useragent.locale</strong></span> @@ -1049,7 +1055,7 @@ This setting helps to satisfy the <a class="link" href="#setpreservation">Anonym well as hooking <span class="command"><strong>navigator.language</strong></span> via its <a class="link" href="#jshooks" title="Hook Dangerous Javascript">javascript hooks</a>. </p><p> This setting helps to satisfy the <a class="link" href="#setpreservation">Anonymity Set Preservation</a> and <a class="link" href="#location">Location Neutrality</a> requirements. -</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Referer Spoofing Options"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2696790"></a>Referer Spoofing Options</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.refererspoof</strong></span> +</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Referer Spoofing Options"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2706446"></a>Referer Spoofing Options</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.refererspoof</strong></span> </p><p> This option variable has three values. If it is 0, "smart" referer spoofing is enabled. If it is 1, the referer behaves as normal. If it is 2, no referer is @@ -1059,7 +1065,7 @@ sent. The default value is 1. The smart referer spoofing is implemented by the </p><p> This setting also does not directly satisfy any Torbutton requirement, but some may desire to mask their referer for general privacy concerns. -</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Strip platform and language off of Google Search Box queries"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2696824"></a>Strip platform and language off of Google Search Box queries</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.fix_google_srch</strong></span> +</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Strip platform and language off of Google Search Box queries"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2706480"></a>Strip platform and language off of Google Search Box queries</h4></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.fix_google_srch</strong></span> </p><p> This option causes Torbutton to use the <a class="ulink" href="https://wiki.mozilla.org/Search_Service:API" target="_top">@mozilla.org/browser/search-service;1</a> @@ -1069,7 +1075,7 @@ platform information. This setting strips off that info while Tor is enabled. </p><p> This setting helps Torbutton to fulfill its <a class="link" href="#setpreservation">Anonymity Set Preservation</a> requirement. -</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Automatically use an alternate search engine when presented with a Google Captcha"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2696865"></a>Automatically use an alternate search engine when presented with a +</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Automatically use an alternate search engine when presented with a Google Captcha"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2706521"></a>Automatically use an alternate search engine when presented with a Google Captcha</h4></div></div></div><p>Options: </p><table border="0" summary="Simple list" class="simplelist"><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.asked_google_captcha</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.dodge_google_captcha</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.google_redir_url</strong></span></td></tr></table><p> </p><p> @@ -1094,7 +1100,7 @@ options are duckduckgo.com, ixquick.com, bing.com, yahoo.com and scroogle.org. T encoded in the preferences <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.redir_url.[1-5]</strong></span>. -</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Store SSL/CA Certs in separate jars for Tor/Non-Tor (recommended)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2696945"></a>Store SSL/CA Certs in separate jars for Tor/Non-Tor (recommended)</h4></div></div></div><p>Options: +</p></div><div class="sect3" title="Store SSL/CA Certs in separate jars for Tor/Non-Tor (recommended)"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2706601"></a>Store SSL/CA Certs in separate jars for Tor/Non-Tor (recommended)</h4></div></div></div><p>Options: </p><table border="0" summary="Simple list" class="simplelist"><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.jar_certs</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.jar_ca_certs</strong></span></td></tr></table><p> </p><p> @@ -1120,38 +1126,31 @@ Separation</a> requirement of Torbutton. Unfortunately, <a class="ulink" href="h is currently not exposed via the preferences UI. </p></div></div></div><div class="sect1" title="6. Relevant Firefox Bugs"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a id="FirefoxBugs"></a>6. Relevant Firefox Bugs</h2></div></div></div><p> - - </p><div class="sect2" title="6.1. Bugs impacting security"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="FirefoxSecurity"></a>6.1. Bugs impacting security</h3></div></div></div><p> +Future releases of Torbutton are going to be designed around supporting only +<a class="ulink" href="https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser.html.en" target="_top">Tor +Browser Bundle</a>, which greatly simplifies the number and nature of Firefox +bugs we must fix. This allows us to abandon the complexities of <a class="link" href="#state">State +Separation</a> and <a class="link" href="#isolation">Network Isolation</a> requirements +associated with the Toggle Model. + </p><div class="sect2" title="6.1. Tor Browser Bugs"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="TorBrowserBugs"></a>6.1. Tor Browser Bugs</h3></div></div></div><p> +The list of Firefox patches we must create to improve privacy on the +Tor Browser Bundle are collected in the Tor Bug Tracker under <a class="ulink" href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2871" target="_top">ticket +#2871</a>. These bugs are also applicable to the Toggle Model, and +should be considered higher priority than all Toggle Model specific bugs +below. + </p></div><div class="sect2" title="6.2. Toggle Model Bugs"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="ToggleModelBugs"></a>6.2. Toggle Model Bugs</h3></div></div></div><p> +In addition to the Tor Browser bugs, the Torbutton Toggle Model suffers from +additional bugs specific to the need to isolate state across the toggle. +Toggle model bugs are considered a lower priority than the bugs against the +Tor Browser model. + </p><div class="sect3" title="Bugs impacting security"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="FirefoxSecurity"></a>Bugs impacting security</h4></div></div></div><p> Torbutton has to work around a number of Firefox bugs that impact its security. Most of these are mentioned elsewhere in this document, but they have also been gathered here for reference. In order of decreasing severity, they are: - </p><div class="orderedlist"><ol class="orderedlist" type="1"><li class="listitem"><a class="ulink" href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=429070" target="_top">Bug 429070 - exposing -Components.interfaces to untrusted content leaks information about installed -extensions</a><p> -<a class="ulink" href="http://pseudo-flaw.net/" target="_top">Gregory Fleischer</a> demonstrated at Defcon 17 that these interfaces can -also be used to <a class="ulink" href="http://pseudo-flaw.net/tor/torbutton/fingerprint-firefox.html" target="_top">fingerprint -Firefox down the to the minor version</a>. Note that his test has not been -updated since 3.5.3, hence it reports 3.5.3 for more recent Firefoxes. This -bug interferes with Torbutton's ability to satisfy its <a class="link" href="#setpreservation">Anonymity Set Preservation</a> requirement. - </p></li><li class="listitem"><a class="ulink" href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=418986" target="_top">Bug 418986 - window.screen -provides a large amount of identifiable information</a><p> - -As <a class="link" href="#fingerprinting">mentioned above</a>, a large amount of -information is available from <a class="ulink" href="http://developer.mozilla.org/en/docs/DOM:window.screen" target="_top">window.screen</a>. -The most sensitive data to anonymity is actually that which is not used in -rendering - such as desktop resolution, and window decoration size. -Currently, there is no way to obscure this information without Javascript -hooking. In addition, many of this same desktop and window decoration -resolution information is available via <a class="ulink" href="https://developer.mozilla.org/En/CSS/Media_queries" target="_top">CSS Media -Queries</a>, so perhaps some more lower-level rendering controls or -preferences need to be provided. These issues interfere with Torbutton's -ability to fulfill its <a class="link" href="#setpreservation">Anonymity Set -Preservation</a> requirement. - - </p></li><li class="listitem"><a class="ulink" href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=435159" target="_top">Bug 435159 - + </p><div class="orderedlist"><ol class="orderedlist" type="1"><li class="listitem"><a class="ulink" href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=435159" target="_top">Bug 435159 - nsNSSCertificateDB::DeleteCertificate has race conditions</a><p> In Torbutton 1.2.0rc1, code was added to attempt to isolate SSL certificates @@ -1182,20 +1181,7 @@ for any Firefox addon to actually block authentication token submission over a TLS channel, so every addon to date (including Perspectives) is actually providing users with notification *after* their authentication tokens have already been compromised. This obviously needs to be fixed. - </p></li><li class="listitem"><a class="ulink" href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=575230" target="_top">Bug 575230 - Provide option to -reduce precision of Date()</a><p> - -Currently it is possible to <a class="ulink" href="http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/02/firm-uses-typing-cadence-to…" target="_top">fingerprint -users based on their typing cadence</a> using the high precision timer -available to javascript. Using this same precision, it is possible to compute -an identifier based upon the clock drift of the client from some nominal -source. The latter is not much of a concern for Tor users, as the variable -delay to load and run a page is measured on the order of seconds, but the high -precision timer can still be used to fingerprint aspects of a browser's -javascript engine and processor, and apparently also a user's typing cadence. -This bug hinders Torbutton's ability to satisfy its <a class="link" href="#setpreservation">Anonymity Set Preservation</a> requirement. - - </p></li><li class="listitem"><a class="ulink" href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=122752" target="_top">Bug 122752 - SOCKS + </p></li><li class="listitem"><a class="ulink" href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=122752" target="_top">Bug 122752 - SOCKS Username/Password Support</a><p> We need <a class="ulink" href="https://developer.mozilla.org/en/nsIProxyInfo" target="_top">Firefox APIs</a> or about:config settings to control the SOCKS Username and @@ -1229,7 +1215,7 @@ to avoid fragmenting the anonymity set of users of foreign locales. This issue impedes Torbutton from fully meeting its <a class="link" href="#setpreservation">Anonymity Set Preservation</a> requirement on Firefox 3. - </p></li></ol></div></div><div class="sect2" title="6.2. Bugs blocking functionality"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="FirefoxWishlist"></a>6.2. Bugs blocking functionality</h3></div></div></div><p> + </p></li></ol></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Bugs blocking functionality"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="FirefoxWishlist"></a>Bugs blocking functionality</h4></div></div></div><p> The following bugs impact Torbutton and similar extensions' functionality. </p><div class="orderedlist"><ol class="orderedlist" type="1"><li class="listitem"><a class="ulink" href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=629820" target="_top">Bug 629820 - nsIContentPolicy::shouldLoad not called for web request in Firefox Mobile</a><p> @@ -1251,7 +1237,7 @@ While this doesn't have much of an effect on Torbutton, it does make writing extensions that would like to do per-tab settings and content filters (such as FoxyProxy) difficult to impossible to implement securely. - </p></li></ol></div></div><div class="sect2" title="6.3. Low Priority Bugs"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="FirefoxMiscBugs"></a>6.3. Low Priority Bugs</h3></div></div></div><p> + </p></li></ol></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Low Priority Bugs"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="FirefoxMiscBugs"></a>Low Priority Bugs</h4></div></div></div><p> The following bugs have an effect upon Torbutton, but are superseded by more practical and more easily fixable variant bugs above; or have stable, simple workarounds. @@ -1302,49 +1288,7 @@ requirement and reveal a user's original IP address. Torbutton's code to perform this workaround has been subverted at least once already by Kyle Williams. - </p></li><li class="listitem"><a class="ulink" href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=419598" target="_top">Bug 419598 - 'var -Date' is deletable</a><p> - -Based on Page 62 of the <a class="ulink" href="http://www.ecma-international.org/publications/files/ECMA-ST/Ecma-262.pdf" target="_top">ECMA-262 -Javascript spec</a>, it seems like it should be possible to do something -like the following to prevent the Date object from being unmasked: -</p><pre class="screen"> -with(window) { - var Date = fakeDate; - var otherVariable = 42; -} - -delete window.Date; // Should fail. Instead succeeds, revealing original Date. -delete window.otherVariable; // Fails, leaving window.otherVariable set to 42. -</pre><p> - -From the ECMA-262 spec: - -</p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"> -If the variable statement occurs inside a FunctionDeclaration, the variables -are defined with function-local scope in that function, as described in -s10.1.3. Otherwise, they are defined with global scope (that is, they are -created as members of the global object, as described in 10.1.3) using -property attributes { DontDelete }. Variables are created when the execution -scope is entered. A Block does not define a new execution scope. Only Program -and FunctionDeclaration produce a new scope. Variables are initialized to -undefined when created. A variable with an Initialiser is assigned the value -of its AssignmentExpression when the VariableStatement is executed, not when -the variable is created. -</blockquote></div><p> - -In fact, this is exactly how the with statement with a variable declaration -behaves <span class="emphasis"><em>for all other variables other than ones that shadow system -variables</em></span>. Some variables (such as -<span class="command"><strong>window.screen</strong></span>, and <span class="command"><strong>window.history</strong></span>) can't -even be shadowed in this way, and give an error about lacking a setter. If -such shadowing were possible, it would greatly simplify the Javascript hooking -code, which currently relies on undocumented semantics of -<span class="command"><strong>__proto__</strong></span> to copy the original values in the event of a -delete. This <span class="command"><strong>__proto__</strong></span> hack unfortunately does not work for -the Date object though. - - </p></li></ol></div></div></div><div class="sect1" title="7. Testing"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a id="TestPlan"></a>7. Testing</h2></div></div></div><p> + </p></li></ol></div></div></div></div><div class="sect1" title="7. Testing"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a id="TestPlan"></a>7. Testing</h2></div></div></div><p> The purpose of this section is to cover all the known ways that Tor browser security can be subverted from a penetration testing perspective. The hope @@ -1430,13 +1374,13 @@ or complete, but it is automated and could be turned into something useful with a bit of work. </p></li></ol></div><p> - </p></div><div class="sect2" title="7.2. Multi-state testing"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2698010"></a>7.2. Multi-state testing</h3></div></div></div><p> + </p></div><div class="sect2" title="7.2. Multi-state testing"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2707624"></a>7.2. Multi-state testing</h3></div></div></div><p> The tests in this section are geared towards a page that would instruct the user to toggle their Tor state after the fetch and perform some operations: mouseovers, stray clicks, and potentially reloads. - </p><div class="sect3" title="Cookies and Cache Correlation"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2698022"></a>Cookies and Cache Correlation</h4></div></div></div><p> + </p><div class="sect3" title="Cookies and Cache Correlation"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2707636"></a>Cookies and Cache Correlation</h4></div></div></div><p> The most obvious test is to set a cookie, ask the user to toggle tor, and then have them reload the page. The cookie should no longer be set if they are using the default Torbutton settings. In addition, it is possible to leverage @@ -1444,11 +1388,11 @@ the cache to <a class="ulink" href="http://crypto.stanford.edu/sameorigin/safeca identifiers</a>. The default settings of Torbutton should also protect against these from persisting across Tor Toggle. - </p></div><div class="sect3" title="Javascript timers and event handlers"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2698045"></a>Javascript timers and event handlers</h4></div></div></div><p> + </p></div><div class="sect3" title="Javascript timers and event handlers"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2707658"></a>Javascript timers and event handlers</h4></div></div></div><p> Javascript can set timers and register event handlers in the hopes of fetching URLs after the user has toggled Torbutton. - </p></div><div class="sect3" title="CSS Popups and non-script Dynamic Content"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2698058"></a>CSS Popups and non-script Dynamic Content</h4></div></div></div><p> + </p></div><div class="sect3" title="CSS Popups and non-script Dynamic Content"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2707671"></a>CSS Popups and non-script Dynamic Content</h4></div></div></div><p> Even if Javascript is disabled, CSS is still able to <a class="ulink" href="http://www.tjkdesign.com/articles/css%20pop%20ups/" target="_top">create popup-like @@ -1473,7 +1417,7 @@ these attacks, playing with them, and reporting what you find (and potentially submitting the test cases back to be run in the standard batch of Torbutton tests. - </p><div class="sect3" title="Some suggested vectors to investigate"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2698112"></a>Some suggested vectors to investigate</h4></div></div></div><p> + </p><div class="sect3" title="Some suggested vectors to investigate"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2707726"></a>Some suggested vectors to investigate</h4></div></div></div><p> </p><div class="itemizedlist"><ul class="itemizedlist" type="disc"><li class="listitem">Strange ways to register Javascript <a class="ulink" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DOM_Events" target="_top">events</a> and <a class="ulink" href="http://www.devshed.com/c/a/JavaScript/Using-Timers-in-JavaScript/" target="_top">timeouts</a> should be verified to actually be ineffective after Tor has been toggled.</li><li class="listitem">Other ways to cause Javascript to be executed after <span class="command"><strong>javascript.enabled</strong></span> has been toggled off.</li><li class="listitem">Odd ways to attempt to load plugins. Kyle Williams has had

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r24579: {website} s/cerficate/certificate/ (website/trunk/docs/en)
by Andrew Lewman 11 Apr '11

11 Apr '11

Author: phobos Date: 2011-04-11 00:51:45 +0000 (Mon, 11 Apr 2011) New Revision: 24579 Modified: website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml Log: s/cerficate/certificate/ Modified: website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml =================================================================== --- website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml 2011-04-11 00:36:08 UTC (rev 24578) +++ website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml 2011-04-11 00:51:45 UTC (rev 24579) @@ -577,12 +577,12 @@ certificate fingerprints for Tor's various websites?</a></h3> <p> <pre> - *.torproject.org SSL cerficate from Digicert: + *.torproject.org SSL certificate from Digicert: The serial number is: 02:DA:41:04:89:A5:FD:A2:B5:DB:DB:F8:ED:15:0D:BE The SHA-1 fingerprint is: a7e70f8a648fe04a9677f13eedf6f91b5f7f2e25 The SHA-256 fingerprint is: 23b854af6b96co224fd173382c520b46fa94f2d4e7238893f63ad2d783e27b4b - blog.torproject.org SSL cerficate from RapidSSL: + blog.torproject.org SSL certificate from RapidSSL: The serial number is: 00:EF:A3 The SHA-1 fingerprint is: 50af43db8438e67f305a3257d8ef198e8c42f13f </pre>

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r24578: {website} a pre will look better. (website/trunk/docs/en)
by Andrew Lewman 11 Apr '11

11 Apr '11

Author: phobos Date: 2011-04-11 00:36:08 +0000 (Mon, 11 Apr 2011) New Revision: 24578 Modified: website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml Log: a pre will look better. Modified: website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml =================================================================== --- website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml 2011-04-11 00:34:07 UTC (rev 24577) +++ website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml 2011-04-11 00:36:08 UTC (rev 24578) @@ -576,7 +576,7 @@ <h3><a class="anchor" href="#SSLcertfingerprint">What are the SSL certificate fingerprints for Tor's various websites?</a></h3> <p> - <code> + <pre> *.torproject.org SSL cerficate from Digicert: The serial number is: 02:DA:41:04:89:A5:FD:A2:B5:DB:DB:F8:ED:15:0D:BE The SHA-1 fingerprint is: a7e70f8a648fe04a9677f13eedf6f91b5f7f2e25 @@ -585,7 +585,7 @@ blog.torproject.org SSL cerficate from RapidSSL: The serial number is: 00:EF:A3 The SHA-1 fingerprint is: 50af43db8438e67f305a3257d8ef198e8c42f13f - </code> + </pre> </p> <hr>

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r24577: {website} rename the ssl cert fingerprint anchors, fix the data. (website/trunk/docs/en)
by Andrew Lewman 11 Apr '11

11 Apr '11

Author: phobos Date: 2011-04-11 00:34:07 +0000 (Mon, 11 Apr 2011) New Revision: 24577 Modified: website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml Log: rename the ssl cert fingerprint anchors, fix the data. Modified: website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml =================================================================== --- website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml 2011-04-11 00:30:45 UTC (rev 24576) +++ website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml 2011-04-11 00:34:07 UTC (rev 24577) @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ funding?</a></li> <li><a href="#Metrics">How many people use Tor? How many relays or exit nodes are there?</a></li> - <li><a href="#sslfingerprint">What are your SSL cerificate + <li><a href="#SSLcertfingerprint">What are your SSL cerificate fingerprints?</a></li> </ul> @@ -572,10 +572,11 @@ href="https://metrics.torproject.org/">Tor Metrics Portal</a>.</p> <hr> - <a id="sslfingerprint"></a> - <h3><a class="anchor" href="#sslfingerprint">What are the SSL + <a id="SSLcertfingerprint"></a> + <h3><a class="anchor" href="#SSLcertfingerprint">What are the SSL certificate fingerprints for Tor's various websites?</a></h3> <p> + <code> *.torproject.org SSL cerficate from Digicert: The serial number is: 02:DA:41:04:89:A5:FD:A2:B5:DB:DB:F8:ED:15:0D:BE The SHA-1 fingerprint is: a7e70f8a648fe04a9677f13eedf6f91b5f7f2e25 @@ -584,6 +585,7 @@ blog.torproject.org SSL cerficate from RapidSSL: The serial number is: 00:EF:A3 The SHA-1 fingerprint is: 50af43db8438e67f305a3257d8ef198e8c42f13f + </code> </p> <hr>

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