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[tor/release-0.2.2] Use observed instead of declared uptime for HSDir
by arma＠torproject.org 14 Mar '11

14 Mar '11

commit f7a3cdc8f27c2306cf06d742af63846c82ebdc56 Author: Sebastian Hahn <sebastian(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Mar 9 11:34:04 2011 +0100 Use observed instead of declared uptime for HSDir It is important to verify the uptime claim of a relay instead of just trusting it, otherwise it becomes too easy to blackhole a specific hidden service. rephist already has data available that we can use here. Bugfix on 0.2.0.10-alpha. --- changes/hsdir_assignment | 7 +++++++ src/or/dirserv.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++++- src/or/rephist.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ src/or/rephist.h | 1 + 4 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/hsdir_assignment b/changes/hsdir_assignment new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ba01990 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/hsdir_assignment @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ + o Security fixes: + - Directory authorities now use data collected from rephist when + choosing whether to assign the HSDir flag to relays, instead of + trusting the uptime value the relay reports in its descriptor. + This helps prevent an attack where relatively few malaicious + nodes can blackhole any given hidden service. Bugfix on + 0.2.0.10-alpha; fixes bug 2709. diff --git a/src/or/dirserv.c b/src/or/dirserv.c index aeeab45..40136a1 100644 --- a/src/or/dirserv.c +++ b/src/or/dirserv.c @@ -43,6 +43,8 @@ extern time_t time_of_process_start; /* from main.c */ +extern long stats_n_seconds_working; /* from main.c */ + /** Do we need to regenerate the v1 directory when someone asks for it? */ static time_t the_directory_is_dirty = 1; /** Do we need to regenerate the v1 runningrouters document when somebody @@ -1775,7 +1777,22 @@ dirserv_thinks_router_is_unreliable(time_t now, static int dirserv_thinks_router_is_hs_dir(routerinfo_t *router, time_t now) { - long uptime = real_uptime(router, now); + + long uptime; + + /* If we haven't been running for at least + * get_options()->MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2 seconds, we can't + * have accurate data telling us a relay has been up for at least + * that long. We also want to allow a bit of slack: Reachability + * tests aren't instant. If we haven't been running long enough, + * trust the relay. */ + + if (stats_n_seconds_working > + get_options()->MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2 * 1.1) + uptime = MIN(rep_hist_get_uptime(router->cache_info.identity_digest, now), + real_uptime(router, now)); + else + uptime = real_uptime(router, now); /* XXX We shouldn't need to check dir_port, but we do because of * bug 1693. In the future, once relays set wants_to_be_hs_dir diff --git a/src/or/rephist.c b/src/or/rephist.c index 53214d6..69001de 100644 --- a/src/or/rephist.c +++ b/src/or/rephist.c @@ -528,6 +528,20 @@ get_weighted_fractional_uptime(or_history_t *hist, time_t when) return ((double) up) / total; } +/** Return how long the router whose identity digest is id has + * been reachable. Return 0 if the router is unknown or currently deemed + * unreachable. */ +long +rep_hist_get_uptime(const char *id, time_t when) +{ + or_history_t *hist = get_or_history(id); + if (!hist) + return 0; + if (!hist->start_of_run) + return 0; + return when - hist->start_of_run; +} + /** Return an estimated MTBF for the router whose identity digest is * id. Return 0 if the router is unknown. */ double diff --git a/src/or/rephist.h b/src/or/rephist.h index 5f6b9f9..b06a39e 100644 --- a/src/or/rephist.h +++ b/src/or/rephist.h @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ int rep_hist_record_mtbf_data(time_t now, int missing_means_down); int rep_hist_load_mtbf_data(time_t now); time_t rep_hist_downrate_old_runs(time_t now); +long rep_hist_get_uptime(const char *id, time_t when); double rep_hist_get_stability(const char *id, time_t when); double rep_hist_get_weighted_fractional_uptime(const char *id, time_t when); long rep_hist_get_weighted_time_known(const char *id, time_t when);

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Merge commit 'sebastian/bug2663' into maint-0.2.2
by arma＠torproject.org 14 Mar '11

14 Mar '11

commit 600ad7bf8d499d04259586bcf91afed7dfb88f99 Merge: 879f171 2f8e96b Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 11 20:37:21 2011 -0500 Merge commit 'sebastian/bug2663' into maint-0.2.2 src/or/dirvote.c | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)

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[tor/release-0.2.2] improve accuracy for when a relay went unreachable
by arma＠torproject.org 14 Mar '11

14 Mar '11

commit 977e396e866052a20de73f4e8121e514d4eff774 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 11 22:12:15 2011 -0500 improve accuracy for when a relay went unreachable --- changes/bug2716 | 5 +++++ src/or/dirserv.c | 13 +++++++++---- src/or/dirserv.h | 8 ++++++++ src/or/main.c | 5 +++-- 4 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug2716 b/changes/bug2716 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4663ed3 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug2716 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Minor features: + - When a relay has failed several reachability tests, be more accurate + at recording when it became unreachable, so we can in turn provide + more accuracy at assigning Stable, Guard, HSDir, etc flags. Bugfix + on 0.2.0.6-alpha. Resolves bug 2716. diff --git a/src/or/dirserv.c b/src/or/dirserv.c index aeeab45..7386927 100644 --- a/src/or/dirserv.c +++ b/src/or/dirserv.c @@ -970,7 +970,11 @@ dirserv_set_router_is_running(routerinfo_t *router, time_t now) if (!answer && running_long_enough_to_decide_unreachable()) { /* not considered reachable. tell rephist. */ - rep_hist_note_router_unreachable(router->cache_info.identity_digest, now); + time_t when = now; + if (router->last_reachable && + router->last_reachable + REACHABILITY_TEST_PERIOD < now) + when = router->last_reachable + REACHABILITY_TEST_PERIOD; + rep_hist_note_router_unreachable(router->cache_info.identity_digest, when); } router->is_running = answer; @@ -3187,7 +3191,8 @@ dirserv_single_reachability_test(time_t now, routerinfo_t *router) * try a few connections per call. * * The load balancing is such that if we get called once every ten - * seconds, we will cycle through all the tests in 1280 seconds (a + * seconds, we will cycle through all the tests in + * 10*REACHABILITY_MASK_PER_TEST seconds (a * bit over 20 minutes). */ void @@ -3214,11 +3219,11 @@ dirserv_test_reachability(time_t now) continue; /* bridge authorities only test reachability on bridges */ // if (router->cache_info.published_on > cutoff) // continue; - if ((((uint8_t)id_digest[0]) % 128) == ctr) { + if ((((uint8_t)id_digest[0]) % REACHABILITY_MODULO_PER_TEST) == ctr) { dirserv_single_reachability_test(now, router); } } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(router); - ctr = (ctr + 1) % 128; /* increment ctr */ + ctr = (ctr + 1) % REACHABILITY_MODULO_PER_TEST; /* increment ctr */ } /** Given a fingerprint fp which is either set if we're looking for a diff --git a/src/or/dirserv.h b/src/or/dirserv.h index 56ad7a6..949482b 100644 --- a/src/or/dirserv.h +++ b/src/or/dirserv.h @@ -12,6 +12,14 @@ #ifndef _TOR_DIRSERV_H #define _TOR_DIRSERV_H +/** What fraction (1 over this number) of the relay ID space do we + * (as a directory authority) launch connections to at each reachability + * test? */ +#define REACHABILITY_MODULO_PER_TEST 128 + +/** How many seconds apart are the reachability tests for a given relay? */ +#define REACHABILITY_TEST_PERIOD (10*REACHABILITY_MODULO_PER_TEST) + /** Maximum length of an exit policy summary. */ #define MAX_EXITPOLICY_SUMMARY_LEN 1000 diff --git a/src/or/main.c b/src/or/main.c index 979a2be..558608e 100644 --- a/src/or/main.c +++ b/src/or/main.c @@ -962,8 +962,9 @@ run_scheduled_events(time_t now) if (accounting_is_enabled(options)) accounting_run_housekeeping(now); - if (now % 10 == 0 && (authdir_mode_tests_reachability(options)) && - !we_are_hibernating()) { + if (now % REACHABILITY_TEST_PERIOD/REACHABILITY_MODULO_PER_TEST == 0 && + (authdir_mode_tests_reachability(options)) && + !we_are_hibernating()) { /* try to determine reachability of the other Tor relays */ dirserv_test_reachability(now); }

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Clarify threat description and avoid negative uptimes.
by arma＠torproject.org 14 Mar '11

14 Mar '11

commit 3a0c6021556abc96f4c610d5e097e3890216595f Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 11 13:03:25 2011 -0500 Clarify threat description and avoid negative uptimes. --- changes/hsdir_assignment | 7 ++++--- src/or/rephist.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/hsdir_assignment b/changes/hsdir_assignment index ba01990..5c04b9b 100644 --- a/changes/hsdir_assignment +++ b/changes/hsdir_assignment @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ - Directory authorities now use data collected from rephist when choosing whether to assign the HSDir flag to relays, instead of trusting the uptime value the relay reports in its descriptor. - This helps prevent an attack where relatively few malaicious - nodes can blackhole any given hidden service. Bugfix on - 0.2.0.10-alpha; fixes bug 2709. + This helps prevent an attack where a small set of nodes with + frequently-changing identity keys can blackhole a hidden service. + (Only authorities need upgrade; others will be fine once they do.) + Bugfix on 0.2.0.10-alpha; fixes bug 2709. diff --git a/src/or/rephist.c b/src/or/rephist.c index 69001de..e4afe62 100644 --- a/src/or/rephist.c +++ b/src/or/rephist.c @@ -537,7 +537,7 @@ rep_hist_get_uptime(const char *id, time_t when) or_history_t *hist = get_or_history(id); if (!hist) return 0; - if (!hist->start_of_run) + if (!hist->start_of_run || when < hist->start_of_run) return 0; return when - hist->start_of_run; }

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[tor/release-0.2.2] we're not reachable if we don't have a routerinfo yet
by arma＠torproject.org 14 Mar '11

14 Mar '11

commit 1a9d19e9728c21ffa37f2b751df8e8e97c1835d3 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Mar 13 15:47:59 2011 -0400 we're not reachable if we don't have a routerinfo yet --- changes/bug1172 | 9 +++++++++ src/or/router.c | 20 +++++--------------- 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug1172 b/changes/bug1172 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3abd743 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug1172 @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ + o Minor bugfixes: + - When we restart our relay, we might get a successful connection + from the outside before we've started our reachability tests, + triggering a warning: "ORPort found reachable, but I have no + routerinfo yet. Failing to inform controller of success." This + bug was harmless unless Tor is running under a controller + like Vidalia, in which case the controller would never get a + REACHABILITY_SUCCEEDED status event. Bugfix on 0.1.2.6-alpha; + fixes bug 1172. diff --git a/src/or/router.c b/src/or/router.c index 75f592d..ba7be3d 100644 --- a/src/or/router.c +++ b/src/or/router.c @@ -793,19 +793,14 @@ consider_testing_reachability(int test_or, int test_dir) void router_orport_found_reachable(void) { - if (!can_reach_or_port) { - routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo(); + routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo(); + if (!can_reach_or_port && me) { log_notice(LD_OR,"Self-testing indicates your ORPort is reachable from " "the outside. Excellent.%s", get_options()->_PublishServerDescriptor != NO_AUTHORITY ? " Publishing server descriptor." : ""); can_reach_or_port = 1; mark_my_descriptor_dirty(); - if (!me) { /* should never happen */ - log_warn(LD_BUG, "ORPort found reachable, but I have no routerinfo " - "yet. Failing to inform controller of success."); - return; - } control_event_server_status(LOG_NOTICE, "REACHABILITY_SUCCEEDED ORADDRESS=%s:%d", me->address, me->or_port); @@ -816,18 +811,13 @@ router_orport_found_reachable(void) void router_dirport_found_reachable(void) { - if (!can_reach_dir_port) { - routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo(); + routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo(); + if (!can_reach_dir_port && me) { log_notice(LD_DIRSERV,"Self-testing indicates your DirPort is reachable " "from the outside. Excellent."); can_reach_dir_port = 1; - if (!me || decide_to_advertise_dirport(get_options(), me->dir_port)) + if (decide_to_advertise_dirport(get_options(), me->dir_port)) mark_my_descriptor_dirty(); - if (!me) { /* should never happen */ - log_warn(LD_BUG, "DirPort found reachable, but I have no routerinfo " - "yet. Failing to inform controller of success."); - return; - } control_event_server_status(LOG_NOTICE, "REACHABILITY_SUCCEEDED DIRADDRESS=%s:%d", me->address, me->dir_port);

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Tweak bug2716 patch a little
by arma＠torproject.org 14 Mar '11

14 Mar '11

commit 176fde505fde38afa56ddce04606118b9080546e Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Sat Mar 12 00:19:52 2011 -0500 Tweak bug2716 patch a little Name the magic value "10" rather than re-deriving it. Comment more. Use the pattern that works for periodic timers, not the pattern that doesn't work. ;) --- src/or/dirserv.c | 12 +++++++++--- src/or/dirserv.h | 6 +++++- src/or/main.c | 4 +++- 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/dirserv.c b/src/or/dirserv.c index 7386927..b68e005 100644 --- a/src/or/dirserv.c +++ b/src/or/dirserv.c @@ -969,11 +969,17 @@ dirserv_set_router_is_running(routerinfo_t *router, time_t now) } if (!answer && running_long_enough_to_decide_unreachable()) { - /* not considered reachable. tell rephist. */ + /* Not considered reachable. tell rephist about that. + + Because we launch a reachability test for each router every + REACHABILITY_TEST_CYCLE_PERIOD seconds, then the router has probably + been down since at least that time after we last successfully reached + it. + */ time_t when = now; if (router->last_reachable && - router->last_reachable + REACHABILITY_TEST_PERIOD < now) - when = router->last_reachable + REACHABILITY_TEST_PERIOD; + router->last_reachable + REACHABILITY_TEST_CYCLE_PERIOD < now) + when = router->last_reachable + REACHABILITY_TEST_CYCLE_PERIOD; rep_hist_note_router_unreachable(router->cache_info.identity_digest, when); } diff --git a/src/or/dirserv.h b/src/or/dirserv.h index 949482b..569abfc 100644 --- a/src/or/dirserv.h +++ b/src/or/dirserv.h @@ -17,8 +17,12 @@ * test? */ #define REACHABILITY_MODULO_PER_TEST 128 +/** How often (in seconds) do we launch reachability tests? */ +#define REACHABILITY_TEST_INTERVAL 10 + /** How many seconds apart are the reachability tests for a given relay? */ -#define REACHABILITY_TEST_PERIOD (10*REACHABILITY_MODULO_PER_TEST) +#define REACHABILITY_TEST_CYCLE_PERIOD \ + (REACHABILITY_TEST_INTERVAL*REACHABILITY_MODULO_PER_TEST) /** Maximum length of an exit policy summary. */ #define MAX_EXITPOLICY_SUMMARY_LEN 1000 diff --git a/src/or/main.c b/src/or/main.c index 558608e..214a4fa 100644 --- a/src/or/main.c +++ b/src/or/main.c @@ -872,6 +872,7 @@ run_scheduled_events(time_t now) static time_t time_to_check_for_expired_networkstatus = 0; static time_t time_to_write_stats_files = 0; static time_t time_to_write_bridge_stats = 0; + static time_t time_to_launch_reachability_tests = 0; static int should_init_bridge_stats = 1; static time_t time_to_retry_dns_init = 0; or_options_t *options = get_options(); @@ -962,9 +963,10 @@ run_scheduled_events(time_t now) if (accounting_is_enabled(options)) accounting_run_housekeeping(now); - if (now % REACHABILITY_TEST_PERIOD/REACHABILITY_MODULO_PER_TEST == 0 && + if (time_to_launch_reachability_tests < now && (authdir_mode_tests_reachability(options)) && !we_are_hibernating()) { + time_to_launch_reachability_tests = now + REACHABILITY_TEST_INTERVAL; /* try to determine reachability of the other Tor relays */ dirserv_test_reachability(now); }

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[tor/release-0.2.2] fix one more typo
by arma＠torproject.org 14 Mar '11

14 Mar '11

commit 61f648ae3764daacb3865c8344f0381fd09a8e45 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Mar 13 15:22:45 2011 -0400 fix one more typo --- src/or/dirserv.c | 3 +-- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/dirserv.c b/src/or/dirserv.c index b68e005..09da66d 100644 --- a/src/or/dirserv.c +++ b/src/or/dirserv.c @@ -3198,8 +3198,7 @@ dirserv_single_reachability_test(time_t now, routerinfo_t *router) * * The load balancing is such that if we get called once every ten * seconds, we will cycle through all the tests in - * 10*REACHABILITY_MASK_PER_TEST seconds (a - * bit over 20 minutes). + * REACHABILITY_TEST_CYCLE_PERIOD seconds (a bit over 20 minutes). */ void dirserv_test_reachability(time_t now)

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Merge branch 'hsdir_assignment' into maint-0.2.2
by arma＠torproject.org 14 Mar '11

14 Mar '11

commit d34a5cdc597824e72453009ed209e5644f158e90 Merge: 600ad7b 3a0c602 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 11 23:30:25 2011 -0500 Merge branch 'hsdir_assignment' into maint-0.2.2 changes/hsdir_assignment | 8 ++++++++ src/or/dirserv.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++++- src/or/rephist.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ src/or/rephist.h | 1 + 4 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] we're not reachable if we don't have a routerinfo yet
by nickm＠torproject.org 14 Mar '11

14 Mar '11

1 0

[tor/maint-0.2.2] Merge remote branch 'origin/maint-0.2.1' into maint-0.2.2
by nickm＠torproject.org 14 Mar '11

14 Mar '11

commit b97d9abd0940037b249a1ee56724dbfed904263b Merge: 0588330 1a9d19e Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Mar 14 17:04:53 2011 -0400 Merge remote branch 'origin/maint-0.2.1' into maint-0.2.2 changes/bug1172 | 9 +++++++++ src/or/router.c | 20 +++++--------------- 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --combined src/or/router.c index 4c5eb7a,ba7be3d..c15b9b2 --- a/src/or/router.c +++ b/src/or/router.c @@@ -7,24 -7,6 +7,24 @@@ #define ROUTER_PRIVATE #include "or.h" +#include "circuitlist.h" +#include "circuituse.h" +#include "config.h" +#include "connection.h" +#include "control.h" +#include "directory.h" +#include "dirserv.h" +#include "dns.h" +#include "geoip.h" +#include "hibernate.h" +#include "main.h" +#include "networkstatus.h" +#include "policies.h" +#include "relay.h" +#include "rephist.h" +#include "router.h" +#include "routerlist.h" +#include "routerparse.h" /** * \file router.c @@@ -49,15 -31,11 +49,15 @@@ static crypto_pk_env_t *onionkey=NULL /** Previous private onionskin decryption key: used to decode CREATE cells * generated by clients that have an older version of our descriptor. */ static crypto_pk_env_t *lastonionkey=NULL; -/** Private "identity key": used to sign directory info and TLS +/** Private server "identity key": used to sign directory info and TLS * certificates. Never changes. */ -static crypto_pk_env_t *identitykey=NULL; -/** Digest of identitykey. */ -static char identitykey_digest[DIGEST_LEN]; +static crypto_pk_env_t *server_identitykey=NULL; +/** Digest of server_identitykey. */ +static char server_identitykey_digest[DIGEST_LEN]; +/** Private client "identity key": used to sign bridges' and clients' + * outbound TLS certificates. Regenerated on startup and on IP address + * change. */ +static crypto_pk_env_t *client_identitykey=NULL; /** Signing key used for v3 directory material; only set for authorities. */ static crypto_pk_env_t *authority_signing_key = NULL; /** Key certificate to authenticate v3 directory material; only set for @@@ -83,7 -61,8 +83,7 @@@ static voi set_onion_key(crypto_pk_env_t *k) { tor_mutex_acquire(key_lock); - if (onionkey) - crypto_free_pk_env(onionkey); + crypto_free_pk_env(onionkey); onionkey = k; onionkey_set_at = time(NULL); tor_mutex_release(key_lock); @@@ -127,78 -106,32 +127,78 @@@ get_onion_key_set_at(void return onionkey_set_at; } -/** Set the current identity key to k. +/** Set the current server identity key to k. */ void -set_identity_key(crypto_pk_env_t *k) +set_server_identity_key(crypto_pk_env_t *k) { - if (identitykey) - crypto_free_pk_env(identitykey); - identitykey = k; - crypto_pk_get_digest(identitykey, identitykey_digest); + crypto_free_pk_env(server_identitykey); + server_identitykey = k; + crypto_pk_get_digest(server_identitykey, server_identitykey_digest); } -/** Returns the current identity key; requires that the identity key has been - * set. +/** Make sure that we have set up our identity keys to match or not match as + * appropriate, and die with an assertion if we have not. */ +static void +assert_identity_keys_ok(void) +{ + tor_assert(client_identitykey); + if (public_server_mode(get_options())) { + /* assert that we have set the client and server keys to be equal */ + tor_assert(server_identitykey); + tor_assert(0==crypto_pk_cmp_keys(client_identitykey, server_identitykey)); + } else { + /* assert that we have set the client and server keys to be unequal */ + if (server_identitykey) + tor_assert(0!=crypto_pk_cmp_keys(client_identitykey, + server_identitykey)); + } +} + +/** Returns the current server identity key; requires that the key has + * been set, and that we are running as a Tor server. */ crypto_pk_env_t * -get_identity_key(void) +get_server_identity_key(void) { - tor_assert(identitykey); - return identitykey; + tor_assert(server_identitykey); + tor_assert(server_mode(get_options())); + assert_identity_keys_ok(); + return server_identitykey; } -/** Return true iff the identity key has been set. */ +/** Return true iff the server identity key has been set. */ int -identity_key_is_set(void) +server_identity_key_is_set(void) { - return identitykey != NULL; + return server_identitykey != NULL; +} + +/** Set the current client identity key to k. + */ +void +set_client_identity_key(crypto_pk_env_t *k) +{ + crypto_free_pk_env(client_identitykey); + client_identitykey = k; +} + +/** Returns the current client identity key for use on outgoing TLS + * connections; requires that the key has been set. + */ +crypto_pk_env_t * +get_tlsclient_identity_key(void) +{ + tor_assert(client_identitykey); + assert_identity_keys_ok(); + return client_identitykey; +} + +/** Return true iff the client identity key has been set. */ +int +client_identity_key_is_set(void) +{ + return client_identitykey != NULL; } /** Return the key certificate for this v3 (voting) authority, or NULL @@@ -268,7 -201,8 +268,7 @@@ rotate_onion_key(void } log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Rotating onion key"); tor_mutex_acquire(key_lock); - if (lastonionkey) - crypto_free_pk_env(lastonionkey); + crypto_free_pk_env(lastonionkey); lastonionkey = onionkey; onionkey = prkey; now = time(NULL); @@@ -397,9 -331,10 +397,9 @@@ load_authority_keyset(int legacy, crypt goto done; } - if (*key_out) - crypto_free_pk_env(*key_out); - if (*cert_out) - authority_cert_free(*cert_out); + crypto_free_pk_env(*key_out); + authority_cert_free(*cert_out); + *key_out = signing_key; *cert_out = parsed; r = 0; @@@ -409,8 -344,10 +409,8 @@@ done: tor_free(fname); tor_free(cert); - if (signing_key) - crypto_free_pk_env(signing_key); - if (parsed) - authority_cert_free(parsed); + crypto_free_pk_env(signing_key); + authority_cert_free(parsed); return r; } @@@ -505,9 -442,7 +505,9 @@@ init_keys(void key_lock = tor_mutex_new(); /* There are a couple of paths that put us here before */ - if (crypto_global_init(get_options()->HardwareAccel)) { + if (crypto_global_init(get_options()->HardwareAccel, + get_options()->AccelName, + get_options()->AccelDir)) { log_err(LD_BUG, "Unable to initialize OpenSSL. Exiting."); return -1; } @@@ -521,12 -456,9 +521,12 @@@ crypto_free_pk_env(prkey); return -1; } - set_identity_key(prkey); - /* Create a TLS context; default the client nickname to "client". */ - if (tor_tls_context_new(get_identity_key(), MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME) < 0) { + set_client_identity_key(prkey); + /* Create a TLS context. */ + if (tor_tls_context_init(0, + get_tlsclient_identity_key(), + NULL, + MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME) < 0) { log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error creating TLS context for Tor client."); return -1; } @@@ -561,28 -493,13 +561,28 @@@ } } - /* 1. Read identity key. Make it if none is found. */ + /* 1b. Read identity key. Make it if none is found. */ keydir = get_datadir_fname2("keys", "secret_id_key"); log_info(LD_GENERAL,"Reading/making identity key \"%s\"...",keydir); prkey = init_key_from_file(keydir, 1, LOG_ERR); tor_free(keydir); if (!prkey) return -1; - set_identity_key(prkey); + set_server_identity_key(prkey); + + /* 1c. If we are configured as a bridge, generate a client key; + * otherwise, set the server identity key as our client identity + * key. */ + if (public_server_mode(options)) { + set_client_identity_key(crypto_pk_dup_key(prkey)); /* set above */ + } else { + if (!(prkey = crypto_new_pk_env())) + return -1; + if (crypto_pk_generate_key(prkey)) { + crypto_free_pk_env(prkey); + return -1; + } + set_client_identity_key(prkey); + } /* 2. Read onion key. Make it if none is found. */ keydir = get_datadir_fname2("keys", "secret_onion_key"); @@@ -619,22 -536,18 +619,22 @@@ tor_free(keydir); /* 3. Initialize link key and TLS context. */ - if (tor_tls_context_new(get_identity_key(), MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME) < 0) { + if (tor_tls_context_init(public_server_mode(options), + get_tlsclient_identity_key(), + get_server_identity_key(), + MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME) < 0) { log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error initializing TLS context"); return -1; } /* 4. Build our router descriptor. */ /* Must be called after keys are initialized. */ mydesc = router_get_my_descriptor(); - if (authdir_mode(options)) { + if (authdir_mode_handles_descs(options, ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL)) { const char *m = NULL; routerinfo_t *ri; /* We need to add our own fingerprint so it gets recognized. */ - if (dirserv_add_own_fingerprint(options->Nickname, get_identity_key())) { + if (dirserv_add_own_fingerprint(options->Nickname, + get_server_identity_key())) { log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error adding own fingerprint to approved set"); return -1; } @@@ -655,8 -568,7 +655,8 @@@ /* 5. Dump fingerprint to 'fingerprint' */ keydir = get_datadir_fname("fingerprint"); log_info(LD_GENERAL,"Dumping fingerprint to \"%s\"...",keydir); - if (crypto_pk_get_fingerprint(get_identity_key(), fingerprint, 0)<0) { + if (crypto_pk_get_fingerprint(get_server_identity_key(), + fingerprint, 0) < 0) { log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error computing fingerprint"); tor_free(keydir); return -1; @@@ -694,7 -606,7 +694,7 @@@ return -1; } /* 6b. [authdirserver only] add own key to approved directories. */ - crypto_pk_get_digest(get_identity_key(), digest); + crypto_pk_get_digest(get_server_identity_key(), digest); type = ((options->V1AuthoritativeDir ? V1_AUTHORITY : NO_AUTHORITY) | (options->V2AuthoritativeDir ? V2_AUTHORITY : NO_AUTHORITY) | (options->V3AuthoritativeDir ? V3_AUTHORITY : NO_AUTHORITY) | @@@ -881,19 -793,14 +881,14 @@@ consider_testing_reachability(int test_ void router_orport_found_reachable(void) { - if (!can_reach_or_port) { - routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo(); + routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo(); + if (!can_reach_or_port && me) { log_notice(LD_OR,"Self-testing indicates your ORPort is reachable from " "the outside. Excellent.%s", get_options()->_PublishServerDescriptor != NO_AUTHORITY ? " Publishing server descriptor." : ""); can_reach_or_port = 1; mark_my_descriptor_dirty(); - if (!me) { /* should never happen */ - log_warn(LD_BUG, "ORPort found reachable, but I have no routerinfo " - "yet. Failing to inform controller of success."); - return; - } control_event_server_status(LOG_NOTICE, "REACHABILITY_SUCCEEDED ORADDRESS=%s:%d", me->address, me->or_port); @@@ -904,18 -811,13 +899,13 @@@ void router_dirport_found_reachable(void) { - if (!can_reach_dir_port) { - routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo(); + routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo(); + if (!can_reach_dir_port && me) { log_notice(LD_DIRSERV,"Self-testing indicates your DirPort is reachable " "from the outside. Excellent."); can_reach_dir_port = 1; - if (!me || decide_to_advertise_dirport(get_options(), me->dir_port)) + if (decide_to_advertise_dirport(get_options(), me->dir_port)) mark_my_descriptor_dirty(); - if (!me) { /* should never happen */ - log_warn(LD_BUG, "DirPort found reachable, but I have no routerinfo " - "yet. Failing to inform controller of success."); - return; - } control_event_server_status(LOG_NOTICE, "REACHABILITY_SUCCEEDED DIRADDRESS=%s:%d", me->address, me->dir_port); @@@ -1050,28 -952,6 +1040,28 @@@ server_mode(or_options_t *options return (options->ORPort != 0 || options->ORListenAddress); } +/** Return true iff we are trying to be a non-bridge server. + */ +int +public_server_mode(or_options_t *options) +{ + if (!server_mode(options)) return 0; + return (!options->BridgeRelay); +} + +/** Return true iff the combination of options in options and parameters + * in the consensus mean that we don't want to allow exits from circuits + * we got from addresses not known to be servers. */ +int +should_refuse_unknown_exits(or_options_t *options) +{ + if (options->RefuseUnknownExits_ != -1) { + return options->RefuseUnknownExits_; + } else { + return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "refuseunknownexits", 1, 0, 1); + } +} + /** Remember if we've advertised ourselves to the dirservers. */ static int server_is_advertised=0; @@@ -1099,7 -979,7 +1089,7 @@@ proxy_mode(or_options_t *options { return (options->SocksPort != 0 || options->SocksListenAddress || options->TransPort != 0 || options->TransListenAddress || - options->NatdPort != 0 || options->NatdListenAddress || + options->NATDPort != 0 || options->NATDListenAddress || options->DNSPort != 0 || options->DNSListenAddress); } @@@ -1234,24 -1114,12 +1224,24 @@@ router_compare_to_my_exit_policy(edge_c desc_routerinfo->exit_policy) != ADDR_POLICY_ACCEPTED; } +/** Return true iff my exit policy is reject *:*. Return -1 if we don't + * have a descriptor */ +int +router_my_exit_policy_is_reject_star(void) +{ + if (!router_get_my_routerinfo()) /* make sure desc_routerinfo exists */ + return -1; + + return desc_routerinfo->policy_is_reject_star; +} + /** Return true iff I'm a server and digest is equal to - * my identity digest. */ + * my server identity key digest. */ int router_digest_is_me(const char *digest) { - return identitykey && !memcmp(identitykey_digest, digest, DIGEST_LEN); + return (server_identitykey && + !memcmp(server_identitykey_digest, digest, DIGEST_LEN)); } /** Return true iff I'm a server and digest is equal to @@@ -1341,8 -1209,6 +1331,8 @@@ static int router_guess_address_from_di int router_pick_published_address(or_options_t *options, uint32_t *addr) { + char buf[INET_NTOA_BUF_LEN]; + struct in_addr a; if (resolve_my_address(LOG_INFO, options, addr, NULL) < 0) { log_info(LD_CONFIG, "Could not determine our address locally. " "Checking if directory headers provide any hints."); @@@ -1352,9 -1218,6 +1342,9 @@@ return -1; } } + a.s_addr = htonl(*addr); + tor_inet_ntoa(&a, buf, sizeof(buf)); + log_info(LD_CONFIG,"Success: chose address '%s'.", buf); return 0; } @@@ -1377,7 -1240,7 +1367,7 @@@ router_rebuild_descriptor(int force if (router_pick_published_address(options, &addr) < 0) { /* Stop trying to rebuild our descriptor every second. We'll - * learn that it's time to try again when server_has_changed_ip() + * learn that it's time to try again when ip_address_changed() * marks it dirty. */ desc_clean_since = time(NULL); return -1; @@@ -1393,7 -1256,7 +1383,7 @@@ ri->cache_info.published_on = time(NULL); ri->onion_pkey = crypto_pk_dup_key(get_onion_key()); /* must invoke from * main thread */ - ri->identity_pkey = crypto_pk_dup_key(get_identity_key()); + ri->identity_pkey = crypto_pk_dup_key(get_server_identity_key()); if (crypto_pk_get_digest(ri->identity_pkey, ri->cache_info.identity_digest)<0) { routerinfo_free(ri); @@@ -1410,16 -1273,9 +1400,16 @@@ ri->bandwidthcapacity = hibernating ? 0 : rep_hist_bandwidth_assess(); - policies_parse_exit_policy(options->ExitPolicy, &ri->exit_policy, - options->ExitPolicyRejectPrivate, - ri->address); + if (dns_seems_to_be_broken() || has_dns_init_failed()) { + /* DNS is screwed up; don't claim to be an exit. */ + policies_exit_policy_append_reject_star(&ri->exit_policy); + } else { + policies_parse_exit_policy(options->ExitPolicy, &ri->exit_policy, + options->ExitPolicyRejectPrivate, + ri->address, !options->BridgeRelay); + } + ri->policy_is_reject_star = + policy_is_reject_star(ri->exit_policy); if (desc_routerinfo) { /* inherit values */ ri->is_valid = desc_routerinfo->is_valid; @@@ -1490,30 -1346,26 +1480,30 @@@ ei->cache_info.published_on = ri->cache_info.published_on; memcpy(ei->cache_info.identity_digest, ri->cache_info.identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN); - ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body = tor_malloc(8192); - if (extrainfo_dump_to_string(ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body, 8192, - ei, get_identity_key()) < 0) { + if (extrainfo_dump_to_string(&ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body, + ei, get_server_identity_key()) < 0) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't generate extra-info descriptor."); - routerinfo_free(ri); extrainfo_free(ei); - return -1; + ei = NULL; + } else { + ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len = + strlen(ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body); + router_get_extrainfo_hash(ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body, + ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest); } - ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len = - strlen(ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body); - router_get_extrainfo_hash(ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body, - ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest); /* Now finish the router descriptor. */ - memcpy(ri->cache_info.extra_info_digest, - ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest, - DIGEST_LEN); + if (ei) { + memcpy(ri->cache_info.extra_info_digest, + ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest, + DIGEST_LEN); + } else { + /* ri was allocated with tor_malloc_zero, so there is no need to + * zero ri->cache_info.extra_info_digest here. */ + } ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body = tor_malloc(8192); if (router_dump_router_to_string(ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body, 8192, - ri, get_identity_key())<0) { + ri, get_server_identity_key()) < 0) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't generate router descriptor."); routerinfo_free(ri); extrainfo_free(ei); @@@ -1528,7 -1380,7 +1518,7 @@@ /* Let bridges serve their own descriptors unencrypted, so they can * pass reachability testing. (If they want to be harder to notice, * they can always leave the DirPort off). */ - if (!options->BridgeRelay) + if (ei && !options->BridgeRelay) ei->cache_info.send_unencrypted = 1; router_get_router_hash(ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body, @@@ -1537,13 -1389,13 +1527,13 @@@ routerinfo_set_country(ri); - tor_assert(! routerinfo_incompatible_with_extrainfo(ri, ei, NULL, NULL)); + if (ei) { + tor_assert(! routerinfo_incompatible_with_extrainfo(ri, ei, NULL, NULL)); + } - if (desc_routerinfo) - routerinfo_free(desc_routerinfo); + routerinfo_free(desc_routerinfo); desc_routerinfo = ri; - if (desc_extrainfo) - extrainfo_free(desc_extrainfo); + extrainfo_free(desc_extrainfo); desc_extrainfo = ei; desc_clean_since = time(NULL); @@@ -1724,6 -1576,8 +1714,6 @@@ router_guess_address_from_dir_headers(u return -1; } -extern const char tor_svn_revision[]; /* from tor_main.c */ - /** Set platform (max length len) to a NUL-terminated short * string describing the version of Tor and the operating system we're * currently running on. @@@ -1754,7 -1608,6 +1744,7 @@@ router_dump_router_to_string(char *s, s char digest[DIGEST_LEN]; char published[ISO_TIME_LEN+1]; char fingerprint[FINGERPRINT_LEN+1]; + int has_extra_info_digest; char extra_info_digest[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1]; size_t onion_pkeylen, identity_pkeylen; size_t written; @@@ -1783,7 -1636,7 +1773,7 @@@ return -1; } - /* PEM-encode the identity key key */ + /* PEM-encode the identity key */ if (crypto_pk_write_public_key_to_string(router->identity_pkey, &identity_pkey,&identity_pkeylen)<0) { log_warn(LD_BUG,"write identity_pkey to string failed!"); @@@ -1805,13 -1658,8 +1795,13 @@@ family_line = tor_strdup(""); } - base16_encode(extra_info_digest, sizeof(extra_info_digest), - router->cache_info.extra_info_digest, DIGEST_LEN); + has_extra_info_digest = + ! tor_digest_is_zero(router->cache_info.extra_info_digest); + + if (has_extra_info_digest) { + base16_encode(extra_info_digest, sizeof(extra_info_digest), + router->cache_info.extra_info_digest, DIGEST_LEN); + } /* Generate the easy portion of the router descriptor. */ result = tor_snprintf(s, maxlen, @@@ -1822,7 -1670,7 +1812,7 @@@ "opt fingerprint %s\n" "uptime %ld\n" "bandwidth %d %d %d\n" - "opt extra-info-digest %s\n%s" + "%s%s%s%s" "onion-key\n%s" "signing-key\n%s" "%s%s%s%s", @@@ -1837,9 -1685,7 +1827,9 @@@ (int) router->bandwidthrate, (int) router->bandwidthburst, (int) router->bandwidthcapacity, - extra_info_digest, + has_extra_info_digest ? "opt extra-info-digest " : "", + has_extra_info_digest ? extra_info_digest : "", + has_extra_info_digest ? "\n" : "", options->DownloadExtraInfo ? "opt caches-extra-info\n" : "", onion_pkey, identity_pkey, family_line, @@@ -1871,7 -1717,9 +1861,7 @@@ } /* Write the exit policy to the end of 's'. */ - if (dns_seems_to_be_broken() || has_dns_init_failed() || - !router->exit_policy || !smartlist_len(router->exit_policy)) { - /* DNS is screwed up; don't claim to be an exit. */ + if (!router->exit_policy || !smartlist_len(router->exit_policy)) { strlcat(s+written, "reject *:*\n", maxlen-written); written += strlen("reject *:*\n"); tmpe = NULL; @@@ -1894,8 -1742,7 +1884,8 @@@ } } - if (written+256 > maxlen) { /* Not enough room for signature. */ + if (written + DIROBJ_MAX_SIG_LEN > maxlen) { + /* Not enough room for signature. */ log_warn(LD_BUG,"not enough room left in descriptor for signature!"); return -1; } @@@ -1910,7 -1757,7 +1900,7 @@@ note_crypto_pk_op(SIGN_RTR); if (router_append_dirobj_signature(s+written,maxlen-written, - digest,ident_key)<0) { + digest,DIGEST_LEN,ident_key)<0) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't sign router descriptor"); return -1; } @@@ -1945,62 -1792,11 +1935,62 @@@ return (int)written+1; } -/** Write the contents of extrainfo to the maxlen-byte string - * s, signing them with ident_key. Return 0 on success, - * negative on failure. */ +/** Load the contents of filename, find the last line starting with + * end_line, ensure that its timestamp is not more than 25 hours in + * the past or more than 1 hour in the future with respect to now, + * and write the file contents starting with that line to *out. + * Return 1 for success, 0 if the file does not exist, or -1 if the file + * does not contain a line matching these criteria or other failure. */ +static int +load_stats_file(const char *filename, const char *end_line, time_t now, + char **out) +{ + int r = -1; + char *fname = get_datadir_fname(filename); + char *contents, *start = NULL, *tmp, timestr[ISO_TIME_LEN+1]; + time_t written; + switch (file_status(fname)) { + case FN_FILE: + /* X022 Find an alternative to reading the whole file to memory. */ + if ((contents = read_file_to_str(fname, 0, NULL))) { + tmp = strstr(contents, end_line); + /* Find last block starting with end_line */ + while (tmp) { + start = tmp; + tmp = strstr(tmp + 1, end_line); + } + if (!start) + goto notfound; + if (strlen(start) < strlen(end_line) + 1 + sizeof(timestr)) + goto notfound; + strlcpy(timestr, start + 1 + strlen(end_line), sizeof(timestr)); + if (parse_iso_time(timestr, &written) < 0) + goto notfound; + if (written < now - (25*60*60) || written > now + (1*60*60)) + goto notfound; + *out = tor_strdup(start); + r = 1; + } + notfound: + tor_free(contents); + break; + case FN_NOENT: + r = 0; + break; + case FN_ERROR: + case FN_DIR: + default: + break; + } + tor_free(fname); + return r; +} + +/** Write the contents of extrainfo and aggregated statistics to + * *s_out, signing them with ident_key. Return 0 on + * success, negative on failure. */ int -extrainfo_dump_to_string(char *s, size_t maxlen, extrainfo_t *extrainfo, +extrainfo_dump_to_string(char **s_out, extrainfo_t *extrainfo, crypto_pk_env_t *ident_key) { or_options_t *options = get_options(); @@@ -2009,128 -1805,87 +1999,128 @@@ char digest[DIGEST_LEN]; char *bandwidth_usage; int result; - size_t len; + static int write_stats_to_extrainfo = 1; + char sig[DIROBJ_MAX_SIG_LEN+1]; + char *s, *pre, *contents, *cp, *s_dup = NULL; + time_t now = time(NULL); + smartlist_t *chunks = smartlist_create(); + extrainfo_t *ei_tmp = NULL; base16_encode(identity, sizeof(identity), extrainfo->cache_info.identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN); format_iso_time(published, extrainfo->cache_info.published_on); - bandwidth_usage = rep_hist_get_bandwidth_lines(1); + bandwidth_usage = rep_hist_get_bandwidth_lines(); - result = tor_snprintf(s, maxlen, - "extra-info %s %s\n" - "published %s\n%s", - extrainfo->nickname, identity, - published, bandwidth_usage); + tor_asprintf(&pre, "extra-info %s %s\npublished %s\n%s", + extrainfo->nickname, identity, + published, bandwidth_usage); tor_free(bandwidth_usage); - if (result<0) - return -1; + smartlist_add(chunks, pre); + + if (options->ExtraInfoStatistics && write_stats_to_extrainfo) { + log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Adding stats to extra-info descriptor."); + if (options->DirReqStatistics && + load_stats_file("stats"PATH_SEPARATOR"dirreq-stats", + "dirreq-stats-end", now, &contents) > 0) { + smartlist_add(chunks, contents); + } + if (options->EntryStatistics && + load_stats_file("stats"PATH_SEPARATOR"entry-stats", + "entry-stats-end", now, &contents) > 0) { + smartlist_add(chunks, contents); + } + if (options->CellStatistics && + load_stats_file("stats"PATH_SEPARATOR"buffer-stats", + "cell-stats-end", now, &contents) > 0) { + smartlist_add(chunks, contents); + } + if (options->ExitPortStatistics && + load_stats_file("stats"PATH_SEPARATOR"exit-stats", + "exit-stats-end", now, &contents) > 0) { + smartlist_add(chunks, contents); + } + } - if (should_record_bridge_info(options)) { - char *geoip_summary = extrainfo_get_client_geoip_summary(time(NULL)); - if (geoip_summary) { - char geoip_start[ISO_TIME_LEN+1]; - format_iso_time(geoip_start, geoip_get_history_start()); - result = tor_snprintf(s+strlen(s), maxlen-strlen(s), - "geoip-start-time %s\n" - "geoip-client-origins %s\n", - geoip_start, geoip_summary); - control_event_clients_seen(geoip_start, geoip_summary); - tor_free(geoip_summary); - if (result<0) - return -1; + if (should_record_bridge_info(options) && write_stats_to_extrainfo) { + const char *bridge_stats = geoip_get_bridge_stats_extrainfo(now); + if (bridge_stats) { + smartlist_add(chunks, tor_strdup(bridge_stats)); } } - len = strlen(s); - strlcat(s+len, "router-signature\n", maxlen-len); - len += strlen(s+len); - if (router_get_extrainfo_hash(s, digest)<0) - return -1; - if (router_append_dirobj_signature(s+len, maxlen-len, digest, ident_key)<0) - return -1; + smartlist_add(chunks, tor_strdup("router-signature\n")); + s = smartlist_join_strings(chunks, "", 0, NULL); + + while (strlen(s) > MAX_EXTRAINFO_UPLOAD_SIZE - DIROBJ_MAX_SIG_LEN) { + /* So long as there are at least two chunks (one for the initial + * extra-info line and one for the router-signature), we can keep removing + * things. */ + if (smartlist_len(chunks) > 2) { + /* We remove the next-to-last element (remember, len-1 is the last + element), since we need to keep the router-signature element. */ + int idx = smartlist_len(chunks) - 2; + char *e = smartlist_get(chunks, idx); + smartlist_del_keeporder(chunks, idx); + log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "We just generated an extra-info descriptor " + "with statistics that exceeds the 50 KB " + "upload limit. Removing last added " + "statistics."); + tor_free(e); + tor_free(s); + s = smartlist_join_strings(chunks, "", 0, NULL); + } else { + log_warn(LD_BUG, "We just generated an extra-info descriptors that " + "exceeds the 50 KB upload limit."); + goto err; + } + } -#ifdef DEBUG_ROUTER_DUMP_ROUTER_TO_STRING - { - char *cp, *s_dup; - extrainfo_t *ei_tmp; - cp = s_dup = tor_strdup(s); - ei_tmp = extrainfo_parse_entry_from_string(cp, NULL, 1, NULL); - if (!ei_tmp) { - log_err(LD_BUG, - "We just generated an extrainfo descriptor we can't parse."); - log_err(LD_BUG, "Descriptor was: <<%s>>", s); - tor_free(s_dup); - return -1; + memset(sig, 0, sizeof(sig)); + if (router_get_extrainfo_hash(s, digest) < 0 || + router_append_dirobj_signature(sig, sizeof(sig), digest, DIGEST_LEN, + ident_key) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_BUG, "Could not append signature to extra-info " + "descriptor."); + goto err; + } + smartlist_add(chunks, tor_strdup(sig)); + tor_free(s); + s = smartlist_join_strings(chunks, "", 0, NULL); + + cp = s_dup = tor_strdup(s); + ei_tmp = extrainfo_parse_entry_from_string(cp, NULL, 1, NULL); + if (!ei_tmp) { + if (write_stats_to_extrainfo) { + log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "We just generated an extra-info descriptor " + "with statistics that we can't parse. Not " + "adding statistics to this or any future " + "extra-info descriptors."); + write_stats_to_extrainfo = 0; + result = extrainfo_dump_to_string(s_out, extrainfo, ident_key); + goto done; + } else { + log_warn(LD_BUG, "We just generated an extrainfo descriptor we " + "can't parse."); + goto err; } - tor_free(s_dup); - extrainfo_free(ei_tmp); } -#endif - return (int)strlen(s)+1; -} + *s_out = s; + s = NULL; /* prevent free */ + result = 0; + goto done; -/** Wrapper function for geoip_get_client_history(). It first discards - * any items in the client history that are too old -- it dumps anything - * more than 48 hours old, but it only considers whether to dump at most - * once per 48 hours, so we aren't too precise to an observer (see also - * r14780). - */ -char * -extrainfo_get_client_geoip_summary(time_t now) -{ - static time_t last_purged_at = 0; - int geoip_purge_interval = 48*60*60; -#ifdef ENABLE_GEOIP_STATS - if (get_options()->DirRecordUsageByCountry) - geoip_purge_interval = get_options()->DirRecordUsageRetainIPs; -#endif - if (now > last_purged_at+geoip_purge_interval) { - geoip_remove_old_clients(now-geoip_purge_interval); - last_purged_at = now; - } - return geoip_get_client_history(now, GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT); + err: + result = -1; + + done: + tor_free(s); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(chunks, char *, cp, tor_free(cp)); + smartlist_free(chunks); + tor_free(s_dup); + extrainfo_free(ei_tmp); + + return result; } /** Return true iff s is a legally valid server nickname. */ @@@ -2257,17 -2012,26 +2247,17 @@@ router_purpose_from_string(const char * void router_free_all(void) { - if (onionkey) - crypto_free_pk_env(onionkey); - if (lastonionkey) - crypto_free_pk_env(lastonionkey); - if (identitykey) - crypto_free_pk_env(identitykey); - if (key_lock) - tor_mutex_free(key_lock); - if (desc_routerinfo) - routerinfo_free(desc_routerinfo); - if (desc_extrainfo) - extrainfo_free(desc_extrainfo); - if (authority_signing_key) - crypto_free_pk_env(authority_signing_key); - if (authority_key_certificate) - authority_cert_free(authority_key_certificate); - if (legacy_signing_key) - crypto_free_pk_env(legacy_signing_key); - if (legacy_key_certificate) - authority_cert_free(legacy_key_certificate); + crypto_free_pk_env(onionkey); + crypto_free_pk_env(lastonionkey); + crypto_free_pk_env(server_identitykey); + crypto_free_pk_env(client_identitykey); + tor_mutex_free(key_lock); + routerinfo_free(desc_routerinfo); + extrainfo_free(desc_extrainfo); + crypto_free_pk_env(authority_signing_key); + authority_cert_free(authority_key_certificate); + crypto_free_pk_env(legacy_signing_key); + authority_cert_free(legacy_key_certificate); if (warned_nonexistent_family) { SMARTLIST_FOREACH(warned_nonexistent_family, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));

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