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[tor/release-0.2.2] Don't report empty bw-history lines in extrainfo
by nickm＠torproject.org 29 Apr '11

29 Apr '11

commit c1927d7d5f5dff5b8d7da5bd4e7a743eb06bcbb3 Author: Sebastian Hahn <sebastian(a)torproject.org> Date: Sat Apr 16 16:01:36 2011 +0200 Don't report empty bw-history lines in extrainfo Some tor relays would report lines like these in their extrainfo documents: dirreq-write-history 2011-03-14 16:46:44 (900 s) This was confusing to some people who look at the stats. It would happen whenever a relay first starts up, or when a relay has dirport disabled. Change this so that lines without actual bw entries are omitted. Implements ticket 2497. --- changes/ticket2497 | 4 ++++ src/or/rephist.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/ticket2497 b/changes/ticket2497 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5117141 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/ticket2497 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Minor features: + - Ensure that no empty [dirreq-](read|write)-history lines are added + to an extrainfo document. Implements ticket 2497. + diff --git a/src/or/rephist.c b/src/or/rephist.c index 9b7eefe..b55797a 100644 --- a/src/or/rephist.c +++ b/src/or/rephist.c @@ -1524,10 +1524,15 @@ rep_hist_get_bandwidth_lines(void) size_t len; /* opt [dirreq-](read|write)-history yyyy-mm-dd HH:MM:SS (n s) n,n,n... */ - len = (67+21*NUM_TOTALS)*4; +/* The n,n,n part above. Largest representation of a uint64_t is 20 chars + * long, plus the comma. */ +#define MAX_HIST_VALUE_LEN 21*NUM_TOTALS + len = (67+MAX_HIST_VALUE_LEN)*4; buf = tor_malloc_zero(len); cp = buf; for (r=0;r<4;++r) { + char tmp[MAX_HIST_VALUE_LEN]; + size_t slen; switch (r) { case 0: b = write_array; @@ -1547,11 +1552,16 @@ rep_hist_get_bandwidth_lines(void) break; } tor_assert(b); + slen = rep_hist_fill_bandwidth_history(tmp, MAX_HIST_VALUE_LEN, b); + /* If we don't have anything to write, skip to the next entry. */ + if (slen == 0) + continue; format_iso_time(t, b->next_period-NUM_SECS_BW_SUM_INTERVAL); tor_snprintf(cp, len-(cp-buf), "%s %s (%d s) ", desc, t, NUM_SECS_BW_SUM_INTERVAL); cp += strlen(cp); - cp += rep_hist_fill_bandwidth_history(cp, len-(cp-buf), b); + strlcat(cp, tmp, len-(cp-buf)); + cp += slen; strlcat(cp, "\n", len-(cp-buf)); ++cp; }

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Add an XXX to the DA code regarding bug 2722
by nickm＠torproject.org 29 Apr '11

29 Apr '11

commit 134da2fbcf865418863bda8d4c479a20f6f6651d Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Mon Apr 18 12:00:48 2011 -0700 Add an XXX to the DA code regarding bug 2722 --- src/or/dirserv.c | 2 ++ 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/dirserv.c b/src/or/dirserv.c index f65f258..525524c 100644 --- a/src/or/dirserv.c +++ b/src/or/dirserv.c @@ -1811,6 +1811,8 @@ dirserv_thinks_router_is_hs_dir(routerinfo_t *router, time_t now) * bug 1693. In the future, once relays set wants_to_be_hs_dir * correctly, we can revert to only checking dir_port if router's * version is too old. */ + /* XXX Unfortunately, we need to keep checking dir_port until all + * *clients* suffering from bug 2722 are obsolete. */ return (router->wants_to_be_hs_dir && router->dir_port && uptime > get_options()->MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2 && router->is_running);

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Make SIZE_T_CEILING unsigned; add a signed SSIZE_T_CEILING
by nickm＠torproject.org 29 Apr '11

29 Apr '11

commit 43ffd023e9267927539dc9c12bee86199cd1c800 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Apr 26 13:00:46 2011 -0400 Make SIZE_T_CEILING unsigned; add a signed SSIZE_T_CEILING None of the comparisons were _broken_ previously, but avoiding signed/unsigned comparisons makes everybody happier. Fixes bug2475. --- changes/bug2475 | 5 +++++ src/common/crypto.c | 2 +- src/common/torint.h | 4 +++- 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug2475 b/changes/bug2475 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d6f0595 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug2475 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Minor bugfixes: + - Avoid signed/unsigned comparisons by making SIZE_T_CEILING unsigned. + (None of the cases where we did this before were wrong, but by making + this change we can avoid warnings.) Fixes bug2475; bugfix on + Tor 0.2.1.28. diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c index 48c8dea..838347e 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.c +++ b/src/common/crypto.c @@ -452,7 +452,7 @@ crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_string(crypto_pk_env_t *env, tor_assert(env); tor_assert(s); - tor_assert(len < INT_MAX && len < SIZE_T_CEILING); + tor_assert(len < INT_MAX && len < SSIZE_T_CEILING); /* Create a read-only memory BIO, backed by the string 's' */ b = BIO_new_mem_buf((char*)s, (int)len); diff --git a/src/common/torint.h b/src/common/torint.h index 2a9fba6..d489684 100644 --- a/src/common/torint.h +++ b/src/common/torint.h @@ -330,8 +330,10 @@ typedef uint32_t uintptr_t; #endif #endif +/* Any ssize_t larger than this amount is likely to be an underflow. */ +#define SSIZE_T_CEILING ((ssize_t)(SSIZE_T_MAX-16)) /* Any size_t larger than this amount is likely to be an underflow. */ -#define SIZE_T_CEILING (SSIZE_T_MAX-16) +#define SIZE_T_CEILING ((size_t)(SSIZE_T_MAX-16)) #endif /* __TORINT_H */

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Fix clear_trackhostexits_mapping() to actually work as advertised
by nickm＠torproject.org 29 Apr '11

29 Apr '11

commit 34510f9278675e6e041503e425ca19a1fa0f3616 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Apr 27 17:21:41 2011 -0400 Fix clear_trackhostexits_mapping() to actually work as advertised Previously, it would remove every trackhostexits-derived mapping *from* xyz.<exitname>.exit; it was supposed to remove every trackhostexits-derived mapping *to* xyz.<exitname>.exit. Bugfix on 0.2.0.20-rc: fixes an XXX020 added while staring at bug-1090 issues. --- changes/clear_trackexithost | 5 +++++ src/or/connection_edge.c | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/clear_trackexithost b/changes/clear_trackexithost new file mode 100644 index 0000000..701d369 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/clear_trackexithost @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Minor bugfixes: + - Fix a bug in the code where we could keep trying to use a + TrackHostExits-based mapping after we failed to reach the intended + destination node. Bugfix on 0.2.0.20-rc. + diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index 082cd5f..2c1196c 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -799,8 +799,8 @@ clear_trackexithost_mappings(const char *exitname) tor_strlower(suffix); STRMAP_FOREACH_MODIFY(addressmap, address, addressmap_entry_t *, ent) { - /* XXXX022 HEY! Shouldn't this look at ent->new_address? */ - if (ent->source == ADDRMAPSRC_TRACKEXIT && !strcmpend(address, suffix)) { + if (ent->source == ADDRMAPSRC_TRACKEXIT && + !strcmpend(ent->new_address, suffix)) { addressmap_ent_remove(address, ent); MAP_DEL_CURRENT(address); }

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Revert "If we are not using BEGIN_DIR cells, don't attempt to contact hidden service directories with non-open dir port."
by nickm＠torproject.org 29 Apr '11

29 Apr '11

commit a6cc15e2aedfc370fc0328edd375a869338ee4f1 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Sat Mar 12 07:17:26 2011 -0800 Revert "If we are not using BEGIN_DIR cells, don't attempt to contact hidden service directories with non-open dir port." This reverts commit 9a7098487b2c25f36112b3521758f42621dcd6af. Conflicts: ChangeLog (left unchanged by this commit) --- src/or/routerlist.c | 10 ++-------- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c index fb8fb88..5e9c82a 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.c +++ b/src/or/routerlist.c @@ -5335,7 +5335,6 @@ hid_serv_get_responsible_directories(smartlist_t *responsible_dirs, { int start, found, n_added = 0, i; networkstatus_t *c = networkstatus_get_latest_consensus(); - int use_begindir = get_options()->TunnelDirConns; if (!c || !smartlist_len(c->routerstatus_list)) { log_warn(LD_REND, "We don't have a consensus, so we can't perform v2 " "rendezvous operations."); @@ -5348,14 +5347,9 @@ hid_serv_get_responsible_directories(smartlist_t *responsible_dirs, do { routerstatus_t *r = smartlist_get(c->routerstatus_list, i); if (r->is_hs_dir) { - if (r->dir_port || use_begindir) - smartlist_add(responsible_dirs, r); - else - log_info(LD_REND, "Not adding router '%s' to list of responsible " - "hidden service directories, because we have no way of " - "reaching it.", r->nickname); + smartlist_add(responsible_dirs, r); if (++n_added == REND_NUMBER_OF_CONSECUTIVE_REPLICAS) - break; + return 0; } if (++i == smartlist_len(c->routerstatus_list)) i = 0;

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Add changes file for previous commit
by nickm＠torproject.org 29 Apr '11

29 Apr '11

commit eb50e3d6bf6eb9880f92050cb0db849394bd6cb0 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Sat Mar 12 07:29:04 2011 -0800 Add changes file for previous commit --- changes/bug2722 | 11 +++++++++++ 1 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug2722 b/changes/bug2722 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ed132fc --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug2722 @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ + o Minor bugfixes + - Ignore the TunnelDirConns option when determining which HSDir + relays are responsible for a hidden service descriptor ID. + Currently, clients and hidden services with TunnelDirConns off + will skip over HSDir relays which do not advertise a DirPort + when making a list of HSDirs responsible for a descriptor ID, + even though they would never try to use a HSDir's DirPort to + upload or fetch a hidden service descriptor. Fixes bug 2722; + bugfix on 0.2.1.6-alpha. + +

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Merge remote-tracking branch 'arma/bug3012' into maint-0.2.2
by nickm＠torproject.org 29 Apr '11

29 Apr '11

commit f0d9e2d6507adcc069b38cd9e0aaf6702f576314 Merge: 4010427 66de6f7 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Apr 28 21:15:14 2011 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'arma/bug3012' into maint-0.2.2 changes/bug3012 | 5 +++++ src/or/config.c | 11 ++++++++++- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] relays checkpoint their state file twice a day
by nickm＠torproject.org 29 Apr '11

29 Apr '11

commit 66de6f7eb8e2948f6c3849dbca20c7b31969b5b7 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Apr 28 21:06:25 2011 -0400 relays checkpoint their state file twice a day --- changes/bug3012 | 5 +++++ src/or/config.c | 11 ++++++++++- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug3012 b/changes/bug3012 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dfde5fa --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug3012 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Minor features: + - Relays can go for weeks without writing out their state file. A + relay that crashes would lose its bandwidth history (including + capacity estimate), client country statistics, and so on. Now relays + checkpoint the file at least every 12 hours. Addresses bug 3012. diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 9384b3a..dc24140 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -5122,6 +5122,11 @@ or_state_load(void) /** If writing the state to disk fails, try again after this many seconds. */ #define STATE_WRITE_RETRY_INTERVAL 3600 +/** If we're a relay, how often should we checkpoint our state file even + * if nothing else dirties it? This will checkpoint ongoing stats like + * bandwidth used, per-country user stats, etc. */ +#define STATE_RELAY_CHECKPOINT_INTERVAL (12*60*60) + /** Write the persistent state to disk. Return 0 for success, <0 on failure. */ int or_state_save(time_t now) @@ -5172,7 +5177,11 @@ or_state_save(time_t now) tor_free(fname); tor_free(contents); - global_state->next_write = TIME_MAX; + if (server_mode(get_options())) + global_state->next_write = now + STATE_RELAY_CHECKPOINT_INTERVAL; + else + global_state->next_write = TIME_MAX; + return 0; }

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[tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'arma/bug3039' into maint-0.2.2
by nickm＠torproject.org 29 Apr '11

29 Apr '11

commit 4010427b519c3727351905bbe5a75e85a055dd58 Merge: 5693fed df3cf88 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Apr 28 20:53:44 2011 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'arma/bug3039' into maint-0.2.2 changes/bug3039 | 5 +++++ src/or/circuitbuild.c | 2 +- src/or/config.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++--- src/or/config.h | 1 + 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

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[tor/master] stop putting wacky values into state->lastwritten
by nickm＠torproject.org 29 Apr '11

29 Apr '11

commit df3cf881d1d217b6ff3757bf95f8c2784584fec8 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Apr 28 20:40:15 2011 -0400 stop putting wacky values into state->lastwritten --- changes/bug3039 | 5 +++++ src/or/circuitbuild.c | 2 +- src/or/config.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++--- src/or/config.h | 1 + 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug3039 b/changes/bug3039 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7347ee3 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug3039 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Minor bugfixes: + - Write the current time into the LastWritten line in our state file, + rather than the time from the previous write attempt. Also, stop + trying to use a time of -1 in our log statements. Fixes bug 3039; + bugfix on 0.2.2.14-alpha. diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index fe94264..85765e3 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ circuit_build_times_disabled(void) 0, 0, 1); int config_disabled = !get_options()->LearnCircuitBuildTimeout; int dirauth_disabled = get_options()->AuthoritativeDir; - int state_disabled = (get_or_state()->LastWritten == -1); + int state_disabled = did_last_state_file_write_fail() ? 1 : 0; if (consensus_disabled || config_disabled || dirauth_disabled || state_disabled) { diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 9384b3a..7534cc7 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -5119,6 +5119,18 @@ or_state_load(void) return r; } +/** Did the last time we tried to write the state file fail? If so, we + * should consider disabling such features as preemptive circuit generation + * to compute circuit-build-time. */ +static int last_state_file_write_failed = 0; + +/** Return whether the state file failed to write last time we tried. */ +int +did_last_state_file_write_fail(void) +{ + return last_state_file_write_failed; +} + /** If writing the state to disk fails, try again after this many seconds. */ #define STATE_WRITE_RETRY_INTERVAL 3600 @@ -5143,11 +5155,13 @@ or_state_save(time_t now) if (accounting_is_enabled(get_options())) accounting_run_housekeeping(now); + global_state->LastWritten = now; + tor_free(global_state->TorVersion); tor_asprintf(&global_state->TorVersion, "Tor %s", get_version()); state = config_dump(&state_format, global_state, 1, 0); - format_local_iso_time(tbuf, time(NULL)); + format_local_iso_time(tbuf, now); tor_asprintf(&contents, "# Tor state file last generated on %s local time\n" "# Other times below are in GMT\n" @@ -5158,7 +5172,7 @@ or_state_save(time_t now) if (write_str_to_file(fname, contents, 0)<0) { log_warn(LD_FS, "Unable to write state to file \"%s\"; " "will try again later", fname); - global_state->LastWritten = -1; + last_state_file_write_failed = 1; tor_free(fname); tor_free(contents); /* Try again after STATE_WRITE_RETRY_INTERVAL (or sooner, if the state @@ -5167,7 +5181,7 @@ or_state_save(time_t now) return -1; } - global_state->LastWritten = time(NULL); + last_state_file_write_failed = 0; log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Saved state to \"%s\"", fname); tor_free(fname); tor_free(contents); diff --git a/src/or/config.h b/src/or/config.h index defda35..78a67dd 100644 --- a/src/or/config.h +++ b/src/or/config.h @@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ char *options_get_datadir_fname2_suffix(or_options_t *options, get_datadir_fname2_suffix((sub1), NULL, (suffix)) or_state_t *get_or_state(void); +int did_last_state_file_write_fail(void); int or_state_save(time_t now); int options_need_geoip_info(or_options_t *options, const char **reason_out);

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