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[tor/release-0.2.2] log when we finish ssl handshake and move to renegotiation
by arma＠torproject.org 20 Jun '11

20 Jun '11

commit 64bfbcb918a59edf8e7167954171f311d032fc4b Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Jun 17 03:31:59 2011 -0400 log when we finish ssl handshake and move to renegotiation debug-level since it will be quite common. logged at both client and server side. this step should help us track what's going on with people filtering tor connections by our ssl habits. --- src/or/connection_or.c | 5 ++++- 1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.c b/src/or/connection_or.c index ed174c9..c019f65 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_or.c +++ b/src/or/connection_or.c @@ -929,13 +929,16 @@ connection_tls_continue_handshake(or_connection_t *conn) if (! tor_tls_used_v1_handshake(conn->tls)) { if (!tor_tls_is_server(conn->tls)) { if (conn->_base.state == OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING) { - // log_notice(LD_OR,"Done. state was TLS_HANDSHAKING."); + log_debug(LD_OR, "Done with initial SSL handshake (client-side). " + "Requesting renegotiation."); conn->_base.state = OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATING; goto again; } // log_notice(LD_OR,"Done. state was %d.", conn->_base.state); } else { /* improved handshake, but not a client. */ + log_debug(LD_OR, "Done with initial SSL handshake (server-side). " + "Expecting renegotiation."); tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback(conn->tls, connection_or_tls_renegotiated_cb, conn);

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Merge remote-tracking branch 'public/bug3369' into maint-0.2.2
by arma＠torproject.org 20 Jun '11

20 Jun '11

commit a25c0a5bf81768c4d4f6fe377cea48f47333a8c8 Merge: e70e836 e470f6a Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jun 14 13:46:10 2011 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'public/bug3369' into maint-0.2.2 changes/bug3369 | 4 ++++ src/or/dnsserv.c | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Make connection_printf_to_buf's behaviour sane
by arma＠torproject.org 20 Jun '11

20 Jun '11

commit 68cd0a9abeab126b3d954f060d922fd71cb945f7 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Wed Jun 15 21:16:44 2011 -0700 Make connection_printf_to_buf's behaviour sane --- changes/fix-connection_printf_to_buf | 10 ++++++++++ src/or/control.c | 29 +++++++++++------------------ 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/fix-connection_printf_to_buf b/changes/fix-connection_printf_to_buf new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b6fa092 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/fix-connection_printf_to_buf @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ + * Code simplifications and refactoring: + + - Make connection_printf_to_buf's behaviour sane. Its callers + expect it to emit a CRLF iff the format string ends with CRLF; + it actually emits a CRLF iff (a) the format string ends with + CRLF or (b) the resulting string is over 1023 characters long or + (c) the format string does not end with CRLF ''and'' the + resulting string is 1021 characters long or longer. Bugfix on + 0.1.1.9-alpha; fixes bug 3407. + diff --git a/src/or/control.c b/src/or/control.c index 5d2d135..2308cd6 100644 --- a/src/or/control.c +++ b/src/or/control.c @@ -481,33 +481,26 @@ decode_escaped_string(const char *start, size_t in_len_max, } /** Acts like sprintf, but writes its formatted string to the end of - * conn-\>outbuf. The message may be truncated if it is too long, - * but it will always end with a CRLF sequence. - * - * Currently the length of the message is limited to 1024 (including the - * ending CR LF NUL ("\\r\\n\\0"). */ + * conn-\>outbuf. */ static void connection_printf_to_buf(control_connection_t *conn, const char *format, ...) { -#define CONNECTION_PRINTF_TO_BUF_BUFFERSIZE 1024 va_list ap; - char buf[CONNECTION_PRINTF_TO_BUF_BUFFERSIZE]; - int r; - size_t len; + char *buf = NULL; + int len; + va_start(ap,format); - r = tor_vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), format, ap); + len = tor_vasprintf(&buf, format, ap); va_end(ap); - if (r<0) { + + if (len < 0) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unable to format string for controller."); return; } - len = strlen(buf); - if (fast_memcmp("\r\n\0", buf+len-2, 3)) { - buf[CONNECTION_PRINTF_TO_BUF_BUFFERSIZE-1] = '\0'; - buf[CONNECTION_PRINTF_TO_BUF_BUFFERSIZE-2] = '\n'; - buf[CONNECTION_PRINTF_TO_BUF_BUFFERSIZE-3] = '\r'; - } - connection_write_to_buf(buf, len, TO_CONN(conn)); + + connection_write_to_buf(buf, (size_t)len, TO_CONN(conn)); + + tor_free(buf); } /** Write all of the open control ports to ControlPortWriteToFile */

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Fix comment typo
by arma＠torproject.org 20 Jun '11

20 Jun '11

commit 70785f87bb47e481053719f2a514bf0598c62b2d Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Thu Jun 16 02:57:58 2011 -0700 Fix comment typo --- src/or/control.c | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/control.c b/src/or/control.c index 2308cd6..2170a9b 100644 --- a/src/or/control.c +++ b/src/or/control.c @@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ static int disable_log_messages = 0; static int authentication_cookie_is_set = 0; /** If authentication_cookie_is_set, a secret cookie that we've stored to disk * and which we're using to authenticate controllers. (If the controller can - * read it off disk, it has permission to connect. */ + * read it off disk, it has permission to connect.) */ static char authentication_cookie[AUTHENTICATION_COOKIE_LEN]; /** A sufficiently large size to record the last bootstrap phase string. */

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Revert "Add an "auto" option to UseBridges"
by arma＠torproject.org 20 Jun '11

20 Jun '11

commit 3b41551b61a604b555891ecc7cb6f8bbde65d128 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Jun 17 16:45:53 2011 -0400 Revert "Add an "auto" option to UseBridges" This reverts commit 507c1257a4d9c629fefc2adbad8db73607749734. --- src/or/config.c | 19 ++++--------------- src/or/or.h | 12 +----------- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 8ab23a3..e0ecab2 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -376,7 +376,7 @@ static config_var_t _option_vars[] = { V(TransPort, PORT, "0"), V(TunnelDirConns, BOOL, "1"), V(UpdateBridgesFromAuthority, BOOL, "0"), - VAR("UseBridges", STRING, UseBridges_, "auto"), + V(UseBridges, BOOL, "0"), V(UseEntryGuards, BOOL, "1"), V(User, STRING, NULL), VAR("V1AuthoritativeDirectory",BOOL, V1AuthoritativeDir, "0"), @@ -3234,19 +3234,6 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options, "of the Internet, so they must not set Reachable*Addresses " "or FascistFirewall."); - /* XXX023 use autobool instead. */ - if (!strcmp(options->UseBridges_, "auto")) { - options->UseBridges = (options->Bridges && - !server_mode(options) && - !options->EntryNodes); - } else if (!strcmp(options->UseBridges_, "0")) { - options->UseBridges = 0; - } else if (!strcmp(options->UseBridges_, "1")) { - options->UseBridges = 1; - } else { - REJECT("UseBridges must be 0, 1, or auto"); - } - if (options->UseBridges && server_mode(options)) REJECT("Servers must be able to freely connect to the rest " @@ -3581,8 +3568,10 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options, if (validate_dir_authorities(options, old_options) < 0) REJECT("Directory authority line did not parse. See logs for details."); + if (options->UseBridges && !options->Bridges) + REJECT("If you set UseBridges, you must specify at least one bridge."); if (options->UseBridges && !options->TunnelDirConns) - REJECT("TunnelDirConns set to 0 only works with UseBridges set to 0"); + REJECT("If you set UseBridges, you must set TunnelDirConns."); if (options->Bridges) { for (cl = options->Bridges; cl; cl = cl->next) { if (parse_bridge_line(cl->value, 1)<0) diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 456dce2..97fecd1 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -2480,17 +2480,7 @@ typedef struct { * when doing so. */ char *BridgePassword; - /** Whether we should start all circuits with a bridge. "1" means strictly - * yes, "0" means strictly no, and "auto" means that we do iff any bridges - * are configured, we are not running a server and have not specified a list - * of entry nodes. */ - char *UseBridges_; - /** Effective value of UseBridges. Will be set equally for UseBridges set to - * 1 or 0, but for 'auto' it will be set to 1 iff any bridges are - * configured, we are not running a server and have not specified a list of - * entry nodes. */ - int UseBridges; - + int UseBridges; /**< Boolean: should we start all circuits with a bridge? */ config_line_t *Bridges; /**< List of bootstrap bridge addresses. */ int BridgeRelay; /**< Boolean: are we acting as a bridge relay? We make

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Revert "Update man page for new UseBridges tristate behaviour."
by arma＠torproject.org 20 Jun '11

20 Jun '11

commit cabb16caa9afb95ce0bfbda0d7784f71e4c153a1 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Jun 17 16:45:23 2011 -0400 Revert "Update man page for new UseBridges tristate behaviour." This reverts commit 40cfad1b5ae90b06eb74861a4fdc1310f8611111. --- doc/tor.1.txt | 10 +++------- 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index 8aa32e8..1815a8d 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -708,14 +708,10 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if from the configured bridge authorities when feasible. It will fall back to a direct request if the authority responds with a 404. (Default: 0) -**UseBridges** **0**|**1**|**auto**:: - Make Tor fetch descriptors for each bridge listed in the "Bridge" +**UseBridges** **0**|**1**:: + When set, Tor will fetch descriptors for each bridge listed in the "Bridge" config lines, and use these relays as both entry guards and directory - guards. If the option is 1, bridges must be used and if no bridges are - configured Tor will not make any connections until a bridge is configured; - if it's "auto", Tor will use bridges if any are configured, otherwise it - will connect directly to the Tor network; if it's 0, bridges are not used - at all. (Defaults to auto) + guards. (Default: 0) **UseEntryGuards** **0**|**1**:: If this option is set to 1, we pick a few long-term entry servers, and try

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.1' into maint-0.2.2
by arma＠torproject.org 20 Jun '11

20 Jun '11

commit 85d4c290d79264d334baa9e5c8fdf3b06d0b3d79 Merge: 209229f 010b8dd Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Jun 17 15:24:23 2011 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.1' into maint-0.2.2 changes/abandon-rend-circs-on-newnym | 8 ++++++++ src/or/circuituse.c | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Merge branch 'bug3407' into maint-0.2.2
by arma＠torproject.org 20 Jun '11

20 Jun '11

commit 209229f100d20958d0826d4f6773d7f6b3a43ade Merge: 64bfbcb 227896e Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Jun 17 14:59:39 2011 -0400 Merge branch 'bug3407' into maint-0.2.2 changes/fix-connection_printf_to_buf | 15 ++++++++ src/or/control.c | 66 +++++++++++---------------------- 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Check maximum properly in crypto_rand_int()
by arma＠torproject.org 20 Jun '11

20 Jun '11

commit 5afab5ca197112b01135980d6cb3694a4519e3cf Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Jun 1 11:48:39 2011 -0400 Check maximum properly in crypto_rand_int() George Kadianakis notes that if you give crypto_rand_int() a value above INT_MAX, it can return a negative number, which is not what the documentation would imply. The simple solution is to assert that the input is in [1,INT_MAX+1]. If in the future we need a random-value function that can return values up to UINT_MAX, we can add one. Fixes bug 3306; bugfix on 0.2.2pre14. --- changes/bug3306 | 5 +++++ src/common/crypto.c | 5 +++-- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug3306 b/changes/bug3306 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b1bb103 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug3306 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Minor bugfixes: + - Make our crypto_rand_int() function check the value of its input + correctly. Previously, it accepted values up to UINT_MAX, but + could return a negative number if given a value above INT_MAX+1. + Found by George Kadianakis. Fixes bug 3306; bugfix on 0.2.2pre14. diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c index d8e6619..851f11b 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.c +++ b/src/common/crypto.c @@ -2145,13 +2145,14 @@ crypto_rand(char *to, size_t n) } /** Return a pseudorandom integer, chosen uniformly from the values - * between 0 and max-1. */ + * between 0 and max-1 inclusive. max must be between 1 and + * INT_MAX+1, inclusive. */ int crypto_rand_int(unsigned int max) { unsigned int val; unsigned int cutoff; - tor_assert(max < UINT_MAX); + tor_assert(max <= ((unsigned int)INT_MAX)+1); tor_assert(max > 0); /* don't div by 0 */ /* We ignore any values that are >= 'cutoff,' to avoid biasing the

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Detect insanely large circuit build state; don't give its length to rand_int
by arma＠torproject.org 20 Jun '11

20 Jun '11

commit 42e4e156d95a1c28a666a5346d491c4ed71435dd Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Jun 1 12:12:01 2011 -0400 Detect insanely large circuit build state; don't give its length to rand_int --- changes/bug3306 | 4 ++++ src/or/circuitbuild.c | 10 +++++++++- 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug3306 b/changes/bug3306 index b1bb103..f868a24 100644 --- a/changes/bug3306 +++ b/changes/bug3306 @@ -3,3 +3,7 @@ correctly. Previously, it accepted values up to UINT_MAX, but could return a negative number if given a value above INT_MAX+1. Found by George Kadianakis. Fixes bug 3306; bugfix on 0.2.2pre14. + + - Avoid a segfault when reading a malformed circuit build state + with more than INT_MAX entries. Found by wanoskarnet. Bugfix on + 0.2.2.4-alpha. diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 3f08448..6d7e711 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -678,7 +678,15 @@ circuit_build_times_shuffle_and_store_array(circuit_build_times_t *cbt, log_notice(LD_CIRC, "The number of circuit times that this Tor version " "uses to calculate build times is less than the number stored " "in your state file. Decreasing the circuit time history from " - "%d to %d.", num_times, CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE); + "%lu to %d.", (unsigned long)num_times, + CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE); + } + + if (n > INT_MAX-1) { + log_warn(LD_CIRC, "For some insane reasons, you had %lu circuit build " + "observations in your state file. That's far too many; probably " + "there's a bug here.", (unsigned long)n); + n = INT_MAX-1; } /* This code can only be run on a compact array */

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